# NOTES

Thanks to Rishi, Won, Saturn, Maikle, Rishi, Ana, Andrew, Justin, and Seiji for all their hard work on this file.

This is the camp orientalism file!

Orientalism is a theory that first emerged in the 1700s but became most popular after Edward Said published “Orientalism” in 1978. Orientalism is a critique of representations, especially reps of the ‘the orient’ (first originated as the middle east/Islamic communities but has evolved to really anything excluded from the global west, think of it basically as like any country that’s not in NATO, typically represented or characterized as backwards). The K is best read as a critique of western centric discourse which the K argues endorses a process of ‘othering’ which operates to create a separation between, basically, “the west and the rest”. Orientalism as a theory explains colonialism as the product of excessive othering, where “the orient” is dominated by “the occident” (western powers, opposite of the orient). In order to win, the most important things for you to win is 1. a link that explains why the aff upholds western outlooks of the world, endorsing a process of othering that necessitates colonialism and 2. that their representations of “The Orient” are incorrect (win this through impact defense).

As far as FW goes, there’s 2 routes it can go. You can try and go for a you link you lose method, where as long as you win they are western centric and uphold orientalist outlooks on the word you should be good. The better method, however, in my opinion, is to prefer an epistemology shift, or retooling of rhetoric. I think this is good because it meshes well with some of the alts and also follows the broader trend of the K, which is largely a reps/discourse centered K. I also think that most of the FW DAs can function as impacts and vice versa.

There’s also a techno-orientalism version of the K. Techno-orientalism as a theory is similar to normal orientalism in that it critiques descriptions of the east (in this case, it’s more specific to East/Southeast asia) but instead of describing “The Orient” as technologically backward, it critiques the fears of a rising Other. I think this version of the K is pretty good especially since a lot of the affs have China or at least tech related impacts, which means it probably links to most of the affs. The k still revolves around the idea that the Orient is subhuman but it also incorporates the Yellow Peril, which is essentially extreme racialized violence against East/Southeast Asians. A lot of the alts for this version of the K are encompassed around a form of futurism, in which you use Asian culture (i.e poetics) to imagine a better future (reading the ev in depth and doing some extra reading will help you understand it better).

How to answer the K

The best way to beat this K is to win the “threats are real” and “discourses don’t shape reality” debate, at least the way this file is structured you should be good to treat it like a security K. You could also try and go for indicts of Said, the original author of orientalism, but that might be a little harder since we didn’t cut anything straight from Said so the neg would probably be able to get around that easily. However, there are a few good indicts of orientalism as a theory, not just Saidean orientalism. There’s also a few good alt fails cards that talk about how a retooling of rhetoric isn’t probably and that western-centrism is inevitable and good. Some of these links are a little weak and you could probably easily impact turn some of them (i.e to a heg link you can just say heg good, that O/W). Like I said above, it’s a really FW heavy K so just winning case o/w will get you far already.

# K – Orientalism

## 1NC shell

#### We are living in the age of fear politics – the war on terror ended years ago yet today’s politicians still insist on the expansion of the western security state – fear-mongering rhetoric like that of the 1ac serves the purpose of continuing the political project of collective political fear

Robin 11(Corey Robin, 2011, “The Politics of Fear”, https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/22/the-politics-of-fear/)**//BRownRice**

In my 2004 book Fear: The History of a Political Idea, I argued that “one day, the war on terrorism will come to an end. All wars do. And when it does, we will find ourselves still living in fear: not of terrorism or radical Islam, but of the domestic rulers that fear has left behind.” When I wrote “one day,” I was thinking decades, not years. I figured that the war on terror—less the invasions, wars, torture, drone attacks, and assassinations than the broader atmosphere of pervasive and militarized dread, what Hobbes called “a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known” and an enemy is perceived as permanent and irrepressible—would continue at least into the 2010s, if not the ’20s. Yet even before Osama bin Laden was killed and negotiations with the Taliban had begun, it was clear that the war on terror, understood in those terms, had come to an end. As early as the 2004 presidential campaign, Democratic candidate John Kerry had hinted at such a possibility in an interview with Matt Bai in The New York Times Magazine: When I asked Kerry what it would take for Americans to feel safe again, he displayed a much less apocalyptic worldview. “We have to get back to the place we were, where terrorists are not the focus of our lives, but they’re a nuisance,” Kerry said. “As a former law-enforcement person, I know we’re never going to end prostitution. We’re never going to end illegal gambling. But we’re going to reduce it, organized crime, to a level where it isn’t on the rise. It isn’t threatening people’s lives every day, and fundamentally, it’s something that you continue to fight, but it’s not threatening the fabric of your life.” A Kinsley gaffe if ever there was one, Kerry’s comment may have helped seal his fate in that election. Even so, it laid down a marker of what has essentially come to pass: Though the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan go on, though the United States continues to assassinate actual and suspected terrorists throughout the Middle East and Central Asia, though security lines continue to snake around airport corners, the high-octane politics of fear we saw in the aftermath of 9/11 has, for all intents and purposes, dissipated. The threat of terrorism is no longer the focus of our days—indeed, probably hasn’t been since 2006; it is instead a nuisance, something the government continues to fight but not something threatening the fabric of our lives. Yet, as others in this symposium have noted, the political infrastructure of fear—the bureaucracies and institutions created in the wake of 9/11, the profiling and practices of surveillance, the laws and enforcement agencies—survives. We still have a Department of Homeland Security and a Patriot Act, Guantánamo is open for service, and what my colleague Jeanne Theoharis calls “Guantánamo at home”—the draconian policies and procedures, directed primarily at Muslims and Arabs, in the federal prison system—has not been scrutinized or even discussed. And all this, it hardly needs be said, nearly three years into the Obama Administration. From these polar realities—a thinning atmosphere of political fear, an expanding infrastructure of political fear—I draw two conclusions. First, the politics of fear is far less dependent upon the actual psychic experience of the public than analysts would have us think. While many believe that the individual emotions of the citizenry propel the policies the government pursues, I see little evidence of that. Even if we assume that each and every member of the public is experiencing fear, that experience still doesn’t explain the policies. A frightened population could just as easily inspire the government to pursue policies that would dampen rather than arouse fear. It is politics that produces policies, not fear. In any event, the public’s putative experience of fear cannot explain the persistence, indeed the enhancement, of the kind of government policies and practices we’ve seen in the last five years or so. A combination of bureaucratic inertia and partisan interests, in which neither party has much incentive to do anything on behalf of a persecuted minority—the sorry stuff, in other words, of old-fashioned political science—explains far more than do speculation and experiments in social or cognitive psychology. Second, journalists and scholars too often assume that the public is united in its fear because the objects of fear—terrorism, radical Islam, and so on—are equally threatening to each and every member of the public. But as Hobbes understood so well, men and women do argue about political threats—whether they exist, whom they threaten, whence they come, how to respond to them. They argue about political threats for the same reason they argue about other political matters: Perceptions of harm are dependent upon beliefs about good and evil, justice and injustice, and experiences of harm are mediated by material factors such as one’s standing in the world. Indeed, it was this profoundly human penchant to argue about threats that drove Hobbes to insist it was among the sovereign’s most important duties to simply decide, to declare by fiat, whether a nation was threatened or not—and that it was among the subject’s most important duties to allow the sovereign to make that decision. Far from assuming that this right of the sovereign to identify public threats would be easily accepted, however, Hobbes understood that it had to be defended through a comprehensive effort of popular instruction—a project, judging by the debates over national security that have punctuated American history from its inception (remember the Hartford Convention?), in which few governments have ever succeeded. That sovereigns have to assert that they are the deciders of our fears testifies to the fact that national security is no more a source of unity than Social Security. As we’ve seen over the last decade, citizens still disagree about threats and how to respond to them, and they experience political fear in different ways. A Muslim or Arab citizen of the United States might well be more afraid of government surveillance than of a terrorist attack. An unemployed middle-aged woman may be more concerned about economic insecurity or poverty than Al Qaeda. And even threats that do temporarily command the public’s attention seldom yield united responses beyond the very short term. A unity of fear, then, is not an artifact of mass psychology; it is a political project, crafted through leadership, ideology, and collective action. Like many political projects, it often fails, or at least does not fully succeed. And when it fails—dissenters question whether we need be afraid, citizens cease to pay attention to “orange” and “red” alerts, parties focus on other items of public concern—governments either try to enlarge the infrastructure by insulating it against the vagaries of public opinion, or dampen the dissent. Again, old-fashioned politics. Since 9/11, we’ve gotten used to the phrase “the politics of fear.” It’s high time we started taking the politics part more seriously.

#### **US-NATO security cooperation is a further perpetuation of the western military-security state, resulting in relentless racialization of “The Orient”**

Amin-Khan 12(Tariq Amin-Khan, 2012 New Orientalism, Securitisation and the Western Media’s Incendiary Racism, [https://mascriticalrace.files.wordpress.com/2017/10/neworientalism.pdf)**//BRownRice**](https://mascriticalrace.files.wordpress.com/2017/10/neworientalism.pdf)//BRownRice)

The Long War may be a war against militant Islam, but it is also against those Muslim-majority states that do not accept the empire’s diktats. An analysis of the rise of militant Islam is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is important to note that militant Islamist and Salafist groups have become a powerful social force in many Muslim-majority states and have violently confronted the post-colonial state in pursuit of their dogmatic and narrow doctrinaire ideas. However, the current resistance of militant Islam against the USA and its NATO allies cannot be seen as anti-imperialist, as the objective of anti-imperialism is the social and economic liberation of imperialised society—this seems contrary to the goals of militant Islam.49 US and NATO military commanders have used fear in trying to defeat militant Islamists. Reliance on this tactic remains, even though it has been unsuccessful in instilling fear among Afghani and Iraqi Islamists—despite their dehumanised and brutalised treatment. The Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib were subjected to this inhuman treatment, which still continues with some modification in Guantanamo Bay, while the USA and NATO take no responsibility for the deaths of unarmed innocent children, women and men by their militaries or by pilotless aerial drone attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen, among other Muslim-majority states. WikiLeaks’ release of footage showing a US military helicopter deliberately targeting two unarmed Iraqi journalists working for Reuters, along with other men and two children, is a poignant reminder of how little the lives of the orientalised are valued.50 Similarly, Western politicians and the media have also used fear to justify the increased suppression of due process, introduction of anti-terror laws, and heightened use of surveillance and intimidation in their respective states. The invocation of fear during the Long War parallels the recent cold war history. The USA used fear—of the ‘red menace’—to construct the security state through the enactment of the 1947 National Security Act that also created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Likewise, the fear of the ‘Muslim terrorist’ in late 2001 led to the enactment of the Patriot Act and the US security state propelled the notion of securitisation, which was universalised beyond the borders of the USA to Canada, the rest of the Western states and to key client post-colonial states, in order to launch the war on terror. However, as noted earlier, the current era of securitisation is at a historically unique moment. While it may incorporate some old Orientalist tropes, and some ideological and imperialist motives may be similar to those of the cold war period security state, there is little relationship to the latter. During the Cold War’s post-McCarthy era although the US security state guided its militarism, fed the arms race by strengthening the military– industrial complex, and presided over its imperialist expansionism for world hegemony, Western societies actually became more open. Due process was generally respected, movements for civil rights, women’s liberation, gay rights and democratic change generally blossomed, and anti-democratic practices and the high-handedness of Western political leaders were broadly challenged. In its current specificity the security state and securitisation have been enormously strengthened by the suppression of dissent and civil liberties with the corresponding expansion of anti-democratic practices and intrusive surveillance within Western states. Simultaneously xenophobia and societal/ anti-Muslim racism have been fuelled by the Western media’s incendiary racism. The USA and its NATO allies have persistently violated the sovereignty of many Muslim-majority states at will, through aerial drone attacks, intrusive surveillance and military occupation.51 This focus on militarisation and securitisation has also allowed the field of security studies to proliferate. Scholars in this field appear to be on a self-fulfilling mission of promoting securitisation, given the number of journal articles that are silent on the invasiveness of surveillance and the antidemocratic character of security regimes. A recent book by Stuart Croft, however, was expected to provide critical intervention on security issues and securitisation.52 It turns out that, despite Croft’s desire to broaden the discussion of identities within particular time and space, he ends up essentialising identity without analysing power or the role of dominant identities. He also does not examine imperialist domination and racialisation; in effect he reinforces securitisation as social constructions rooted immemorially in history, which he claims have a mutual impact on both the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ (p 92). To treat the securitiser and the securitised as coterminous and to contend that they are mutually affected by security regimes means that there is no analysis of power or understanding of powerlessness and racialisation. Similarly, to claim as Croft does, that the ‘securitisation of Islam is not a unique event’ as it is just another social reconstruction among hundreds in history, albeit of a different ‘Other’ (p 259), is to be unmindful of the colonial legacy and the consequences of current imperialist forays in Muslim-majority states, as well as to ignore the deep racism and xenophobia prevalent in Europe and North America. Croft’s ahistoricist views on the subject allow him to maintain that, just because Catholics suffered during the formation of Britain and the Irish through British imperialism, and that the Dutch, Germans and Jews were targeted in Britain, it is now the turn of Muslims to also join the throngs of oppressed people (pp 39–44, 74, 259)— which is indeed a very disturbing rationale for the prevalence and intensification of xenophobic oppression and violence in society. This enables him to conveniently opt out of interrogating securitisation, a field in which he is completely invested. In effect, Croft’s approach ‘normalises’ the securitisation of the ‘Other’ as an uneventful ahistorical phenomenon. And the most that he can then do is to undertake a proper post-structuralist textual analysis of xenophobic writings against Muslims and Islam by British ‘public intellectuals’, politicians and religious leaders, and compare them to the atrocities against the Catholics and the Irish or the ridiculing of the Dutch—to further reinforce his historicist approach (see chapters 1, 5 and conclusion). The effect of such an undertaking, while it recognises that securitisation creates xenophobic responses from the dominant community, is to make a mockery of due process for the securitised and to remain inattentive on how their rights are consistently trampled by the coercive arm of the Western state. But Croft is not interested in challenging the notion of securitisation at the level of the state; rather, he seeks merely to move beyond the Copenhagen School of security studies to offer a theory of securitisation that is more encompassing of identities, time and space (see pp 77–91). In other words, he wants theory to account for the role of influential non-state actors, and media and cultural elites, as well as the military and the police (which are really part of the state’s coercive arm) in shaping the securitisation regimes (pp 70–85). Croft’s penchant for conceiving the development of the securitisation process as outside the state (through the actions of individuals) is so overwhelming that he dwells at length in his text on the notion of ‘ontological security’—the idea that the nature of the security of the self is effectively a ‘relationship between identity, narrative and security’, which is ‘achieved [almost reflexively] through the creation of a series of relationships performed through everyday routines and practices’ (p 17). But the nature of this type of framing completely omits the role of the state and focuses mainly on his notion of ‘ontological security’, which becomes a coping mechanism for the individual to deal with the ‘benefit’ or the fallout from securitisation. This approach therefore permits Croft to treat the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ as coeval, and to exclude the security state and its securitisation policy from a critical gaze. I have argued here that securitisation is a historically specific process, a post-cold war phenomenon that emerged as the US model of the security state was universalised in the aftermath of the September 11 events, and the paradigm was emulated by all Western, and some key client Muslimmajority states. Furthermore, I have also tried to show that racialisation is deeply embedded in, and a concomitant part of, securitisation through discussions on the niqab, sports, terrorism suspects, and incendiary racism. To ignore racialisation as a process of dehumanisation and to treat it merely as a form of ‘othering’ (an oxymoron that inoculates the dominant group from absorbing the suffering of the ‘Other’) authorises writers like Croft and others in his field of security studies to focus on deepening securitisation without really problematising the role of the Western nation-state and the media in the ongoing subjugation and xenophobic treatment of racialised communities. In addition to the dehumanised treatment of the Muslim and people who ‘look like Muslims’ in European and North American societies and by the US and NATO militaries, racialised immigrants and Muslims are made scapegoats for Europe’s social ills, and are even blamed for the continent’s economic woes. Journalists and writers—Mark Steyn, Barbara Amiel, Melanie Phillips and Robert Spencer—have referred to the ‘demographic threat’ of Muslims overwhelming Europe and other Western countries in apocalyptic terms, and have even developed a new term for their characterisation: ‘Eurabia’.53 Given this attitude, and as long as some of the incendiary racist media coverage peddles anti-immigrant and antiMuslim vilification and fables about ‘Eurabia’, hatred and the new Orientalism will eat away at European and North American societies in the Long War era.

#### [more links]

#### **Western-centric political discourses like the 1ac fuel a process of constant othering, where “The Orient” is always depicted as subhuman and subjected to endless violence – turns case**

Garcia 19(Paola Garcia, Sep 22, 2019, "On Orientalism and the Dehumanization of the Other," Inside Arabia, https://insidearabia.com/on-orientalism-and-the-dehumanization-of-the-other/)**//BRownRice**

The dehumanization of the “Other” is at the core of most of humanity’s tragedies. It is responsible for all manner of violence, whether physical, spiritual, or intellectual. Nationalism necessarily places one’s culture as superior to all others, making that which is culturally different inferior and less human, rendering it at worst inert material to be subjugated for one’s benefit and at best a mere source of entertainment. We live in a time plagued by these issues. We are encountering terrifying ideologies and politics that are racist to their core. We are dealing with the resurgence of fascism, neo-Nazism, white supremacism, institutionally endorsed racial, sexual and gender discrimination, walls, apartheids, anti-immigrant laws, and it goes on and on. These catastrophes all stem from “othering,” that is, from thinking that those who are different from us are inferior and threatening by default. Behind the othering lens, there is little room to acknowledge the humanity inherent in every single culture and individual. The Quran fittingly states, “We have . . . made you into nations and tribes, so that you might come to know one another.”[2] Citing scripture carries the risk of being perceived as irrational and unaware of what is appropriate in intellectual discourse. However, if we disregard the source and focus on the idea itself, we will find it extremely pertinent to the discussion. The notion of knowing one another is crucial because it implies a relationship of equals. It assumes the existence of a common denominator between them: humanity. This understanding appears, regrettably, to be lacking in today’s world. In Timothy Mitchell’s excellent book, Colonizing Egypt, we learn that “We” have been attempting to know not each other, but the “Other,” the lesser object of our exploitative designs. This “We” can stand for any individual, discipline, institution or nation that systematically views cultures other than its own as inferior and often, even subhuman, a view which nationalism tends to produce and promote. In the United States, we presently have a president who unapologetically brags about his racist views and boasts about the supposed inferiority of cultures different from his own. This tragically deranged man has fought and continues to fight tooth and nail to have these chauvinistic views implemented as the laws of our land: travel bans for Muslims, a wall to keep “threatening intruders” away, racial slurs turned into political slogans, immigrants in cages, children dying in detention centers, away from their parents, etc. The appalling examples abound. In the Trump era, xenophobia, narcissism, and anger have become normalized and even glorified, seen as an effective means to make our country “great.” In the Trump era, xenophobia, narcissism, and anger have become normalized and even glorified, seen as an effective means to make our country “great.” The situation is heartbreaking, and only by reflecting and fixing our hearts about how each of us sees “others” can we begin to veer from the destructive path we are on. Professor Edward Said 1935 2003 Professor Edward Said (1935-2003) This type of bigotry has its counterpart in the intellectual world. As Edward Said articulately explains in Identity, Authority and Freedom: “If the authority granted our own culture carries with it the authority to perpetuate cultural hostility, then a true academic freedom is very much at risk, having as it were conceded that intellectual discourse must worship at the altar of national identity and thereby denigrate or diminish others.”[3] Said, who had several conflicting identities, including Palestinian, American, and academic, asserted that he found it impossible to identify with the “triumphalism of one identity because the loss and deprivation of the others are so much more urgent.” Similarly, citing Said, Nora Akawi explains that “‘to make the practice of intellectual discourse dependent on conformity to a predetermined political ideology’ or predetermined canon of learning, western or other . . . ‘is to nullify intellect altogether.’”[4] And this is what has happened in much of our learning about “other” cultures, learning which promotes the views that lead to today’s devastating politics. “We” have “triumphed” in defining “our” culture as superior and this gives “us” the right to look down at whatever “we” want, in whatever form “we” want and for whatever purpose “we” deem worthy. This triumph has come at a great loss. The price of excluding all the others is actual poverty of the spirit, allowing us to keep only “dust”, projections, and imaginings that stand in for reality. The price of excluding all the others is actual poverty of the spirit, allowing us to keep only “dust”[5], projections, and imaginings that stand in for reality: “‘Think of it no more!’ wrote Nerval to Théophile Gautier, of the Cairo they had dreamed of describing. That Cairo lies beneath the ashes and dirt, . . . dust-laden and dumb.’ Nothing encountered in those Oriental streets quite matched up to the reality they had seen represented in Paris. Not even the cafés looked genuine. ‘I really wanted to set the scene for you here’, Nerval explained, in an attempt to describe the typical Cairene street, ‘but . . . it is only in Paris that one finds cafés so Oriental.[6]’” The reality for these “travelers” was the French representation of the “Orient.” Anything else, was unacceptable. The Orient itself, in this case, Cairo, appeared to them completely chaotic, incomprehensible, disappointing. The “Orient” they found existed outside of their “world of exhibition,” lacked “genuine” cafes, and was empty of most of what they expected to encounter. The “Orient” Europe had produced was a much better “Orient” than the one inhabited by other (lesser) types of human beings. They desperately wanted foreign countries to mirror the “Orient” they had brought with them. But, to their disillusionment, this foreign, non-European “Orient” would reflect everything but the image embedded in their imagination. This foreign “Orient” seemed to have nothing to do with their manageable, easily representable, homegrown “Orient.” Later, colonialists attempted to force and forge their “Orient” into being, in the European mold of “order” and “progress” that, in their view, should reign globally. The alleged preeminence of western culture and Euro-American supremacism are promoted and exported all over the globe, unconsciously accepted by many everywhere as the truth. Although most cultures have engaged in some form of othering throughout history, in western modernity and post-modernity, othering has been taken to an unprecedented level, with the most atrocious consequences: genocides, apartheids, all forms of colonialism, the destruction of native peoples and cultures, atomic bombs, nuclear weapons, etc. The alleged preeminence of western culture and Euro-American supremacism are promoted and exported all over the globe, unconsciously accepted by many everywhere as the truth. It takes, however, little awareness to realize that these supposedly superior cultures are built, to a lesser or greater degree, primarily on the edifice of an overarching underlying value: pure material progress at the expense of ethics and human values. In other words, the chief value of our time and culture is the worship of material wealth above all else. This “theology of progress” makes us believe that unbounded economic and material prosperity is the ultimate aspiration of human beings, and what will make one “happy.” This “theology of progress” makes us believe that unbounded economic and material prosperity is the ultimate aspiration of human beings, and what will make one “happy.” In reality, it leaves people spiritually bankrupt, mentally and emotionally sick, willing to do pretty much anything, including poison their own people (the food industry/medical industry mafias), for profit. These are values that come directly from our western liberalism and monstrous form of capitalism and which, sadly, most of the world is striving to adopt. It is, therefore, worth approaching the issue of “Orientalism” as just another expression of “Othering,” a toxic and inhumane perspective on the differences that in actuality make our society a vibrant and powerful melting pot. For without the mosaic of races, cultures, languages and heritage, society will wither and die. Diversity is the mother of creativity and expansion, it is to be valued and encouraged. The mark of a great society is its ability to embrace others, cultivate their uniqueness, and mold their contributions into a sacred wholeness. The “others” are Us, the separation is but an illusion.

#### Only reorienting our thinking eastward through ecologies of knowing can disrupt colonial notions of supremacy - vote neg to resist the Western epistemology that serves as the basis for global oppression and environmental destruction.

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Far from being an expert in China or East Asia, 16 I read Peters’ article through my own work that, in part, centers on critical theories/pedagogies, and comparative and international education (CIE). Through critical pedagogical lenses, I see Peters’ overall argument as calling for **(re-)reading** the politics of the **‘threat’**, questioning if it emerges from (neo)coloniality and epistemologies of the North. Peters details a histography of sociopolitical delegitimization on how non-western othering has encouraged Western assimilation and the need to disrupt the politics of Western supremacy. **Comparative work is essential** here, but comparative fields inherently form contested terrains. CIE work becomes problematic when non-contextually positioning one educational system as ‘best’ for all others to blindly assimilate to. Opposingly, critical CIE is crucial for better understanding the commonalities and differences between educational systems to allow for true contextual lending and borrowing. Two important notations need to be given. First, critically reading the world is largely comparing what we ‘know’ with new knowledges, so such comparative problematizing the self’s ingenuous knowledges is also needed beyond the professionalized CIE field. This includes critically reading our own comparisons guided by Western benchmarking. Second, ‘education’ here is beyond schooling to include non-formal and informal models (e.g. public pedagogy through Hastie’s comparisons with Nazism). Largely avoiding giving explicit self-analysis, Peters calls on readers to reflect upon what needs to be **(un)learned** from hidden curricula of Western supremacy. I read Peters’ article through the lenses of Said’s (1979) Orientalism and Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2016, 2018) calls to **counter epistemologies** of the North’s dominance and **resulting oppressions**. As such, Peters critiques Western policymaking to thwart ‘threats’ of losing global hegemony through de-Orientalization and dethroning epistemologies of the North. I see two conundrums which are difficult but not impossible to overcome through teaching for critical literacy. First, such reflectivity is meaningless and without transformative praxis if epistemological dominance is not critically problematized. Hidden curricula of untethered Western supremacy without contextuality that Peters argues hardens the difficulty of its disruption, but also amplifies its necessity. For example, this coincides with my article on being a self-defined Freirean scholar in China in which I problematize both Western-centric rubrics of ‘quality’ academics and how, ironically, Western academics too-often do not **critically compare themselves** within their self-legitimized rubrics (see Misiaszek, 2018). The second conundrum I see is the perceived ‘threat’ of a global paradigm shift of epistemologies of the North eastward and thus Orientalism is disrupted, not by ceasing epistemological dominance but rather shifting them eastward. Two issues come to mind here. One is de Sousa Santos’ framing the grounding of epistemologies of the North with **coloniality, patriarchy, and capitalism**. Peters argues China’s lack of histories of being the colonizer and China is ‘becom[ing] a vast and encompassing global capitalist power’ but not the Western perception of a ‘capitalism and liberal democracy [a]s a holy combination’. Second, epistemologies of the South should not replace Northern epistemological dominance, but rather exist to **counter them for teaching**, learning and decision-making through ecologies of knowing (Santos, 2018). Without question, global **epistemological shifts will occur**, but their processes and emergent outcomes should be read as possibilities rather than fatalistically determined already. Not writing in a fatalistic manner, Peters’ leaves open the possibilities for these upcoming shifts by learning from the politics of supremacy and dominance to **avoid global oppressions** and **planetary unsustainability** from continuing/reoccurring. Unfortunately, if we learn or not is questionable.

## O/V

#### International intervention of the west into the east is justified by orientalism-it metaphysically separates the west and the east causing not only western intervention and wars, but also terrorist sentiments in the east. Recognition of orientalism is the first step to change

Imaan Zia 19[Imaan Zia, Mass Communication graduate from NUST, "Orientalism and its International Implications",4-26-2019, Voice of Balochistan, https://voiceofbalochistan.pk/culture/orientalism-and-its-international-implications/, 1LEE]

In its initial stages orientalism was justification of the West’s domination of the East. Colonialism created a legitimizing ideology of their own to rationalize their hold over the East. Therefore, one may say that colonialism created orientalism. Orientalism is about the West asserting its power over the East. It is a form of erasure, silencing and over-simplification of the Eastern and Islamic culture internationally by blending all of its subcultures, so that it can only be perceived through the Western lens.

There’s also plenty of evidence to prove that orientalism effects international politics and policy-making. According to Oxford Analytica, an independent strategic-consulting firm, since orientalism forms the basis of interaction between the West and East, it affects the Western politicians’ perception of any population they think is “oriental” and vice versa.

It presents the Orient as passive and incapable of self-representation, mostly because it observes it from an external point of view rather than a realistic understanding. According to a 2015 research paper written at the University of Cologne, Germany, Orientalism is an act of “metaphysical segregation” of the West and East. Simply put, it creates clear distinctions between the West and East in a way that puts them on opposite ends of a spectrum; the West being the superior one. This promotes an Us versus Them ideology; the Occident versus the Orient.

This same ideology, derived from Orientalism, is more often than not, used as justification for when the West interfere in matter of the East. An example is the US, who have given some variation of the same idea every time they’ve needed to justify their invasion of Iraq, their bombings in Syria and Yemen, and even their policies regarding the East like Trump’s “Travel” Ban that targets travellers exclusively from Muslim states.

According to Oxford Analytica, another argument is also that terrorist ideologies originating in the East are also derived from colonial-era legacies i.e. the idea that the West is culturally and morally superior to the East stimulates anti-west sentiments in the East.

The West needs to acknowledge and challenge these primitive ideas and concepts regarding the East. They need to develop an improved and more inclusive understanding of non-western societies without falling into their paternalistic and restrictive mindsets. Acknowledging this gap and trying to account for it can help alleviate resentment on all sides.

Diminishing these colonial influences will require an inter-generational effort to change attitudes and behaviors. The first step however, is the recognition of these influences. Orientalism cannot be reduced to just an academic and intellectual misunderstanding. It has to be recognized as an intellectual weapon that provokes conflict between the West and East. Once recognition sets in, efforts to alter the resulting attitudes and behaviors can be continued.

#### Orientalism continues in the modern era-the characterization of India as uncivil and non-progressive within covid 19 reports made by the west proves that the weaponization of distinction still exists-even native writers proliferate this due to orientalist subjugation and infantilization embedded in the narrative

Samir Saran and Jaibal Naduvath 20[Samir Saran and Jaibal Naduvath, President and Vice-President of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), India’s premier think tank, "Revisiting Orientalism: Pandemic, politics, and the perceptions industry",5-24-2020, ORF, https://www.orfonline.org/research/revisiting-orientalism-pandemic-politics-and-the-perceptions-industry-66665/, 1LEE]

The reordering of global power relations with the emergence of the East has begun to alter the West’s imagination, narratives and processes of self-identification. One discernible and strengthening trend arising from this changing political landscape is the increasing deployment of reductive stereotypes in the Western media, reminiscent of the colonial era when the West appropriated to itself the “burden of civilising the savage” East.

This effort to devalue, deplore and defame the East is now a recurrent theme and, perhaps, is an attempt to define oneself as distinct from the “other” in these troubled times. More insidiously, it is also deployed as a method of control and as a projection of a superior agency for achieving definitive economic and political goals. Simply put, the West seeks to tower above all by diminishing the East.

With its increasing economic influence (the pandemic notwithstanding), igreater presence in world affairs, and an emerging and louder identity (wth passionate supporters and detractors), India’s actions and policies have come under close and often critical scrutiny in powerful sections of the liberal media in the Atlantic system. This, by itself, is both natural and unsurprising.

What is disturbing is the near universal, vicious and negative portrayal of a land that is proud of its democratic politics (just as many other nations are), with a loud, disruptive and often aggressive media, and mobilisations led by communities that have toppled governments and, sometimes, catalysed perverse outcomes. It is a far from perfect, largely low-income country, with its fragilities debated with gusto at home and judged at the hustings repeatedly. What is curious about the naked aggression of the liberal Western media is its visible conflation of the domestic debates of their land with those in foreign lands; their sense of loss of their old place and space and the externalisation of grievance onto the “outsider”; and, their weaponisation of differences in much the same manner as their far Right counterparts.

Many a time, this “reduced” portrayal of India or other lands may be just journalistic or editorial carelessness. When it does happen, it must be called out and now is a good time to engage with this trend. The distasteful grammar, and gloomy imagery that dominates Western coverage on India says less about the country under the scanner and more about the malaise within media organisations as they move from editorial and ownership structures of the past to the digital and decentralised realities of today. The ugly underbelly of a section of the media continues to reveal itself as it engages with India and its efforts in coping with the Covid-19 pandemic.

Over the last two months, organisations such as the BBC, the Atlantic , the Washington Post and the New York Times, among others, have run series of reductive commentaries on the state of India’s preparedness and its capacity to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic. If we are being honest, they are being biased and blasé about it.

From alarmist commentaries (one report hypothesised that half of India could be infected!) and ridiculing the capacity and agency of the government, to deriving vicarious delight by focusing on well-known social inequities, their reporting has been “misery porn” with the spotlight being on India’s vulnerabilities and shortcomings in the fight against the pandemic. These are embellished through a cleverly selected presentation of events and facts; compelling images of poverty, denial, and deprivation; and, an overdose of virtue showboating.

The recurring portrayal of marginalised communities and migrants lacking economic, social, and political agency is presented as distinct from the values of esteem, equality and harmony, which form the bedrock of a “civilised” society. This narrative deliberately ignores the universal acceptance of these “ideals” to meet its singular objective — the perpetuation of a needless discourse of discord instead of a more worthwhile debate on the failure of globalisation and the extant economic models, something which is on stark display around the world.

This media narrative on India is perhaps not meant to only highlight inequality within the country because inequality is all prevalent around the world, more dazzlingly so in the West. It appears to be an attempt to distance a country and its mainstream from the civilised “self” which resides in the moral and emancipated world of publishers, editors and reporters. India and its large population are being painted as the proverbial “other” even as New York, the beacon of Western civilisation, is being scorched by the scourge.

Incidentally, and expectedly, many of these reports have been penned by native authors. This old trick affords plausible deniability to the publications against any allegations of White bias or racism, which is still resplendent in each of these reports. Nobel Laureate professor Amartya Sen and renowned pan-Africanist and political philosopher Frantz Fanon have argued how centuries of colonial subjugation and cultural infantalisation have left deep imprints on the self-image of the colonised, with the natives often viewing themselves and their cultures through the coloniser’s prism of prejudice. This phenomenon is one of colonialism’s most dehumanising byproducts and has now achieved viral potency alongside the pandemic.

Literary critic and linguist Namvar Singh, in his essay Decolonising the Indian Mind, alluded to this desperate urge that resides within Indian English-language writers to be accepted and understood by Western audiences as being part of their own identity continuum. The absurdity of the writings are, therefore, astounding. Just how absurd can be guessed from the assertion that a country with a per capita income of $2,000 must have the governance infrastructure and attributes similar to those with multiple times the resources and capacity — the leitmotif of much that is published on India. What is often forgotten in the “one village” discourse perpetuated by this class is that this village never was and never will be. This pandemic is the story of “millions of villages” seeking their own salvation as the “global ethic” promoted by the liberal media was the first victim of, and culprit-in-chief for, the pandemic and its heavy toll.

For a nation the size of a continent with many inherent challenges, India’s response has been bold and feeble at the same time, just as it has been universal and differentiated. While states such as Kerala and some others appear to have contained the crises well, other states with more complex and complicated politics are battling to keep this virus in check. There are shortcomings galore but most importantly, there is resolute intent across society and politics to fight the pandemic. States are adopting different models — unique to their local situation — drawing heavily from aspects as diverse as their specific cultural practices, topography, information systems and technology, along with government intervention.

Arguably, some states in India have outperformed some of the developed nations. A fair and balanced reportage should have presented these myriad experiences in combating the novel coronavirus, rather than just those narratives that build stereotypes and biases. In fact, the odd positive story out of India has the focused objective of establishing chaos and disorder as the norm — the outlier province with West-like predisposition, the snake-charmer and the bazaar magician, the bandar and the bandarlog, and other such notions lurk among words and between lines. This is reminiscent of the debates in 19th-century Britain with its praise of some quaint developments in India and its resolute determination to tame the East.

Celebrated political thinker Edward Said situated this impulse in the colonial domination of the non-West by the West, and the attendant perceptions of superiority that accompanied such domination. He argued that the West was able to manage, and even produce, the non-West by projecting itself as progressive, rational, civil and humanistic as opposed to the non-West. This reductive narrative was a purposeful one, created to morally justify the colonial enterprise and legitimise the civilising mission which was the “White man’s burden”.

This civilising purpose perpetuated through literature, popular culture and politics for over two centuries has not only informed and influenced the trajectory of colonial politics and popular Western imagination, but has also become embedded as the indisputable truth, forever colouring Western understanding of the Orient.

Starting with James Mill’s influential History of British India (1817) to Katherine Mayo’s Mother India (1927), diminished narratives on native agency, Professor Amartya Sen argues, have informed the views of generations of the Western intellectual and political elite, from Alexander Duff to Theodore Roosevelt and beyond. Works such as Rudyard Kipling’s White Man’s Burden, whom George Orwell called the “prophet of British Imperialism”, are considered reflective of this seemingly benign ethnocentric trajectory of colonial discourse.

French Jewish thinker Emmanuel Levinas traces this bias to the West’s philosophical bearing, where identity is sought in the indurate logic of the self, rather than the expression of self in relation to difference. This predisposition manifests in a skewed representation of non-Western experiences. It is the cornerstone of the age-old identity debates that have troubled and defined human interactions. The sense of “Us versus Them”, or our superior agency versus theirs, proliferates the reports around Covid-19. The articles in the New York Times deploy a lack of empathy to create the “identity distance”. The Atlantic deploys lack of agency as a missing virtue, and social inequity defines the coverage of the BBC and the Washington Post in this instance. Unfortunately, the pandemic has a different tale to narrate.

A study of infection patterns in New York, for instance, presents vivid glimpses of elite depredations. The Black and marginalised communities have been significantly more affected than the rest, with one report assessing that Black Americans were thrice as likely to die from the infection than their White compatriots. The virus has indubitably driven a wedge between the economic haves and have-nots in the US, with significantly higher than average infections and deaths even among caregivers, who are people of colour, than their White counterparts. This isn’t very different from the Indian experience where the more impoverished are facing the fury of the pandemic.

Universally, and without exception, catastrophic events such as the raging pandemic tend to disproportionately affect the economically and socially marginalised more. In India, struggling migrants seek a path back to their hamlets. In the US, the rich and powerful escape to the Hamptons. This is an identity discourse of another variety that poses the same question for all humanity on the form and format of our economic agenda and priorities.

Colonial biases and stereotypes form an intractable part of the Western subconscious. However, the representation also needs to be viewed within a grander scheme. Beyond the articulation of the reductive occidental logic, it also offers a convenient moment for some to mobilise the newly dispossessed intelligentsia against the new nationalist urge that is shaping India’s political and economic discourse.

The story of the media reportage on India’s response to Covid-19 is, perhaps, not about the country’s efforts and its successes and failures. It is a narrative of perverse politics where the increasingly under threat elite opinion makers — the post-colonial custodians of virtue — are expressing (through their media) their contempt for those who do not see their path as either divine or preordained. This is political coverage, not one on the pandemic, and it has been scripted with the ink of exclusion.

## FW

### T/L

#### Discourse shapes the hegemonic power relations that enable gendered and Orientalist hierarchies that construct the way we perceive and construct meaning on Others

Khalid 17 (Maryam Khalid | *Gender, Orientalism, and the ‘War on Terror’: Representation, Discourse, and Intervention in Global Politics* pg 4-6 | DOA: 7/16/2022 | SAoki)

Understanding how gendered and orientalist categories and identities ‘work’ in international relations entails exploring the relationship between power, discourses, and representation. Rather than attempting to uncover ‘what is out there’ (that is, rejecting the idea that ‘reality’ is something that is knowable), this research is focused on the politics of knowledge, on questioning the emergence of categories such as ‘barbaric’, ‘oppressed’, ‘civilised’, ‘free’ (to name a few), and how they work to produce and sustain knowledge about ‘us’ and ‘them’, making specific courses of action such as military intervention possible and legitimate. The theoretical framework for this analysis is poststructural, and informs the ‘analytical strategy’ that guides my research and analysis in this book. My research is concerned with how gendered and orientalist categories are utilised in ways that necessitate military intervention through the construction of an enemy (and thus creating a ‘Self’ in reference to this enemy). I argue that this is done by exploiting long-held assumptions about race/ethnicity and gender, such as the naturalness of ascribing ‘feminine’ traits like sensitivity, weakness, and emotionality to ‘women’, and ‘Othered’ traits such as irrationality, lack of development, and a lack of civilisation to non-‘Western’ peoples. Subscribing to an understanding of discourse that is poststructural in its commitment to the constructedness of knowledge, I argue that language is a not simply a neutral medium used to convey ‘facts’ or pre-existing meaning. Instead, I view discourse as a ‘structured, relational totality’ (Doty 1996, 6) in which language (writing, speech, pictures, any system of signification that represents our ideas in a way that allows others to ‘read’ meaning) is not simply used to ‘communicate information’ (carrying meaning that we intend to project), but is the site of the creation of meaning and implicated in the establishment of the ‘regimes of knowledge and truth’ (Gee 1999, 1; Shaprio 1985–1986, 193–194). Language is not an objective means through which we interpret the world, conveying predetermined, natural, or neutral ‘meanings’ which exist a priori and are intrinsic to things, events, people, or groups. Rather, as Terrell Carver argues, language has ‘meaning only in virtue of our inscribing it there’; it is used to inscribe meanings onto the world, objects, and experiences, and to read ‘those meanings back to ourselves as if they had always resided in the objects or experiences’ (2002, 50). This approach most closely reflects my research concerns, in particular for exploring the construction of identity in terms of discourse, and the role of power in discursive identities (Torfing 1999, 90–91, 96). That is not to say that this poststructuralist understanding of discourse conceives of objects, events, and people as ‘not existing’ outside discourse: rather, it asserts that they have no meaning and are incomprehensible to us without language and discourse as interpretive tools (Campbell 1992, 6). Discourses, in this understanding, are ways of constructing knowledge, and of referring to knowledge, about particular topics. They are groups of ideas, images, and practices that are relational (they all refer to another in some way), providing us with ways of talking about, knowledge about, and conduct associated with particular topics, events, activities, or institutions (Hall 1997, 6). As such, they are ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault 1972, 54). These ‘discursive formations’ enable and limit our knowledge and ways of speaking about something by defining what is appropriate (and inappropriate), useful (or unimportant), and ‘true’ about particular subjects, and ‘what sorts of persons or ‘subjects’ embody its characteristics’ (Hall 1997, 6). By setting out these ‘rules of acceptability’, discourses become ‘regimes of knowledge and truth’ that utilise procedures of inclusion and exclusion to ‘regulate our approach to ourselves, each other and our surroundings’ (Andersen 2003, 3). That is, discourses produce insiders and outsiders by excluding/including particular ‘themes, arguments and speech positions’, denouncing some groups of people as ‘abnormal or irrational’ and granting others ‘the right and legitimacy to treat these people’ (Andersen 2003, 3). Therefore, discourses are imbued with power: discursive representations define and limit what is ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ (by allowing one ‘truth’ to be elevated over another), and these representations or ideas about people can be used to subjugate, control, and order them discursively. Discourses reflect, enact, and reify power relations, and certain actors play a privileged role in the discursive production and reproduction of meaning (Weldes et al. 1999, 13). Within discourses certain meanings and statements are privileged, objects and subjects are created and ascribed attributes and others are ignored, certain acts are legitimated whilst others are made improbable. Dominant discourses successfully marginalise and displace alternative (contesting) arguments, activities, and discourses by naturalising certain meanings and hierarchies; they ‘seek to render themselves incontestable’ by defining what is ‘common sense’ knowledge, creating an a priori ‘givenness’ for certain identities, the relevance (and irrelevance) of particular categories, and simultaneously obfuscate the construction of these categories and identities (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 134–145; Martin 2000, 24–25). Identity (gendered, racialised, for example), then, is not something we possess but is constructed out of discursive practices. It is not pre-given or ‘natural’, but always being constructed and reconstructed, and is established in relation to someone or something else (another group, individual, or state, for example), in relation to what it is not (Connolly 1991, 64–66; Street 1997, 141). These relationships allow discourses to make things intelligible: they provide us with ways of knowing the world, of being in it and acting towards it by ‘operationalizing a particular ‘regime of truth’ whilst excluding other possible modes of identity and action’ (Milliken 1999b, 229). Hegemonic practices that attempt to fix meaning in discourses are inextricably linked to representational practices, and it is in these practices that we can locate the operation of power in identity-making (Doty 1996, 8–10). However, this does not mean that gendered relations of power and gender discrimination and inequality are ‘merely’ constructs (created through discourse); they are also material ‘realities’ that (while they cannot be understood outside discourse) give rise to practices, acts, and material effects that can (and need to) be challenged, transformed, and changed. Women (and men) in Afghanistan and Iraq (but also in the broader ‘global south’ and in the US and Europe) have lived experiences of discrimination, violence, and oppressive practices that are inherently gendered and, at times, racialised. In the Afghan and Iraqi contexts, these have impacted particularly on women, both before and after the US-led military interventions (Al-Ali and Pratt 2009; Brodsky 2003). While these lived experiences of Afghans and Iraqis are drawn upon in official US gendered orientalist ‘War on Terror’ discourse, they also exist beyond this specific discourse. That is, the material practices of the Taliban and Hussein are not simply the products of ‘War on Terror’ discourse. Rather, they themselves are the outcomes of broader gendered (and at times racialised) relations of power which, although they cannot be understood outside of ‘discourse’, give rise to material actions. That is, discursive meanings must be understood as enacted through and constructed by material practices such that ‘[d]iscourses and material practices are . . . mutually constitutive’ (Epstein 2008, 5).

#### **Debate and research as models of resistance disrupts the will to dominate the Orient and brings a cleansing force to the modes of thought that sustain modern coloniality.**

Leonardo 18 (Zeus Leonardo, "Dis-orienting Western Knowledge", The Cambridge Journal of Anthropology, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26945997, Autumn 2018, Accessed 7-19-2022)//ILake🪐

Said’s debt to the Foucault (1977) of Discipline and Punish is clear when the former affirms the latter’s archaeological method, whereby rules of discursive engagement produce subjects based on their inclusion, as opposed to exclusion, into statements that do not determine but define their participation. In other words, it is through their appearance (in statements, in documents, in narratives) that natives as such are transformed into natives. Said (1979: xix) writes that this ‘will to understand’ the Orient turned into a certain ‘will to dominate’ it. France’s ability to ‘know’ the Egyptians brings the Orient and its subjects into view or existence, as objects of consumption for the Occident. They are brought into vision by a civilizing force capable of supervision. Like Foucault’s description of technologies of surveillance, the colonial panopticon sees the Orient without being seen, writes it without being read, surveys it without being marked. This happens through writing and other forms of capturing the natives for nativist purposes, that is, of asserting European superiority over the naturalized inferiority of the Orient. But Said disagrees with Foucault by asserting the author’s imprint rather than disappearance from discourse (see Foucault 1991). This is consistent with Said’s ‘worldly’ analysis of literature and other linguistic practices as not reducible to text but instantiations of concrete relations with their context. They function as representations of the material world, not in the reductive sense that compromises orthodox Marxism’s effectivity but in a Vician (1984) recursive sense of play between cultural traffic, knowledge production and human participation. Sometimes credited with Said, postcolonial analysis does not signal a break from anti-colonial analysis as much as it is a shift in explaining its processes. Said is concerned with the same colonialism that provided Fanon ([1952] 2008) and Césaire’s ([1955] 2000) problematic but Said’s is a colonial predicament turned into a literary phenomenon. Its brutality is not only its capacity to turn targets of colonialism into non-beings but equally their disfigurement through metaphor and other linguistic practices. The worldliness of language, for example, means that annunciation cannot be divorced from the earthliness that interpellates it. Disfiguration happens when knowers are perversely consumed as objects in the orientalist knowledge industry and ignorance ironically asserts itself as the only legitimate form of knowledge (see Mills 2007). Said shares Anibal Quijano’s (2000) turn away from studies of official, administrative colonialism and towards the ‘coloniality of power’. Following the grooves of Quijano, Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2007: 243) describes coloniality thusly: Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and everyday. Nxot to be underestimated, the fall of traditional colonialism marked a transition in the modern world system of race from colonialism to coloniality, from subordination to subjectivation, from the transparency of power to its opaqueness, and finally, from what Said (1994a: 23) characterizes as the reliance on the ‘business of empire’ and ‘empire of business’. Just as Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren (1986) describe curriculum as simply the introduction to a particular way of life, so we can characterize, with William Appleman Williams, ‘empire as a way of life’ (cited in Said 1994a: 55). Immigrants, refugees and other categories of people enter colonialism as a structure already lying in wait, whether or not a colonial power administers a colonial state (see Grosfoguel 2007). In short, the world witnesses the coloniality of power turn into the power of coloniality to direct life outcomes even after the end of the official colonial era. Just as the end of US enslavement ended one peculiar form of racism and not racism itself, thus inaugurating another form (i.e. Jim Crow segregation) to replace it (Bonilla-Silva 2001), ending colonial occupation does not sound the death knell of coloniality. Knowledge and the epistemic problem To say that decolonization is a curricular problem is to suggest that curriculum reform is part of the decolonial project. Knowledge production has always been part of the colonial project for it was not only a material imposition of a foreign or external power but a concerted effort internally to supplant an existing way of life with another. This means that decolonizing the curriculum is no less than decolonizing the dominant theory of knowledge, if not knowledge itself. By theory, Said favours a secular version not reducible to its abstract, even religious, overtones but theory as part of human activity in Vico’s (1984) The New Science, which is that humans can only understand (and therefore undo) what they themselves have made. It shares a family resemblance with Lukács’ (1971) affirmation of theory’s place in forging critical consciousness as part of creating the world we can get behind rather than only describing the one we reject in front of us (see Said 1983: 234). But neither is theory the same as critical consciousness, the second providing spatio-temporal context for the first as well as accounting for the untidy nature of historical experience that resists standardization through theory. In this sense, knowledge is less a thing of human nature than a thing humans do. As part of undoing what colonial knowledge has made of us to which we no longer consent, the gift of colonialism must be returned with interest within a decolonial project that dis-orients the curriculum. In recent decades, multicultural reform has put a dent in Eurocentrism’s hold on the US curriculum. That welt has been noticed as its sentinels were awakened in order to defend their territory. Once thought to be something about re-indigenization of land, decolonization moves on to new territory, this time the realm of knowledge and cognition. It is one thing to remove the colonizer from the first and quite another to purge them from the second. For the colonizer’s stench remains long after the denouement of decolonization. Insofar as the colonizer was able to insert themselves into every nook and cranny of the colony, inner city or township, including the colonial subject’s self-concept, a decolonizing violence of the same magnitude, what Fanon ([1961] 2005) calls a ‘cleansing force’ (51; italics in original), must take place. Colonialism redefined the category of ‘human’ as part of the radical departure within humanism to reduce it to essential traits like abstract reason. Since at least the Cartesian cogito, which pronounced the mind-body split in favour of a decontextualized, rational spirit, the coloniality of being meant that cognition was a cog in the juggernaut of European, capitalist, colonial expansion. Western epistemology has oriented humans, as part of defining their essence, towards knowledge as a conquering impulse. This ‘ego conquiro’ and its accompanying ‘imperial attitude’ became a constitutive part of knowledge, practically and conceptually (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 245; italics in original). In practical terms, it means a fundamentally suspicious and misanthropic attitude towards the other as a threat to European being, who must be stamped out or violently assimilated in what has become a perpetual state of war. Conceptually, europocentrism has a virtual monopoly on what it means to be human, for as Charles Mills (1997) reminds us, within the racial contract European humanism is just as it sounds: only Europeans are humans. To make matters worse, the ‘educational racial contract’ (Leonardo 2015) is flanked by the ‘colonial contract’ (Leonardo and Vafai 2016). Even accursed Whites in the form of white women and the white working class, for example, retain the mark and possibility of being human; they are beings, after all. The radical cut within the denominator of the human made by colonialism within an imperialist ontology makes curriculum reform a matter of life and death as colonial subjects fight off forms of social death in everyday life.

#### **This debate is helpful to understand WHY different actors are incentivized to inflate the threat China poses to the US**

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The United States is caught in a challenging spot between its historical containment policies and more recent overtures of engagement with respect to China.1 Even as the George W. Bush and Barack Obama Administrations looked at new ways to engage with China around shared objectives such as anti-terrorism, economics, and North Korea, the vestiges of yesteryear’s containment still abounded.2 Both administrations vacillated depending on global events and perception, and they utilized varying measures of pro-China, anti-China, and even a pro-Asia derivative. Complicating the relationship further, policies of engagement abounded in the economic space while containment generally appeared in the military and political arena. Today’s simultaneously disparate overtures of containment and engagement by the Donald Trump Administration can be seen in a host of US actions. With respect to containment, America has boosted financial support of Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and other key Asian partners.3 The United States has also opposed China’s launch of the Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). While in the past the United States played a global role in the development banking arena, China’s power and influence has grown substantially with the creation of the AIIB—in spite of America’s efforts to curb its success.4 Meanwhile, with respect to engagement, the United States continues to encourage China to partner on nuclear weapon non-proliferation, Sino-American trade and mutual economic stimulus, and animal rights.5 While lack of policy coherence between different presidential administrations is not uncommon, such seismic shifts in approaches to contain or engage is indicative of underlying interpretations of threat. Experts have noted the inherent limitations of containment for the United States as a viable approach today due to China’s global reach, thus leaving cost imposition as the only available option.6 Others have questioned this lack of policy coherence and even offered a structured approach of partial disengagement as a policy solution. Aaron Friedberg and Charles Boustany Jr. have proscribed a four part approach to offset challenges from China: adopting a tariff policy, increasing defensive measures to counter tech transfers to China, encouraging domestic innovation, and strengthening trade with key partners.7 Doctrines of containment or engagement, or hybrid solutions, reflect the policy output of the China threat calculus. Exploring the many actors who profess a dogmatic adherence to one of these frames is insightful to better understanding their levels of influence and bias around the China threat.

### Othering DA

#### There’s an OTHERING DA: Orientalist discourse serves to subjugate “The Other” to endless racialized violence for the sustenance of whiteness

Sharma and Sharma 3(Sanjay Sharma, Brunel University London · Department of Social and Political Sciences PhD, and Ashwani Sharma, White Paranoia: Orientalism in the Age of Empire, September 2003)**//BRownRice**

The affective power of the images, however, is not secured by what they simply wish to signify, but rather, in how they accomplish it. In the Western imagination, they cannot be conceived in any other way than being manufactured. Yet, the boundary between what these photographs denote and connote is seemingly rendered impossible to maintain or grasp. Their imaginary force works by a monstrous transgressive immediacy which threatens to short-circuit the ordered Manichean representational schema of the “West and the Rest. ” Islamic culture, as the absolute Other of the West, has been unleashed —and Islamaphobia rationalized. The original suspicion of racialized Others as an external threat to security and culture of the West materializes into a paranoid reality. The threat has transmuted, however, and it is now as much from within than without: Al-Qaeda really are everywhere, and unstoppable because of their haunting omnipresence. Bush ’s twin declarations of the “war against terrorism ” and the “axis of evil ” not only seek to reassert an imperialist hegemony through an incredulous bifurcation of global political relations, they also express the dread of contagion in the fear of losing control . The Islamicized representations of the West described above are not the hybrid cosmopolitanism envisaged by the political imaginary of a liberal multiculturalism. The identity and superiority of the West has traditionally been discursively produced by Orientalist systems of representation based on maintaining a rigid and absolute difference against its “Other. ” However, Edward Said alludes to an ambivalence in the Western fascination and fear of the Other that lies at the heart of the discourse of Orientalism. If, following Said, the representations of the East (as despotic, barbaric, exotic, sensuous, spiritual . . .) are actually disavowed Western projections on to the Other, what happens when this material, imaginary, and representational boundary appears to breakdown and implode? Our contention is that contemporary Orientalism is figured on a boundary in jeopardy of being unable to maintain its own apparatus of power. This is not to say that Orientalism ’s disciplinary capacity has been diminished. As a matter of fact, the Western multicultural desire for otherness is a motor force to a deterritorializing capitalism in the new globalizing Empire (Hardt and Negri 2000). Nevertheless, as the consumption of otherness accelerates in the fractured global economy of racialized bodies, information, media, fashion, ethnic cuisine, and displaced labor, Orientalism’s ability to regulate and objectify the Other has become increasingly vexatious. Contemporary Orientalism is confronted, infiltrated, and defied by its own abjured structure of exclusion. Considered as a historically specific racializing regime of power–- knowledge fixated on difference, Orientalism has been, par excellence, a cultural racism. Perhaps this accounts for why the relationship between Orientalism and Whiteness (as an exnominated racial category) has been underplayed. In this article, we wish to explore how a contemporary Orientalism, as inscribed in cosmopolitan culture, is intimately tied to the production of a paranoid white subjectivity. The political necessity of “making whiteness strange” in order to divest its power (Dyer 1997) is not, however, the key concern here, as identifying white paranoia does not necessarily undo its agency or violence. Our intention is to interrogate a contemporary politics (pathology) of a self-fashioning Whiteness, whose empty universality as the measure of humanity is unraveling in the age of Empire. Orientalism Now . . . Empire establishes no territorial centre of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentred and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command (Hardt and Negri 2000: xiii). In their sweeping account of the emergence of a new post-imperialist political constitution of world order, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri insist that fixed boundaries and limits are no longer the defining features of an “inclusive” Empire. On the contrary, mobile borders and the multiplicity of difference, labor, and commodities are the drive and desire of Empire. The authors announce that a new operation of power and rule has emerged—a global postmodern sovereignty—which thrives on “differential hierarchies” and “hybrid fragmented subjectivities.” They contrast this with the essentializing power of imperialism, in its will to manage the Other through colonial terror and domination. The “crisis of modernity” has been most acutely expressed in the invariable exigency of a Manichean division between an emergent Europe and its abject Other. That which is excluded and negated gives birth to a positive identity for the European colonizer (Said 1978). Said has cogently argued that the inverted absolute difference of the Other is essential for the possibility and maintenance of a superior Occident. The requisite Other is then not what is merely excluded, but has to be acknowledged at the same time. Hardt and Negri take this up when they highlight that the dialectical recognition of otherness is an “intimate” kind of estrangement for the colonizer. They write: Knowing, seeing, and even touching the colonized is essential, even if this knowledge and contact take place only on the plane of representation . . . This intimacy in no way blurs the division between the two identities in struggle, but only makes more important that the boundaries and purity of identities be policed (Hardt and Negri 2000: 127). It was Frantz Fanon (1986) who clearly demonstrated that the policing of the racial/cultural boundary was a profound site of anxiety for the white European. In reality, its transgression (and violent consequences for the Other) has been the norm rather than the exception. But it is the ineluctable necessity of upholding and sustaining the besieged boundary of absolute difference that produces such dread. Why else, as Homi Bhabha (1994: 77) contends, are “the same old stories of Negro’s animality, the Coolie’s inscrutability . . . told (compulsively) again and afresh . . .”? In their exposition of Empire, Hardt and Negri read postcolonial theory as importantly deconstructing and challenging essentialist racial binaries of modernity. Yet they accuse theorists such as Bhabha and Said as operating with an anachronistic dialectical notion of colonial power that can only seek to displace a binaristic hierarchy, by the postcolonial incantation of hybridity and difference. The failure to fully grasp the new modality of a decentered and deterritorializing global power, results in postcolonial theory marking the shift towards Empire, rather than being able to challenge its extant form of rule. This is not the place to challenge Hardt and Negri’s rather reductive reading of what they characterize as “post-colonial theory.” However, their project compels us to consider how Orientalism operates in the age of Empire. Even though Orientalism’s bifurcating racialized structure (inside/ outside) appears to be at odds with the subsumption of difference in Empire, what unites the discourses of Orientalism and Empire is the interest in (cultural) difference. “Real subsumption,” according to Hardt and Negri, has no “outside” for the expansion of capitalism. It does not exclusively lead to the exclusion or obliteration of difference; rather, it can equivocally produce differential hierarchies and hybrid subjectivities in the incorporation of all forms of life. These authors argue that the racism of Empire is a cultural (or imperial) neo-racism of segregation, which primarily integrates others (differences are ordered and controlled). It is distinguished from the colonial racism of division and hierarchy, which takes place across the racial boundary of Self/Other (differences are excluded and negated). Following Deleuze and Guattari, they contend that cultural racism needs to be conceived as a “strategy of differential inclusion,” as opposed to the absolute exclusion of the Other. White supremacy functions . . . through engaging alterity and then subordinating differences according to degrees of deviance from whiteness. This has nothing to do with the hatred and fear of the strange, unknown Other. It is a hatred born in proximity and elaborated through degrees of difference of the neighbor. . . Subordination is enacted in regimes of everyday practices that are more mobile and flexible but that create racial hierarchies that are nonetheless stable and brutal (Hardt and Negri 2000: 194). While these authors properly maintain that a contemporary racism “rests on the play of differences” instead of a Manichean bio-racial divide, Policar (1990: 100) reminds us that the two formulations “easily flow into each other and so that they cannot be found in a pure state.” The issue is not just one of historical specificity, as the practice of Western racism has been irrevocably imbricated with culture (see Young 1995). To highlight, contra Hardt and Negri, that Orientalist discourses have embodied both colonial and cultural racisms is an obvious but necessary point to make. Arguably, the marking of “cultural” otherness has been the cardinal differentialist racializing operation of Orientalism. Said observed a shift in the regime of colonial power during the nineteenth century which “turned the Orient from an alien into colonial space” (1978: 211). This materialization of power over the “Orient” attempted to penetrate its “cultural, temporal, and geographical distance . . . expressed in metaphors of depth, secrecy and sexual promise . . . the ‘veils of an Eastern bride’ or ‘the inscrutable Orient’...” (Said 1978: 222). The closing down of distance between the West and its Other in the actual encounter with the spaces and bodies of the “Orient” did not result in existing boundaries melting away. Colonial governmentality was onerously preoccupied with maintaining a racial and cultural divide. For the colonizer, the ambivalent coupling between racism and sexualized desire for the Other was undoubtedly the most destabilizing and perverse to police. And the popular colonial tales of Westerners “going native” or insane in exotic foreign lands were thinly disguised warnings for not getting too close to the Other. As Deborah Root notes, the exoticism of the Other has worked: . . . by generating excitement and delirium precisely from the viewer’s ambivalent relationship to difference, qualities that in one context are classified as negative—such as violence—can with the proper distance produce delight, desire, and of course, the edge of danger and ambiguity that supplies an added frisson (1995: 34).

### Settler DA

#### **Theres a SETTLER DA: Orientalist discourses serve to justify the “white man’s burden” to dehumanize and eliminate the indigenous through a process of settler colonialism**

Mansour 11(Awad Issa Mansour, Orientalism, Total War and the Production of Settler Colonial Existence, https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10036/3153/MansourA.pdf?sequence=2,February 2011)**//BRownRice**

Favouring or promoting a subjective analysis over an objective one has implications on which peoples are deemed legitimate nations and therefore which have legitimate claim to nationhood. This reflects, or is even a practice of a form of, power. Here, however, the power is not only over who controls the meanings of the terms, and for what purpose(s) they are used, but also who decides who is ‘worthy’ of having a time, and of having a future, as well as the power and means to scrap ‘others’, allegedly devoid of human characteristics and severed, from the pulse of life; hence the power to determine who is worthy of living. The subsequent logical deduction produced from this discourse is that there can be no crime in eliminating the ‘other’ fundamentally because its mythical construction of this ‘other’ means that one cannot kill or injure ‘a thing’ that is already dead or on the sure-path towards death, and particularly after having been ‘cast out’ from time. 136 Here this discourse compresses a future-time death with the present life of the ‘other’ being. Thus, in this orientalist discourse, the ‘other’ is the embodiment of death (albeit not happened yet) and the orientalist discourse portrays this ‘other’ as having no future, because the orientalist has taken claim of the ‘other’s’ future, in a course in which there can be only one future, that of the orientalist ‘us’. Hence, according to the orientalist discourse of the settler-colonial type, the ‘other’ nations are deemed lifeless as they have no future in the course of the settler-colonial project except that which has been determined by the ‘us’ of settler colonials. This in turn means a total de-railment of the ‘other’ from the progression of time. In other words, the linear sequence of the progression of time accorging the orientalist settler colonial discourse is made up as follows: Where the ‘other’s’ (indigenous nations) past has progressed to their present, it (the indigenou’s present) is replaced with the ‘us’s’ present (of the settler colonial) so that there can only be one future – that of the ‘us’s’ (the settler colonial’s). Any residuals of the ‘other’s’ phases of time still in the present should be eliminated as they have (or must have) no future. In this sense, settler colonizers seem to be time-jacking137 the ‘other’s (indigenous nation’s) future indefinitely, rendering the latter non-existent. Patrick Wolfe has refered to settlercolonial tendency to genocide as manifesting “the logic of eliminantion… [which] refers to the summary liquidation of Indigenous people…”138 Therefore, according to the logical outcome of this settler-colonial-orientalist discourse, the ‘other’ nations should be made to have no future by physical elimination or by rendering them without souls, non-human, and therefore expendible physical relics with no place in the future in the contest over existence – the power to decided who conceptually and therefore existentially has a tomorrow (the ‘us’ or the ‘other’). In such a configuration, there can be no future where both the ‘us’ and the ‘other’ exist in this orientalist discourse. It follows according that any elimination practices of the indigenous is claimed by the settler colonizers to be primarily a ‘selfdefense’ from an indigenous reclaim of their temporal future. Hence, the seeming driving factor of total war waged by the settler colonials is not out of self-defence from actions by the indigenous nation may necessarily do in the present. Rather it represents and offensive by the settler colonizers to create a future totally void of indigenous participation or claim. In other words, if there are no indigenous left to participate, then there can be no indigenous re-claim to a future. The means to realize this seems to be through total war which assumes a temporal in a addition to an existential-eliminating dynamic: rendering the indigenous nations without a temporal present, thus cancelling both the indigenous’s past and future by eliminating the linking temporal component, the present and its physical manifestion in terms of indigenous people, culture, relics of heritage, and institutions which could shape their future

### Exclusion DA

#### Theres an EXCLUSION DA: Status quo westerncentrism in IR scholarship crowds out marginalized voices – a retooling of rhetoric is crucial now to include Asian perspectives of IR to disrupt white epistemologies

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Mapping the terrain of the ongoing debate over ‘non-western’ IR In these contexts, whether there are any substantial merits to developing a ‘non-Western’ IR theory and what such a theory would (or should) look like are topics of heated debate in contemporary IR. This interest in the theorisation of ‘non-Western’ IR results largely from discontent with the epistemic value of mainstream theories, namely realism, liberalism, and constructivism, all of which have ‘Western’ – or, more specifically, ‘Eurocentric’ (Patomaki, 2007) – analytical or normative underpinnings (Acharya and Buzan, 2017; Johnston, 2012). Western/Eurocentric theories, the criticism goes, misrepresent and therefore misunderstand much of ‘the rest of the world’ (Acharya, 2014: 647). In addition, advocates of ‘non-Western’ IR theory building often point out that Asia has cultures, institutions, norms, and worldviews that are inherently different from those derived from or advanced in Europe. Long-standing interests and growing endorsement Consider, for example, David Kang’s critique. In his well-known piece, ‘Getting Asia Wrong’, Kang (2003: 57–58) calls for ‘new analytical frameworks’, noting that ‘most international relations theories derived from the European experience of the past four centuries … do a poor job as they are applied to Asia’. Critiques of this kind have long served as a starting premise in theoretical studies on Asian IR. Almost two decades ago, Peter Katzenstein (1997: 1) wrote as follows: ‘Theories based on Western, and especially West European, experience have been of little use in making sense of Asian regionalism’. Similarly, Jeffrey Herbst (2000: 23) commented that ‘[i]nternational relations theory, derived from an extended series of case studies of Europe, has become notorious for falling short of accounting for the richness and particularity of Asia’s regional politics’. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan have made a similar argument in their edited volume, Non-Western International Relations Theory: ‘The puzzle for us is that the sources of international relations theory conspicuously fail to correspond to the global distribution of its subjects. Our question is “why is there no non-Western international theory?”’ (Acharya and Buzan, 2010: 1). Here, China’s rise has added momentum to long-standing attempts to build new or indigenous theoretical frameworks – especially within the Chinese IR community. Yaqing Qin at the China Foreign Affairs University argues that ‘Chinese IR’ theory ‘is likely and inevitabl[y] to emerge along with the great economic and social transformation that China has been experiencing’ (Qin, 2007: 313). The scholarly practices of building an IR theory ‘with Chinese characteristics’ are a case in point (Callahan, 2001, 2008) Although consensus on what ‘Chinese characteristics’ actually are has yet to be determined, many Chinese (and non-Chinese) scholars hold that the establishment of a Chinese IR theory or a ‘Chinese School’ of IR is desirable or ‘natural’ (Kristensen and Nielsen, 2013: 19; Qin, 2016b); in this light, Confucianism, Marxism, ‘Tianxia’ (all-under-heaven), and the Chinese tributary system are all cited as theoretical resources for Chinese IR (see, e.g. Kang, 2010; Qin, 2016a; Song, 2001; Wan, 2012; Wang, 2011; Xuetong, 2011; Zhang, 2012; Zhao, 2009). In short, there has been a great deal of studies that aim to ameliorate the Western parochialism of IR. This trend includes a strong and increasing commitment to the development of ‘national schools’ among non-Western (in particular, Chinese) IR scholars. In other words, many IR scholars in non-Western countries have made considerable attempts to discern their nations’ unique social ontologies or historical-cultural traditions in their quest to develop an indigenous IR theory or ‘non-Western’ IR.

### Knowledge production DA

#### Occidental stereotyping of China based upon perceptions from the Maoist era distorts the literature and all Oriental knowledge

Vukovich 11 [Daniel F. Vukovich is currently an Associate Professor at the University of Hong Kong., 11-21-2011, “China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the PRC”, Taylor & Francis, [https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203145579/china-orientalism-daniel-vukovich]//AA](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203145579/china-orientalism-daniel-vukovich%5d//AA)

You remember Kosygin at the 23rd Congress! ‘Communism means the raising of living standards,’ of course! And swimming is a way of putting on a pair of trunks! - Mao Zedong, as told to (or imagined by) Andre Malraux If it is repeated often enough will a truth-claim necessarily become a truth? Such appears to be the case with the verdict on historical Maoism. The demonization of the Mao era is a general, if under-explored feature of China studies and intellectual-political culture around the world - not least among liberal Chinese intellectuals.1 In this chapter I critique this production of truth about Chinese Maoism by documenting where it has occurred, and what new knowledge and figures of colonial discourse it turns upon. En route, I will argue that the “new” truth about the Mao era - perhaps not new but what was always already “known” or at least assumed by the U.S.-West - is an indispensible part of Sinological-orientalism. Indeed the demonization of Maoism is arguably the lynchpin of the entire discursive edifice surrounding the P.R.C. because it serves as what China is in the process of overcoming on its road to normality and political modernity. In that sense it is also a sign of what contemporary China still lacks. It is the presupposition of the construction of post-Mao China as becoming-the-same as “us.” The Mao era of socialist construction and mass mobilization is what China is recovering from; it is conceived of as some type of oriental aberration, a despotic nightmare from which it is still trying to fully awake; at the very least it is a space of negative difference from the present. Most simply put, the chief blame for China's lingering history of political, economic, and cultural deformation and “lag” lies with Mao Zedong and his Party state. This in itself is a highly interesting formulation. It is certainly better, in a liberal-humanist-Cold War kind of way, than older traditions of blaming China's problems on the Chinese character, race, or even Confucianism. But what it shares with such older views, in addition to an implicit teleology, is a refusal to take the actually existing, “Chinese” realities and views seriously as something other than negativity and lack. By this I mean that such views - the truth on Chinese Maoism - do not take the Chinese revolution or Chinese-Marxist developmental/constructive efforts seriously. Not in terms of either what they achieved (or even failed in), what was attempted or intended, the complexities and ambiguities of what resulted, nor in terms of the self-understanding of the era and its partisans, actors, or witnesses. Nor do the complexities and differences of contemporary China fare too much better; it is allowed to be an emergent and rising economy, but not so much an emergent society (to put this more conventionally). By “taking it seriously” I refer then not only to the Maoist accomplishments — its other failures notwithstanding - in political economy or social development, and its achievements in egalitarianism and human welfare. I refer more fundamentally and conceptually to the ways in which that revolution and post-1949 trajectory until at least 1979 understood itself, so to speak: what it said and did, and what it was trying to do. I want to emphasize its positive record, surely, but also its positivity or complexity, including this level of self-understanding and discourse. Above all else, the hostile or demonizing knowledge about the Mao era is premised upon the negation of Maoist discourse itself. By that, and following the work of Gao Mobo among others, I refer to the rational-practical-affective framework that enabled people to make sense of their lives and world during the Mao years. I characterize this further below, momentarily. But it is the negation of this discourse that, in turn, allows the Mao era to be re-coded as totalitarianism, extremism, brainwashing, terror. Or in somewhat more sympathetic codings: as sheer, sublime utopianism or something like a spiritualistic apotheosis of collective desire. It produces the triumphalism of China discourse vis-à-vis the Mao era: that we now know the awful truth. That discourse and that whole era need not be taken seriously aside from its body counts because it was, in a word, fake. That is a view that can be easily verified by liberal intellectuals on the mainland and diaspora, or by self-professed “dissidents” of the current regime. (It is not I think controversial to say that these largely Westernized and English fluent Chinese intellectuals, businessmen, and artists represent China to the West.) But this shift and regime of truth is about still more than the triumph of de-Maoification, the market mentality, liberalism, American education, the Cold War victory of the U.S.-West, and so on: it reflects not only a Cold War perspective but - as my analyses below and throughout this book attempt to show - is also a colonial discourse that turns upon orientalist tropes about despotism, cruelty, passivity, and irrationality running rampant in China. It marks China's essential difference from the normative U.S.-West, and again it is this Maoism that China must and is leaving behind. In short, this new knowledge of the Mao era marks the imbrication of Cold War (“totalitarian”) and colonial discourse within an orientalist production of knowledge. It is “new” in the sense that prior to the mid-1970s the “anti” views of the P.R.C. were always countered to a certain extent by the very visible specter of the Maoist revolution and discourse: their existence in China at least implied that the self-understanding of the Chinese - howsoever “brainwashed” - was different than that of the Cold War and racist discourse about Red China. There were far fewer “dissidents” and exiles, not to mention Sinologists, who could serve their representative functions. And one should not underestimate the (past) symbolic power and good name of China in the former Third World and various postcolonial contexts. With the Western triumphalism after the “end” of the Cold War as well as real de-Maoification in China, this is simply no longer the case. So, too, the resurgence of modernizationist and liberal-humanist discourse around the world marks the same eclipse. It is this shift that I wish to document below by examining how knowledge of the Mao era is produced in a way that smacks of colonial discourse - both in terms of old-fashioned (Cold War) orientalism and the enumerative modality investigated by Bernard Cohn among others in their studies of knowledge production under British imperialism. I begin with a discussion of Maoist discourse and of scholarship on the nature of Maoist governance; from there I will attend to codings of the relatively under-studied yet crucial period of the Great Leap Forward and its famine. While mapping the production of such Sinological knowledge, I also broach a wider argument: that this is a global phenomenon, a part of cultural/ideological globalization and its attendant spread of Eurocentrism and orientalism if also in liberal or other guises. What I am saying, in other words, is that despite the obvious and in other ways welcome increase of flows of information, commodities, and people in recent decades, what we have seen is in fact an increase in the orientalist production of knowledge. In the case of China, this turns fundamentally upon the negation of Maoist discourse in favor of an orientalist coding of the Mao era as aberration or nightmare.

#### Western propagation of knowledge has caused a “Sinologization” of global thought

Vukovich 11 [Daniel F. Vukovich is currently an Associate Professor at the University of Hong Kong., 11-21-2011, “China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the PRC”, Taylor & Francis, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203145579/china-orientalism-daniel-vukovich]//AA

The “Sinologization” of global thought The previous chapter examined a Cold War-colonial production of knowledge about the Mao era in general and the Great Leap Forward in particular. Of particular importance is not just the enumerative modality in general, but more specifically the work of American demographers and the British Indian, Nobel Laureate Sen in propagating a regime of truth about Mao and the famine of 1959-61. This is all to say, then, that this coding is indeed a global phenomenon and not limited to China experts. Given the long-standing importance of China to twentieth-century politics as well as the global influence of Maoism itself, from South Asia to Latin America and beyond, it is to be expected that there is such a thing as a global production of knowledge - a regime of truth - about Mao and Maoist China. And yet this phenomenon is rarely remarked upon as such within the academic field, not least because of the belief in objective or neutral knowledge. What this chapter aims to do is to make the case for the global distribution of such knowledge and to show that it does not simply hail from truth and expertise. What we have to deal with, instead, is the Sinologization or orientalization of global thought about China. By that I mean both the influence of authorized, “expert” knowledge and the imbrication - or inseparability - of this with more popular and self-evidentially orientalist/colonial forms of knowledge. What is at stake here are two standard problems from within the postcolonial and Marxist traditions, respectively, that have not been adequately addressed to the subject of modern China: the writing of the Other, and where incorrect ideas come from. It is here, then, where we can begin to track the global circulation of Sinological-orientalism, its system of dispersion, in this case the demonization of Chinese Maoism as a nightmarish aberration within China's incomplete but inevitable long march to Western modernity and liberal, democratic capitalism. But this abstract coding of China and the Mao period is subtended by a deep anxiety and at times paranoiac fear of its “massness,” and of its perceived threat to the West, especially its “freedom” and liberal individualism.1 Much of this discourse can be seen reflected and refracted in Don DeLillo's Mao II (1991), arguably his most prescient novel, at least in a symptomatic sense, in its obsession with the “threat” that global, non-Western “terrorism” presents to authorship, freedom, the liberal individual, and “modernity.” The novel's protagonist, Bill Gray, is a reclusive, Pynchonesque writer with severe writer's block. His two closest friends are his publisher Charles Everson and his live-in assistant Scott Martineau, whose girlfriend, Karen Janney, he has an affair with. Gray agrees to be photographed by a New York City photographer named Brita, who is doing a series of portraits of important writers. In a conversation with Brita and others, Gray laments the declining significance of literature in an age where “terrorists” and “crowds” have supplanted novelists’ function as the conscience and brain of a culture. The future belongs to crowds, as the text famously puts it in its opening prologue (itself a televisual scene of a mass wedding ceremony of the Unification Church, aka the “Moonies” of old). After this, Gray disappears again and secretly decides to go to the UK to speak on behalf of a Swiss poet who has been kidnapped and held hostage in war-torn Beirut. He then meets George Haddad, a representative of the Maoist group responsible for the kidnapping, and secretly agrees to go to Lebanon to negotiate the poet's release. En route, he is hit by a car in Cyprus, unknowingly lacerates his liver, and dies in the night. His last coherent thoughts are of wanting “devoutly to be forgotten,” as if in the end the crowds are victorious. The fate of the poet is left ambiguous. The novel ends with the photographer in Beirut, snapping photos of the Maoist leader of the same group (as if a confirmation of Gray's earlier remark about “terrorists”). With perfect American-colonial arrogance, for the last snap she suddenly tears off the hood of a boy, the leader's son, who has been guarding the door. Later, she more happily photographs a random wedding party on the streets outside her hotel, as if to say small apolitical crowds are still okay. Through it all, the novel is delivered in DeLillo's characteristically televisual imagery, his rich, minimalist dialogue, and omnipresent indirect discourse. Yet while the theme of crowds is central to the novel, with all the depth of some 1950s-era screed about mass society, it is in fact fully articulated to the theme of terrorism - of leftist, Maoist so-called “terrorism” in particular. The bulk of the novel's plot is centered on the “terrorist” kidnapping of the Swiss poet by a Lebanese resistance group in Beirut (one with a “Marxist component”) (124). The Swiss detail is significant when we recall that that place, for a certain imagination, remains the very paragon of neutrality and social, liberal democracy. Utopia achieved for the Europhilic intelligentsia perhaps. But for all the novel's resonances with the post 9/11 U.S.-West - and these are what make it prescient indeed - “terror” here signals less Islam than the very massness, the overwhelming numbers of “others” who seemingly refuse “individuality” or the autonomous self for a communal, collective identity, cause, and way of life -be it nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, Maoism, and so on. Or alternatively this is what makes the novel resonate so strongly with the new, postcolonial world system after 9/11. As one of DeLillo's editors put it: “Long before he had written anything Don told me he had two folders - one marked ‘art’ and the other marked ‘terror’.”2 The collective and the communal, while a seductive threat everywhere, just so happen to belong in the East. They are also seen as “backward” by all the major characters, including the narrator and implied author. The emotionally disturbed Karen is the only possible exception, and she is nonetheless pathologized throughout the text. To a significant extent, then, we also have to see the novel's lament about Maoist and other forms of terrorism as of a piece with the older, more familiar bogey of communism and the specter of the Red East. There is again an articulation between the colonial and the Cold War worldviews at work in this novel. Whether it affirms this or simply ambiguates it in more “postmodern” fashion is not our concern here. The fact that in the novel's Beirut there are other, “real” or Islamic fundamentalists in existence, as opposed to the Maoists/political radicals, underscores what I am claiming here. For the novel and presumably DeLillo, there is not much difference between the leftists and the fundamentalists, the Iranians and the Lebanese, or between the Moonies and the Maoists. This is what Spivak once pithily called an assimilation of the Other through non-recognition. Thus the first chapter opens inside a packed Yankee Stadium, as 6,500 “anonymous” couples (anonymous to whom?) and followers of Reverend Moon get married all at once; it ends with the narrator's ominous prognostication about the future belonging to crowds (16). By the end of the novel, with Brita watching that small wedding party in the streets of “the dead city” Beirut, we have been taken around much of the world outside the West (241). En route, and as noted earlier, the novel establishes a chain of equivalence between the Moonies, the various groups of the Lebanese civil war, the Iranian “masses” of the revolution and later of the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the Peruvian Maoists, and China. But it is a specifically Maoist China, even when the much-later Tiananmen protests are signified. The latter is established by both the image of the massive protest in Tiananmen Square, which occupies the novel's front pages in a cinematic “opening credits” form, and Karen's witnessing on television the aftermath of the bloody crackdown ordered by Deng Xiaoping (in reality the anti-Maoist par excellence). And yet, it is in fact impossible to say for certain that the opening, unspecified photo is in fact of Tiananmen 1989. It could just as easily be one of any number of Cultural Revolution rallies from decades before. So, too, Karen is enthralled by the portrait and name of Mao, as well as by “Mao suits” (fairly anachronistic by 1989) and the crowds. That, perhaps, is the point: it is all one, an undifferentiated mass society cathected to a Great Leader, external to and threatening the West. Clearly the 1991 novel is obsessed with Mao/Maoism, and its overall image of China is akin to the older, Cold War vision of an “army of blue ants.” What we have again, then, is an abstract and reductive yoking together of radically different - but all non-white - groups, cultures, nations, and moments in time. They form one chain of equivalence that is seen here as a vague but powerfully looming threat. It is a threat not just to individual lives (e.g. Karen's, Bill's, the poet's) but to an entire way of life and to the “self” as such. More specifically, this is the self - independent, coolly rational, introspective, and autonomous - of both Western liberal capitalism and, relatedly, of an earlier modernism and the figure of the artist-writer as the conscience or legislator-interpreter of “mankind.” The threat against this imaginary institution is established and made immanent to the U.S. in several ways. In addition to the opening “cult” ceremony, there is the presence of the name “Sendero Luminoso” (the Shining Path of Peruvian Maoism) spray-painted on ruined buildings in Tompkins Square Park in New York. When Karen asks someone where these guerrillas are, she is told “everywhere” (175). As Jeoffrey Bull has aptly noted, the novel then brings together these Maoists and the Beirut war by having, two pages earlier, people saying “Beirut, Beirut, it's just like Beirut” when they see fireballs from nearby gas main ruptures (173). As to the substance of the threat, this is left vague overall but still menacing (or perhaps menacing because vague). This is done in part through the invocation of the violence of the crowd as such, whether it is the Ayatollah's frenzied mourners nearly pulling his limbs apart, the violence in Tiananmen (burnt bodies), or the Swiss poet's likely demise at the hands of the terrorists/kidnappers. Moreover, the novel articulates this threat through - self-indulgent - dialogues on the eclipsed role of the artist/novelist. Thus Gray will comment to Brita that: Years ago I used to think it possible for a novelist to alter the inner life of the culture. Now bomb-makers and gunmen have taken that territory. They make raids on human consciousness. What writers used to do before we were all incorporated. (41) The so-called terrorists, then, have stolen the artists’ thunder and this privileged stratum has been “incorporated” to boot. Not incorporated by capitalism but by a certain shift in the Geist of the world: a rising, soon to be triumphant practice of and desire for “absolute being” and “All men one man” for “the end of time”; this is how DeLillo characterizes what the Maoists, Moonies and the like desire (163, 235, 16). They seek an erasure of the self through “cultish” belonging and through experiencing the “link to the fate of mankind,” and thereby living “in history” (82,235). To be fair, Mao II sees this as a universal, not explicitly “Oriental” Geist and problem, just as Karen serves in some sense as a foil character and moral antithesis to the narcissistic, and eventually quite pathetic protagonist and his assistant, Scott. But on the other hand, Karen is nonetheless consistently pathologized as being merely “postcult,” and it is no accident that, save for one photo of a European soccer crowd crushed against a fence, all the “terrorists” (Mao, the Ayatollah, Abu Rashid, the Shining Path) and their slavish followers or crowds are not-white (82). Not unlike how Kennan et al. saw totalitarianism, the threat originates in the “Asiatic” East. There is clearly an asymmetry and therefore a prejudice here, one rooted at the very least in anxiety if not the paranoia characteristic of much Western postmodern fiction.3 Bull, too, is almost on to this point when he notes - albeit uncritically - that “terrorists have taken control of the West's narrative (as Bill [Gray] predicted)” (222). Within this orientalist bifurcation of the world, China occupies the paramount place. As I will go on to explain shortly, it is a dichotomy that the novel unsettles and disturbs, or cannot quite contain. As Ryan Simmons has cogently argued, the “Salman Rushdie affair” following the Ayatollah's fatwa against the great Indian novelist is an important backdrop to the book; Rushdie may well be imaged in the protagonist himself as well as in the Swiss poet-kidnappee (Simmons 677). But few have commented on the centrality of “Maoism” and China in the novel, and when this has been done it is mostly along the lines of the above equivalence. The real, historical Mao and the P.R.C. are indeed assumed to be part of the same, naturalized chain and threat. Thus Mark Osteen will refer to Bill Gray's (and the novel's) opposition to “Maoist or terrorist monologism” in favor of “Bakhtinian heteroglossia” (661). This ahistorical conflation of Maoism and China with the Shining Path, revolutionary Iran, the Unification Church of Reverend Moon, and Abu Rashid (whose characterization as a Maoist has no historical basis itself) - in the novel and its scholarship - is, in short, deeply misleading as well as surprising in work as erudite as DeLillo's.

### Xenophobia DA

#### **Western culture fosters fear of foreigners, which can escalate into violence**

Karasapan 17 [Omer Karasapan, Omer Karasapan served 30 years at the World Bank. He now works with Strategies for Stability. Prior to joining the World Bank in 1989, he worked for Human Rights Watch as a consultant and also taught at the New York University., 4-12-2017, "Refugees, migrants, and the politics of fear," Brookings, [https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/04/12/refugees-migrants-and-the-politics-of-fear/]//AA](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/04/12/refugees-migrants-and-the-politics-of-fear/%5d//AA)

The fear of migrants and refugees, stoked by politicians, is setting a defining narrative for elections in the West. The Brexit vote directly played on these fears as did the U.S. elections with its narrative of Mexican “criminals and rapists,” both setting a tone for electoral victories that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago. The Dutch elections, where the nativist trend grew but was held at bay, also saw much negative rhetoric around Islam. With elections in France and Germany coming up, the trend seems unlikely to abate. It is worth remembering, however, that while the recent refugee crisis presents an easy target, the social tensions and challenges reflected in these elections are a decades-old phenomenon. The advent of refugees from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan certainly didn’t create these tensions. Nor did the accompanying economic migrants, who sought refuge in a Europe where identity politics had been part of the political landscape for decades. In the meantime, the reality of their links to crime and terrorism have been lost in harsh campaign politics. During the U.S. campaign, with loud assertions linking migrants and refugees to crime waves, the Sentencing Project noted, “Foreign-born residents of the United States commit crime less often than native-born citizens.” This is echoed by the libertarian Cato Institute, which reported, “All immigrants are less likely to be incarcerated than natives relative to their shares of the population”. The first comprehensive study in Germany to look at its 1 million refugees, noted, “The refugee influx to Germany in 2014 and 2015 wasn’t followed by a “crime epidemic.” Instead, “there were ‘muted increases’ in some criminal activity in the immediate aftermath of the record influx of refugees, which saw an uptick in drug crimes and fare-dodging in areas with bigger reception centers…also associated with increased minor crime for German citizens—partly explained by increased police presence.” Research points to an “immigrant paradox,” which isn’t fully understood according to Boston University’s Salas-Wright: “One theory is that people who pick up their lives and move to a foreign country and set up a new life tend… to be interested in making this new life work.” This likely holds true for refugees fleeing war, especially if they are with their family or are anchors for them. On refugees, migrants, and terrorism, the Migration Policy Institute, noted, “The United States has resettled 784,000 refugees since September 11, 2001. In those 14 years, exactly three resettled refugees have been arrested for planning terrorist activities… two were not planning an attack in the U.S. and the plans of the third were barely credible.” Another study looked at four decades of foreigners coming into the U.S., noting that “the chance of an American being murdered in a terrorist attack caused by a refugee is 1 in 3.64 billion per year while the chance of being murdered in an attack committed by an illegal immigrant is an astronomical 1 in 10.9 billion per year. By contrast, the chance of being murdered by a tourist on a B visa, the most common tourist visa, is 1 in 3.9 million per year.” What we do know is that from Orlando to San Bernardino and others, U.S.-born terrorists remain a far greater threat. This is also a significant factor in Europe as seen in attacks in Paris, Brussels, Copenhagen, and London. Yet here too it is worth remembering that attacks from radical Islamic groups in Europe are a decades-old phenomenon, long predating the recent influx of refugees and migrants. The reality is that the challenges of integrating some Muslim youth has indeed provided (a tiny) opening for terrorist recruitment in Europe. Fifteen years ago, the now infamous neighborhood of Molenbeek from where many of the Brussels and Paris attackers came, was known for riots “born out of desperation… in a neighborhood characterized by poor job prospects, bad housing and deficient education”—much like similar outbursts in the U.K., France, and elsewhere. There is also an emerging link between petty crime—another point of call for the disenfranchised and alienated—and terror groups. Islamic State is now deliberately tailoring its message to appeal to this small subset within the European Union’s 20 million Muslims. According to Professor Peter Neumann from King’s College London, “There is now a perfect fit between these young men and (IS) that has shed any attempt at serious theological discourse.” Alain Grignard, from Belgium’s counterterror agency, says that “Young Muslim men with a history of social and criminal delinquency are joining up with the Islamic State as part of a sort of ‘super-gang’”—enticements including “gamified” recruiting videos from IS. The channels through which terror and crime affect the West are overwhelmingly homegrown—including a trend of violence targeting these newcomers. Banning the displaced and migrants will have little impact on this challenge—a point underlined by the U.N. What will matter will be better integration of disenfranchised youth and support to narratives from Muslim communities in the West and elsewhere against the ideology of terror. Also worth remembering is that the vast majority of Muslims in the West and beyond are firmly against IS and their ilk, even with the outrages the nativists continue to inflict.

### Occidentalism DA

#### Occidentalism represents dominance and creates a binary in which it is in direct opposition to orientalism, promoting rivalries with the East

Massad 15 [Joseph Massad, Joseph Massad is Professor of Modern Arab Politics and Intellectual History at Columbia University., Spring 2015, "Orientalism as Occidentalism on JSTOR," History of the Present Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 2015), pp. 83-94), Duke University Press, [https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/historypresent.5.1.0083?searchText=orientalism&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Dorientalism%26so%3Drel&ab\_segments=0%2FSYC-6451%2Ftest&refreqid=fastly-default%3Aa93b208e3cce816a93457684324c83c1]//AA](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/historypresent.5.1.0083?searchText=orientalism&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Dorientalism%26so%3Drel&ab_segments=0%2FSYC-6451%2Ftest&refreqid=fastly-default%3Aa93b208e3cce816a93457684324c83c1%5d//AA)

In Orientalism, Edward Said’s efforts were dedicated to uncovering how the “Oriental” other of the Occidental self was formed and conjured up. His seminal book would also explicate the constitution of this Occidental self, an explication that would become generative of a large body of literature that followed in its footsteps. In this brief contribution, I argue that the lasting and ongoing impact of Orientalism is its uncovering of the Occidentalism that subtends Orientalist discourse and institutions. Whereas Said does not always name what Orientalism presupposes as “Occidentalism,” and although his engagement with the notion of Occidentalism in this book and in later writings is sparse and not always consistent with the theoretical apparatus that he constructs in Orientalism, the definition of Occidentalism that I offer is based, as will be shown, on a decidedly Saidean apparatus. The term has been rebarbatively appropriated and extracted from his text by critics, both sympathetic and antipathetic to his project. A careful reading of Said’s major line of argumentation in his book, however, offers a particular understanding of Occidentalism as the discourse through which what came to be constituted as the Occident was reactively formed, in the Nietzschean sense, by a series of projections that othered the entire world outside of this constituted Occident. Said explains that the Oriental conjures up the identity of the Occidental: “Such categories as impostor (or Oriental, for that matter), imply, indeed require, an opposite that is neither fraudulently something else nor endlessly in need of explicit identification. And that opposite is ‘Occidental.’”1 Examples include how “the ‘bizarre jouissances’ of Orientals serve to highlight the sobriety and rationality of Occidental habits.”2 Said concludes that the function of Orientalism in the twentieth century is as “a code by which Europe could interpret both itself and the Orient to itself.”3 He tells us while discussing the work of Ernest Renan that “it is not too much to say that Renan’s philological laboratory is the actual locale of his European ethnocentrism; but what needs emphasis here is that philological laboratory has no existence outside the discourse, the writing by which it is constantly produced and experienced. Thus even the culture he calls organic and alive—Europe’s—is also a creature being created in the laboratory and by philology.”4 Said’s astute reading of Raymond Schwab identifies this relationship in the latter’s work clearly: “In Schwab’s view, the Orient, however outré it may at first seem, is a complement to the Occident, and vice versa.”5 Orientalism then, given Said’s explications, is a, if not the, major component in the formation of Occidentalism’s putative object: the Occident. Whereas Said defined Orientalism clearly and unambiguously as “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) the ‘Occident,’”6 and as “a Western style of dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient,”7 he anticipated what Occidentalism would be without naming it when he added that “European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self.”8 He would clarify that “as much as the West itself, the Orient is an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the West. The two geographical entities thus support and to an extent reflect each other.”9 Said mentions the term Occidentalism ambivalently in Orientalism on a few occasions and brings it up briefly in subsequent writings, which would be later cited by his critics and political enemies. He seems to posit the term as sometimes operating as the opposite of Orientalism, its mirror image (rather than its “secret sharer”), which seems at odds with his understanding of Orientalism. But, as the following will show, he is not always clear that this is his intended meaning. Said announces early in the book that “to speak of scholarly specialization as a geographical ‘field’ is, in the case of Orientalism, fairly revealing since no one is likely to imagine a field symmetrical to it called Occidentalism.”10 What Said thinks this “reveals” is that for those who constituted themselves as Occidentals and who continue to constitute themselves as such to study Occidentalism, to acknowledge how they have formed themselves and been formed would undercut the very fiction of their claim that the Occident was a real place, and not an Idea. This would, in turn, overturn the binary which makes them able to study what they constituted as the Orient. In this sense, Occidentalism is always an uninterrogated essential point of departure for Occidental Orientalist subjects. As any type of symmetry between Orientalism and Occidentalism was not evident, something about Occidentalism in its distinctiveness from Orientalism struck Said as important to note. He tells us: One of the important developments in nineteenth century Orientalism was the distillation of essential ideas about the Orient [ . . . ] into a separate and unchallenged coherence; thus for a writer to use the word Oriental was a reference for the reader sufficient to identify a specific body of information about the Orient. This information seemed to be morally neutral and objectively valid; it seemed to have an epistemological status equal to that of historical chronology or geographical location. In its most basic forms, then, Oriental material could not really be violated by anyone’s discoveries, nor did it seem ever to be revaluated completely. Instead, the work of various nineteenth-century scholars and of imaginative writers made this essential body of knowledge more clear, more detailed, more substantial—and more distinct from ‘Occidentalism.’11 Again, here Said does not offer a definition of this “Occidentalism” nor an explanation of what it is. Rather, he seems to imply that the term designates a discursive lens through which Orientals represent the Occident, which again is not symmetrical to Orientalism, as it lacks its power as a dominating or authoritative discourse and set of institutions. In contrast to Said, Egyptian philosopher Hasan Hanafi uses “Occidentalism” in exactly this sense when he proposes that the others of Europe (Orientals, Africans, and Native Americans), especially Arabs and Muslims, should study the Occident’s Orientalism not as source material to understand Arab and Muslim civilization or the Arab and Muslim self, but rather as an object of study which would allow them to study Europe and the Occident in a “neutral” way. Instead of idealizing Europe and falling in the trap of “westernization,” they would be undertaking this work without seeking or possessing power over the Occident.12 Said’s last reference to Occidentalism is found on the last page of Orientalism—lodged in the very lesson that he hopes his book will impart to future generations: If this book has any future use, it will be as a modest contribution to [ . . . ] challenge [worldwide Orientalist hegemony], and as a warning: that systems of thought like Orientalism, discourses of power, ideological fictions [ . . . ] are all too easily made, applied, and guarded. Above all, I hope to have shown my reader that the answer to Orientalism is not Occidentalism. No former ‘Oriental’ will be comforted by the thought that having been an Oriental himself he is likely—too likely—to study new ‘Orientals’—or ‘Occidentals’—of his own making.13 This is perhaps the most perplexing of Said’s invocations of the term. Whereas on the previous two occasions, he demonstrated clearly that Occidentalism could not be the opposite of or even the same (“symmetrical”) as Orientalism, indeed that it would be an impossible phenomenon altogether, here he conjures it up as a potential “answer” to the “challenge” of Orientalism. Yet Said cautions against this dialogic correspondence, which implies that Occidentalism, as the opposite of Orientalism, can be willed or chosen by Orientals answering the question or “the challenge” of Orientalism. But if Orientalism “is the whole network of interests inevitably brought to bear on (and therefore always involved in) any occasion when that particular entity ‘the Orient’ is in question,” then in the ongoing age of European Empires and their U.S. extension, how could Occidentalism, if defined as the opposite of Orientalism, be possible at all?14 I find that this third mention is the weakest of Said’s invocations of the term and smacks of a proleptic political defensiveness that posits a liberal egalitarianism between two incommensurable terms that cannot be equalized. Here Said seems to suggest that Orientals could answer the challenge of Orientalism with an Occidentalism of their own; thus he posits Orientals and Occidentals as equal terms and subjectivities, after he had already shown us that they could only exist as a binary in a hierarchy that structured their inequality a priori. Also, in this last invocation he seems to present Orientalism and Occidentalism as ontologies and epistemologies that are not connected to institutions of power—including economic, military, social, ideological, and political—although he had previously insisted that this was the case with Orientalism. In fact, given his other explicit invocations of Occidentalism and his implicit references to it when he speaks of what Orientalism presupposes, we can see clearly that Occidentalism is indeed enmeshed in the very same network of powerful institutions. The Occident and Occidentals are thereby produced through the ruse of presupposing their existence as anterior to the discourse and the institutions that produce them in the first place. Both Said and his analysis of Orientalism in the book would be accused by facile critics of being “Occidentalist” or “reverse Orientalist,” pushing Said into more defensiveness in later writings. In Culture and Imperialism, for example, he restated his argument in a different, even more damning, way: “We [American intellectuals] have rarely been so fragmented, so sharply reduced, and so completely diminished in our sense of what our true (as opposed to asserted) cultural identity is. The fantastic explosion of specialized and separatist knowledge is partly to blame: Afrocentrism, Eurocentrism, Occidentalism, feminism, Marxism, deconstructionism, etc.”15 This defensive posture is ironically manifest in the very book where Said expands on his notion of Orientalism to include Europe’s relationship with the entire world. As he informs us at the outset, “About five years after Orientalism was published in 1978, I began to gather together some ideas about the general relationship between culture and empire that had become clear to me while writing that book . . . I have tried here to expand the arguments of the earlier book to describe a more general pattern of relationships between the modern metropolitan West and its overseas territories, [including] Africa, India, parts of the Far East, Australia, and the Caribbean.”16 What is remarkable in the list of “isms” that Said invokes above is that “Occidentalism” seems out of place amongst them (as is Eurocentrism). What comes across most of all in this list, aside from Said’s irritation and impatience with the other terms and the proliferation of their “isms,” is his seeming inattention once again to the asymmetries between Occidentalism (and Eurocentrism) and the rest of the isms he lists. Said’s defensiveness is manifest throughout his “Afterword” to Orientalism, published in 1994, where he sought to fend off those who attacked his book for allegedly being “antiWestern” as opposed to being an analysis of how the Occident/West came to be.17 He would later make the mistake, including in a 2003 new preface to Orientalism, of falling into the unfortunate trap of a liberal equivalence between Orientalist-inspired imperial jingoism in the United States and Arab and Muslim “anti-Americanism,” thus echoing the last paragraph of the 1978 edition of the book where he had forewarned against the use of Occidentalism as a response to Orientalism, which I mentioned above.18 Still, this defensiveness did not halt his interest in how Occidentalism worlds the world of Europe and non-Europe. This concern, which haunted him till the end of his life, is invoked again as the problematic of identitarian essentialism and binaries in his late book, Freud and the Non-European. 19 I take Said’s first definition of Orientalism as also applicable to Occidentalism, but I have rewritten his words with a slight modification: Occidentalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between (most of the time) “the Orient” (but often the entire world that lies outside what is defined or imagined as the “Occident”) and the “Occident;” it is a “Western style of dominating” the entire knowable world, including the Orient and the Occident.20 In this context, Said’s judgment, which alienated many Europeans and Euro-Americans, should be slightly modified. He states: “It is therefore correct that every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric. Some of the immediate sting will be taken out of these labels if we recall additionally that human societies, at least the more advanced cultures, have rarely offered the individual anything but imperialism, racism, and ethnocentrism for dealing with ‘other’ cultures.”21

### Poststructural DA

#### Poststructural DA---the AFF reproduces ‘War on Terror’ logics that establish gendered and oriental classificatory frameworks that naturalize Otherization as a ‘truth’ for the construction of Western imagination

Khalid 17 (Maryam Khalid | *Gender, Orientalism, and the ‘War on Terror’: Representation, Discourse, and Intervention in Global Politics* pg 9-11 | DOA: 7/16/2022 | SAoki)

---DA = discourse analysis, not disad (or is it?)

I apply a poststructural DA approach to reading ‘texts’ (as words, images, sounds, anything through which we aim to communicate meaning) through identifying as discursive attempts to ‘fix’ as legitimate certain knowledges and ‘realities’. The key analytical techniques I use are presupposition, predication, pre/proscription, and (re)production, 4 to uncover the contingent bases (contingent on gendered and orientalist logics and knowledge) that discursive practices seek to mask and naturalise as ‘truth’ (Martin 2000, 25). I look at how what is presupposed and predicated about people, places, things, ideas, functions to present as true particular knowledge and ‘identities’ through particular verbs, adverbs, and adjectives (that is, how characteristics are attributed to subjects and objects). Specifically, I explore how the Bush administration’s discursive practices construct the appropriate ‘Self’ and inappropriate ‘Other’ in terms of logics of gender that privilege particular expressions of masculinity (over femininities and inappropriate masculinities), and logics of orientalism (and broader racialised logics) that privilege whiteness and ‘Westernness’ over non-white and ‘Eastern Others’ through relational distinctions (free/oppressed, civilised/barbaric, benevolent/threat, for example) structured according to hierarchical logics of gender and of race/orientalism (in which masculinity, maleness, whiteness, and ‘Westernness’ are privileged), particularly in terms of their deployment in constructing narratives of intervention (Doty 1993b, 306; Milliken 1999b, 232). In establishing background knowledge and subject/object qualities, analysing presupposition and predication along with pre/proscription can show how a causality that prescribes ‘truth’ is asserted. In delimiting ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’, I see discourses as pre/proscriptive because they function to exclude or demand particular actions based on the ‘knowledge’ they assert (Griffin 2009, 43–44). That is, once a ‘fact’ has been established through presupposition and predication, the conclusions drawn from these ‘facts’ are also discursively established as ‘truth’; processes of pre/proscription attempt to ‘fix’ (albeit partially) certain ‘truths’, ‘facts’, and ‘knowledge’, and from these, the actions, behaviours, conclusions that logically follow as ‘acceptable’. ‘War on Terror’ discourse, I argue, prescribes certain desirable characteristics (on which the ‘Self’ is predicated) and performances (of masculinity, for example) and proscribes others (for example, behaviours toward women ascribed to the barbaric ‘Other’) based on logics of gender and orientalism, and draws ‘natural’ or ‘logical’ conclusions from these. This is where (re)production occurs through, for example, the use of classificatory schemes that categorise people into identity groups to which they ‘naturally’ belong, and which produce hierarchies of identity that are also based on naturalised ‘truths’ about the world and its people. For example, particular identities constructed through predication, such as backward Afghans, oppressed women, dangerous Muslim/Arab men, pre/proscribe ‘logical’ actions (or inactions) such as oppressed (without agency) Afghan women, irrational and uncontrolled barbaric Afghan men, and a benevolent, civilised US. From these ‘truths’ it can be concluded in official ‘War on Terror’ discourse that ‘oppressed Afghan women’ need to be ‘saved’ by the ‘benevolent and superior US’ (through military intervention). These processes also need to be understood in terms of the productive power of discourses, that is, productive of power, in naturalising and making ‘truth’ of the knowledge(s), ‘facts’, narrative, realities, meanings, and identities that discourses speak of, construct, and order. Through continually employing discursive processes (of presupposition, predication, pre/ proscription), they are (re)productive of the ‘meanings, subject identities, their interrelationships, and a range of imaginable conduct’ (Doty 1996, 4) defined by the discourse. (Re)production is particularly important for my analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 , as the ways in which ‘War on Terror’ discourse expanded since its beginning in September 2001 to function both consistently (in terms of its broadest logics) and adapt to changing events (in terms of specific narratives) through the 2001–2003 ‘War on Terror’ period, resulting in two military interventions (in Afghanistan and Iraq) that were highly connected to each other in this discourse. A logic of difference (‘us’/‘them’, ‘East’/‘West’) underlies this, which operates to (temporarily) ‘fix’ these differences, and the contingency of this logic is itself masked by discursive practices (Doty 1996, 8–11). For example, official US ‘War on Terror’ discourse functions to make ‘natural’ certain identities, and structures them according to gendered and orientalist assumptions, but the way it does this is contingent on the successful ‘silencing’ of other possibilities and representations. That is, official US ‘War on Terror’ discourse is contingent on marginalising those representations and narratives that challenge the ‘truth’ of the assumptions and understandings that shape this discourse. Thus the analysis of how discursive representations are made ‘natural’ (through processes of presupposition, predication, pre/proscription, articulation, interpellation, and (re)production) also requires engagement with how identities and categorisation in discourse are contingent and how the assumptions of, and knowledge offered in, particular discourses are not ‘natural’ but constructed. I use analytical methods of juxtaposition and deconstruction to demonstrate that the world can be interpreted differently from the world as it is discursively constructed in official US ‘War on Terror’ discourse. Using textual analysis to interrogate the basic assumptions of texts (deconstruction) and drawing on alternative representations of events, issues, or identities that are not acknowledged in this discourse ( juxtaposition), I seek to unsettle the privileged knowledge that informs official US ‘War on Terror’ discourse.

### Discourse shapes realities

#### Studies prove that representations that demonize the Other increase the likelihood of conflict by providing justification for aggressive military action.

Gray ‘19 [Gavan Patrick Gray; College of Policy Studies Department of Policy Studies Professor; September 2019; “The New Orientalism: The Influence of Media Representation of ‘the Other’ in International Affairs”; Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Special on Heterodoxy in Global Studies; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335915350\_The\_New\_Orientalism\_The\_Influence\_of\_Media\_Representation\_of\_'the\_Other'\_in\_International\_Affairs; accessed 7-20-2022; AH]

The filter presented by media coverage exists on a number of levels; however, the scope of this article focuses only on two aspects: the lack of complexity, and the lack of humanity. In the first instance the presentation of the state in the form of a monolithic entity leads to the reduction of its human component, in terms of citizenry and culture, to a single representative individual. This figurehead, as we have seen has been the case with figures such as Putin, Assad, Kim, Hussein, becomes an easy target for media demonization. The danger lies in the possibility that by presenting this figure as both representative of the state, and as a personification of clear black and white morality, it becomes easy for the media’s audience to come to view the state itself, and by extension the citizens of that state as extensions of this clear black and white morality. This tendency is exacerbated by the second element of sidelining representation of the wider population and their culture and instead focusing only on affairs of state: security, politics, economic issues, etc. There is strong evidence that these patterns are likely to produce greater acceptance for military action, especially if framed as a ‘just’ act of retribution for moral transgressions. Berinsky (2007) found that citizens are most strongly influenced by elite attitudes, typically expressed through mass media promotion of the opinions of professed policy experts, in deciding whether to support or oppose military action. When these messages are framed in terms of good versus evil, or as confronting a foreign villain, there is an even stronger tendency to offer unconditional support (Liberman, 2006). These patterns are tied to our deep-seated distrust of ‘the other’, especially when tied to a sense of anger or hostility (Kim, 2014). Additionally, when the ‘out group’ is perceived as a cohesive whole there is a heightened desire to achieve retribution or inflict punishment (Liberman & Skitka, 2019). Clearly these patterns can only be enhanced by both media personification of the state as a whole in the form of the all powerful leader, and through the lack of awareness of the diversity and humanity of the state’s citizenry that exists as a side effect of distorted and imbalanced thematic framing of the state in question. The analysis here clearly shows certain trends at play in how different states are covered. Despite each state’s importance in world affairs they are treated differently by the media. This is, of course, perfectly natural as, depending upon their size, relationships and policies, they will play different roles, and have a greater or larger impact on specific areas of news because of this. In other words, it is understandable, to an extent, that an imbalance in fields of coverage exists. Nonetheless, the manner in which they are represented will have an impact on public perceptions and these will, in turn, have an impact on how the public responds to calls for aggressive military or political responses to the states in question, potentially making such military responses more tempting as a first, rather than last, response. From the results, there appears to be a clear correlation between a state’s status as either threat or ally and its media representation. In the case of Japan, there is a significantly higher focus of media attention on cultural stories that reflect the more human or natural aspects of the country, and an inversely weak tendency to focus on its leader. In this case, Shinzo Abe, the Prime Minister of Japan, is not simply a temporary state leader. He has been in power longer than the five preceding Prime Minister’s combined and was Japan’s preceding Prime Minster before those five took power. He is, by far, the most dominant figure in twenty-first century Japanese politics yet he is comparatively rarely the focus of Western reporting on his country despite his involvement in a number of political scandals that might have further justified such attention. The argument might be made that, unlike Putin and Xi, Abe is not an authoritarian leader. Yet in the same two year period, King Salman of Saudi Arabia, a Western ally despite his authoritarian rule, features just once in headlines from the New York Times (a 300:1 ratio against headlines featuring the state name) and five times in the Guardian (a 40:1 ratio). In the same manner, Japan’s general populace, its social issues and its culture receive greater attention despite the fact that both China and Russia have equally rich, vibrant societies capable of providing ample fodder for interesting and illuminating articles. Even in regard to more neutral ‘news’ stories, focusing on criminal events, natural disasters or reporting of unusual occurrences, there is a clear discrepancy in the amount of coverage Japan receives in comparison to the other states. It is hard to say whether such trends are a deliberate pattern designed to produce specific reactions in the audience or an unconscious bias that exists within the media itself, leading them to shy away from the investigation of and reporting on more human-oriented news regarding countries commonly perceived as threats. The reasons for the tendency among journalists and their host organizations to do this is something that might be examined in future research. The important factor is that a bias in the presentation of these countries does exist and it is one that is likely to contribute to the adoption of more two-dimensional, monolithic, institutionally-oriented perceptions of the states in question that exacerbate the natural tendency of audiences to view foreign nations with a higher level of suspicion and moral certitude than they do their own. As such, in times of high tension, where the possibility of military conflict between the West and these states becomes a real possibility, the patterns employed by the media in such coverage are likely to allow military options, which should always be a last recourse, to be adopted with greater ease and acceptance than they otherwise might. The institutions of the media have a powerful and important role, both within their host societies and beyond. They have the power to promote greater understanding and awareness among the states of the world by highlighting the appeal of foreign cultures, and the social patterns that reveal the common bonds of humanity that are shared by diverse people. That the media is moving in a different direction that limits such awareness-raising solely to states viewed as political allies is not simply a missed opportunity for enhancing global stability and peace, but a dangerous trend that is likely to increase the likelihood of future conflicts by seizing upon military action as a justifiable default response to perceived transgressions, rather than a policy of last resort.

### AT binary DA

#### Orientalism is not binary-its dogmas can include a wide range of variations and serves to be a hegemonic discourse between the west and the other, rather than the West and East.

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In an essay surveying the impact of Edward Said’s seminal text Orientalism1 on film studies, Gerald Sim claims that “there are few film scholars who demonstrate command of Said’s full thesis,” and that the focus has primarily been on Orientalism’s Foucauldian pedigree, at the expense of its humanist and Marxist sources.2 A common critique of Orientalism is that it suffers from the same essentialist binarism that its author identified in Orientalist discourse.3 I shall argue instead that Said’s analysis is more nuanced than is often implied, while remaining a fairly clear paradigm that can help to both locate patterns within Western film representations of the East and evaluate degrees of conformance to Orientalist stereotypes. In particular, I shall examine exoticism as a fundamental ingredient in Orientalist fiction, one defined by a paradoxical interplay between attraction and repulsion that reveals an inherent ambivalence towards the Orient. Superficial readings of Orientalism have overlooked exoticism’s ambivalent nature, and thus partially misunderstood the West’s fantasy about Asian cities such as Shanghai and Singapore as idealized, imaginary spaces.

The commercial sea trade between China and America in the mid-nineteenth century involved the use of clipper ships anchored at ports on the West Coast of the United States. Trips across the Pacific Ocean could include an outbound journey from San Francisco to Shanghai, allowing some Chinese men to return home after they had made enough money from the California Gold Rush of 1849, and an inbound journey featuring a cargo of tea, silk, porcelain, spices, and other goods purchased in China. The speedy clipper could have as many as thirty-five sails, requiring extra hands to operate them, which became problematic for boarding masters when sailors decided to jump ship and prospect for gold instead of unfurling acres of canvas. The resulting shortage of skilled labour led to the widespread practice of forcibly kidnapping men to serve as sailors, known as crimping or shanghaiing. Various techniques were used, from serving drinks spiked with drugs, to knocking people over the head, as portrayed in the film Shanghaied (Charlie Chaplin, 1915). Shanghaiing was made illegal in 1915 by the US Congress with the Seamen’s Act, but by that point the association between kidnapping by rendering someone unconscious and heading for Asia had been cemented in the popular imagination. To be shanghaied has also come to designate a general sense of disorientation caused by the mysteries of the Orient and, more specifically, to refer to the Western male’s fear (or fantasy) of being overpowered by a dragon lady in Chinatown.

I shall refer to Euro-American narrative fiction films set in Singapore, particularly the Bette Davis film The Letter (William Wyler, 1940) and the recent action thriller Hitman: Agent 47 (Aleksander Bach, 2015), to illustrate the aforementioned Orientalist alternation between fear and desire, and to underscore the point that Said’s model does in fact provide opportunities for a multi-dimensional study of filmic texts. Singapore was chosen in part due to its multi-ethnic identity, composed primarily of diasporan Chinese originally from coastal provinces such as Guangdong, Fujian, and elsewhere, as well as Malays and Tamils. This diverse mix more easily reveals the artifice of Orientalism, given the tendency to portray the East with a broad stroke, which in Hollywood films can create the impression that Singapore is an ethnically homogenous Chinese city similar to Hong Kong, for instance. The historical contexts in which these films were produced and the periods they represent (Singapore as a wild, nineteenth-century Eastern port, a colonial entrepôt for the export of rubber in the thirties, a modern banking centre in the nineties, etc.), can also be a significant parameter in gauging variations, not so much in the degree of empirical misrepresentation of Singapore, but rather in the Westerner’s self-perception visà-vis the East. Focusing exclusively and systematically on depictions of a single location rather than cherry-picking films set in different Asian countries should be a useful way to assess the variety of genres that engage in Orientalist discourse. My research has uncovered over seventy feature-length narrative fiction films set in Singapore, but since the present article is concerned mainly with the application of Saidian dogmas to film, an exhaustive analysis of the Orientalist Singapore filmography cannot be included, although it is hoped that the sampled films, specifically the classic melodrama and contemporary action films mentioned above, will provide a sense of why Singapore has been one of the main exotic destinations in the history of Hollywood cinema. Other such locales include Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tangier, Casablanca, Calcutta, Macao, and Istanbul, all of which “provide a suitably romantic, mysterious and colourful background for thrillers, adventure films and romantic dramas, a sort of composite Orient.”5 Singapore was a privileged trading hub in the British Empire that inspired many literary and filmic narratives embodying Said’s dogmas, whereas Shanghai, as a frequent non-stop destination for American sailors in the nineteenth century, has the added distinction of functioning as a verb, especially in its passive form, that refers broadly to what might be termed the Orientalist peril.

It must be noted that, in spite of the significant influence of Said’s Orientalism on the development of post-colonial studies, references to this text in the film studies literature are uneven. Film scholars have usually engaged in textual analyses focusing on stereotypical representations of Asian cultures and peoples, often with a brief acknowledgement of Said’s foundational work, but without addressing its specific arguments directly.6 One exception might be Ella Shohat and Robert Stam’s Unthinking Eurocentrism, although this changes the terms as well as the scope of the analysis, on the grounds that Eurocentrism is the broader concept, which includes not only East–West but also North–South relations, as well as relations with Indigenous Nations.7 However, there has been little attempt to discuss Said’s own summary of his argument, namely the four dogmas of Orientalism, a list of themes or cultural stereotypes that actually describe Eurocentrism quite well.8 In fact, Shohat and Stam provide a partial (and unacknowledged) response of sorts to Said’s dogmas, as a kind of complementary mirror image of or flip side to Orientalism, in the form of five “mutually reinforcing intellectual tendencies” that describe Eurocentric discourse.9 Ironically perhaps, the conceptual breadth of these tendencies is narrower than that of Said’s dogmas, because they focus almost exclusively on Western political history (specifically, on the enduring co-presence of democracy and totalitarianism), eliding other social and cultural institutions. In contrast, Said himself had already engaged in a similar terminological broadening a year prior to the publication of Shohat and Stam’s study, when he released Culture and Imperialism (1993). In this self-described sequel to Orientalism, Said provides another list of five themes, meant to outline the ideological relationships between culture and imperialism, drawn from a number of disciplines, including ethnography, history, and literary studies.10

The fact that Said’s four dogmas are listed on pages 300–301 of Orientalism may in itself partly explain why the dogmas have been overlooked, perhaps by impatient scholars expecting to extract the essence of an important book’s argument in its introduction. The first dogma establishes the Orient’s incommensurable difference from, and inferiority to, the Occident. These are the two key features of Orientalist discourse, according to Said, and arguably the most controversial: its stark binarism and its axiological nature. Not surprisingly, this also happens to be the first theme mentioned in Culture and Imperialism. We may note that here the opposition is no longer between the West and the East exclusively, but between the West and the rest:

On the fundamental ontological distinction between the West and the rest of the world there is no disagreement. So strongly felt and perceived are the geographical and cultural boundaries between the West and its non-Western peripheries that we may consider these boundaries absolute.11

The binarism allows one to polarize Orientalism further by overlaying the civilizational distinction between East and West, which by default includes religion and race, by adding other categories of identity such as gender, class, and sexuality. So one could line up the binaries mentioned in all four dogmas, creating two columns of adversarial terms. The West is of course associated with the Self, and described as good, rational, developed, humane, superior, modern, scientific, diverse, and safe, whereas the East is the domain of the Other, and can only be bad, aberrant, undeveloped, savage, inferior, primitive, superstitious, uniform, and dangerous.

Listing these paired terms shows how different they are, how they refer to different concepts that range from identifying types of economic development, modes of knowledge acquisition, moral behaviour, and so forth. This may strike one as an informal list of features, but the common thread, indeed the structuring principle, of these varied terms is the assignment of positive and negative values, which is meant to highlight the hegemonic quality of Orientalism, as a political discourse that seeks to justify its will to dominate others. Said’s primary aim was to expose the binarism of Orientalism as an axiological rather than a logical system. It does not necessarily follow that the apparent binarism of his own method, which is partly a rhetorical matter, represents a contradiction. It may help to recall that he explicitly rejects the notion of Occidentalism, for instance, as an equally essentialist and symmetrical response to Orientalism, which can only support belligerent ideas such as the Clash of Civilizations.12

### AT: China Threat Real

#### Reject the aff’s Westernized studies – they reflect a securitized narrative of the China that does more to demonstrate Western Sino-panic than actual information about China.

Bergsten ‘20 [Lisa Bergsten; Sweedish Defense university + Master’s Programme in Politics and War ;Fall 2020; “Evil Monsters and Machines”; https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1525320/FULLTEXT01.pdf; accessed 7-16-2022; AH]

There has been a lot of research done on China within the academic field of security studies. Researchers have studied the **Western view of China** from both critical and non-critical perspectives. Some research is a **Western attempt to understand** and predict the tactics and strategies used by China. Ratner (2011) argues that it is important to look at the Chinese government through different perspectives, and not only strategic ones, and tries to perceive the emergent security threats which China will have to handle in the future. Zhang (2019) investigates how the PRC use coercion, both military and non-violent coercion as a tactic against other states in the South China Sea. Saunders (2020) explores China’s strategies and calculations when it comes to their national security. He looks at aspects such as their **modernisation of their military** as well as their international and regional cooperation and diplomacy in both military and other security fields to analyse how China is trying to secure its strong position in the world order. The focus is on how China is protecting its national interests overseas by looking at their military strategies, and their peacekeeping operations to better understand China’s behaviour (Saunders 2020). Overall, these **studies do not tell us that much about China, as they are still from a Western perspective**. Other studies about China focuses on how the West views China. Möller (2007) gives an account of how the West has researched China from the 80s until the early 2000s. He looks at how the debates have gone from discussing multipolarity to China’s rise, and conclude that the research has been dominated by different strands of thought at different times: The evolution of the European debate over two decades points to an early dominance of Sinological exceptionalists, followed by a challenge by “internationalists” that pulled the Sinologists back in conceptional terms, followed in turn by the emergence of constructivism that provided the Sinologists with an excuse to once again turn exceptionalist (Möller 2007, 183). Hook, through a descriptive study, gives an account of how the British threat perception of China has changed and developed from 1945-2000, with a focus on Hong Kong and how the handover of Hong Kong to China affected it (Hook 2004). Roy (1996, 758) conducted a literature review over the different arguments on the pro-China vs anti-China stances politically. Focusing on the China threat, the arguments he presents concern regional instability and how China could transform into a superpower which would increase both their power and threat level to the West. More recently, Song (2015) did a securitisation analysis with a poststructuralist approach and analyses how the **West securitises China from three different perspectives**. One of the more interesting pieces of research is by Pan Chengxin (2012), who discusses how, in the current Western research on the rise of China, China is usually approached either as a security threat or as a country full of economic opportunities. Building onto arguments by Said, Clifford, and Geertz about the autobiographical nature of knowledge, Pan argues that **most studies about China’s rise** to power say more about how the West views itself rather than **producing actual useful knowledge about China**. Two paradigms (or narratives), opportunity and threat, perpetuate the **East as something Other to the West** (Pan 2012, 43). Focusing on this othering, Pan argues that it “is not so much about treating others as threats per se as it is about the employment of such discursive tactics as imposition, reduction, and denial when it comes to understanding other’s subjectivities” (Pan 2012, 56). Furthermore, using the threat paradigm when looking at China tells us about how the West is afraid to be treated like they have treated others in history; the **West is afraid to be colonized, conquered by China**. This paradigm is built onto ideas about Western superiority due to knowledge – i.e. modernity and technology – which allows/have allowed them to justify not only the current world order but also colonisation (Pan 2012, 43ff). Hence, it includes ideas of **Orientalism**, ‘the white man’s burden’ etc. Through representing China as a monolithic whole, dismissing its subjectivities, and/or imposing onto it a singular, fixed subjectivity of power politics, the **“China threat**” paradigm acts as a discursive construction of an **objectified Other**, cast as an Other and threatening object, China by definition lacks the kind of rationality and subjectivity that are characteristic of the Western knowing subject (Pan 2012, 55).

#### Perceived threats of Chinese technological dominance inaccurate and nonsense – rather, they are sinotechnophobic projections of Western technological insecurity and an inability to move towards the future.

Mahoney ‘22 [Josef Gregory Mahoney; Josef Gregory Mahoney is professor of politics at East China Normal University in Shanghai, where he also directs the International Centre for Advanced Political Studies and the international graduate programme in politics;6-14-22; “China’s Rise as an Advanced Technological Society and the Rise of Digital Orientalism”; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-022-09817-z#Sec5; accessed 7-17-2022; AH]

The role of theory here is to provide the connective tissue of ideas and concepts to help us perceive the bigger picture and the various intersections within, changing and moving through time, but anchored with examples in a material reality that is familiar to us. The role of theory however is not explain everything perfectly. Nevertheless, my purpose has been to illustrate the role that advancing China as a technological society has played during its modern development, how this has in turned been received by others. What we find is that each period has been deeply entwined with competitive nationalisms and often, various forms of cultural, political and even racial discrimination. I have not discussed whether Sino(techno)phobia is in some way justified. This is the defining concern among those who assert that Chinese technology is dangerous, even without the taint of Digital Orientalism. To be sure, Chinese technology can now compete, and perhaps “win” in a decade or so; but it did not start the world down the path of competitive nationalism, imperialism or hegemony, nor did it innovate the first technological society. China can still argue that its advances have been to secure sovereignty and national wellbeing and not hegemony, arguments that are less credible elsewhere. This is why in part I find arguments advanced by some against Huawei, for example, to be disingenuous. Given what we know of actual American practices—including unregulated tech giants with self-serving agendas (including selling access to malign and anti-American interests), as well as US governmental spying through US-tech based networks, even on allies, and the fact that after 9/11 that the US government could access private and academic networks held by American firms and universities with little to no judicial oversight—the blacklisting of Chinese firms because they “might” engage in similar tactics at some point, and to characterize this as defending liberal values against communism, is complete nonsense. Indeed, as others have pointed out, there are constructive ways for Huawei to comply with the cybersecurity laws wherever they do business [26], and unlike many American firms, there’s no evidence that they haven’t done so. This is why Mayer and I described the continuing US-led campaign against Huawei as exemplifying Sino(techno)phobia and Digital Orientalism [45]. I have not discussed whether there is Chinese fear of Western technology, and how this relates to Sino(techno)phobia. To be sure, the Chinese are wary of any technology that compromises sovereignty and security. While the West and particularly the US have increasingly flirted with the fantasy of technological autarky, of decoupling from Chinese technology, the same can be said about China seeking autonomy and independence. But it should be noted that in the US, it’s common to cry loudly of potential threats, while in China, it’s generally taboo to do so unless those threats can be countered effectively. That said, we should acknowledge the increasing trend of technology securitization and strong fusions between civilian and military technology in both countries and the mutual fear this creates. Much is made about China’s intention of demonstrating the superiority of its system relative to Western forms of liberalism, with such rhetoric peaking again with what some in the West view as Chinese triumphalism associated with its successful efforts to contain the outbreak (e.g., [80]). But this overstates the role of ideology in policymaking and pits Marxism spuriously as the central antagonist in this confrontation [44]. Marxism did normalize technological development and the emergence of China’s technological society as a material means for reestablishing sovereignty and security. But perhaps today’s competition is really located in the extent to which China as a technological society acknowledges itself for what it is and then seeks a position of human advancement that transcends or evolves to a higher stage of existence and well-being—as China claims per it ambitions to establish itself as a ‘fully modern socialist nation.’ Conversely, the West, and more specifically the US, seem stuck in time or even regressing, unable to accept or manage changes constructively, unable to normalize the growing intersections and counterbalances that must exist within and between governance, technology, social progress and individual actualization. Too often, instead of looking inward and finding the true source of its problems, and further, how these problems are not dissimilar from others elsewhere, the US has externalized them with Sino(techno)phobia and Digital Orientalism. Perhaps the difference between the two countries is the extent to which they acknowledge and react to their own totalitarian-oriented surveillance states. In general terms, Shoshana Zuboff gets to this question in part in her book, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism [88], where she asks whether we will be ‘the masters of information and machines or its slaves.’ We should be cautious when applying this thinking to China. Too often Westerners equate the CPC as the inhuman monster wielding inhuman technology. What if the opposite is true: what is the CPC is the human face that aims to be the master of machines and information, and to do so as much as possible for the greater good within a social and political system they believe they were compelled to create in the first place in order to survive the onslaught of technologically advanced imperial nations? What if this human face (or Facebook) does not exist at all in the West, or only limitedly, incapable of actually confronting or regulating various technological masters that have become systemically entrenched and the pharmakon of contemporary life—both the poison and the cure for so many Western ills?

### AT: Mainstream IR

#### The affirmative’s assurances of “objective” and “scientifically-backed” IR theories mask the underlying orientalist narratives that spur realism as a justification for US hegemony and it’s “colonial desire” of China.

Cho and Hwang ‘19 [Young Chul Cho and Yih-Jye Hwang; Young Chul Cho is an Associate Professor in the School of International Studies at Jeonbuk National University, South Korea. Yih-Jye Hwang (PhD, Aberystwyth) is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Leiden University.; 4-13-19; “Mainstream IR Theoretical Perspectives and Rising China Vis-À-Vis the West: The Logic of Conquest, Conversion and Socialisation”; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-019-09620-3; accessed 7-19-2022; AH]

Mainstream IR scholarship, under the cloak of objective scientific knowledge production, thus reflects the identity and interests of the West, specifically the AngloAmerican world, by encouraging its scholars to exclude non-Western systems of thought and using its theoretical perspectives to justify and perpetuate Western hegemony ([42, 95]: 167–83). Our analysis of the Self/Other relations in each mainstream IR perspective suggests that realist, liberalist, and constructivist perspectives are ‘problem-solving’ approaches, as opposed to critical approaches ([18]: 204–54). To paraphrase Cox’s [18] renowned statement — ‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ — mainstream IR theoretical perspectives are always for great, hegemonic powers and for the purpose of securing an international system designed for the security and interests of those great hegemonic powers. In international affairs, the Self is the hegemon (often the West), and the Other is the subordinate (often the Rest). The Self is the proactive subject, and the Other is a mere object to be controlled by the Self for the Other’s own good. The Other’s subjectivity is often missing or ignored. Normatively and meta-theoretically, this way of thinking is tied to logocentrism, ‘which at once differentiates one term from another, prefers one to the other, and arranges them hierarchically, displacing the subordinate term beyond the boundary of what is significant and desirable in context’ ([36]: xvi). From Plato through to the present time, logocentrism has been the dominant mode of producing meaning in Western culture. In the context of Jacques Derrida, Delanty [21] says that logocentrism is ethnocentric because it privileges Western thought over all other forms of thought and makes Western reason the sole criterion for ‘correct and universal’ knowledge. It is easily discernible that logocentrism is theoretically akin to Said’s [93] notion of Orientalism, which notices the Orient as the most recurring image of the Other, the West’s ‘contrasting image, idea, personality, and experience’ that helps to define what the ‘West’ is. In critical IR literature on China, Chengxin Pan’s study on Western representations of China’s rise is particularly illuminating. In Knowledge, Desire, and Power in Global Politics [82], Pan first provocatively asserts that ‘China watching rarely watches itself’. He argues that although it is commonly held as ‘objective truth’, Western knowledge of China’s rise is in fact less about ‘China’; rather, it is a reflection of ‘a certain Western self-imagination and its quest for certainty and identity’ ([82]: viii). Pan then persuasively demonstrates the ways in which two prominent Western ‘paradigms’ – namely: China the ‘threat’ and China the ‘opportunity’ – have steered and shaped Western understandings of China, determining ‘certain acceptable ways of making sense of China and facilitate the production of knowledge along those lines’ ([82]: 22). To him, these two paradigms are produced by a longstanding ‘colonial desire’ of the West towards China. Whereas ‘the ‘China threat’ paradigm bears the stamp of fears, the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm can be best seen as manifestations of modern fantasies’ ([82]: 16). In addition, the presumed superiority of the West over its Others suggests that only one single (Western) path leads to the end form of human civilisation or history [31], that is, the one represented by Western civilisation. Western civilisation is thus understood to be not only different from its Eastern counterpart, but far superior to it. Western-centrism in this sense is prescriptively built upon the assumption that the totality of Western culture is universal. External geographical or cultural differences thus come to be represented as Others that could constitute a threat to Western universality. In such a Manichaean world of morality, the Self and the Other are essentially different, and the temptation is strong to translate Self/Other into a logocentric good/evil binary framework that provides a moral basis for conquest, conversion, and socialisation. IR examples of this are US President Ronald Regan’s use of ‘evil empire’ to describe the Soviet Union in 1983 and US President George W. Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address describing Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the ‘axis of evil.’ Thus, the logic of conquest, conversion, and socialisation when dealing with Others is often justified by stealth in mainstream IR perspectives. Realism, liberalism, and constructivism never provide value-free IR knowledge; rather, they are normative theories for the hegemon. Logocentrism and Orientalism have here been shown to constitute the hidden normative underpinning of those mainstream IR theoretical perspectives. As Pan [81] rightly noted, the US perception of the Other (i.e., China) as a threat is closely linked to how US policymakers see themselves ‘as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation.’ By tracing mainstream IR’s understanding, explanation, and interpretation of its practices, we have shown how logocentrism and Orientalism manifest themselves in the discipline. Therefore, in the rest of this article, we turn to a case study — the rise of China — to examine our deliberation of Self-Other relations in world politics and test our initial proposition about the mechanisms through which and the conditions under which Self-Other relations function when theorising about international relations.

### AT threats are real

#### Psychological studies have proven inherent biases within security studies that exaggerate Eastern threats in order to justify War on Terror-esque interventions to crush the Orientalist “threats” and sustain the liberal world order.

Bergsten ‘20 [Lisa Bergsten; Sweedish Defense university + Master’s Programme in Politics and War ;Fall 2020; “Evil Monsters and Machines”; https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1525320/FULLTEXT01.pdf; accessed 7-16-2022; AH]

2.2 Threats and Orientalism in Security Studies One of the most known ideas about threats comes from securitization theory, coined by Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, which theorises how issues become security threats, and connects that to political action. Something is securitised if it “is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 24). If an issue is securitised, it is constructed as a threat through speech acts by an authority figure and is accepted as such by the audience; it does not need to be a **‘real’ existential threat** in a sense, but it needs to be presented and accepted by the audience as such. Another comprehension on the perception of threats comes from Janice Gross Stein (2013) who connects the findings of cognitive psychologists with the study of threat perception, particularly the rationalist idea that inaccurate threat perceptions come from noncredible signals which then result in war and armed conflicts. Building onto ideas by Meyer, she looks at both the individual, as well as at the state-level in her theoretical development and connects emotions and pre-existing ideas with rational information processing. She argues that the evidence shows the importance of existing beliefs when it comes to threat perception as “people strongly prefer consistency, that they are made uncomfortable by dissonant information, and that they consequently deny or discount inconsistent information to preserve their beliefs” (Stein 2013, 372). Hence, **there exists a bias** in how much importance and trust the subject put in some information versus other forms of information, and how this leads to **incomplete generalisations which impact leaders judgement** (Stein 2013, 365ff). Mitzen (2006) coined the concept of ontological security, security of the self or identity security, and linked it to the spacialisation of time. “Ontological security refers to the need to experience oneself as a whole, continuous person in time — as being rather than constantly changing — in order to realize a sense of agency” (Mitzen 2006, 342). Drawing on the work of Anthony Giddens and Lisbeth Aggestam, Mitzen argues that **ontological security** can serve as a motivation for actions, and fulfil both individuals as well as nation-states need for stability and helps define the self through the action of others (Mitzen 2006, 344, 357). This also one of the **key** ideas in **techno-Orientalism**. One example of how Orientalism has been used in connection to security studies can be seen in Patrick Porter’s book Military Orientalism. Porter (2013) argues that the Eastern way to make war is **exotified** and that the differences between the East and the West are **exaggerated through Orientalism** (Porter 2013, 18). Porter combines the concept of Orientalism with the military and connects the West’s fascination with so-called **‘Eastern’ ways of war** with its own identity creation, building directly on Said’s logic. Another study, by Hobson (2012), offers a theoretical orientalist critique of the Eurocentric perspectives in international theory which assume that there is a need for intervention by the West in the East, to contain and secure a **liberal world order** with the West as the top form of civilisation (Hobson 2012, 129). He particularly criticises post-modern theorists like Foucault and Baudrillard for **ignoring Eastern agency**, and argues that they are guilty of **exaggerating the West’s power and unity**, and thus “failing to recognize the interactive relationship between East and West, precisely because of Said’s conception of Orientalism/Eurocentrism rests on the Self/Other identity-formation process that Foucault first emphasized” (Hobson 2012, 133). Bassil (2019) looks at and criticises the orientalist discourse in the West which concern the Islamic State, and the violence the group have perpetrated, and how this discourse contributes to a deeply racist and problematic narrative about the people in and from the Orient as well as of the religion Islam. Another example of how Orientalist discourse has been studied in security studies is Maryam Khalid’s book Gender, Orientalism, and the ‘War on Terror’ which looks at the presence of **gendered orientalist ideas** in the Bush regime’s creation of the War on Terror, specifically on the construction of Iraq and Afghanistan as the evil enemy, and how that justified the U.S. intervention in those countries. She concludes that Orientalism is a gendered discourse which cement representations as facts, and understanding that “uncovers a system of representations that produces and renders intelligible specific categories such as ‘East’, ‘Arab’, ‘Muslim’, ‘West’, ‘Civilised’, and ‘barbaric’, and organises them according to binary logics, and in hierarchical ways” (Khalid 2017, 152). She argues that the ’War on Terror’ discourse created a link between the Taliban and Saddam Hussein which was built on a gendered understanding of the **Orientalist Other’s desire and nature**, which included a feminine characteristic like irrationality and tied it to the Oriental masculinity. These ideas helped create a narrative of how a barbaric form of masculinity was set out to **destroy the civilised Western world** (Khalid 2017, 155).

### Extra

#### Impossible for realism to explain every political action, the political myth is inherently layered and necessitates epistemological analysis.

Joanne Esch 10[Joanne Esch, Ph.D. candidate who specializes in organizational communication and communication practices of law and policy at the university of Boulder Colorado, "Legitimizing the "War on Terror": Political Myth in Official-Level Rhetoric on JSTOR", June 2010, Political Psychology Vol. 31, No. 3, International Society of Political Psychology, https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/20721298?sid=primo, 1LEE]

When it comes to understanding the crucial political events of our epoch, there is a temptation to believe that meaning is intrinsic and "facts speak for themselves" (Jackson, 2005). This, of course, is never actually the case. In reality, meaning is layered upon a narrative after the fact like Technicolor added to a black and white film. The process of layering meaning over a narrative is complex and contested; it mythologizes the narrative so that it holds shared significance for a group. This is the process of work on political myth; and it is ongoing because significance is never agreed upon once and for all. Bottici and Challand (2006) defined political myth as "the continual process of work on a common narrative by which the members of a social group can provide significance to their political conditions and experience" (p. 320). Political myth operates within all political cultures, regardless of how "demythologized" or "enlightened" a group may consider itself. Myth responds to the fundamental need to create significance in a chaotic and perhaps indifferent world; thus, all societies have a mythical dimen sion, but what they differ in is the degree to which myth is exposed to critical discussion (Bottici & Challand, 2006). An understanding of political myth can shed light on the intersection of political discourse and political practice and provide insight into the psychology of legitimization in political discourse.

#### Orientalism is not just a narrative, it is a political myth—Myths are particularly dangerous in its way to create power and damage from language alone

Joanne Esch 10[Joanne Esch, Ph.D. candidate who specializes in organizational communication and communication practices of law and policy at the university of Boulder Colorado, "Legitimizing the "War on Terror": Political Myth in Official-Level Rhetoric on JSTOR", June 2010, Political Psychology Vol. 31, No. 3, International Society of Political Psychology, https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/20721298?sid=primo, 1LEE]

Myth ought to be approached from a phenomenological perspective that leaves aside the question of the "reality of myth" and instead focuses on the process through which a social group adapts and readapts a common narrative so that it lends significance to their political conditions and experience (Bottici, 2007). Thus, this study makes no attempt to determine the extent to which mythical representations of the world actually reflect the "true nature" of reality.

Three key attributes distinguish a political myth from a simple narrative: First, a mythical narrative provides significance. Second, it is shared by a group and (re)produced at various levels. Third, it can come to affect the political conditions of the group (Bottici, 2007).

Significance. Myth is a product of the endless human attempt to minimize chaos and master the unknown. While myth sometimes has religious roots and connotations, it is not exclusively a religious phenomenon. As Bottici (2007), Cassirer (1973), and others have pointed out, myth answers a call for significance that goes beyond the simplest form of meaning (wherever there is language there is meaning) but stops short of providing ultimate meaning in matters of life and death (this is the realm of religion). Blumenberg (1985) conceived of significance as a grounding that draws events and narratives closer to the individual and renders them less indifferent to him or her. Unlike science, myth does not simply describe the world; by providing significance, it helps us reduce the world's complexity. Blumenberg (1985) has highlighted the difference between making sense and making significance in order to explain the functional difference between science and myth: science explains phenomena and can be universal, while myth brings the phenomena closer to us and is always particular. Bottici (2007) has summa rized what I will call the "proximization" function of myth by explaining, "While something can have a meaning but I can still remain completely indifferent to it, something that has significance is something that I feel 'close' to" (p. 124). What is myth for one person may simply be a story for another or even for the same person at a different point in time.

Work on Myth. The second aspect that distinguishes myth from narrative is that myth is interrelational--it is borne within a web of relationships in which it is continually (re)produced, (re)interpreted, and (re)transmitted. Blumenberg (1985) understood myth as work on myth--that is, as a continual process of reworking by narrators and perceivers who can scarcely be distinguished from one another. Myths are not singular entities stated or written at one point in time; but rather, living entities that always relate to the present. The process of work on myth takes place at innumerable sites: art, speech, rituals, and social practices being only a few examples (Bottici & Challand, 2006). Myth is also condensational--it can be compressed into symbols and words, and these condensed fragments can then recall an entire body of work on a given myth (Bottici & Challand, 2006). Cumulative exposure to the work on myth thus allows it to frame our understanding of the world without our consideration or even awareness. Additionally, as a consequence of the interrelational and ever evolving nature of myth, there are often many variations of myth built around one central mythical core. While this paper focuses on the utility of (reproduc ing myth at the level of official rhetoric, it must be understood that this is only one of many sites for work on myth.

The Power of Myth. The third aspect of the definition of political myth is that it addresses the political conditions and experiences of a group. Political myths frame our perception of the world and shape how we feel about it; consequently, they help determine how we act within it (Bottici & Challand, 2006). They shape political practice by giving language its reality-making effect. Scholars such as Jackson (2005) and Wilmer (2002) have pointed out that wars cannot be fought without a widespread willingness in society, and social will ingness requires a shared understanding of circumstances and significance, which is constructed through language. Language and practice are two sides of the same coin, and political myth has an exceptional ability to give power to language.

Iyengar's (1991) idea that rhetoric "frames" issues so as to offer the addressee implicit contexts for understanding information provides some insight into myth's utility for policy legitimization. Frames reside in the types of key words, metaphors, concepts, and symbols speakers choose to emphasize in their narratives (Entman, 1993). Thus, the use of linguistic cues to encourage addressees to perceive events through the lens of a particular myth may be understood as a type of framing.3 Words may become mythically encoded and then serve as key words or lexical triggers. When used in rhetoric, these words allow a myth to serve as an implicit frame of reference for understanding the given narrative. Thus, myth is subtle because it is condensable. As Flood (1996) explains,

Myths do not... have to be recounted in extenso in order to function as elements of political discourse. Myths can be evoked by labels ("the Aryan myth!"), watchwords and slogans ("Workers of the world, unite!"), metonymic allusions ("the Vietnam syndrome"), echoes or quo tations ("I cannot tell a lie").. . [E]ven single words such as "Liberty," "Free Enterprise," or "Communism" can carry a range of associations with widely accepted, ideologically slanted accounts of historical events, (p. 85)

For this reason, language that carries mythical connotations gives meaning to statements that goes beyond what is actually said. Such mythical connotations often preclude certain responses. For example, deeming someone "a Fascist" renders the idea of negotiating with that person absurd and irresponsible because the word is loaded with mythical associations as broad as "evil" and as specific as "the historical lesson of the 1938 Munich Agreement."4 Language that contains condensed fragments of myth can thus have powerful consequences for social processes and structures. By influencing our perception, cognition, and emotions, linguistic recollection of political myth can deeply affect what we consider to be legitimate, making myth a pivotal intersection of discourse and political practice. As Bottici and Challand (2006) put it, "a political myth is not simply a prophecy, but it tends rather to become a self-fulfilling prophecy" (p. 329).

## Links – policy affs

### Generic

#### The 1ac’s fear politics endorses a process of othering resulting in constant hate crimes and aggression toward ‘The Other’

Javanbakht 19(Arash Javanbakht, Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, Wayne State University, 1-11-2019, "The politics of fear: How fear goes tribal, allowing us to be manipulated," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/the-politics-of-fear-how-fear-goes-tribal-allowing-us-to-be-manipulated-109626)**//BRownRice**

Fear is arguably as old as life. It is deeply ingrained in the living organisms that have survived extinction through billions of years of evolution. Its roots are deep in our core psychological and biological being, and it is one of our most intimate feelings. Danger and war are as old as human history, and so are politics and religion. Demagogues have always used fear for intimidation of the subordinates or enemies, and shepherding the tribe by the leaders. Fear is a very strong tool that can blur humans’ logic and change their behavior. I am a psychiatrist and neuroscientist specializing in fear and trauma, and I have some evidence-based thoughts on how fear is abused in politics. We learn fear from tribe mates Like other animals, we humans can learn fear from experience, such as being attacked by a predator. We also learn from observation, such as witnessing a predator attacking another human. And, we learn by instructions, such as being told there is a predator nearby. Read news coverage based on evidence, not tweets Learning from our conspecifics – members of the same species – is an evolutionary advantage that has prevented us from repeating dangerous experiences of other humans. We have a tendency to trust our tribe mates and authorities, especially when it comes to danger. It is adaptive: Parents and wise old men told us not to eat a special plant, or not to go to an area in the woods, or we would be hurt. By trusting them, we would not die like a great-grandfather who died eating that plant. This way we accumulated knowledge. Tribalism has been an inherent part of the human history. There has always been competition between groups of humans in different ways and with different faces, from brutal wartime nationalism to a strong loyalty to a football team. Evidence from cultural neuroscience shows that our brains even respond differently at an unconscious level simply to the view of faces from other races or cultures. At a tribal level, people are more emotional and consequently less logical: Fans of both teams pray for their team to win, hoping God will take sides in a game. On the other hand, we regress to tribalism when afraid. This is an evolutionary advantage that would lead to the group cohesion and help us fight the other tribes to survive. Tribalism is the biological loophole that many politicians have banked on for a long time: tapping into our fears and tribal instincts. Some examples are Nazism, the Ku Klux Klan, religious wars and the Dark Ages. The typical pattern is to give the other humans a different label than us, and say they are going to harm us or our resources, and to turn the other group into a concept. It does not have to necessarily be race or nationality, which are used very often. It can be any real or imaginary difference: liberals, conservatives, Middle Easterners, white men, the right, the left, Muslims, Jews, Christians, Sikhs. The list goes on and on. When building tribal boundaries between “us” and “them,” some politicians have managed very well to create virtual groups of people that do not communicate and hate without even knowing each other: This is the human animal in action! Fear is uninformed During the first year after my arrival in the U.S., one night I entered a public parking lot to turn around. People were leaving a building in Orthodox Jewish dress; it was a temple. For a short second, I noticed a subtle, weird but familiar feeling: fear! I tried to trace the source of this fear, and here it was: My hometown was almost all Muslims, and I never met a Jew growing up. One day when I was a little child and we were visiting a village, an old lady was telling a crazy story about how Orthodox Jews steal Muslim kids and drink their blood! Having come from a well-educated family that respects all religions, being an educated doctor and having so many great Jewish friends, I felt embarrassed that still the child within had taken that stupid and obviously false story a bit seriously, only because that child had never met a Jew. This human tendency is meat to the politicians who want to exploit fear: If you grew up only around people who look like you, only listened to one media outlet and heard from the old uncle that those who look or think differently hate you and are dangerous, the inherent fear and hatred toward those unseen people is an understandable (but flawed) result. To win us, politicians, sometimes with the media’s help, do their best to keep us separated, to keep the real or imaginary “others” just a “concept.” Because if we spend time with others, talk to them and eat with them, we will learn that they are like us: humans with all the strengths and weaknesses that we possess. Some are strong, some are weak, some are funny, some are dumb, some are nice and some not too nice. Fear is illogical and often dumb Some people are afraid of spiders, others of snakes or even cats and dogs. Aris Suwanmalee/Shutterstock.com Very often my patients with phobias start with: “I know it is stupid, but I am afraid of spiders.” Or it may be dogs or cats, or something else. And I always reply: “It is not stupid, it is illogical.” We humans have different functions in the brain, and fear oftentimes bypasses logic. There are several reasons. One is that logic is slow; fear is fast. In situations of danger, we ought to be fast: First run or kill, then think. Politicians and the media very often use fear to circumvent our logic. I always say the U.S. media are disaster pornographers – they work too much on triggering their audiences’ emotions. They are kind of political reality shows, surprising to anyone from outside the U.S. When one person kills a few others in a city of millions, which is of course a tragedy, major networks’ coverage could lead one to perceive the whole city is under siege and unsafe. If one undocumented illegal immigrant murders a U.S. citizen, some politicians use fear with the hope that few will ask: “This is terrible, but how many people were murdered in this country by U.S. citizens just today?” Or: “I know several murders happen every week in this town, but why am I so scared now that this one is being showcased by the media?” We do not ask these questions, because fear bypasses logic. Fear can turn violent Toppled headstones at Mount Carmel Cemetery in Philadelphia Feb. 27, 2017. A report on the vandalism cited an increase in anti-Semitic bias since the 2016 election. Jaqueline Larma/AP Photo There is a reason that the response to fear is called the “fight or flight” response. That response has helped us survive the predators and other tribes that have wanted to kill us. But again, it is another loophole in our biology to be abused. By scaring us, the demagogues turn on our aggression toward “the others,” whether in the form of vandalizing their temples or harassing them on the social media. When demagogues manage to get hold of our fear circuitry, we often regress to illogical, tribal and aggressive human animals, becoming weapons ourselves – weapons that politicians use for their own agenda.

#### Politicians exploit fear to control the masses and gain votes. They can use this manipulation to encourage orientalist-sentiment.

Cox 7/8/22 [Ana Marie Cox, Ana Marie Cox is an American author, blogger, political columnist, and critic. The founding editor of the political blog Wonkette, she was recently the Senior Political Correspondent for MTV News and conducted the “Talk” interviews featured in The New York Times Magazine from 2015 to 2017. She graduated from the University of Chicago with a Bachelor of Arts degree in history in 1994. She studied American history in graduate school at the University of California, Berkeley., 7-8-2022, "Democrats Can Win if They Embrace the Politics of Fear," The New York Times, [https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/08/opinion/democrats-abortion-midterms.html]//AA](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/08/opinion/democrats-abortion-midterms.html%5d//AA)

When it comes to abortion rights, the Democrats need to lean into the politics of fear. They face a base that feels betrayed and a set of wealthy, moderate voters in purple states who may not realize that their own rights are also on the line. Democrats need both of these groups to stave off defeat in the fall, and fear can drive them to the polls. What should the Democrats tell them to be afraid of? A national abortion ban. America after the fall of Roe v. Wade might feel like were living in the worst-case scenario, but anyone who values reproductive freedom has reason to panic about what could happen if Republicans take back power in Washington. G.O.P. Congress members have already introduced bills that would criminalize abortion in various ways. They are only more emboldened now. Last month, former Vice President Mike Pence called for a national abortion ban. More to the point, Senator Mitch McConnell, the minority leader, has called it possible. Recently, he hedged the prediction by stating an obvious fact: Neither side on this issue has had 60 votes to pass such a ban. Is that a phrase you feel comfortable hanging your future on? Plenty of progressive voters don’t need to be made aware of the danger. They are already terrified for the future. But everyone should be, not just those who might want or need an abortion in the future. The conservative legal theories (and the conservative jurists) that brought down Roe threaten marriage equality, privacy in the bedroom, even contraception. A law banning abortion by recognizing fetuses as humans with constitutional rights could criminalize in vitro fertilization. The life-or-death pregnancy scenarios now playing out in red states could be repeated right next door, no matter where you live. To meet the urgency of the moment and save their razor-thin and often nonexistent hold on the Senate, Democrats must talk about that future, giving voters across the country, in every state, a reason to vote. Lives are on the line. At the same time, Democratic leaders have to understand that the politics of fear can run both ways. The End of Roe v. Wade Commentary by Times Opinion writers and columnists on the Supreme Courts decision to end ??the constitutional right to abortion. David N. Hackney, maternal-fetal medicine specialist: The end of Roe is a tragedy for our patients, many of whom will suffer and some of whom could very well die. Mara Gay: Sex is fun. For the puritanical tyrants seeking to control our bodies, thats a problem . Elizabeth Spiers: The notion that rich women will be fine, regardless of what the law says, is probably comforting to some. But it is simply not true . Katherine Stewart, writer : ??Breaking American democracy isnt an unintended side effect of Christian nationalism. It is the point of the project . The party needs to scare voters and show that they, too, are scared: scared of the voters themselves. Democratic politicians watched Republicans roll back abortion rights for decades and when Roe fell, they had no plan. Now, they need to demonstrate that they are willing to put themselves at the mercy of those they failed making specific promises and letting the voters know that if they fail again, it will be more than a fund-raising opportunity. It will be a reckoning. Politicians have never shied away from making campaign promises, but the Republicans are better at creating the circumstances for voters to exact revenge. Grover Norquists Taxpayer Protection Pledge held sway over hundreds of Republican candidates for over a decade. For the G.O.P., the pledge was a neat way to synchronize the interests of the very rich and the defiant antigovernment streak of the white middle class, and the key to making it work, for as long as it has, has been simple: letting voters know they expect to be held accountable. If an elected official bucks the tax pledge, voters have a specific reason to send them home and the politician has no excuses. A promise to protect abortion rights would not have the same kind of moneyed network behind it that the tax pledge does. But it would carry the same emotional and political weight. In the end, all politicians have to answer for their records. Say that Democrats committed, for once, to prioritizing action over whatever solution Washington considers reasonable. Call it the Abortion Access Pledge and turn running against the threat of a national abortion ban into a chance to run for something, too. Don’t quibble, don’t be distracted by debates over whether or when a ban will happen. Instead, decide on a handful of action items around abortion access and get everyone who wants a vote or a dollar to say it out loud: I will support abortion access in these ways and if I don’t follow through, you should kick me out. I am honestly unsure if it matters what those action items are; I do know Democrats will have to throw out any concern for the appearance of moderation. Right now, all the ideas about bridging the gap to abortion access sound extreme. But so did the tax pledge at one point. So did overturning Roe v. Wade. Take allowing abortions on federal land . Biden could declare the policy so. Candidates would only have to pledge to support it. Yes, the policy would invoke an avalanche of untested legal theories and complicated jurisdictional questions. But Democrats who want to save the lives of those in need of an abortion cant fall back on its complicated as an excuse to not even try. If you want something less complicated something that would also help roll out abortions on federal lands make a pledge not to vote for any appropriation bill that carries the Hyde Amendment, which bans federal funding for most abortions. On its own, abolishing the Hyde Amendment would not greatly expand access outside states where abortion is legal. But combined with abortion access on federal property, the government could act even more directly to help those seeking abortion care. Stonewalling Hyde-burdened budgets could lead to a government shutdown, but if you think that ruins a party’s reputation forever, well, you are probably a current Democratic office holder. Embracing a politics of fear on reproductive rights unites two of the constituencies the Democrats need to edge out the G.O.P. in key narrow races (Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Georgia). First, hammering home the danger of a national ban may sufficiently alarm moderate voters in the suburbs, convincing them to abandon Republicans. Second, addressing the widespread sense of betrayal among progressive voters will help keep them activated. The threat of a national abortion ban is also a national message. Democrats can make it clear that the party can’t risk a single loss, no matter how lopsided the polls are. And then there is the simple truth underpinning this entire strategy: Protecting abortion rights is popular. This plan where Democratic leaders take real political risks is untried. But it’s worth the gamble. Bold action is the only way to assure voters that they are prepared to do whatever it takes when other rights are on the chopping block. Most significantly, prioritizing responsiveness to voters would reset the entire framework of Democratic campaigns. The only way this strategy could truly backfire is if Democrats run on a promise and then break it, again. And expect to be re-elected, again. Of course, that is what Democrats are doing right now. Protect Roe was their rallying cry; it turns out thats all it was. Fear often divides, but it can also unite. When you have a common threat, there is an opportunity for a common mission. This threat is no longer beyond the horizon its at the door. Now, Democrats, decide on a mission.

### Borders

#### The nation state border is constructed on a eschatological imaginary that pulmugates in racialized ways of understanding U.S.-Asian relations as an ideological contagion

Man 18 (Jessica Man | Master of Arts degree in Asian American Studies | *“The Perfect Type of Industry”: 2012 and Apocalyptic Visions of the Asian Century* pg 26 | DOA: 7/8/2022 | SAoki)

Adam McKeown reminds us that the ways in which the Chinese Exclusion Act was enforced at the American border “did more than just classify Chinese immigrants. It asserted a vision of properly ordered global social relationships, a vision that was inseparable from the failures and contradictions inherent in its enforcement” (379-280). There is a wealth of scholarship that addresses the imperial preoccupation with legislating the border, linking it to both nationalist-statist anxieties about maintaining the ethno-national hierarchies of empire as well as anxieties about controlling subjugated bodies and legitimating colonial relationships to land. Chinese exclusion, which provided the basis for all subsequent iterations of racialized border control, points to the conceptualization of migrant labor as ideological contagion. All migrants are “carriers;” “illegal” migrants as early as the Exclusion Act had not been subjected to the proper ritualized screening that McKeown writes about. The inconsistencies inherent to border policing despite several attempts at reform indicate that Exclusion was not only about the physical prevention of Chinese entry, which it failed to do in the comprehensive manner pushed by labor unions, but about the public ideological decontamination of the United States. The concept of Yellow Peril not only threatened the stability of these “properly ordered global social relationships,” i.e. the economic and political ordering of immigrants and citizens based on American ideas of trade, race, and disability, but with actual total cultural and national annihilation. Yellow Peril is not only epistemological or metaphysical – it is an eschatological way of understanding U.S.-China (and more broadly U.S.-Asian) relations. With this framework, we can begin to understand the Page and Exclusion Acts and the associated immigration bans levied in the early 20th century as a state-sanctioned method of staving off apocalypse and eschaton, a legitimate way of recognizing the periodic and transitory nature of Empire. VII. Dream Interpretation – Apocalypse, Eschaton, and Empire In order to understand the relationship between state and apocalypse, we must first define the terms “apocalypse,” “eschaton,” and “eschatology.” “Apocalypse” is commonly understood as a temporal mode that is focused on the imminence of an ending – to Empire, to global life, to cosmology. I am making a distinction here between the popular and the theological, scholastic definitions. The former conflates apocalypse and eschaton into a commentary on imperial and colonial anxiety, while the latter approaches apocalypse as a critical, fundamental, and radical shift in epistemology where what is hidden is revealed, and eschaton as the moment or period of obliteration where knowledge itself collapses. “Apocalypse” is a term derived from the Greek apokalypsis, roughly translating to “uncovering,” but most famously taken to mean “revelation,” as in the biblical Revelation of John, sometimes called the Apocalypse of John. The word cannot be separated from its theological origins; Christianity is one of the fundamental traditions of thought through which Western nations understand history, social order, and futurity, and apocalypticism comes directly out of that tradition. The secularized notion of apocalypse turns prophesy into prediction, masking imperial Christian logics behind those of capitalism, modernity, and the state. “Apocalypse,” especially in its theological sense, should not be used as a semantically-neutral stand-in for just any religious conceptualization of the end of the world for this exact reason. John’s apocalypse, received on the island of Patmos, is an extremely dense text, crowded with fantastic and terrifying images, moving in and out of different modes of signification without giving the reader a comprehensive cipher. Throughout the text, John describes a vision of the destruction of the world, wars in spiritual and physical realms, the subjugation and liberation of humanity, and the dramatic culmination of Christian notions of spiritual warfare. Most importantly, the text anticipates the thing which is to be revealed: the total renewal and redemption of the spiritual and physical realms, and the nature of the perfected body. John’s vision is not only of the end of the world but of how the cosmos will be reorganized into a new as a temporal mode that is focused on the imminence of an ending – to Empire, to global life, to cosmology. I am making a distinction here between the popular and the theological, scholastic definitions. The former conflates apocalypse and eschaton into a commentary on imperial and colonial anxiety, while the latter approaches apocalypse as a critical, fundamental, and radical shift in epistemology where what is hidden is revealed, and eschaton as the moment or period of obliteration where knowledge itself collapses. “Apocalypse” is a term derived from the Greek apokalypsis, roughly translating to “uncovering,” but most famously taken to mean “revelation,” as in the biblical Revelation of John, sometimes called the Apocalypse of John. 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Throughout the text, John describes a vision of the destruction of the world, wars in spiritual and physical realms, the subjugation and liberation of humanity, and the dramatic culmination of Christian notions of spiritual warfare. Most importantly, the text anticipates the thing which is to be revealed: the total renewal and redemption of the spiritual and physical realms, and the nature of the perfected body. John’s vision is not only of the end of the world but of how the cosmos will be reorganized into a new. In this way, the Exclusion Act, the Asiatic Barred Zone Act, and other turn-of-the-century immigration acts can be understood to constitute a state or state-sanctioned eschatology. Protective and nationalist legislation is always instated to narrow down the possible futures of empire and empire’s end. If American triumphalism is a belief in the inevitable dominance of U.S. government, culture, and ways of life over those of other nations, it must be maintained and driven by an eschatological imaginary that exposes weaknesses in the imperial strategy and thinks about the ways through which the empire could be destroyed. London’s “Unparalleled Invasion” provides an apocalypse that exposes the eschatological nature of the Exclusion Act and how it anticipated the fundamental threat Chinese laborers posed to the American nationstate. The Exclusion Act and all other anti-Asian immigration laws function on, and are justified through, an imagined future predicated on the destructive power of Yellow Peril, validating a specific vision of eschaton and apocalyptically reframing the nature of Asian immigration. Apocalypse necessarily deals with periodicity. Christian theology recognizes several “marks” in its historical record: pre- and post-lapsarian time, ante- and post-diluvian time, preand post-messianic time, pre- and post-apocalyptic time, and so forth. It also recognizes the nebulous and intractable nature of time – Giorgio Agamben notes in Infancy and History that Christianity “resolutely separates time from the natural movement of the stars to make it an essentially human, interior phenomenon” (95). The Second Epistle of Peter corroborates this observation, famously stating that “with the Lord one day is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day” (3:8, ESV). Eschatology therefore must be understood to extrapolate from a specific system of periodizing or marking history, but purposefully leave the actual span of the period it envelops unclear in order to avoid foreclosing itself at a certain date. In a statesanctioned eschatology, the effect is to suspend, extend, and frame the period of imperial life so that the end state of totalized destruction hangs ominously over the present moment, continually presenting a justification for exclusion and border maintenance as nationalist projects of conservation.

### China

#### Digital Orientalism explains the acceleration of fears of China’s rise and if it continues to dominate our epistemological thought then it could have apocalyptic consequences-surveillance states and justification of suppression

Maximillian Mayer and Josef Gregory Mahoney 20[Josef Gregory Mahoney, professor of politics at East China Normal University in Shanghai, Maximillian Mayer, assistant professor in international studies at the University of Nottingham Ningbo, "Why Trump’s campaign against Huawei is digital orientalism",01-18-2020, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3046357/trumps-campaign-against-huawei-symptom-digital-orientalism-ignoring, 1LEE]

We introduce the concept of “digital orientalism” to help explain what is really at stake in controversies over China’s rapid digitalisation.

In a special issue of the Journal of Chinese Political Science, we write: “The increasingly apparent and uncomfortable development that many instinctively deny is that one of the key elements of Sinological orientalism, the notion that China would become more like the West, has become increasingly true, with the caveat that the West, likewise through the same types of technology, has become increasingly like China.”

Anxieties have resurfaced in two key areas. First, worries about the “technological society” and its threat to values and practices considered culturally intrinsic are key concerns in both China and the West.

These fears have accelerated in the West with the unprecedented rise of platform companies – technology-enabled businesses that create value by facilitating exchanges between two or more interdependent groups – and state surveillance.

But with the emergence of a Chinese tech state and mushrooming Chinese platform companies, and with China drawing even with and perhaps overtaking the West in some technology fields, these fears have been reinforced.

Huawei and the double standards of the West

Second, China’s technological leapfrogging has produced “Sinotechnophobia”. The fear of Chinese technology has diminished Western fears of Western tech in a manner that recalls the cold war’s arms race (“we’re bad, but they’re worse”).

But Sinotechnophobia could have apocalyptic consequences, either through self-destruction or mutual destruction, on par with those described by Jairus Victor Grove in Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World: imagine unrestricted surveillance states justifying self-suppression in the name of bolstering security against each other, with competing artificial intelligence running algorithms that accelerate poor decision-making.

What digital orientalism masks is the extent to which China experiences many of the same problems and practices found in democratic societies. Surveillance capitalism works similarly everywhere and some misuse of AI and big data by US agencies is on par with China and sometimes worse.

This convergence also causes discomfort in Beijing, which often trumpets China’s differences while struggling to discipline the ’90s and 2000s generations, which, having grown up in a market society with extremely high levels of personal technology usage, have more in common with American millennials than with their own parents.

How AI and quantum computing add to danger of US-China conflict

Whatever threats Huawei poses for democratic politics, it distracts us from those posed already by Western tech giants and algorithmic governance through an almost complete erosion of privacy, omnipresent surveillance and valid worries that elections can be hacked by foreign powers or purchased via social marketing using targeted fake news.

In the Journal of Democracy, Larry Diamond describes this as the “road to digital unfreedom” and “postmodern totalitarianism”. We add that a self-defeating “us versus them” logic is merely picking your poison.

Instead of focusing on the drawbacks of an individual company or technology, we should acknowledge the broader reality: intensifying global homogenisation, cyberwar, the dominance of platform companies, inescapable surveillance capitalism, the impossibility of data privacy, the normalisation of stealth mass-manipulation and nudging campaigns, the experience of post-truth rationalities and the reduction of individuals to constantly accessible screen-brain interfacing.

Liberal societies don’t need Chinese tech to destroy not just democratic processes but the very conditions of democratic life and politics. Yet, by creating a “dangerous other” and foregrounding misleading binaries, digital orientalism keeps us from deliberating socio-technical futures and the good society that we should envision.

Only by recognising the convergence of authoritarian digitalisation in China, Europe and the US can we unchain our imaginative powers as digital citizens and find a better way forward.

#### Digital Orientalism the is independent cause towards the fear that drives the US and its Allies to harsh policies towards China

Gregory Moore 22[Gregory Moore, Professor of Global Studies and Politics at Colorado Christian University, "Huawei, Cyber-Sovereignty and Liberal Norms: China’s Challenge to the West/Democracies",6-3-2022, SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-022-09814-2, 1LEE]

We define digital orientalism as re/inscribing a pseudo-otherness, typically resorting to tropes first employed during classical [Said], Cold War, and Sinological forms of orientalism [Vukovich], but now used when social, cultural, economic and even political differences have increasingly narrowed through the increasing tilt towards a global technological society in ways that are undermining older national and cultural narratives and associated hegemonies [17, p. 1].

Said’s orientalism construct [26] is an important contribution to the study of colonialism, post-colonial thought, international relations and sociology. There is no reason to challenge it here. It’s application to the digital realm is an interesting and important one. The premise of the editors of this special issue is that the West expected China to evolve into a liberal democracy, but that this has not happened, and moreover this (from the West’s perspective “fundamentally illegitimate”) power has been able to increasingly compete head to head with the US and the West in military, political, economic and technological terms, and this has created deep fear among Western/democratic leaders. Fear is a key part of this orientalist narrative. The argument is that it is fear of this digital, political and cultural other that drives a tough US, Australian, British (for example) policy toward China, and drives a harsh stand toward Huawei. To set this up in a cause and effect framework, then digital orientalism is the independent variable that causes fear in the US and others towards China, that brings about the dependent variable, harsh policies toward China and Huawei specifically. What this would mean is that other factors would not explain the dependent variable, the harsh US/Western policy toward Huawei. The question we will pose here is, is this correct?

#### The aff’s attempt to mobilize against China is an extension of the military industrial complex and the DOD’s newest raison d’être

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Several actors inflate the China threat narrative in the United States. This includes the military industrial complex, attempting to justify a large Department of Defense budget. Actors in this group are national security elites, both within the Department as well as those companies providing defense-related services.13 Politicians attempting to distract from domestic issues at home would also benefit from inflating the China threat. There is evidence of electoral benefits for politicians in discussing a threatening environment and increasing defense spending during times of elections.14 It has been noted that elites “appear to have the motive, means, and opportunity to offer greatly distorted national security narratives.”15 Foreign countries in the Pacific who are concerned by China’s encroachment, both economic and military, would also inflate the China threat as to encourage the United States to increase its regional involvement. These countries, such as Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, frequently raise concerns about China’s activities in both international governing bodies as well as with American policymakers as part of their diplomatic agenda.16 Finally, one could imagine how human and animal rights and environmental groups opposed to China’s policies would also be located in this camp of building a negative narrative around China. These groups could further anti-China messaging to inspire support and enact change in policy towards China. While coming from quite different perspectives, these disparate groups comprise an uncoordinated alliance that collectively forms an anti-China lobby. Their actions, communications, and lobbying efforts in the domestic environment paint an elevated threat from China. Diving a bit deeper into the military industrial complex, the elevation of enemy connotations of threat and threat narratives coincide with its desire for additional resource allocation to the defense industry. As Kenneth Mayer noted, the military’s “budgetary *raison d’être*” in the past was the Soviet Union.17 If the essence of an industry is to protect against something tangible, that *raison d’être* would need to exist in order to secure resources. The creation of a narrative highlighting the threat would go a long way in making the threat a reality and securing additional resources to stem the threat. Creating a more threatening visage of China would provide a modern-day budgetary *raison d’être*.

#### Businesses have an incentive to make China out to be a threat

Ciovacco 20 (Carl, currently a Senior Director at a major financial institution in the Washington D.C. area. As a graduate of West Point, he served as a military officer in the US Army. He received his Master in Public Policy degree from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and his PhD from Virginia Tech’s School of Public and International Affairs. He served for nearly a decade as a national security consultant for the US Government focusing on national threat assessment. He has published articles in The American Interest, The National Interest, Harvard International Review, Journal of Strategic Studies, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Journal of Policing, Intelligence, and Counter Terrorism, Strategic Insights, and Armchair General Magazine where he co-authored an article with the current Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina, “Bias and the Perceived China Threat”, 9/3/20, The SAIS Review of International Affairs, <https://saisreview.sais.jhu.edu/bias-and-the-perceived-china-threat/>, Accessed 7/8/22)//mackerel

While friendly Sino-American relations furthers an environment conducive to business growth, some industries are likely to inflate the China threat. Businesses that operate in import-competing industries, and that have a protectionist angle, such as those in natural resource, energy, and domestic manufacturing, may tend to inflate the China threat. One such example is when the American solar panel industry filed a petition with the Commerce Department to raise tariffs on China’s solar panels coming into the United States. The US solar panel industry built a narrative that China was providing illegal subsidies, conducting massive dumping of solar products, and taking manufacturing and jobs in the United States “while China’s solar industry pollutes its own people.”18 While the minority in the business industry, those US industries benefiting from protectionism view China as a detriment to their livelihood and continue to disparage China and paint it in a threatening light.

#### An inflated China threat is disastrous for everyone involved and makes their impacts inevitable

Swaine 22 (Michael, director of QI’s East Asia program, is one of the most prominent American scholars of Chinese security studies. He comes to QI from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he worked for nearly twenty years as a senior fellow specializing in Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and East Asian international relations. Swaine served as a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation. Swaine has authored and edited more than a dozen books and monographs, including Remaining Aligned on the Challenges Facing Taiwan (with Ryo Sahashi; 2019), Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Strategic Net Assessment (with Nicholas Eberstadt et al; 2015) and many journal articles and book chapters. Swaine is directing, along with Iain Johnston of Harvard University, a multi-year crisis prevention project with Chinese partners. He also advises the U.S. government on Asian security issues. Swaine received his doctorate in government from Harvard University and his bachelor’s degree from George Washington University, “Threat Inflation and the Chinese Military”, 6/2/22, Quincy Paper No 7, <https://quincyinst.org/report/threat-inflation-and-the-chinese-military/>, Accessed 7/8/22)//mackerel

* Can flow aff

Less-extreme versions of these threat perceptions eschew any reference to China’s political system or ideology as a source of hostile Chinese behavior, stressing instead the unavoidable dangers that China as a rising power poses to the U.S. as the dominant state in a largely anarchic global system of states enjoying no supreme enforcement or mediating power. Such dangers supposedly arise from the inevitable uncertainties each power has regarding the intentions of the other, the presumed steadfast desire of the dominant power to retain its global power position and to protect the central role of its values and norms within the global system, the rising power’s desire to alter many of those values and norms to better reflect its interests, and its overall fear that the dominant power will increasingly act to constrain its rise.4 Yet despite the near-absence of a recognition of domestic political or ideological factors, even this structural realist argument assumes that Beijing, as a supposedly insecure but growing power, is inevitably driven to undermine and weaken the U.S. through all possible means to ensure its successful rise to a dominant position in the global order. In this view, although Beijing might not be evil or ideologically hostile, the threat it poses is still seen as extremely dire and inevitably growing, as long as China’s economy continues to grow robustly and uncertainty over China’s ultimate goals continues to exist. Unsurprisingly, such extreme threat perceptions have generated equally extreme reactions among most U.S. political leaders, pundits, and many analysts of international relations. The assumed scope and scale of the Chinese threat is seen by these individuals to require a “whole-of-society” response, designed to “push back” against Chinese misbehavior in a variety of ways, from applying tariffs and sanctions to correct China’s “predatory” and mercantilist economic and trade policies to building up the U.S. military to deter China’s aggressive military or paramilitary actions.5 In virtually all areas, zero-sum (i.e., I win, you lose) calls for “severe” competition, pressure, punishment, confrontation, and wholesale or selective decoupling of links with China seem to predominate, with relatively little attention paid to developing specific, concrete ways to moderate or bound the rivalry through various types of understandings or, even less, mutual accommodation or collaboration.6 In what appears at first glance to be a significant qualification of such a response, the Biden administration has stated that the U.S. relationship with China will be “competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be.”7 This implies that Washington’s policy will include a wide range of approaches to Beijing, at presumably robust levels across the board. But the reality has thus far been quite different. Although far less reckless and ideological toward Beijing than the Trump administration, the Biden administration has clearly indicated that its predecessor generally correctly assessed the extreme, existential threat posed by China. As a result, the overall framework of the Biden (and congressional) approach to China has continued to stress sharp, values-centered, and largely punitive forms of response to Beijing’s rise and its influence. The apparent underlying assumption of this approach is that the threat China poses is so enormous that attempts to reach anything more than narrow understandings, or expand mutually beneficial forms of collaboration with Beijing, by and large serve to divert attention away from the primary objective of “pushing back” in every way possible (Secretary of State Antony Blinken has described the threat as “the greatest geopolitical test of the 21st century.”).8 In this assumption, constructive engagement has supposedly “failed,” so why continue it? And reinforcing this prevailing Washington viewpoint is the notion that, regardless of how hostile or zero-sum the U.S. approach to Beijing might be, the Chinese will always remain willing to cooperate meaningfully on some issues (such as climate change) when it is in their interests to do so. All this clearly indicates that certain types of U.S. threat perceptions have made Washington prone to extreme policy reactions in response to various Chinese actions. And those policies can of course in turn cause Beijing to react in various ways, including what are viewed as more (or less) threatening types of action. The possibility of a vicious cycle of worsening, inflated threats and counterthreats emerging from such a dynamic is obvious. In other words, threat inflation can significantly increase the possibility of an otherwise entirely avoidable conflict between the threatened nation and the threatening nation. This suggests that holding an exaggerated threat perception of China can pose at least as much of a danger to the United States as underestimating it. In addition to the dangerous vicious cycle mentioned above, it can produce wasteful and socially disruptive policies by unnecessarily diverting resources into unproductive areas such as excessive military buildups, and by unnecessarily alarming or panicking the citizenry. This is particularly of concern in the military arena, where an inflated threat almost inevitably leads to excessive commitments of financial, intellectual, and technological resources that could be used elsewhere.

#### Orientalism frames the PRC as an “Other” in need of reforms, forcing a sense of sameness upon to it in which Chinese culture is lost. This logic of sameness is at the roots of capitalism and colonialism and serves as a modern form of these ideological frameworks.

Vukovich 11 [Daniel F. Vukovich is currently an Associate Professor at the University of Hong Kong., 11-21-2011, “China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the PRC”, Taylor & Francis, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203145579/china-orientalism-daniel-vukovich]//AA

“China” and the new era In “Orientalism Now,” the concluding chapter of Edward Said's 1978 book, we are left with the migration of orientalism from European empires and philology to the U.S. imperium and the dominance of social scientific discourse. This project begins where Said left off. It argues that there is a new, “Sinological” form of orientalism at work in the world, one that takes as its object an “Other” that has since the 1970s occupied an increasingly central place within the world system and Western intellectual-political culture: the People's Republic of China. As with Said's formulation rooted in the Middle East and South Asia, Sinological-orientalism and its production of a textual “China” helps constitute the identity or “Self” of the West (what Balibar aptly calls the “Western-Christian-Democratic-Universalist identity”) (“Difference” 30). The U.S.-West is what China is not, but which the latter will become. So, too, the new orientalism is part of a neo-colonial or imperialist project: not just the production of knowledge about an “area” but the would-be management and administration of the area for economic, political, and cultural-symbolic benefit. But whereas orientalism in Said turned upon a posited, essential difference between Orient and Occident (as in Kipling's famous verse: “Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet”), the new form turns upon sameness or more specifically, upon China's becoming sameness. China is seen as in a process of haltingly but inevitably becoming-the-same as “us”: open, liberal, modern, free. Put another way, “China” is understood as becoming generally equivalent to the West. What this reflects, in part, is the by now familiar resurgence of modernization rhetoric under the cover of “globalization” and the end-of-history thematic famously captured by Francis Fukuyama. But that, in turn, was triggered by the collapse of the former Soviet Union as well as by the fateful deployment of the market mechanism and the logic of capital within China. After a noble but brief interruption of the politics and discourse of modernization by Chinese Maoism and by the long decade of the 1960s and early 1970s, the former is back in charge not only of area studies but of global intellectual-political culture. When one recalls the Marxist cultural analysis of capital as such, namely as an historical force of abstraction that makes unlike things alike on the basis of some third thing called the value-form (their “exchange value” or “general equivalent”), the relationship between this orientalism and global capitalism appears in sharper relief. Sinological-orientalism is in an important sense a capital-logic, just as historical capitalism betrays an orientalist one. As Said himself made clear (in at least my reading of him), orientalism and colonial discourse may precede the rise of capitalism, but in the modern era they are hand in glove. So, too, for the present moment, whereby Western investment and “con-strainment” strategies are often rationalized on the basis of these being beneficial to the Chinese and their progression towards democracy and human rights (whatever these mean), as well as helping “balance” and protect the rest of Asia from China's rise. I further address the relationship between orientalist and capital logics in a final chapter. My argument is a totalizing, “functionalist” one about the integral relationship between capitalism and orientalism. But then, so is the thing. The historical conditions of possibility for a global Sinological-orientalism are the momentous if not counter-revolutionary changes within China itself- its Dengist “era of reform and opening up” dating from 1979 - and the West's economic, political, and discursive responses to this subsequent rise to global prominence. This paradoxical relationship is captured in the logic of becoming-sameness: China is still not “normal” (and has been tragically different), but is engaged in a “universal” process such that it will, and must, become the same as “us.” Whether it wants to or not. That is the present-future offered to China within this discourse, and - as anyone who watched the 2008 Olympics opening ceremonies knows (“one world, one dream”) - it is also one taken up within China itself. I turn to the question of Occidentalism below, and at other times make reference to Westernized/liberal views within China. But I only partially address the internalization of orientalism within China and the current Party state. That is surely an important matter worthy of its own book. But my focus here reflects in part my conviction that it is the Western — now fully global — dimensions and roots of orientalism that are the main problem underlying the often dysfunctional, neo-colonial relationship between China and the West. My concern is the production of knowledge about the P.R.C. outside of China and the cultural, ideological, and other politics that subtend this. One could write a different project focused on the representation of China from within the mainland; this would have to include indigenous constructions and essentializations of China outside of, as well as prior to, foreign imperialism or orientalism. But the impact in China of modernimperialism and “contact” remains decisive for all of us, and once we reach this era we need necessarily engage the orientalist and post-colonial questions. There will be no “new” Sinology until this conversation at least begins. As will quickly become clear, my analysis of Sinological-orientalism abounds with gestures and full-on references to what I take to be some of the complexities of Maoist and post-Mao China in political, ideological/cultural, and other terms. Contra Said's own practice in 1978, then, I do take it to be important to at least attempt to argue for some of those complexities and “brute realities of the Orient” (his words) that are occluded by the isolated details and positional superiority of orientalism. His decision not to do so has meant that his work there is often reductively appropriated by cultural and postcolonial studies that reduce the problem of orientalism to some basic Freudian Othering process, the deployment of stereotypical images in film, a simple self/other identity dynamic, and so forth. While all of these are part of orientalism, to be sure, the larger problems and challenges of epistemology, political knowledge, and the constitution of discourse were too often obscured even within the postcolonial field. Positional superiority refers to that tactic or de facto strategy by which the object of study is kept in place, never allowed to challenge let alone displace the effectively a priori assumptions, conclusions, and discourse: it places “the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the upper hand” (Orientalism 7). It is not just a heuristic but the foundational rule of colonial discourse and orientalism.1 For our purposes this means that the authority and a priori knowledge of the Sinologist-analyst-watcher reigns supreme and untroubled. For all its detailed knowledge, then, Sinological-orientalism works as a circular, self-enclosed system. It is also paradoxical in that what I am calling its emphasis on China's “becoming-sameness” is also at odds with this flexible superiority, which is also to say the ultimate inferiority of the native, Chinese reality. For all of these reasons, one must take the risk of trying to argue for and signify these complexities, counter-factuals, and counter-stories about the P.R.C. This is surprisingly difficult to do, in part because the language we have to describe such things fits not at all with the dominant, Western, liberal humanist paradigm of the humanities and human sciences. This is, I believe, also Wang Hui's problem in his brilliant and searching but difficult works on Chinese histories and Western theory.2 My own emphases have been with the political, Maoist past as well as its traces today, even after its demonization at home and abroad. Others would certainly write all of this differently, and it is again something worthy of book-length treatment despite the professional risks involved (writing “positive” scholarship about the Mao era). Some already have. In addition to others cited in this study, Lin Chun's The Transformations of Chinese Socialism is another case in point (albeit focused on the reform era). But all of this work is of very recent vintage and remains marginal to the overall China field. Sinological-orientalism and its basic logic can be understood as a development within colonial discourse in the present, postcolonial era of intensive globalization. It is as if what Dipesh Chakrabarty memorably described as the “waiting room of history” — or the continual saying of “not yet” to the colonized who would be free - has subtly but importantly shifted.3 The time is at hand. The denouement has inched closer. The last real constraint remains the Party state which will depart from the historical stage with our help. This marks a shift from the essential difference between East and West to their - China's - general equivalence: a sameness structured by a hierarchical difference. The denigrating and condescending faith that they are, after all, becoming the same as us (or should be made so) has become stronger and is no longer simply the view of enlightened liberals like J. S. Mill. While a range of temporary - as opposed to essential - obstacles can be summoned up to explain why China is not yet free and normal, the main and seemingly most fungible one remains the Chinese Communist Party (state). Were it not for this anachronistic, evil institution, the logic goes, China would and will be becoming-the-same and joining the normal world. A Sinified, mainland Chinese path is more or less impossible, be it in the Maoist attempt at alternative modernity (itself a Western/Marxist hybrid) or in the various, nascent post-Mao efforts to reform and develop a Chinese state and society adequate to the nation's various, complex challenges, and that might catch up to the heretofore largely unchecked, rapid, and dislocating deployment of capitalism.

### Chinese AI

#### The 1AC’s depictions of the Chinese AI threat tie into an Orientalist narrative that technologically otherizes China as a challenge to Western techno-hegemony.

Selwyn ‘21 [Neil; Neil Selwyn is a Distinguished Professor in the Faculty of Education, Monash University who has worked for the past 25 years researching the integration of digital technology into schools, universities and adult learning; 6-14-21; “Facial recognition and the Chinese other: Western discourses of China and AI”; https://criticaledtech.com/2021/06/14/facial-recognition-and-the-chinese-other-western-discourses-of-china-and-ai/; accessed 7-17-2022; AH]

Western perceptions of digital innovation have long remained in thrall to East-Asia. Just as Japan was seen as the world-leading innovator in micro-electronics and computers during the 1980s, China is now widely considered to be leading the development of artificial intelligence. Western news media, policy and public opinion perpetuate a sense that “China Is Dominating Artificial Intelligence” (Forbes 2018), “Will China Lead The World in AI by 2030?” (Nature 2019), “China – The First Artificial Intelligence Superpower” (Forbes 2021), and variations thereof. The ways in which AI is discussed and imagined in the West therefore continues to lean heavily on the notion that AI is being done by the Chinese in different, more rapid and efficient ways. Such discourses are not without substance. China is certainly home to some of the world’s most successful AI companies, with the Chinese government promoting AI as a central tenet of its strategies toward economic development and political stability over the next 20 years. In contrast to the oscillation of Western computer science between relatively bountiful ‘AI springs’ and fallow ‘AI winters’, Chinese AI is seen to be experiencing a prolonged AI ‘heat wave’ – bolstered by significant state involvement and support. Indeed, the Chinese government support for AI has been described as a “real existential threat to US technological leadership” (Chen 2019). Nevertheless, these discourses around AI are also underpinned by a continuation of ‘techno-orientalist’ discourse (Roh et al. 2015) that has long influenced Western thinking around emerging technologies. This frames Chinese society and culture in hyper-technological and distinctly ‘othering’ terms – what Huang (2020, p.59) describes as “a form of accelerationism where China is unstoppable in its technological development”. Crucially, while China is acknowledged to be making great strides in the development of emerging digital technologies, this is also framed in largely pejorative terms. Indeed, current Western discourses around China and AI span a range of contradictory characteristics – in one sense spanning what Lawrence Lek (in Huang 2020) describes as the “exotic, bizarre, tacky, and cheap”, while also seen as chillingly authoritarian, unethical and oppressive. Common tropes around China’s involvement in AI innovation throughout the twenty-first century therefore repeated return to notions of China as a ‘copy and counterfeit’ culture, as well as a place of mindless labour – with people working hard in high-tech factories without capacity for critical or original creative thought. At the same time, China is seen a place where the state make extensive use of digital technology to enforce totalitarian control, while Chinese companies gain unfair competitive advantage from the nation’s fierce protection of its internal market. As Huang (2020, p.46) concludes: “According to techno-orientalist stereotypes, China is home to a generic communist horde that threatens to imitate (and potentially steal and undermine) Western techno-hegemony”. Of key significance to our own research on facial recognition technology, is how these views are being espoused (and perhaps internalised) by Western IT industry actors involved in the development and roll-out of facial recognition technology in Australian society. Certainly, AI-related discourses from Western news media, policy-makers, academia and IT industry actors continue to draw regularly on notions of ‘look at what China is doing’. Commenting on academic depictions of developments in big data and commercial dataveillance, Wu (2020, p.7) notes how “the new spectral China begins frequenting conferences, journals, and PowerPoint slides”. Similarly, in-depth research by Dan Kotliar (2020) describes how Israeli IT start-up developers are happy to rely on reductive (and in some instances racist) connatations of somehow operating along more expert and ethical lines in comparison to their much more successful Chinese competitors – therefore justifying their own actions in terms of ‘old colonialist’ tropes. Indeed, the forms of technological ‘othering’ that typify Western views toward Chinese AI echo the forms of cultural differentiation described by Edward Said (1978) as ‘Orientalism’. Here Said examined how perceptions of South and East Asia during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were defined by recurring tropes and clichés drawn from colonial and imperialist perspectives – all implying a stark distinction between the ontological and epistemological foundations of ‘the Occident’ (self) and ‘the Orient’ (other) in order to justify Western superiority, authority and capacity to reconstruct the passive and weak Oriental other. The current literature on technological orientalism suggests that such discourses are being perpetuated in terms of the twenty-first century context of artificial intelligence.

### Chinese Cyber

#### Fears of Chinese cyber capabilities are rooted in orientalist tropes that pose it as a sneaky, backwards, thief unable to grasp international norms

Ooi and D’arcangelis 17 (Su-Mei Ooi and Gwen D’Arcangelis, 2017, Framing China: Discourses of othering in US news and political rhetoric, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2059436418756096>, )**//BRownRice**

China as thief: cyber battles The construction of China as potential enemy Other takes on an additional hue when we look at the depictions of China’s cyber activities—China moves from cheat to a more malicious cousin, the thief. The United States first focused on issues of “cyber warfare” in the mid-2000s to late 2000s, but at the time, the trope associated with China was not necessarily that of thief. In the mass news media, a militaristic lens framed much of the discussion, depicting China as a rule breaker flouting international norms and thus posing a security threat. For example, a Los Angeles Times article highlighted that “China in the last year has developed ways to infiltrate and manipulate computer networks around the world in what U.S. defense officials conclude is a new and potentially dangerous military capability, according to a Pentagon report” (Barnes, 2008). China is even placed in relation to al-Qaeda: “Cyber-attacks and cyber-espionage pose a greater potential danger to U.S. national security than Al Qaeda and other militants that have dominated America’s global focus since Sept. 11, 2001, the nation’s top intelligence officials said Tuesday” (Dilanian, 2013). This juxtaposition with al-Qaeda only served to heighten the military valence of China’s cyber activities, and a push to prepare for such a threat. Indeed, in the words of Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL): “The threat, to be sure, is real—and, we cannot allow ourselves to grow complacent …” (Nelson 2008). Snowden’s revelations of US spying on China in June of 2013 drastically changed the shape of the discussion however. Snowden demonstrated that the NSA (1) had two data centers in China from which it had been inserting spy software into vulnerable computers; (2) targeted the Chinese University of Hong Kong, public officials, businesses, and students; (3) hacked mobile phones; and (4) in 2009, hacked the Pacnet headquarters in Hong Kong, which runs one of the biggest regional fibre-optic networks. In response to Snowden’s revelations, a spate of articles compared the United States’ and China’s hacking, displaying a range of attitudes from journalists—some espoused that both countries demonstrate equivalent transgressive behavior, while others argued that China has crossed the line into more aggressive hacking that goes beyond the United States’ more benign “preemptive” hacking. The latter attitude indicates the resilience of tropes of the Yellow and Red Perils, a China whose inherent ideological and cultural differences with the West makes it a threat. The different lenses through which journalists and pundits viewed China’s spying in comparison with that of the United States further invoke this Orientalist demarcation. An article in The Washington Post thus contrasts China’s behavior against that of the United States, which merely seeks “to examine huge amounts of communication metadata around the world to look for trends” and “to preempt some threat against the U.S.” China’s spying is described, however, as “infiltrating almost every powerful institution in Washington, D.C.,” “breaking into major news organizations,” “stealing sensitive military technology,” and “stealing so much intellectual property that China’s hacking has been called the ‘greatest transfer of wealth in history’” (Fisher, 2013). Drawing in particular on incendiary words like “stealing” and “infiltrating,” this article distinguishes China as a sneaky thief. US journalists and pundits, in charging China with stealing economic resources, have further solidified the demarcation of China as an inferior and dangerous Other. A well-circulated quote by national security pundit Adam Segal stated, “The problem is we’re not talking about the same things … We’re trying to make a distinction between cyber economic espionage and normal political-military espionage. The Chinese don’t make that same distinction” (Bengali & Dilanian, 2015). By portraying China as unable to grasp the fundamental distinction between economics and national security, Segal suggests China’s thievery is connected to a more fundamental character flaw—China is unable to grasp proper civilized norms. Similarly, US official response has been that China’s view of data collection as a sovereign right has rendered them essentially different from the United States and by implication, the civilized world. That Chinese governmental espionage involves the collection of economic intelligence that is shared with Chinese companies further departs from civilized norms. Michael Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency thus explained that “they clearly don’t have the same lines in the sand, if you will, with that regard” (Bennett, 2015). Historically, US depictions of China as uncivilized have occurred whenever China has gained power or threatened US interests. The narrative of China as a sort of child following in the United States’ footsteps on the path to modernity has proven exceedingly popular since World War II and frames the US approach to China as a potential ally and resource who at the same time may never be civilizable (Kim, 2010; Vukovich, 2012). In this Orientalist narrative, China’s journey to modernity is always understood as precarious and, moreover, subject to US vigilance as to whether it meets the appropriate benchmarks. The title of an editorial in The Washington Post epitomizes current iterations of this sentiment and the ease with which Orientalist imagery can be invoked to portray China’s path to modernity as needing US guidance when China falls out of line: “The US Needs to Tame the Cyber-Dragon: Stronger Measures are Need[ed] to Block China’s Economic Espionage [emphasis mine]” (“The U.S. Needs to Tame,” 2013). In reality, US vigilance can be attributed to the concern since the end of the Cold War, that a “sleeping giant” able to challenge US global hegemony is awakening (Kim, 2010). Thus, the cultural work done by portrayals of China as unable to adhere to civilized norms serve to bolster the image of China as perpetually unprepared to be a responsible member of the international community. In fact, this narrative of China’s thievery serves to persuade the American public that China is a threat to the international community. One Wall Street Journal journalist perfectly echoes this sentiment: A China that leads the world in the theft of intellectual property, computer hacking and resource nationalism will prove extremely destabilizing. If it continues on this course, Beijing should not be surprised if other countries begin to band together to collectively counter some of the more harmful implications of China’s rise. A better outcome for all will be for China to embrace its responsibilities to help lead the world … (Metzl, 2011) This article, although hopeful that China may at some future point become a responsible global actor, even leader, ultimately reifies the notion that an increase in China’s global power is always suspect.

### Cognitive biotech

#### The pursuit of human enhancement is a form of masked orientalism.

**Taillandier 21** (Apolline Taillandier, "“STARING INTO THE SINGULARITY” AND OTHER POSTHUMAN TALES: TRANSHUMANIST STORIES OF FUTURE CHANGE", Wiley Online Library, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/hith.12203, 6-9-2021, Accessed 7-19-2022)//ILake🪐

According to Bostrom and Yudkowsky, superintelligent AI promises to change humanity's destiny in unprecedented ways, yet this future would need to be actively shaped rather than passively anticipated. A key notion in this respect is that risk preparedness requires unprecedented forms of human and social engineering. For instance, Bostrom has suggested cognitive enhancement as one way to maximize the likelihood of an AI transition occurring at a manageable (that is, secure) pace.62 As is rarely noted, the apparently radical visions of Vinge and Kurzweil also entail elements of continuity: intellectual property rights for the former, some form of morality for the latter. In Vinge's words, “the post-Singularity world does fit with the larger tradition of change and cooperation that started long ago (perhaps even before the rise of biological life)”; this means that “much of what we value (knowledge, memory, thought) need never be lost.”63 As Bostrom and a group of AI policy experts have argued, avoiding a disruptive AI scenario would require specific forms of global political regulation, such as averting the threat of a technology race between competing nation-states.64 Thus, although AI promises to make an unprecedented kind of change in human history, it also imbues the posthuman horizon with what I have elsewhere referred to as a conservative inclination; indeed, long-term dangers posed by AI seem to justify urgent calls for risk mitigation that link the preservation of existing global orders with the furthering of humane values.65 Safeguarding the future of innovation is a matter of changing the aims of AI from a scientific discipline concerned with problem-solving, efficiency, and accuracy “to a field concerned with systems that are provably beneficial for humans.”66 From this perspective, the scalar future of superintelligence opens up new realms of value and unprecedented possibilities for global coordination, the exploration of which would be essential for safely developing posthuman AI. PATHWAYS TO UNPRECEDENTED CHANGE As scholars have aptly noted, transhumanist futures profoundly challenge humanity's role as the central subject of history; at the same time, they do not appear to destabilize Western modern history's universalizing ambitions.67 Simon has claimed that narratives of developmental continuity leading from humanity to posthumanity must be avoided. The challenge of making sense of the unprecedented is retaining the emancipatory potential of Enlightenment horizons of collective betterment and the critical power of postcolonial and feminist perspectives. In this sense, transhumanism finds itself at odds with “a global approach to politics without the myth of a global identity,” such as that which has been promoted by Dipesh Chakrabarty.68 At the same time, transhumanism turns technology into the main agent of change. By presenting “a better-than-human being that is also other-than-human,” transhumanist technological projects enact a vision of posthumanity as “humanity's temporal other” that undermines the modern Western idea of history.69 In this respect, transhumanism is best understood as part of a specific historical moment, one marked by the rise of an evental sense of historicity. As this article demonstrates, however, transhumanism is also a highly ambiguous idea—at least, it is in terms of how its advocates have defined it. For instance, Bostrom has described transhumanism as a gradual process of awakening to new realms of experience and value. Defined in this way, transhumanism aims to update progressive hopes in the light of new technological possibilities.70 According to Bostrom, technologies of “human enhancement” are the contemporary forms of a modern “quest to develop further.”71 Yet many transhumanists have argued that Western values of human improvement failed to be truly universal. For instance, transhumanist futurist F. M. Esfandiary harshly criticized the romanticization of suffering and nature as a flawed intellectual posture that often constitutes a disguised form of orientalism, or what he called the “doomsday chic of Western intellectuals.”72 To point out precisely how it is that transhumanist stories have only partly overcome universalist human history, it is necessary to examine the forms of knowledge and identity that would survive the transition to some unknown future. Transhumanists understand the human condition as a transitional stage, so they believe that some of its qualities are meant to be permanently overcome whereas others need to be carefully preserved. These three conceptualizations of the posthuman future—the Promethean, the spontaneous, and the scalar—illustrate how transhumanist futures intertwine notions of utopia, dystopia, progress, and radical change in different ways. The posthuman is not conceived of as an entirely new era, even if realizing immortality and superintelligence would fundamentally alter the course of human history. Rather, as Bostrom has argued, transhumanism represents the way toward a realm of reality, experience, scientific knowledge, and morality that is not yet accessible to humans.73 In this sense, transhumanism is best understood as involving both continuous and discontinuous modes of historicity: the posthuman future is at once an unprecedented future and a development from past and present patterns of practices, values, and ideas. This point is evidenced by the three types of posthuman futures outlined above. In the Promethean future, unprecedented change would be brought about by an enlightened vanguard of individuals who are dedicated to expanding human capacities through self-transforming technologies, ranging from bodybuilding to psychoactive drugs. Continuity would be ensured by conserving personal identity, which is variously located in genetic material or in patterns of neuronal activity. In the spontaneous future, change would occur through the uncontrolled emergence of new life forms. However, decentralized social institutions would be sustained by shared norms of rationality and the continuous evolution of scientific public culture. In the scalar future, change would depend on the rationalizing power of AI, whereas continuity would result from the alignment of human values and AI decisions. In the three cases, historical change would involve some form of nonhuman agency; at the same time, it would remain inscribed within the story of humanity. Whether they seek to preserve cryogenized bodies, to build a digital archive “as big as the earth” (to borrow Theodor H. Nelson's phrase), or to ensure that future generations actually come into existence with a sense of what makes life worthwhile, most transhumanists are as concerned with the past as they are with the future.74 In transhumanist mailing lists and journals, special historical rubrics and calls to personal archives have expressed a sense of historicity, which transhumanists have understood as being manifested in the continuity of their own enterprise and that of individual identity through time. For this reason, posthuman futures have not altogether defied historical understanding. This fact has influenced transhumanist practices: many transhumanists believe that knowledge produced “with an eye toward future users” (including those in the remote future)—cryogenic and time capsules or digital archives, for instance—must be protected from future decay and from unprecedented technological breakthroughs.75 Yet many also believe that some form of identity and the conditions for making sense of the world will remain essentially the same. In transhumanism, visions of the truly other-than-human future usually stand in opposition to a desirable, more humane future in which the development of benevolent AI converges with forms of human enhancement or transformation. For instance, the roboticist Hans Moravec pointed out that conceiving of intelligent machines as humanity's “mind children” required looking into “a future which, from our present vantage point, is best described by the words ‘postbiological’ or even ‘supernatural.’ It is a world in which the human race has been swept away by the tide of cultural change, usurped by its own artificial progeny.“76 At the same time, Moravec's “transmigration” scenario offered a pathway to human survival in a future in which “protein-based” intelligent life-forms would be disadvantaged.77 In this and less uncanny scenarios of posthuman future, the possibility of directing evolution or averting technological catastrophe is understood as taking part in a broader historical course—be it genealogical (as in the case of the Promethean future), evolutionary (as in the case of the spontaneous future), or accelerationist (as in the case of the scalar future).

### COVID

#### Discourses of disease as security threats follow the trend of the racialization of disease, putting a target on Asian and Black people’s backs

Siu and Chun 20 (Lok Siu, Claire Chun, October 2020, Yellow Peril and Techno-orientalism in the Time of Covid-19: Racialized Contagion, Scientific Espionage, and Techno-Economic Warfare, page 427-428)**//BRownRice**

The Racialized Contagion The recent exponential rise of anti-Asian violence in the United States and globally during the pandemic illustrates the persistent danger of racializing diseases. Historians and social critics have documented and traced the ways in which diseases have been continually racialized by their association with particular peoples in geographical regions. Examples in recent memory include SARS marked as Asian, MERS as Middle Eastern, Ebola as African, and so on. In regards to this current pandemic, it might be useful to recall the popularization of the “Chinese as contagion” trope in U.S. history, as its multiple afterlives continue to inform the public’s facile acceptance of the notion of Chinese as diseased bodies and pathogenic carriers. The late nineteenth century racialization of the smallpox outbreak in San Francisco serves as the antecedent to the current moment and illustrates its relationship to the broader context of the anti-Chinese movement. When the smallpox epidemic broke out in San Francisco intermittently from 1868 through the 1880s, its origin was presumptively traced to Chinatown. At the time, it was widely accepted that epidemics were caused by environmental factors like polluted air, contaminated water, and general bad hygiene and sanitation. Through prevailing racist ideas of this period, Chinatown’s crowded streets, tight living quarters, and irregular layout were taken as evidence in creating a “laboratory of infection.”17 According to Nayan Shah, public health officials of the time helped construct Chinatown as a place filled with “horrors of percolating waste, teeming bodies, and a polluted atmosphere” and attributed these unsavory conditions to “depraved” innate Chinese cultural behaviors and practices, ignoring the economic factors that compel sharing of living quarters and the racist state in not extending sanitation services to Chinatown.18 By linking the environmental conditions of Chinatown with Chinese “primordial” culture, government officials came to target the Chinese person (the culturalbiological body) as the site of disease origin, contamination, and threat to public health writ large. Another study of public health in Los Angeles offers an analogous scenario.19 The emergence of these public health discourses in the 1870s must be situated in the context of the anti-Chinese movement. As Chinese workers poured into cities like San Francisco and Los Angeles after the completion of the railroad, they quickly became targets of intensified prejudice and racial violence. To the white working class, these Chinese laborers were perceived not only as economic threats to their livelihood; but, as racialized discourses of Chinese as disease carriers intensified, they were also feared and despised as a biomedical threat. Together, these yellow peril discourses molded perceptions of ethnic Chinese as both economic and biological threats, fueling the anti-Chinese movement that eventually led to the successful legislation of the Chinese Exclusion Act. This historical example shows how the racialization of disease worked in tandem with racial capitalist logic to animate anti-Chinese sentiment, violence, and legislation. The current rise in anti-Asian violence is clearly spurred by President Trump’s persistent attacks against China along with his explicit racialization of the virus. Indeed, since the onset of the pandemic, his administration has sought to blame China, whether it is for hiding the seriousness of the outbreak in Wuhan, delaying communication of the outbreak, or underreporting the number of deaths. The deployment of the politics of blame seeks to displace the pandemic-induced anger, anxiety, and rage onto China and, by extension, onto the bodies of Chinese and Asian Americans. Moreover, the racialized terms, the “Chinese virus” and the “kung flu,” naturalizes the virus as being endemic to Chinese bodies, thereby conjuring the phantasm of the Chinese/Asian contagion. While the ideational power of the Chinese/Asian contagion lies in its construction of the Asian body as the vehicle and embodiment of the virus, the deployment of blame against China/the Chinese for the spread of the virus serves as the catalyst that directs anger and rage against Chinese/Asian bodies. However, to view current attacks against Chinese/Asian Americans in the isolated context of the pandemic risks the danger of interpreting this aggression “as exception.” Instead, drawing on the lessons of the late nineteenth century example, we want to situate the rise of anti-Asian violence within the broader context of the anti-China campaign.

### Cyber

#### Cyberspace is used to conquer and maintain control over the East

Jahshan 14 [Jahshan, Paul, , 1/6-9/2014, "Cyber-Orientalism and the Virtualization of an Image: Edward Said’s Legacy for a Digital Century", Academia, [https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/64263212/Cyber-Orientalism\_and\_the\_Virtualization\_of\_an\_Image\_\_Edward\_Saids\_Legacy\_for\_a\_Digital\_Century-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1658085601&Signature=Q~OBIuNZ~gp2MmQf5vWyrG3nqsaI4~ihtleaixj-pf9ddubbFSuB2m6WFU6~QVXB2tVlK3inhQthmIF29SGfSo7huvHcmzjdDO85rV~gIrT2kBtw63cQHa4jax1go9U-al3zv-HYgIKHL7QLGImSlxLwGSdFkUMCmtqD7IVOmh3Q6AH5iIOINUpVWKcQpSJtmZUvglAdJlMgWEtSAtf8leTwLyOCByAYVyo4sFqHAV4pPkhbKyxAn8Xnn1-FrTlA5DbIxeTbroEIzEtYS469ZhHEnFSbG0vcZEe5Id8u6KUFJ5LI9nt~VBqIwlslzOhfsL3PJxNNDRTSReSBJNdxPw\_\_&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA]//AA](https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/64263212/Cyber-Orientalism_and_the_Virtualization_of_an_Image__Edward_Saids_Legacy_for_a_Digital_Century-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1658085601&Signature=Q~OBIuNZ~gp2MmQf5vWyrG3nqsaI4~ihtleaixj-pf9ddubbFSuB2m6WFU6~QVXB2tVlK3inhQthmIF29SGfSo7huvHcmzjdDO85rV~gIrT2kBtw63cQHa4jax1go9U-al3zv-HYgIKHL7QLGImSlxLwGSdFkUMCmtqD7IVOmh3Q6AH5iIOINUpVWKcQpSJtmZUvglAdJlMgWEtSAtf8leTwLyOCByAYVyo4sFqHAV4pPkhbKyxAn8Xnn1-FrTlA5DbIxeTbroEIzEtYS469ZhHEnFSbG0vcZEe5Id8u6KUFJ5LI9nt~VBqIwlslzOhfsL3PJxNNDRTSReSBJNdxPw__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA%5d//AA)

In its third incarnation as cyber-Orientalism after traditional Orientalism and area studies, it is in the digital arena that information is now produced, after being first distributed through word of mouth, then through the radio during the world wars, then through the first televised conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, then finally live in the Iraq wars and beyond. Information has always been deferred—language, we remember from Derrida, is always metaphorical; it is now speech, sight, and probably soon the senses that will be broadcast in real-time, near-reality simulations. It is in the digital arena that Said’s theatricality of the Orient is fully implemented, as Lisa Nakamura noted in her 1995 essay “Race in/for Cyberspace: Identity Tourism and Racial Passing on the Internet,” using as her example the then-famous, and still online today, cyberspace construct LambdaMOO (“Multi-UserDomain Object Oriented”): “Role-playing sites on the Internet…offer their participants programming features such as the ability to physically ‘set’ one’s gender, race and physical appearance, through which they can, indeed are required to, project a version of the self which is inherently theatrical.” (Nakamura 712) In an uncanny description of how Orientalism may have been constructed, acted out, and understood half a millennium ago, 7 Nakamura writes that in cyberspace’s online communities, “[t]his type of Orientalized theatricality is a form of identity tourism; players who choose to perform this type of racial play are almost always white, and the appropriation of stereotyped…figures allows them to indulge in a dream of crossing over racial boundaries temporarily and recreationally.” (Nakamura 714) This theatrical game of “identity tourism” barely hides the fact, to Nakamura, that it “represents a phantasmatic imperial space, much like Kipling’s AngloIndia, which supplies a stage upon which the ‘grand dream of a successful quest’ can be enacted.” (Nakamura 714-15) A year later, Ziauddin Sardar’s essay “Alt.Civilizations.FAQ: Cyberspace as the darker side of the West” firmly anchored America’s history-long thirst for new territorial grabs onto the new virtual realms of cyberspace, saying: “Beyond postmodernism’s subjugation of the realities, modes of knowing and social being of Other cultures, the West urgently needs new spaces to conquer. The moon and the inner planets are out for the time being given the cost of colonizing them. The outer space is a domain best left, for the time being, to Start Trek. For the conquest to continue unabated, new terrestrial territories have to be found; and where they don’t actually exist, they must be created. Enter, cyberspace.” (Sardar 734) The Internet, originally a military creation of the US Department of Defense in the 1960s, has developed, according to Sardar, as a “conscious reflection of the deepest desires, aspirations, experiential yearning and spiritual Angst of Western man.” (Sardar 734) Cyberspace, however, is no mere stage for the re-creation of the non-Western mirror image. As Sardar sharply writes, “cyberspace not only kills history, it kills people too,” (737) and it is in the cyber-arena that mainly non-Western populations are constantly observed by drones piloted thousands of miles away by operators alternating between playstation-like bouts of tracking, targeting, and killing, and PTA sessions or family gatherings only a few minutes later. Drone operation terms, like "bugsplat" for confirmed kills and "squirters" for 8 the luckier survivors running away, are direct descendants of god's-eye games where the player reigns supreme over the fate of her digital sim-creatures. This distance killing is then relayed, through various channels (YouTube, TV, Whatsapp, and other digital media) to a public, Western as well as non-Western, thirsting to enter, voyeur-like, a cybernetic game where digital circuits arouse the most basic instincts. The other side has also provided, of course, its share of gruesome scenes for public cyberspace consumption. Cyber-Orientalism is also a more insidious, more indirect face of hegemony. In her 2012 essay “Digital Occupation: Gaza’s High-Tech Enclosure,” Helga Tawil-Souri points out that Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005 was only a physical one, leaving in its place a vastly more complex arsenal of “frictionless high-technology mechanisms” affecting, and in turn controlling, the Palestinian Authority’s telecommunication sector, resulting in what she calls the “digital occupation” of Gaza, defined as the “multifaceted process that combines the territorial and economic dynamics of land and digital enclosures.” (Tawil 31) Digital enclosures of Tawil-Souri’s kind in Gaza are closely related to cybernetics, itself a transdisciplinary field involving mechanical, biological, and social elements, an instrument where the system being analyzed—in this case the Orient—reacts to and produces changes that can be measured as feedback that will trigger changes in the system itself, changes that can be simulated, replicated, and therefore categorized. But the cyberPanopticon, an infinitely more refined concept than its original mechanico-architectural construct, contains in itself, as in the Benthamian model, the seeds of opposite emancipatory strategies, what one may call, in the context of this paper, de Certeauan cyber-practices of everyday life. Michel de Certeau’s 1984 book explored ways in which Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish model could be circumvented through everyday practices such as using ordinary language and walking in the city. The discursive re-mapping of the physical 9 city enables citizens to divert systems of control set up by power centers. This becomes all the more relevant when one realizes that cyberspace, in its majority, is a giant exercise in writing, whether in the programming code or the input and feedback from users, and at the same time a virtual city, criss-crossed by data information highways, communication hubs, and online communities. Cyberspace is the locus of practices of everyday life par excellence, offering cybernauts possibilities of digital subversion and invisibility undreamed of before. As early as 2000, Edmund Ghareeb assessed the role of the new media in the information revolution in the Arab world, concluding that with the internet, “in some ways far more powerful than any of the other technologies…Web pages…appeal to some opposition groups seeking to get their messages across.” Hacking, foreshadowed by de Certeau’s bricolage nature of everyday practices, is to Ghareeb the answer to the governmental nature of control, whose bureaucrats “are not always as versatile or as creative as computer users.” (Ghareeb 415) Likewise, Lawrence Pintak, in 2009, advanced the idea that Arab journalists using the new technologies were equally responsible for the emergence of a revolutionary Arab consciousness, placing them “on the borderlands of Arab identity, shaping an emerging ‘imagined’ watan…that, in some ways, transcends the traditional lines in the sand that define the nation-state.” (Pintak 191) More recently, after Snowden’s revelation of the Prism surveillance program, ordinary users and hackers put together a website called “Prism-break,” with the obvious play on the prism/prison near-homonymy, offering cybernauts alternative operating systems and programs with which it is believed they can escape the panoptical grasp of intrusive, mainly Western, governments. It is in that same cyber-arena that Arabs will be able to reshape the construction of the Oriental in counter-hegemonic ways of re-writing the self, and precipitate the demise of the second stage of the development of Orientalism, area studies. When Said described 9-11 as the “[s]pectacular horror…that struck New York…[and] ushered in a new world of unseen, 10 unknown assailants, terror missions without political message, senseless destruction,” (Inadequate Banners, 2001) he was perhaps unknowingly echoing Guy Debord’s 1967 La Société du spectacle, in which the French Marxist founder of the Situationist International defined the spectacle as “the heir of all the weaknesses of the Western philosophical project which was to understand activity, dominated by the categories of seeing; indeed, it is based on the incessant deployment of the precise technical rationality which grew out of this thought. It does not realize philosophy, it philosophizes reality. It is the concrete life of all which is degraded into a speculative universe.” (Debord, thesis 20) Combining area studies’ focus on analyzing the present socio-politico-cultural variables of, in this context, the Orient, with the profound Angst born of a decidedly hegemonic past, the spectacle of cyber-Orientalism is the present-day technological marriage of bits of information with an imaginary discourse of its nemesis, its double, its clone. In the digital realm, there are no originals, as Walter Benjamin presciently foresaw; there are only copies, and any hitherto assumed superiority vanishes as the two come face to face. Jean Baudrillard, in “Clone Story,” masterfully problematizes the issue of the double, which is “precisely not a prosthesis: it is an imaginary figure, which, just like the soul, the shadow, the mirror image, haunts the subject like his other, which makes it so that the subject is simultaneously itself and never resembles itself again, which haunts the subject like a subtle and always averted death. This is not always the case, however: when the double materializes, when it becomes visible, it signifies imminent death.” (Baudrillard 95) A death of the image which originally represented nothing, and which cyberOrientalism uncovers as different and deferred, where often contradictory discourses overlap, traverse, and transect the digital spaces. Dickie Wallace, in 2008, submitted Sacha Baron Cohen’s film “Borat” to a close Baudrillardian reading, producing a “hyperrealization” of Borat “with the Map of the European ‘Other,’” in fact mapping out “the traces of the 11 phantasmagoria of the Other out of which Borat is formed…[exploiting] a Saidian discourse of this Orientalized part of Europe, substituting the region’s ‘signs of the real’ for a ‘real” that becomes ‘Borat’s Kazakhstan.’” (Wallace 36) What Wallace did was to uncover Cohen’s tongue-in-cheek mise-en-scène where the everyday reality is mercilessly derealized into a nonsensical discourse; Borat’s representation of Kazakhstan “has replaced the real Kazakhstan,” (Wallace 38) effectively producing a simulacrum which has, in Baudrillard’s words, “no relation to any reality whatsoever.” (Baudrillard 6) What was predicted by the Frankfurt School, and theorized by Guy Debord and other post-structuralist thinkers, found itself suddenly realized, and vastly aggrandized and facilitated, by the epochal changes facing humanity as it enters, every year more surely, into the technologies of digital information, augmented reality, cyber-surveillance and countersurveillance. From late medieval to industrialized, from post-industrialized to informational, Orientalism is ready to be ushered into its third phase, that of cyber-Orientalism.

### Democracy

#### The affirmative’s quest for democracy reinforces a dictatorship-democracy dichotomy that serves as an orientalist avatar of the differential degrees between the East and the West.

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The notion of democracy is not only a category of analysis (a Weberian ideal type). It works today largely as an identity marker for the West, the signifier of its very quintessence. As such, it establishes and perpetuates the superiority complex of the West vis-à-vis “the Rest”, democracy being held as the universal model of the “end of history”.7 Western democracies have thus unsurprisingly long been annoyed at the fact that China blatantly refuses to “transit” toward democracy in accordance with the prophecy of democracy as the end of history and the West as the destiny of the world. In the face of the emergence of COVID-19 in Wuhan, Western democracies have repeatedly asserted the superiority of their political regime—with, in the background, the belief in a form of superior democratic rationality. However, from March-April onwards, as Western democracies in turn came to be seriously affected by the disease, this stance started to reveal its illusory as well as deadly character. Does Democracy Protect Against Disease? When the epidemic was announced, in France as in many Western countries, the media discourse immediately engaged in a denunciation of the Chinese political system: editorials, op-eds, and broadcast or televised debates condemned the death of Dr. Li Wenliang, considered a “martyr of the coronavirus”,8 analysing how it revealed of the “failure” of the Chinese system,9 particularly of its “totalitarianism”.10 French media have not hesitated to attribute Dr. Li’s death to his treatment by Chinese authorities, writing at length about his “imprisonment”,11 or even, for some, going as far as to suggest his murder by the Chinese authorities.12 In other words, the coronavirus was framed less as an issue of public health than as a matter of foreign policy/politics. By the end of January, the announcement of the lockdown in China reinforced this reading even further: the lockdown was presented as a totalitarian measure dictated by the profound nature of the Chinese regime, rather than by the severity of the problem in epidemiological terms. The decision to put tens of millions of people under house arrest reinforced the feeling of radical alterity between Europe and China: more than ever, it was out of the question to compare the two entities. Meanwhile, the superiority of democracy was energetically reaffirmed.13 Then, from March onwards, while the prospect of confinement no longer appeared so “exotic/archaic” in Europe and as Wuhan started to lift its lockdown, editorials and op-eds began to question the ability of democracy to handle the crisis any better than China had.14 The question was raised as to whether authoritarianism might not ultimately be better able to respond to health crises, although the answer remained invariably negative: no, of course not.15 Finally, from early April onwards, when China reported its “success” in eradicating the virus, Western democracies imposed quarantine measures—although European mortality rates quickly escalated to higher numbers than in China. Since then, editorials and op-eds have returned to the discourse of non-comparability, arguing that Chinese numbers were fake, which was typical of Chinese “propaganda”,16 itself a product of China being a “structurally deceitful country”.17 Thus, it was argued, given the lack of comparable data (statistics in democracies being assumed to be honest and reliable), the comparison between democracy and dictatorship would be impossible—as well as being morally unacceptable. Are Public Policies Comparable Only Among Democracies? Not very many situations lend themselves to international comparison better than the one arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic. John Stuart Mill, one of the founders of qualitative comparison, established in his System of Logic, published in 1843, a typology of the comparative methodologies to isolate and test the variables of a given phenomenon: the method of most similar cases producing differing outcomes and the method of most different cases producing similar outcomes.18 The China-France comparison seems a priori to be in the matrix of the most different cases: for the same outcome, namely the suppression of the virus, two different methods, one democratic, the other authoritarian. Yet, the most similar cases comparison appears to be a better fit: the two countries have used the same methods, namely lockdown (confinement), but with dissimilar results. China aimed to eradicate the virus, France to slow down its pace (the so-called “flattening” of the curve). Of course, the lockdown was stricter in China than in France, but progressively, with the use of drones and methods of surveillance, this gap has reduced.19 In certain respects, the French lockdown was both more stringent and more massive than the one imposed in China: China confined only one province and a handful of cities, a tiny part of its population, without declaring a state of emergency, while Paris imposed a national lockdown on its 67 million inhabitants and declared a state of emergency. In France, the media pushed a narrative of blaming and shaming China, which in turn delayed rather than prompted the reaction of the French government to take public health measures against the coronavirus. The expected positive effects of freedom of the press and transparency in terms of inducing prompt government reaction to the crisis did not materialise. The initial absence of reaction toward the virus contrasts with the “overreaction” deployed against the H1N1 flu in 2009, which had a much lower death rate than COVID-19 but was first declared in the United States, another country considered to be part of the “club of liberal Western democracies”. So, why did Amartya Sen’s theory, once extrapolated to epidemics, not prove to be true in the case of COVID-19? The Democracy-Dictatorship Binary: An Orientalist Reading of Comparative Politics In 1978, Edward Saïd, following Syed Hussein Alatas,20 defined Orientalism as an epistemic process at the heart of the domination of the West, a process built on a series of essentialising stereotypes.21 From an Orientalist perspective, the COVID-19 epidemic was interpreted in the West as the dysfunctional, even well-deserved, offspring of Chinese totalitarianism, rather than as a public health event. Biases and stereotypes against China, reactivated by the start of the epidemic, are not only racist against Chinese people per se but also reveal deeper stereotypes of authoritarian regimes, of which Beijing is currently the paradigmatic case.22 The origins of the massive media reaction of blaming China can be traced back to the Orientalism of our categories of thought and the categories we use in the social sciences. Such Orientalism lies at the heart of the genesis of the discipline of political science. It suffices to quote Montesquieu, who was the first, in his Spirit of the Laws, to establish despotism as the “natural” condition of the East, based on his readings on Japan, China, Siam, and the Ottoman Empire.23 Next, in Montesquieu’s wake, John Stuart Mill and Max Weber associated freedom, legality, and modernity distinctively and exclusively with the West.24 After the Second World War, transitology, which borrows heavily from the theory of modernisation derived from the Weberian thesis, became one of the pillars of the discipline of comparative politics.25 Non-Western countries were intended to “transit” toward democracy. The dictatorship-democracy dichotomy became the new semiotic avatar of the differential degrees of civilization between West and East. The central question, formulated from the West, focused on how to “assist” non-democratic countries to democratise, reactivating the myth of the civilising mission of the West. From the 1980s onwards, the social sciences were diversely affected by the Saïd revolution. If Orientalism had a major impact on the discipline of anthropology, it had a lesser impact on other social sciences. In political science and public law in particular, Eurocentrism was vigorously denounced, but the comparison between dictatorships and democracies remained limited to the emphasis of their profound, ontological alterity. Orientalism diffused with more ease within the interdisciplinary field of “area studies”, a somewhat marginalised field. If most of the “areas” forming the units of area studies were to some degree homogeneous in religious or political terms—real or fantasied26—this was not the case of Oriental Asia, characterised by its extreme religious as well as political diversity.

### Drones

#### Drones are a tool of Orientalist discourse that shape Western anxieties projected into forms of necropolitical genocide and dehumanization

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The drone programme and its practices: orientalism, biopolitics and state terrorism

So far I have shown the discourses and tropes of modernity that characterise the drone and its surveillance as a neutral and humane way for finding and killing terrorists. In the second section, I demonstrated that the assumptions of the mechanical drone’s neutrality and autonomy are overstated given that human beings still play a large role in targeting. I undermined the rhetoric of objective targeting by highlighting the drone programme’s colonial gaze and the Orientalism inherent to targeting and surveillance, which dehumanises Muslims and Arabs and fuels enemy creation. In this section, I will show how the drone programme operates as state terrorism. In continuity with the Bush administration before it, the Obama administration framed its drone programme as “self-defence,” arguing that strikes precisely target only those on a “kill list” (Obama 2013; Becker and Shane 2012). This shift from punishment to more “humane” biopolitical forms of warfare has been necessary to legitimise the violence of capitalist democracies throughout modernity (Kordela 2016; Wall 2016). Since precision bombing is an exercise of sovereign power in the sense that it involves deciding who will die and who shall be left alone to live, the drone programme is a biopolitical form of warfare used to protect the US population from the risk of terrorism (Kordela 2016; Allinson 2015; Wilcox 2015; Wall 2016). According to Foucault (2003), the sovereign’s biopower, or right to put people to death so that others may live, is only legitimate insofar as it preserves (certain) lives and can appear meaningful only if it succeeds in presenting itself as necessary for the reproduction of life (Foucault 2003; Wilcox 2015; Kordela 2016). Crucially, biopower’s right to kill finds its sole justification in racism. Racism is a way of introducing “a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (Foucault 2003, 254). In the context of the drone programme, Orientalism forms the biopower which justifies drone violence and creates the critical break between what must live and die. In Allinson’s (2015) biopolitical analysis of drone violence, she utilises Achille Mbembe’s “necropolitics”, which “refers to the arrogation of, in Foucauldian terms, the sovereign’s command of death, but within the apparatuses of surveillance, auditing, and management which characterize ‘biopower’” (2015, 114). Allinson argues that by identifying racism as the technology of power that unites the exercise of sovereign power with the technologies of surveillance and auditing, “the drone is precisely a technology of the management of populations: of the drawing of a ‘caesura’ between worthy and unworthy life” (2015, 119). The drone is not an instrument for making life live among those it surveys, but “to define who matters and who does not, who is disposable and who is not” (Mbembe 2003, 27). In colonial fashion, the drone’s surveillance is to identify populations as less than life, or as dangerous life whose extinguishing must be managed in order for valuable life to flourish (Allinson 2015). In order for the drone (via data mining and algorithms) and its operators to distinguish between who lives and who dies, the US government and its intelligence agencies rely upon an Orientalist apparatus of knowledge which constructs Middle Eastern males as enemies. Indeed, the drone programme’s policies identify military-aged males in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Somalia as the category of unworthy life and assimilate every decision to kill to the identification of members of such a category (Allinson 2015). These populations of military-aged men, because they are represented as “risks”, can be “hunted” and “tracked” like prey via surveillance because they are “savage” or “animal life” (Allinson 2015; Chamayou 2015). Although the term “terrorism” has not usually been applied to state violence due to their presumed legitimate authority to wage violence, theorists of critical terrorism studies have argued that states can be terrorists as well (Blakeley and Raphael 2016; Heath-Kelly 2016; Jackson 2008; Grosscup 2006; Sluka 2000). They argue that states, like non-state actors, also engage in terrorism – violence directed towards or threatened against civilians – which is designed to instil terror or intimidate the population of people as a means of preventing or changing their political behaviour (Jackson 2008; Blakeley and Raphael 2016). Blakeley and Raphael (2016) argue that state terrorism can be understood in relation to foreign policy objectives, which can be traced back to the objectives of the European colonial era. It is within this context that I analyse US policies. In addition to drone “personality strikes” – strikes that target specific people as identified on a given “kill list” – the drone programme also engages in “signature strikes” or “crowd killings”. These strikes allow for drone operators to fire at militaryaged males associated with suspicious activity even if their identities are unknown. As I already argued, surveillance is limited in that there is no visual difference between enemies and civilians and, for this reason, algorithms use surveillance feeds and data mining in order to find targets based on their “suspicious activity” or “movements” (Chamayou 2015; Wilcox 2015; Amoore 2009; Schuppli 2014; Aradau 2015). This concept is called “activity based intelligence”, and relies on an enemy’s group membership, or social network, and the number and frequency of contacts regardless of their nature, in order to speculate whether someone is a terrorist suspect (Chamayou 2015). A tactic such as this makes it likely that some will be labelled guilty by association (Aradau 2015; Baggiarini 2015; Amoore 2009); as one drone officer affirms, “if we decide [someone is] a bad person, the people with him are also bad” (Porter 2011, n.p.). Former CIA Director Michael Hayden defended signature strikes to former president Obama by stating that they could take out a lot more “bad guys” by targeting groups instead of individuals (Klaidman 2012). Another perceived benefit is that the more afraid militants are to congregate, the harder it is for them to plot, plan or train for attacks against the United States and its interests (Klaidman 2012). Contrary to government assertions, most drone strikes are not actually targeting those on the “kill list”, but are targeting groups of males whose identities are unknown (Heller 2012; Shane 2015). This practice, based on prejudiced racial profiling, demonstrates that the United States does not discriminate between civilians and suspected militants, and that it lumps them together due to their coexistence in the same space. Notably, by targeting groups, the United States disrupts the social lives and political activity of the rest of the population. For instance, signature strikes have adverse implications for political and social life because people in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan are tribal. For them, the most important social and legal institution is the Jirga. In concrete terms, the Jirgas are vital group discussions in which community problems are resolved by a decision-making assembly of male elders (Cavallero, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012). However, because groups of military-aged males are likely to be targeted by drones, the activity of coming together for such communal decision-making is dangerous. The Living Under Drones report reveals that civilians are perfectly cognisant of the erosion of Jirgas due to “crowd killings” (2012). With the threat of signature strikes, the United States has effectively limited movement and social life in FATA through threat of bombardment. As Jan, a man who was left destitute by a drone strike reveals: “… we saw funerals being attacked, bakeries, mosques. It felt like the US is not leaving any part of Waziris” life untouched. They had to destroy every segment of our life’ (quoted in Ackerman 2016, n.p.). In Yemen, others complain of similar conditions. One man explains, “[p]eople were terrified. People are afraid now to attend any large gathering – weddings, funerals. Everyone is just trying to survive” (quoted in Salama 2014, n.p.). Clearly, signature strikes have disrupted the political, as well as the economic and social spheres of civilian lives. The other controversial US policy that targets civilians is “double taps”. A double tap is a practice of striking an already targeted site in relatively quick succession (Cavallero, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012). Living Under Drones reports that there is significant evidence that the United States has repeatedly engaged in this tactic (2012). Journalist Chris Woods (2013) explains that secondary strikes have discouraged civilians from coming to one another’s rescue and have inhibited the provision of emergency medical assistance from humanitarian workers. Living Under Drones states: Crucially, the threat of the ‘double tap’ reportedly deters not only the spontaneous instinct of neighbors and bystanders in the immediate vicinity of strikes, but also professional humanitarian workers providing emergency medical relief to the wounded (Cavallero, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012, 76). The double tap practice is designed to be terroristic. For instance, Glenn Greenwald reports that a 2004 US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Bulletin states: [T]errorists may use secondary explosive devices to kill and injure emergency personnel responding to an initial attack’. Such terror devices ‘are generally detonated less than one hour after initial attack, targeting first responders as well as the general population. (cited in Greenwald 2012, n.p.) According to the standards set by the FBI then, the United States is committing acts of terrorism. The report by Cavallero, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey (2012) reveals that due to fear of being attacked, emergency personnel now wait up to six hours to provide medical relief. In addition to these practices, the United States’ use of the drone programme for assassinations, or summary executions, is also a terrorist tactic. As Jeffrey Sluka explains (2000), Amnesty International has identified the main forms of state terror as arbitrary detention, unfair trial, torture and political murder or extrajudicial execution. Begoña Aretxaga (2000) explains that the message summary execution seeks to convey is one of impotence. The dead bodies spread the message (among many) that resistance to the state’s project is futile and that the price for resistance is high. When those vaporised by tactics of “signature strikes” and “double taps” are left in pieces, we must speak of it as a form of terrorism because such practices are intended to send the message that the United States is omnipotent, omnipresent and utterly ruthless. We must also speak of terrorism because the necropolitical logic of these strikes homogenises all males in the terrorist “hot spots” the drone surveys as a population worthy of being put to death, thus precluding discrimination. Although it is militaryaged males that are collectively designated to a category of inherently dangerous people, there is nevertheless a further assimilation and stereotyping of all humans in sight of the drone to that category due to the necropolitical gaze – hence signature strikes and other strikes that have attacked civilians at weddings and funerals (Allinson 2015; Engelhardt 2013; Struck 2002).2 It is this indiscriminate targeting of populations rendered suspicious and disposable that leads the drone programme to operate as state terrorism. As Blakeley and Afxentiou demonstrate in this special section, the use of aerial bombing to terrorise the civilian population and make it afraid to congregate does not present a novelty; British air power of which the drone is a descendant, was a tool for terrorising and controlling entire populations. An important continuity between historic air power and drone warfare is that in both cases the violence of the bombing is experienced by a population. Since those under the drone’s gaze are not perceived as fully human due to Orientalism, like natives in the colonies, they are not provided noncombatant immunity despite the language of just war. Eurocentric – and more specifically, United States – narratives concerning drone bombing also obfuscate what it means for civilians to live under drones. For instance, film and media representations of drone bombing limit their focus to armed drones or the pilots that control them, leaving out the experiences of victims on the receiving end of their violence (Gregory 2011; Stahl 2013). In this way, the audience is allowed to sympathise with drone pilots and government officials who allegedly only want to keep us safe from risky populations, but not with the civilians who suffer our violence and terrorism. Their voices are not worthy of circulation, despite the fact that they know much better the violence inflicted by the drone programme. The aforementioned Living Under Drones report reveals a disturbing reality for civilians in northwest Pakistan. One thing the report reveals is that since drones hover over their target areas persistently so as to provide an “unblinking eye”, those under them are acutely aware that their lives and actions are being scrutinised (see also Acheson et al. 2017). The report proclaims that the constant hovering of drones causes psychological terror to those on the ground, thus drawing attention not only to the deaths caused by drone bombing but also to other destructive effects such as psychological terror, insomnia and the disruption of social and political life. In Palestine, civilians cannot forget they are occupied and under aggressive military surveillance either, because as Palestinian Atef Abu Saif explains elsewhere, “[t]he drone keeps us company all night long. Its whirring, whirring, whirring, whirring is incessant – as if it wants to remind us it’s there, it’s not going anywhere. It hangs just a little way above our heads” (2014, 31). Civilian testimony in Living Under Drones reveals the constant and inescapable fear of being killed by a drone. According to the report such all-pervasive fear has led people to sacrifice their education, their social lives and their freedom in order to avoid becoming a target. US drones have intimidated the population to the point that it has changed people’s habits and routines. As Safdar Dawar states: If I’m shopping, I’m really careful and scared. If I’m standing on the road and there is a car parked next to me, I never know if that is going to be the target. Maybe they will target the car in front of me or behind me. Even in mosques, if we’re praying, we’re worried that maybe one person who is standing with us praying is wanted. So, wherever we are, we have this fear of drones. (quoted in Cavallero, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012, 98). As Dawar’s statement demonstrates, there is no place he feels safe, not even at a place of worship. To live under drones is thus to be made to feel entirely vulnerable. As Gibson states, “… It’s all terrifyingly random. Suddenly and without warning, a missile launches and obliterates everyone within a 16-yard radius” (2012, n.p.). These people at the mercy of US pilots can do relatively little to assert their innocence (Jalal, 2016). Civilians are not only afraid of being in the vicinity of another target but also of being misconstrued as a threat for targeting themselves. The fear is captured by Saif when, in his book The Drone Eats with Me, he observes: I am surrounded by a squadron of drones. I can’t help but imagine that they have just one plan: to kill me. If I run, I will look more like a reasonable target, a dangerous threat in motion. … He might suspect that I am trying to avoid being seen, that I have something to hide. It is better to be obvious, I realise, so I opt for my old tactic and walk straight down the middle of the street. This way the drone operator sees me perfectly clearly; he knows I have nothing to hide. (Saif 2014, 226). At the same time that they themselves are threatened by lethal violence, people under drones have to worry about not being perceived as threats, while lacking the knowledge of what might or might not constitute them as such. As a consequence, those under drones internalise being watched and having their every action scrutinised and thus, by necessity, they alter their behaviour. The failure of the drone programme to impose surveillance solely on “terror suspects” and to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty must be seen for what it is: a form of state terrorism. The United States punishes civilians and suspects alike with surveillance, group killings that assume guilt by association, and through the targeting of houses, mosques and schools (Ross and Serle 2014; Reprieve 2013). The threat of hovering drones that has led people to remain in their homes and stop socialising demonstrates that surveillance is not benevolent, but rather a tool for control and domination over populations, as Saif clearly intuits when he notes that “[t]he occupation is now truly 21st century – the best drone technology in the world is being deployed up there, just to keep us occupied” (2014, 149). No matter where drones are employed and by whom, whether it is US drones in Pakistan (Living under drones 2012, Tahir 2016) or Israeli drones in Palestine (Saif 2014), their operation is containment. Those who may regard the terror inflicted upon civilians by drones as an unwanted side-effect of US policies should note that these policies and the terror they inflict are no accident. As Jacob Levich argues, … [T]he US is consciously integrating the ruinous secondary effects of drone warfare into its overall counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. Terrorism is a strategy to coerce people into withdrawing support from the insurgents; this is typically accomplished through assassinations, torture, surveillance, mass expulsions, [and] ruthless displays of military force … (Levich 2012, n.p.) Levich is correct in stating that these are tactics of COIN, which focus not only on defeating armed groups but also on controlling populations in which they move and policing those populations for signs of “subversive” activity (Blakeley and Raphael 2016; Khalili 2012). At the same time, Shaw and Akhter (2012) and Chamayou (2015) argue that in Pakistan’s FATA, the CIA is actually engaged in counterterrorism, a subdivision of COIN, whereby winning hearts and minds is irrelevant to the strategic aim and thus, there is less care to avoid civilian casualties. Crucially, these COIN practices of the drone programme are embodiments of social threats, which is what terrorism aims to do. Lauren Wilcox (2015) and Levich (2012) go even further to argue that the drone programme’s violence is akin to torture in that there is absolute non-reciprocity. The drone programme maximises the vulnerability of civilians, with Levich arguing that COIN inflicts pain on a whole community instead of only the individual target, so that it can enforce popular consent in Pakistan and other areas of resistance to US domination. Thus, in colonial fashion, US drone violence not only dehumanises and punishes whole populations with absolute non-reciprocity but it also makes life for these already vulnerable populations unliveable. Expectedly, those living under drones have become aware of their dehumanisation and that they are seen as potential threats. An art installation in Pakistan entitled Not a Bug Splat (in reference to the military slang for those killed by drones as “bug splats”) placed a large poster of an unnamed child who lost her parents and two younger siblings on the ground in Waziristan to give a “human face” to victims, so that they are not just “blobs” on a screen (Benedictus 2014, n.p.). Artists hope the image “will create empathy and introspection amongst drone operators, and will create dialogue amongst policy makers …” (Benedictus 2014, n.p.). Saif similarly wonders: Who will convince him that the buildings he sees on his screen are not graphics, but homes containing living rooms, and kitchens bathrooms and bedrooms; that there are kids inside, fast asleep; that mobiles hang over their beds; that teddy bears and toy dinosaurs lie on the floor; that posters line the walls? (Saif 2014, 66). Here, Saif, like people in Pakistan, seeks to humanise himself and his surroundings. Individuals under drones want those watching them to not see them just as graphics or as Orientalist constructions of “terrorists” due to their ethnicity and geographic location, but as real people, with real homes and real lives. Their feelings of degradation are not imagined as the language, policies and necropolitical logic of the drone programme demonstrate. Civilian deaths are not humanising; they are solely referred to as “collateral damage,” their lives turned into mere statistical figures in order to create a language that can make the drone programme discursively defendable. As Saif says: “Everything is turned into numbers. The stories are hidden, disguised, lost behind these numbers. Human beings, souls, bodies – are all converted into numbers” (Saif 2014, 76). Meanwhile, when CIA officials bombed an “al-Qaida compound” and killed two “Western” hostages, their deaths received a rare personal apology from former president Obama who went on television and said their names; they were not turned into numbers (see Shane 2015; Ackerman 2015; Baker 2015). Here we see biopolitics at work: Western casualties are people, their deaths are “tragic”; their loved ones are given explanations and media attention. Whereas when Muslim civilians are killed by drone strikes and their families travel to meet Congress members, the latter fail to show up to apologise or acknowledge their loss, as was the case for the Rehman family (Devereaux 2015, Grim and Linkins 2015; Gusterson 2016; see also, Friedersdorf 2012; Engelhardt 2013). Ackerman (2016) reports that after strikes people are left impoverished, anguished and infuriated. Rafiq ur-Rehman who lost his mother states, “[i]f America kills any westerner, one of their own, white people, they apologize and compensate. But if it’s Pakistanis like us, they don’t care. In my opinion, America treats us worse than animals” (quoted in Ackerman 2016, n.p.). Jan, who was previously quoted, was struck by a drone and feels the dead are the lucky ones since those maimed are left to suffer in agony and poverty (Ackerman 2016). Anti-American sentiment arises not only because survivors are livid at the injustice but also because as Noor Behram, a photographer in Pakistan explains: There are just pieces of flesh lying around after a strike. So the locals pick up the flesh and curse America. They say that America is killing us inside our own country, inside our own homes, and only because we are Muslims. The youth in the area surrounding a strike gets crazed. Hatred builds up inside those who have seen a drone attack. (Shah and Beaumont 2011, n.p.). For parents who lose their children and feel powerless and lacking in their ability to protect them, resentment is understandable. This is also true for children left without parents or other family members. The hatred of those impacted by drone attacks is reasonable given that their loved ones’ deaths are neither acknowledged, nor made grievable as a direct consequence of the Orientalist language and attitudes that render their communities subhuman. The animosity that drone strikes provoke has led some to call them counterproductive and as the new recruiting tool of militants. In 2010, Faisal Shahzad, who tried to set off a car bomb in Times Square, justified his targeting of civilians by telling the judge “[w]hen the drones hit, they don’t see children” (Becker and Shane 2012). The testimonies of those under drones demonstrate the disconnect between the experience of living under the drone programme and government claims of “precise” drone targeting. The government’s language of precision that feeds the impression that the drone programme – and the drone in particular – leads to more ethical violence, obscures the terrorism the drone programme forces others to live with. The rhetoric of “humane” drone strikes elides the dehumanisation and racism which justifies the drone programme and its indiscriminate strikes. Those who seek to be critical call drone strikes “assassinations” (Scahill and Greenwald 2014; Chamayou 2015; Barrinha and Mota 2017; Allinson 2015; Cockburn 2016), but such an analysis omits that most strikes are signature strikes and that only the more infrequent personality strikes constitute assassinations. Signature strikes and double taps cannot be assassinations since they are not specific. Instead, they are nothing but murder. They are simultaneously, a form of murder that works to terrorise the surrounding population. It is important to make this distinction because assassinations can be justified; consider Hitler, for example (also see Aloyo 2013). Proponents and critics who claim that the drone programme can be made legal and ethical with transparency, accountability and amendments to US policies are also obscuring the broader violent effects of drone bombing by giving the programme a veil of legitimacy (Shane 2012; Bowden 2013; Mayer 2013; Braun and Brunstetter 2013). Even if the policies of signature strikes and double taps were discontinued (which is doubtful), the repressive and terrorising component of surveillance would persist. The testimonies of people in Palestine, Yemen and those in Pakistan, demonstrate that terror effects are constitutive of what drones do, irrespective of the intentions of those who use drones. Furthermore, policy cannot purge the Oriental attitudes that legitimise drone use and the killing of Muslims in the first place, and neither can mechanical drones and their systems. While they can help provide more objective information to personnel, they do not exist in a vacuum and therefore do not escape the socio-political relations and cultural knowledge that legitimate the drone programme’s violence.

### Hegemony

#### The 1ac’s hegemonic discourses are consistent with orientalism – the alt is a prerequisite to international relations

Nayak and Malone 9(Meghana V. Nayak and Christopher Malone, 2009, American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism: A Critical Rethinking of US Hegemony, page 256-257)**//BRownRice**

American Orientalism: The Discourse on ‘‘The West and the Rest’’ Edward Said (1979) shatters the taken-for-granted status of colonial and postcolonial knowledge about the developing world with his analysis of Orientalism. As he notes, European intellectual, artistic, archeological, and literary examinations of—and claims about—the bodies and borders conquered and mapped, justified the necessity and endurance of colonial European empires. Further, there is an internal consistency of the Orientalist discourse, despite any lack of correspondence with a ‘‘real’’ Orient, in order to confer an objective and innocent status to the knowledge production that both prompted and rationalized the brutality of imperialism (Said 1979:5–7). However, this does not mean that Orientalism is just a play of meanings and ideas, for, as constructivist IR scholars argue, the more we act toward an entity as if it has a particular representation or meaning, the more that entity can take on that representation (Wendt 1992; Doty 1996). For example, the more European colonialists perceived colonized territories as incapable of self-governing, the more Europeans treated the territories as in need of governing. Indeed, Orientalism is a ‘‘Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient’’ (Said 1979:3), acting ‘‘dynamically along with brute political, economic, and military rationales’’ (Said 1979:12). Said (1979:12) also claims that Orientalism has much less to do with the ‘‘Orient’’ and much more to do with the making of ‘‘our’’ world. Knowledge claims about the Other (the Orient⁄the East) actually cement the way the Self (Europe ⁄the West) sees and constructs itself. The ‘‘Orient’’—a mysterious, erotic, dark, dangerous mass of Muslim, Hindu, Jewish, Arab, South Asian, East Asian natives—is a deep and recurring image in Western identitymaking. The impact of Said’s work, particularly Orientalism, on critical IR is threefold. First, it creates space for critical IR scholars to examine representational practices and international hierarchy in international politics, in dialogue with scholars in other fields, such as literary criticism, anthropology, postcolonial thought, feminist studies, political geography, and others. Said’s contrapuntal analyses of culture, colonial discourses, nationalism, power, and representational practices in his body of work opens the way to explore the nuances, contradictions, and shifting and hybrid contexts of Othering (Chowdhry 2007). The Other is that through which the subject is represented as privileged and superior, with the Other being devalued, feared, reviled, even desired, in some way. The Other stands as a potential disruption of the Self, but at the same time, as critical IR theorist Campbell (1998b) points out, the Self cannot fully contain or ‘‘resolve’’ the anxiety over the difference from or the encounter with the Other; without the production of this anxiety, insecurity, and danger, statecraft and nationmaking would have nothing against which to assert themselves. Indeed, for the West, the encounters of slavery, colonialism, and genocide have to be represented as trysts with danger, backwardness, and ever-threatening barbarism—anything but illegitimate violence—in order to naturalize Western superiority. Second, the various debates about Said’s work have inspired and fortified critiques of rationalist methodology of mainstream IR scholars and of how their ontological presumptions about and methodological studies of the ‘‘West’’ and the ‘‘rest’’ obscure more than they explain (Allain 2004; Chowdhry 2007). Third, the American variant of Orientalism allows for an analysis of the discursive deployments in which (1) the United States assumes and relies upon an ontological distinction between the United States and Others (Weldes et al. 1999; Richter-Montpetit 2007); (2) the United States employs authoritative epistemological claims and representations about Others’ bodies, habits, beliefs, feelings, and political sensibilities, thereby justifying interventions, sanctions, and other actions within, across, and outside of its borders (Persaud 2002); and (3) US foreign policy relies on a rationalist methodology consisting of finding ‘‘evidence,’’ such as reports and fact-finding missions, of foregone conclusions about the Other and the United States need to assert its position (Tetreault 2006). Research in this vein, both within and in conversation with critical IR, has examined both the US relationship with the Middle East since the 1940s7 as well as American aggressions since the nineteenth century (Sadowski 1993; Ngai 2000; Little 2002; Mamdani 2004; Khalidi 2005). Orientalism, or at least the controversies over its conclusions, has featured prominently in the debates since 9 ⁄ 11 over whether Huntington was right about Islam (Fox 2001; Abrahamian 2002; Elshtain 2004; Lewis 2004), and in claims that the United States is Othering Islam⁄Arabs with disastrous results (Little 2002; Khalidi 2005; Alam 2007). Further, many find that an understanding of Orientalism ‘‘within’’ the United States, particularly toward Arab Muslim and South Asian Americans, after 9 ⁄ 11, is crucial (Hagopian 2004). Agathangelou and Ling’s (2005) stinging critique of the 9 ⁄ 11 Commission Report’s treatment of the Muslim Other demonstrates the overwhelming reasons why we should understand the reasons for and consequences of constructing the quintessential Muslim⁄Arab ⁄Middle Eastern Other both within the United States and ‘‘elsewhere.’’ With Huntington’s (2004) recent claims about the alleged threat of Mexican immigration to the indubitably Christian and Anglo-Saxon America, it also seems worthy to rethink how Othering works and against whom in various historical periods. Some scholars trace American Orientalism to the Spanish–American War, or use different regional examples such as China, Japan, the Philippines, and Hawaii (Doty 1996; Klein 2003; Leong 2005). Campbell (1998a) points to the impoverishment of Western political analysis of heterogeneous communities, particularly in the international responses to and representations of violence in Bosnia. He specifically notes that Europe and the United States intervened not to ‘‘save’’ Bosnia but rather to articulate Western nationalist imaginaries to discipline and contain the ideal of multiculturalism.8 Doty’s (2003) recent work explores how the United States, the UK, and France use immigrants as a site of Western statecraft and race-based order and security. Not all of these authors explicitly reference Orientalism, but they fit within scholarship that asks the same kind of questions Said first posed in Orientalism and both expanded upon and critiqued in his later work. We assert that a critical interrogation of American Exceptionalism can enhance the extremely rich field of inquiry discussed above. We turn next to an examination of th e relationship between American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism.

#### **The aff’s portrayal of China as a dystopian threat reflects paradigms of Techno-Orientalist Sinophobia, creating a totalizing view of China that undermines scholarship and knowledge production – only the alt can solve.**

Wu 21 (Valerie Wu, "Western Media’s Portrayal of a Futuristic, Dystopian China is Harmful", Glimpse from the Globe, https://www.glimpsefromtheglobe.com/topics/politics-and-governance/western-medias-portrayal-of-a-futuristic-dystopian-china-is-harmful/, 8-10-2021, Accessed 7-8-2022)//ILake🪐

SAN FRANCISCO — Imagine a futuristic city where robots prevail. Since the advent of imperialism, this futuristic and otherly view has often served as the popularized Western conception of Asia. This concept is known as Techno-Orientalism, a phenomenon that primarily dominates discourse surrounding media portrayals of East Asia. According to journalist George Yang in Wired Magazine, Techno-Orientalism, which creates an ideology of the Asian “Other,” rests on Western logic of the East as a technological threat to the world. With Beijing’s technological rise in an increasingly globalized world, Techno-Orientalist frameworks have now become fundamental to specifically describing China. Plan A Magazine’s Lily Luo writes that the term “Techno-Orientalism” was originally coined by Asian scholars like David Roh, Greta Niu and Betsy Huang. These scholars perceived Techno-Orientalism as the projection of historical Orientalism, or what Khan Academy’s Nancy Demerdash describes as the “conception of an ‘Orient’ that was rooted in incivility.” Under the futuristic gaze of Techno-Orientalism, East Asians are not only conceived of as a racialized source of fear, but also a source of technological fear. In other words, the technological advancements of East Asian countries were perceived as a threat to the global order. Today, Techno-Orientalism is most evident in the Western media’s coverage of China, which often reflects what Yang describes as “Western anxieties about the East.” “China’s dystopian tech could be contagious,” reads a 2018 headline from The Atlantic. The word “contagious” implicitly projects the notion that China’s technology is somehow diseased, evoking imagery of illness and a plague — racialized elements that Yang states were formerly attributed to Chinese immigrants building the United States’s Transcontinental Railroad back in the 19th century. The article goes on to describe China’s “social credit” system and its effects as a method of “social control” with “teeth.” The element of “teeth” provokes a more physical understanding of China’s technological capabilities. Instead of directly analyzing the mechanics of the system, the article employs metaphors that conjure up negative connotations of fear and violence. Another headline for a 2019 article in The American Conservative demonstrates a similar concept: “George Orwell’s Dystopian Nightmare in China.” The featured image displays a large cartoon of Chinese President Xi Jinping looming over ordinary citizens and handing them numbers intended to dictate their identities. The article cites the Orwellian vision of the world — particularly Social Psychologist Erich Fromm’s afternote about the dangers of men becoming machines — implying that this is what China has become. The issue is not endemic to a few articles or a handful of media organizations and publications. In a 2018 op-ed in Bloomberg, Cathy O’Neil argues that the United States must take an active stand against the surveillance state with the headline: “Want to See Your Dystopian Future? Look at China.” For The New York Post, a headline reads: “China’s ‘social credit’ system is a dystopian nightmare.” This angled coverage of China, unintentional or not, falls prey to a certain dehumanizing rhetoric in which the Chinese people are viewed as constant victims of a dystopian, futuristic state. In the process of shedding light on how China’s technological advancements may strip humanity away from Chinese citizens, an important topic that deserves coverage and criticism, Western media coverage paradoxically falls victim to the same trope: implying that Chinese people are mindless robots at the mercy of a technological villain. It is necessary, though, to acknowledge that criticism of Techno-Orientalist sentiments pervasive in Western media is not based on the assumption that such articles are not credible. In fact, it is because these articles are so well-written and well-researched on a topic that merits global attention that it becomes even more essential to understand how racialized ideals manifest in complex ways within contemporary media discourse — even in the small ways, like headlines, images and adjectives. This problem becomes cyclical, especially because so many articles cite the ideas mentioned by others. This may explain how the media tends to exacerbate Sinophobia. Often, Western media’s hegemonic mindset regarding Beijing prizes competition over collaboration. This undermines a positive diplomatic relationship between the United States and China and, more critically, a nuanced American understanding of Chinese people, culture and values. When evaluating how Techno-Orientalism has shaped internalized conceptions of China, it is critical to be rhetorically careful and to distinguish between hard evidence and Western interpretations of that evidence. These interpretations appear to be motivated by hegemonic fears of Asian countries achieving unprecedented progress and subverting colonialist paradigms. Alternatively, these interpretations may be real fear rooted in the use of technology to oppress certain liberties — a genuine concern. However, journalists must be careful in examining their assumptions and biases. When writing about China, they should consider how certain language may benefit discourse on the country or proliferate harmful stereotypes. It may even be worth thinking about how the media can provide a counternarrative to Techno-Orientalist ideologies. Instead of characterizing China’s technological rise as dangerous and fear-mongering, journalists and media experts could explain the original reasoning behind such technological policy measures. The Qiao Collective, for example, is an organization that is a staunch defender of China against “Western aggression.” While not without its controversies and criticism, the volunteer-run media site features articles intended to provide a more nuanced, humanizing perspective on China. Articles on the website strategically deconstruct stereotypes and misconceptions about China from raising awareness of China’s internationalist solidarity during the coronavirus pandemic to more personal reflections on the connections between China’s political thought and anti-racist thinking. Ultimately, addressing biases in media coverage can enhance not only the quality of reporting, but also address the ways in which reporting contributes to political misconceptions of entire nationalities, cultures and values.

### Indo-Pak War

#### The 1ac’s depiction of India and Pakistan as irrational actors ready to launch war at any moment follows the discursive trend of positing them as threats to solidify US hegemony

Vaughan 13(Tom Vaughan, 9/27/13, ASIAN FURY: GENDER, ORIENTALISM AND THE INDO-PAKISTANI NUCLEAR 'THREAT' IN US FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE, page 24-26)**//BRownRice**

A close analysis of US foreign policy texts surrounding the India-Pakistan nuclear threat, sensitive to the effects of administration change and 9/11 on US security discourses, reveals a complex process of representation and subject positioning which changes over time. Using the representational practices approach, I conclude that the possibility of nuclear war between India and Pakistan is initially constructed as an urgent and direct threat, to the countries themselves and to US nonproliferation interests. After 9/11 and during of George W. Bush's two terms as US President, the condition of threat is downplayed as India and Pakistan are hailed into compliant, controlled positions, and the focus of US foreign policy in the region is redirected towards fighting terrorism. Practices of gendering and orientalism, however, are present in both discourses and used to represent the states concerned in a way which preserves US dominance and masculinity. The dominant discourse between the Pokhran and Chagai nuclear tests in 1998, and the end of the Clinton administration and subsequently the 9/11 terrorist attacks, sees the rise of an imminent and direct Indo-Pakistani nuclear threat. India and Pakistan are both assigned roles of infanitlised, feminised, oriental others, whose irrationality, irresponsibility and lack of restraint means their possession of nuclear technology is a clear and present danger to international security. India and Pakistan are simultaneously sites of US identity-building. Said suggests that orientalism does not only denigrate the 'others'; it also reinforces Western dominance and identity by creating a 'flexible positional superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of relationships with the Orient without him ever losing the relative upper hand' (2003: 7). By constructing India and Pakistan in such a manner, the US justifies its own intervention and police-like behaviour, regulating interactions between them and coercively imposing the NPT and sanctions which form a US regime of control. Until co-operation is achieved, however, the dominant discourse makes it clear that India and Pakistan will remain dangerous, if not 'rogue', pariah states. The post-9/11 discourse, studied up to the end of the second Bush administration, reconfigures the US view of the proliferation terrain and casts India and Pakistan in different, more complex subject roles than straightforward threats to international security. Carranza notes that the 9/11 attacks had a profound effect on US proliferation concerns, as focus shifted to allowing 'good' proliferation whilst preventing nuclear technology being provided to terrorists (2006: 514). Concomitantly, the dominant discourse which previously identified India and Pakistan as a threat began to soften its tone towards the two proliferators. Before 9/11, the US was able to reinforce its masculinity and dominance through the enforcement of the Western nonproliferation regime. However, the post-9/11 moment necessitated a 'hypermasculine' project to 'save US state identity' (Nayak, 2006: 43), since attacks on US soil threatened to topple the US's dominant status as a strong and inherently 'right' superpower. Nonproliferation efforts were no longer sufficient to sustain this project, and so India and Pakistan became discursively co-opted into the 'war on terror' as subordinate US allies – rather than threats that the US could police and neutralise to cement its dominant status. India and Pakistan are still used to reinforce a hegemonic US masculinity, but represented as compliant allies instead of dangerous and irresponsible proliferators. Discursively infantilised as irrational, oriental others in the pre-9/11 dominant discourse (Nayak, 2006: 49), they are now regulated and co-opted into the Western bloc of 'rational' and even 'democratic' 'allies' of the US, realigned in opposition to the new oriental 'others' of terrorist organisations and the states that support them. The discourse nonetheless maintains India and Pakistan's subordination to the US by qualifying their newly-assigned masculinities with orientalist assumptions about their nuclear status and emphasising their instrumentality in US objectives against terrorism. In many respects they are represented similarly to colonial subjects. Although continually feminised, orientalised and subordinated, India and Pakistan's nuclear behaviour ceases to be constructed as a viable security threat to regional, international and US security. My findings illustrate vividly the fluid nature of discourse, and how seemingly fixed meanings and statements of 'fact' can evolve over time. The Foucauldian concept of discourse holds that all knowledge is historically and culturally specific, susceptible to change and 'radical breaks' in history which can drastically alter perceptions of fact (Hall, 1997: 47). For US understandings of international relations and mainstream foreign policy discourse, 9/11 was a radical break which altered the discursive relationships between the US and other international subjects. At once, the borders of the international security landscape were redrawn. Fukuyama's (2003) proclamation that 'we may be witnessing ... the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy' was called into question. The reshuffle of nonproliferation discourse in the wake of 9/11 demonstrates that seemingly fixed relationships and political 'facts' may be challenged, reshaped or nullified in any number of ways.

### Info

#### The West uses the news as a front for promoting its orientalist propaganda

Way 13 [Way, Lyndon C. S., Lyndon C.S. Way (MA, PhD) is a lecturer in Communications and Media within the Discourse and Society research cluster here at the University of Liverpool., 3-1-2013, "Orientalism in online news: BBC stories of Somali piracy: Ingenta Connect," Intellect, https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/intellect/jams/2013/00000005/00000001/art00002]//AA

aBStraCt This article considers how news stories about piracy off the coast of Somalia reflect E. Said’s concept of Orientalism, that is, the West representing the Rest in ways beneficial to the West. Critical discourse analysis is applied to news stories from the international BBC news website to reveal strategies used to represent a non-western ‘other’ in need of control by a successful West. This legitimates the West’s military presence and actions whilst challenging BBC’s claims of objectivity. An historical account of both Somalia and piracy precede this analysis. The former illustrates how Somalia’s current ‘failed state’ status is in part due to foreign involvement while the latter describes how this status has produced conditions conducive to piracy. Actions by the West together with the BBC’s Orientalist perspective do little to relieve Somalia’s hardship, suffering and ending Somalia’s multiple problems. IntroduCtIon Orientalism is a concept that sees the world divided into two distinct and unequal parts: European and non-European or ‘the West and the Rest’ (Hall 1992). Though a concept that has caused much controversy (Bozatzis 2009; Young 2004), Orientalism has historical, political and analytical relevance when considering texts about non-Europeans, or ‘Orientals’. According to E. Said (1979: 2–3), Orientalism is an academic area of study, a style of thought which makes distinctions between ‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident’. This distinction is not arbitrary, but linked to power. Said (1979: 5) observes, KeyWordS Orientalism BBC pirates Somalia critical discourse analysis website 19 JAMS\_5.1\_Way\_19-33.indd 19 6/12/13 10:38:23 AM Lyndon C. S. Way 20 ‘The relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony’. Orientalism represents non-European identity as an inferior ‘other’ compared to a more superior European identity. This distinction is part of an Orientalist political view made by Europeans for the benefit of Europeans (Said 1979: 7). But Said’s Orientalist argument is not without its critics. R. Young (2004: 177) claims to accept Orientalism is to accept that ‘each [western] writer is identified in turn as complicit in the process of the intellectual subordination of the East to the West’. This would then exclude western writers from more critical perspectives, such as Marxists. Despite these worthy objec- tions, this article considers the core ideas of Orientalism by asking how one western media outlet, which prides itself on values associated with objectiv- ity, represents Somali piracy in ways that contribute to relations of power and domination by western interests. This is done by historically contextualizing Somalia and piracy. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is then applied to a sample of news stories. It is argued that a variety of linguistic strategies exclude Somalis, ‘other’ Somali pirates and represent western militaries and their actions as successful. Together, these discourses legitimate military action in Somalia, echoing Orientalism, where the West represents the Rest in ways beneficial to the West. theory and methodoLogy The international BBC news website was chosen as a site of analysis due to its reach and its reputation of being objective. BBC’s news services operate the world’s widest-reaching international newsgathering network, communicating in 33 languages and claiming to have 230 million weekly users (Anon. 2012a). Despite much discussion about a digital public sphere (see Dahlberg 2001), the BBC sees its online news service not as a distinct entity, but as an inte- gral part of its multi-platform service, a ‘supplement’ to its traditional serv- ices (Anon. 2012b). In fact, this ‘supplementary’ service is widely used, being the world’s 47th most visited and the most popular online news site in the United Kingdom. BBC presents itself as objective. This is evident in the BBC’s six public purposes, the second part of ‘bringing the UK to the world and the world to the UK’ being relevant to this study. According to its website, it priori- tizes building global awareness and understanding of international issues by its journalists who adhere to the values of ‘accuracy, impartiality and inde- pendence’ and ‘providing reliable and unbiased information of relevance, range and depth’ (Anon. 2012a). These are core values of objectivity that is recognized as an ideal or social construct of western journalism, not practical journalism (Chalaby 1998: 130). In fact, newsroom studies have revealed how news is not objective, ideology being embedded in the very logic of news production that includes source choices, news selection and the need to produce a steady and predictable supply of copy (Machin and Niblock 2006; Garcia Aviles and Leon 2002). This being the case, one may expect many western sources describing events from a western perspective on the BBC, questioning claims of objectivity. It is on this ideological backdrop that CDA is applied. In CDA, linguistic and grammatical choices in texts are analysed, allowing analysts to reveal broader discourses that are drawn upon (Fairclough 2003; JAMS\_5.1\_Way\_19-33.indd 20 6/12/13 10:38:23 AM van Dijk 1993). CDA aims to reveal what kinds of social relations of power, inequalities and interests are perpetuated, generated or legitimated in texts both explicitly and implicitly (van Dijk 1993). This article’s analysis focuses on how Somali pirates and western militaries are represented. To do this, two analyses are performed. The first analysis draws especially on T. van Leeuwen’s (1995, 1996) approach to the way ‘social actors’ and their actions can be classified, categorized and recontextualized. Here, basic lexi- cal choices such as namings are considered as well as what is included and excluded, as these choices may be politically or socially significant, suiting text producer’s interests and purposes (Kress 1989). Questions such as who does what to whom in sentences and where participants are posi- tioned both in sentences and in more active or passive roles are examined. How speech is recontextualized is analysed, relying both on C. R. Caldas- Coulthard’s (1994) analysis of sources and relevant aspects of Appraisal Theory (White 2006). A second analysis considers specific strategies identi- fied by H. Bishop and A. Jaworski (2003) that represent pirates as a danger- ous ‘other’. This CDA is supplemented by an historical contextualization of events in Somalia and Somali piracy. Scholars who use CDA highlight the importance of historically contextualizing analysis (Richardson 2007; Fairclough 2003, 1995b; Wodak 2001a, 2001b; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; van Dijk 1993). R. Wodak’s (2001a, 2001b: 70) ‘discourse-historical’ approach to CDA enables analysts to ‘detect and depict the disfiguring of facts and realities’ by histori- cally contextualizing texts. This inter-disciplinary approach contends that it is only through understanding the history of Somalia and Somali piracy that the discourses news draw upon can be understood. the data In this article CDA is carried out on news stories from January 2008 until June 2010. It was at this time that Somali waters became ‘the world’s worst piracy area’ (Menkhaus 2009a: 22). Although there are 212 stories listed on the BBC website under ‘Somalia Pirates’ during this time, 100 stories were collected. Only stories that reported on the activities of pirates and western militaries were selected, exemplifying when Somali piracy became both sophisticated and disruptive resulting in international military responses. In CDA, discourse is thought of as ‘a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts’ (Wodak 2001a, 2001b: 66). Practitioners do not (and can not for practical reasons) analyse in great detail every ‘linguis- tic act’, but select what they believe are representative samples (see, for exam- ple, Bishop and Jaworski 2003 or van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999). In this tradition, out of the 100 stories, there is a close detailed analysis of eleven stories. These were selected as it is believed they accurately reflect the domi- nant discourses articulated throughout the news. Four of these stories were selected to represent how pirates and non-pirating Somalis as well as related social issues are represented within piracy stories. To select these stories, two major social problems related to piracy, namely ‘dumping in Somalia’ and ‘illegal fishing in Somalia’ were entered into the website’s search engine. Only four stories specifically about Somali piracy were produced and included. The remaining seven stories were chosen to represent ongoing themes in coverage such as the capturing of large vessels, pirates expanding their reach, military concerns and successes. Orientalism in online news 21 JAMS\_5.1\_Way\_19-33.indd 21 6/12/13 10:38:23 AM Lyndon C. S. Way 22 eventS In SomaLIa This section does not cover the long and complex history of Somalia, but illus- trates the role foreign interests have played in Somalia’s current status as a ‘failed state’ and a pirate-friendly area. Somalia has seen world and regional interest throughout its recent history. In the late nineteenth century, European powers began their scramble for Africa, one prize being the Horn of Africa and Somalia. Referring to Ethiopian and British involvement in the political and religious freedom of Somalia, Dervish leader Muhammad Abdullah Hassan claimed they ‘have destroyed our religion and made our children their children’ (Omondi 2010). Though critical of the British, Somalia had relations with the Ottomans and the Germans. In 1920, with the collapse of the Dervish state, it was turned into a British protectorate. Thereafter until independence in 1960, Somalia was governed by either the British or Italians as part of their geopolitical regional policies. But independence did not mean an end to outside involvement. By the mid-1960s, Somalia had formal military relations with the Soviet Union, industrial funding from China and Italian support for its expatriates, while the United States sent substantial military aid to Somalia’s hostile neighbour Ethiopia. In 1977 the Soviet Union transferred its interests to Ethiopia and by 1980 Somalia had been transformed into a western client with American weaponry and advisors. Since 1991, with the fall of Major General Muhammad Siad Barre’s govern- ment, Somalia has been fighting internally though with outside influences. In 2002, a temporary government was formed, but a lack of support by the inter- national community including America, weakened its authority and internal support (Raffaelli 2007). The Transnational Federal Government (TFG) was established in 2004, being widely supported by the West. In the 2000’s, with a weak TFG, Ethiopian Troops with American backing were responsible for driving out Islamist groups such as the Coalition of Islamic Courts. Since January 2009, an African Union peace force has been in Somalia. 2009 also saw a new transitional parliament and president. Despite these latest moves, Al-Qaeda is providing advisors to the Islamist militant group al-Shabab, while America, the United Nations and other African and western countries are backing the TFG, including supplying arms. But this intervention is not necessarily for altruistic reasons. As K. Menkhaus (2009a) observes, ‘Outside actors are working hard to tip the scales in favour of their Somali allies’, acting out of self-interest (Raffaelli 2007). SomaLIa’S pIraCy StageS Historically, Somali piracy has followed three stages (Laing 2010; Menkhaus 2009b; Lennox 2008; Puchala 2005). The first begins with sporadic spates of small scale attacks on vulnerable ships. In Somalia, this began in the early 1990s when foreign fishing trawlers and those looking to cheaply dispose of their hazardous waste took advantage of its rich and unpatrolled waters (Laing 2010: 2; Menkhaus 2009b: 22; Lennox 2008: 8). Angry fishermen armed themselves with rocket-propelled grenades and assault rifles and began firing on foreign trawlers who responded likewise. The second historical stage sees pirate activities increase to the point where they effectively choke the flow of seaborne commerce. Since 2005, the number of Somali pirate attacks has increased dramatically, as has the size of vessels and ransoms, evolving into international organized crime. These JAMS\_5.1\_Way\_19-33.indd 22 6/12/13 10:38:24 AM attacks signal the sophistication of Somali piracy, using spies in ports, mother ships, negotiators, spokespersons, accountants, financiers, logistics coordi- nators, caterers, financing/ money laundering networks and political power holders (Laing 2010; Lennox 2008; Middleton 2008). In response, the third historical stage is ‘pirate organisations are smashed, strongholds are assaulted and reduced and leaders are apprehended or killed’ by powerful sea powers which form pirate-hunting navies (Puchala 2005). In Somalia, this has taken the form of Nato’s Combined Task Force 150 launched in 2002, the EU’s NAVFOR launched in 2008, the US-led CTF151 and war ships from Russia, China, Indonesia, India, South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Despite the impressive number of nations involved, this response is tentative and reactive with approximately sixteen ships patrolling an area two-thirds the size of Europe. Why pIraCy’S upSurge? Scholars agree the root of the upsurge in Somali piracy is its lack of govern- ance and a population with few sources of income (Carafano et al. 2009; Moller 2009; Lennox 2008). Safe haven, opportunity and economic hardship are needed for piracy to become as endemic as it has (Moller 2009: 12; Lennox 2008: 2; Chalk 2008: 8; Puchala 2005: 6). This describes Somalia’s present condition. First, Somalia is a safe haven for pirates. It has a mostly remote 2300 mile coastline, giving pirates access to the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean and the Seychelles. Their networks include the regional Puntland government, clan leaders and al-Shabab (Carafano et al. 2009). R. Middleton (2008: 5) argues that, ‘even if the higher eschelons of Somali government and clan structure are not directly involved in organising piracy, they probably do benefit’. Second, Somalia has ample opportunity for piracy. The Gulf of Aden is one of the world’s busiest waterways with approximately 21,000 ships, or 7 per cent of global maritime commerce, passing through it annually (Seibert 2009a; Carafano et al. 2009). Furthermore, this traffic must slow down to file into the Gulf of Aden ‘chokepoint’, making illegal boarding simpler. No Somali navy or coast guard aids in creating a busy, unruly sea route with ‘no indigenous deterent to piracy’ (Lennox 2008: 4). Third, there is sufficient evidence of economic hardship. In 2009, the UN sought £556 million for Somali emergency humanitarian aid (Menkhaus 2009b: 24). Hardship has been exacerbated since the early 1990s with foreign companies illegally dumping a wide array of nuclear and hazardous wastes in Somali waters, destroying the coastline that used to sustain thousands of people as a source of food and livelihood (Lennox 2008; Menkhaus 2009b). These activities are set to continue as it costs as little as £1.55 a tonne to illegally dump in Somalia where the same costs £617.00 a tonne in Europe (Carafano et al. 2009: 9). Foreign companies have also exacerbated Somalia’s plight by over- fishing, tempting Somali fishermen into piracy. Its waters are some of the most abundant fishing grounds in the world but are now being overfished by European, Asian and African flagged ships (Middleton 2008). S. Coffen- Smout (1998) notes these have no concern for bio-diversity inspired by short- term gain and profitable catches. Pirates, being ex-fishermen and former coast guards, have very few alternatives to making money other than turning to Orientalism in online news 23 JAMS\_5.1\_Way\_19-33.indd 23 6/12/13 10:38:24 AM Lyndon C. S. Way 24 crime (Middleton 2008). Together, these three conditions produce a situation in Somalia where piracy is rampant. Why a LaCK of foreIgn mILItary SuCCeSS? There are several reasons for western militaries’ lack of success. First, capturing and putting pirates on trial does not deter those who believe piracy’s benefits outweigh its risks (Middleton 2009: 2). Second, history reveals a reactive mili- tary response is not enough. D. Puchala (2005: 13) observes that ‘the histori- cal fact is that pirates were suppressed when they were sought out, hunted down and forcefully destroyed along with their strongholds and sanctuaries’(emphasis in original). This is not on the remit of the task forces that react to each attack. Third, there is much skepticism about the true motives behind military interventions. B. Seibert (2008:1) believes the EU has something to ‘prove’, the NAVFOR operation being ‘the first under the auspices of the European Union’. Menkhaus (2009a: 9) notes: [...] the robust [international] naval response has more to do with navies seeking to use anti-piracy as a training exercise, an opportunity to improve co-ordination with other navies, and a justification for their own budgets at a time when naval operations have been less central in the Global War on Terror. Fourth, there is a general consensus that success against piracy is depend- ent on the establishment of a functional government. As Seibert (2009a:1) observes, ‘the eradication of piracy requires the re-establishment of a func- tioning Somali state, reasserting control over its territory, including its coastal areas’. anaLySIS News coverage was abundant, especially during the second and third stages of Somali piracy when foreign sea-borne transport was most affected. Stories did not cover issues leading up to the piracy ‘crisis’, but recontextualized the almost daily skirmishes between western militaries and pirates. This section examines the lexical and grammatical strategies used in this coverage, revealing how Orientalism is at play, despite BBC claims of objectivity. (A) Exclusions Fairclough (2003: 149) notes that what is included and excluded may be politi- cally or socially significant. Part of the Orientalism articulated in the sample involves excluding social actors and issues which either do not legitimize western militaries or represent the West negatively. Very rarely are Somalis represented. Even in the four stories about non- pirating Somalis and social issues, they are only named twice and govern- ment officials three times. Excluding non-pirating Somalis aids in creating a discourse of Somalia as a distant ‘other’ in need of western military action. Almost excluded are social issues related to piracy, namely illegal fishing, dumping and a lack of government. References to these are scarce, averaging about one sentence for each story. Consider: 1. War-torn Somalia has not had an effective government since 1991. JAMS\_5.1\_Way\_19-33.indd 24 6/12/13 10:38:24 AM 2. We need an effective coastguard to protect our fishermen from illegal fishing, to prevent dumping of toxic materials in our waters and fight shipping piracy. Van Leeuwen (1995: 99) notes that abstractions lack detail of actions and involve ‘texts mainly concerned with legitimising and de-legitimising actions and reactions’. In excerpt one, readers are informed that Somalia is in trou- ble, being ‘war-torn’ and having no ‘effective government’. However, this sentence (and story) gives no detail as to the reasons for this condition, how it has come about and how the West can help. Excerpt two demonstrates how even sentences with more detail are abstract enough to cause confusion. Here, illegal fishing, dumping and piracy are put in a list as part of a request for a coastguard, not as the first two being partly responsible for the third. All three acts are agentless nominalizations, that is, no participant is named as respon- sible for the actions. Responsibility is further obscured by almost excluding ‘foreign’ involvement in these activities. Only once is ‘illegal dumping’ collo- cated with ‘foreign’ in the sample and only once more in the same sentence. Though these exclusions and abstractions create an awareness of a problem in Somalia, they do not help in understanding reasons for piracy. Instead, by creating an awareness of a problem, they aid in legitimizing a need for outside help – possibly from western militaries. (B) Namings Van Leeuwen (1996: 48) observes that when social actors are not person- ally named, readers are deprived of a ‘point of identification’ and thereby ‘treated as distant “others” rather than as people “we” have to deal with in our everyday lives’. With very few exceptions across the 100 stories, pirates are not named personally contributing to the idea of a distant Somali pirate ‘other’. As noted previously, this is likely a result of newsroom practices such as source choices and availability, though the result is noteworthy. This strat- egy is complemented by naming pirates as groups such as ‘pirates’, ‘the pirate group’, ‘those groups’, ‘new pirate suspects’, ‘piracy’ and ‘pirate spokesmen’. This strategy allows writers to homogenize all ‘pirates’ as the same, making it easier to treat them as an enemy (van Leeuwen 1996: 48). On the contrary, western militaries are personally named extensively, giving readers ‘a point of identification’ and usually named with functional honorifics connoting authority and respect (van Leeuwen 1996: 53–54). Namings include ‘Commander Simon Huntington, commanding officer of Devonport-based HMS Chatham’, ‘Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff’, ‘Lt Christensen’, ‘The British admiral in charge of the EU naval force’ and ‘Rear Adm Peter Hudson’. These lexical strategies offer points of identification, making it easier to sympathize and respect these western military actors. Even impersonal names of western militaries emphasize importance and legitimacy by employing functional titles. ‘The EU’s naval force (Navfor)’, ‘a Royal Marine team’, ‘the UK Foreign office’, ‘Royal Navy warship’ as part of ‘Nato anti-piracy operations’ all connote importance. For example, by naming a ‘Royal Navy warship’, importance is connoted. The lexica ‘Royal’ connotes both regal power, justice and legitimacy as well as being from Britain with historical connotations of maritime might. Together, these functional titles draw upon a discourse of Orientalism by highlighting western militaries’ importance and legitimacy. Orientalism in online news 25 JAMS\_5.1\_Way\_19-33.indd 25 6/12/13 10:38:24 AM Lyndon C. S. Way 26 (C) Activations, passivations and prepositional phrases A number of grammatical strategies are also employed which articulate Somali pirates as an ‘other’ in need of successful western military intervention. One strategy is activating western militaries with agency, that is, representing them doing something to someone, which connote power (Fairclough 1995b: 110). Consider: 3. The UK’s Royal Navy shot dead two suspected pirates attacking a Danish cargo-ship off the coast of Yemen. 4. A Royal Navy warship on Nato anti-piracy operations has destroyed two pirate boats in the Somali Basin, Nato has said. In excerpt three, the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy is activated with agency by being represented as shooting ‘two suspected pirates’ and ‘destroying’ two pirate boats in excerpt four. This strategy is common throughout the sample, along with the complementary strategy of emphasis through dominant begin- ning of sentence position (van Dijk 1991: 216). For example, in excerpt three’s story, western militaries enjoy dominant sentence position five times, while pirates are only in this position twice, despite the story recontextualizing pirates capturing a ship. These two excerpts also illustrate how pirates are passivated. To be passi- vated, or have something happen to an actor, accentuates weakness and subjection to others (Fairclough 2003: 150). Pirates are represented as such, being ‘shot’ in excerpt three and having their boats destroyed in excerpt four. In this same story (excerpt four), pirates continue being passivated, when Nato ‘spotted a larger [pirate] vessel’, Nato is ‘monitoring the vessels’ and Nato had ‘disrupted a pirate attack group’. These all draw on a discourse of weak pirates subjected to the actions of a successful western military, legiti- mating their large budgets and operations near Somalia. Representations of western militaries include being activated without agency. These representations also draw upon discourses of Orientalism, legitimating western actions. In one story, NAVFOR is activated verbally five times in the story’s first five sentences and again within the reported speech ‘Eunavfor is continuing to monitor the situation’. Though this last activation does not supply much information as to what NAVFOR is doing, to continue ‘to monitor’ draws on a discourse of power and control, thereby legitimizing NAVFOR’s presence in Somali waters. To the contrary, aside from some titles, pirate agency is all but absent. In fact, the only time pirates are represented with agency is when their actions are negative or show weakness. Consider: 5. Ten Somalis surrendered and the smaller boats were destroyed. Here, pirates are activated, in dominant sentence position. However, their weakness is emphasized by ‘surrendering’ above and ‘could not continue’ and ‘were left with only enough fuel ... to return to Somalia’ in other parts of this same story. T. A. Van Dijk (1991: 216) observes that participants’ actions can be ‘played down’ when represented later in a sentence and/ or embedded in a prepositional phrase or clause. He found this de-emphasizes negative acts of in-group members like the police and positive acts by out-group members JAMS\_5.1\_Way\_19-33.indd 26 6/12/13 10:38:24 AM such as those from minority groups. In our study, pirates are most commonly found in prepositional phrases, thereby de-emphasizing their roles in Somali waters. Consider: 6. Its [NAVFOR] statement says the ransom was dropped to the pirates hold- ing the Saint James Park chemical tanker at Somalia’s port of Garacaad on Thursday. Here, pirates appear in non-dominant middle of sentence position in the prepositional phrase ‘to the pirates’, while NAVFOR is activated and empha- sized. This strategy contributes to a discourse beneficial to western powers by de-emphasizing pirates and their successes while emphasizing western successes. This aids in legitimizing the vast amount of money and resources spent by the West in military activities near Somalia. (D) Sources Though source choices are much to do with journalistic routines, they are ideological giving voice to some people instead of others (White 2006: 58; Caldas-Coulthard 1994: 304). With very few exceptions in the 100 stories, BBC uses almost exclusively western military sources. For example, in a story which recontextualizes the capture of the Sirius Star, there are only American and British sources, despite the story being about a Saudi-owned oil tanker hijacked by Somali pirates in the Indian ocean heading to the United States. British involvement was confined to two Britons being captured. Using foreign military sources gives legitimacy to them and their views (Caldas-Coulthard 1994), allowing the story of Somali pirates to be told from their point of view. Consider: 7. Commander Simon Huntington, commanding officer of Devonport-based HMS Chatham, said he was ‘extremely pleased’ the warship had ‘success- fully disrupted a pirate attack group operating in the Somali Basin and prevented them from mounting attacks against merchant shipping’. Here, the source is a British commander. The direct quotes include lexical choices such as ‘extremely pleased’ and ‘successfully’ that emphasize Nato’s success. Grammatically, Nato is given agency twice, it ‘disrupted a pirate attack group’ and ‘prevented them from mounting attacks’. Again, these choices within reported speech demonstrate how source choices contribute to discourses compatible with the interests of western powers, that is represent- ing a successful and necessary presence in Somali waters. Another result of using western military sources is ‘us’ and ‘them’ groups are created. Fairclough (2003: 149) identifies nouns and pronouns such as, ‘we’ and ‘they’ that promote such divisions. Within reported speech, pirates are named as ‘they’, ‘them’ and ‘their’ extensively. Consider: 8. Once they get to a point where they can board, it becomes very difficult to get them off, because, clearly, now they hold hostages (emphasis added). 9. ‘What we will do’, he [Rear Adm Peter Hudson] said, ‘is use our intelli- gence assets, our maritime patrol aircraft, the dialogue we have with the region ... as well as our partners ... to make sure that we can concentrate [our efforts] ... in a ... more sophisticated manner’. Orientalism in online news 27 JAMS\_5.1\_Way\_19-33.indd 27 6/12/13 10:38:25 AM Lyndon C. S. Way 28 In excerpt eight, pirates are named as ‘they’ and ‘them’, contributing to the idea of an ‘other’ group. This idea is emphasized through overlexicalization, that is, appearing more often than one would expect (Kress 1989). In excerpt nine, ‘we’ and ‘our’ are used three times each articulating an ‘us’ group of the UK navy, readers and the navy’s ‘partners’ which are mostly western powers. There are alternative ways to writing these sentences that would have done less to ‘other’ pirates. First, using names could give readers a ‘point of iden- tification’. Second, if pirates were used as sources, the third person pronouns would become the first person ‘we’ (seen in excerpt nine), a more inclusive pronoun. Third, pirates could have been functionalized such as ‘the captain’, or ‘the pirate’, reducing the idea of a Somali ‘other’. However, this distinction between ‘us’ the West and ‘them’ Somali pirates articulates a cornerstone of Orientalism, distinguishing the West from the Rest. StrategIeS of ‘otherIng’ Bishop and Jaworski (2003: 250) identify five strategies used by the British press’s coverage of the German England Euro 2000 football match that ‘other’ British football hooligans. These are ‘de-authentication’, ‘pejoration’, ‘homog- enization’, ‘minoritization’ and ‘universalization’. Four of these strategies are used in Somali piracy stories contributing to depictions of a dangerous ‘other’ that must be controlled by the West. (i) Pejoratıon Bishop and Jaworski (2003: 263) found the press used lexical choices that high- lighted negative imagery of hooligans. This strategy is employed by representing pirates as dangerous, greedy and uneducated. In one story, a pirate is described as ‘a sea-bandit’ who telephones from a ‘notorious den’. These choices connote danger. Greed is connoted through lexica which describe pirates as ‘big-spending’ owning ‘two lorries, a luxury car ... [their] own business’ with an ambition to ‘get a lot of money’. Greed is further emphasized with the lexica ‘money’ and ‘cash’ appearing six times in one story, another case of overlex- icalization. Pirates are also represented as uneducated, despite the expertise and skills involved in running large pirate operations. Consider: 10. ... piracy has become a way of life for many young Somali men, as they simply do not know any better. and Many young men have no education and no understanding of the rule of law. Here, pirates are activated negatively by ‘not know[ing]’ and ‘have no educa- tion’ and ‘understanding’. Though this may be true of many pirates, the sophistication, expertise and complexity of operations described by Middleton (2008: 6) are missing as a dominant discourse. However, such representations serve the purpose of legitimizing military force in order to control those who are greedy and ‘simply do not know any better’. (ii) Homogenization Bishop and Jaworski (2003: 263) found that newspapers characterized hooli- gans as a distinct group with ‘a small, finite set of attributes’. Somali pirates are represented as homogenized personally and socially. Consider: JAMS\_5.1\_Way\_19-33.indd 28 6/12/13 10:38:25 AM 11. They promote the use of drugs – chewing khat [a stimulant which keeps one alert] and smoking hashish – and alcohol[...]. 12. Most of them are aged between 20 and 35 years – in it for the money. 13. Once a pirate makes his fortune, he tends to take on a second and third wife – often very young women from poor nomadic clans, who are renowned for their beauty.’ In extracts 11 and 12, pirates (‘they’ and ‘most of them’) are homogenized personally in terms of drug and alcohol usage, age and motivation. In extract 13, successful pirates are homogenized in terms of relations with women. It seems questionable to apply such personal and social traits to all those involved in Somali piracy considering the various backgrounds, tribal affili- ations and expertise involved in pirate operations. Such homogenization, however, does draw upon discourses of Orientalism that represent the ‘other’ negatively, justifying the need for military intervention. mInorItIzatIon and unIverzaLIzatIon Bishop and Jaworski (2003: 266) found newspapers ‘represent[ed] them [hooligans] as highly visible but not representative of the nation (minoriti- sation), on the one hand, and as potentially overcoming the entire nation (universalization) on the other hand’. This apparent dichotomy is evident when representing Somali pirates, though minoritization is far less the case than universalization. The following is one of the few examples of how pirates are treated as non-representative (minioritization) of Somalians: 14. They [pirates] have made life more expensive for ordinary people because they ‘pump huge amounts of US dollars’ into the local economy [...]. Here, ‘ordinary people’ are identified distinct from pirates (they). This distinc- tion helps create two groups in Somalia, one being pirates. Though a minority, pirates and their activities are highly visible by making ‘life more expensive for ordinary people’. Despite this minoritization, the threat of piracy globally is articulated far more commonly. Consider: 15. They now carry AK-47s and use speedboats to rule the high seas of the world. 16. It has been reported in the past that wealthy businessmen in Dubai were financing the pirates. But the BBC’s Somali Service says these days it is the businessmen asking the pirates for loans. 17. ‘They have money; they have power and they are getting stronger by the day’. In these extracts, a discourse of global impending threat or universalization is articulated. In extract 15, this is explicitly articulated by pirates ‘rul[ing] the high seas of the world’. Though this seems to go against most of the sample which represents them as less powerful than foreign militaries, it emphasizes the idea that pirates are a dangerous ‘other’, a threat that needs controlling by western military actions. This discourse is furthered in extracts 16 and 17. In extract 16, pirates’ financial universalization is represented. They not only finance ‘wealthy businessmen’, but these men are from ‘Dubai’, a country known for its oil riches. Furthermore, by these men ‘asking’ pirates for loans, a Orientalism in online news 29 JAMS\_5.1\_Way\_19-33.indd 29 6/12/13 10:38:25 AM Lyndon C. S. Way 30 financial hierarchy is represented with pirates controlling finances, accentuat- ing pirates’ financial power. In extract 17, this is reinforced, along with the idea of a growing threat by ‘getting stronger by the day’. Elsewhere in the sample, ‘pirates are becoming more aggressive and assertive’, ‘hundreds of armed men are coming to join the pirates’ and ‘pirate gangs in the Gulf of Aden are now multi-clan operations’. These sentences emphasize the immediacy of impending danger by using the present continuous tense in ‘are becom- ing’ and ‘are coming’, expressing the idea that something is happening now. This is further emphasized with the lexical choice ‘now’, presupposing that multi-clan operations were not the case in the past. Representations like these contribute to a discourse of a potential global pirate threat. This, of course, contributes to a discourse of a dangerous ‘other’ that needs to be suppressed by western military actions. ConCLuSIon Orientalism divides the world into two unequal parts. It is a political vision, a representation or simulacrum of the Orient reproduced ‘in the West, for the West’ (Said 1979: 166). It ‘is bound up with the disposition of power and powerlessness in each society’ (Said 1979: 332). In the case of Somali piracy, we can see how representations are made by the West for the West. A large number of lexical and grammatical strategies have been revealed that exclude Somalians and the many challenges facing them. Instead, a danger- ous Somali pirate ‘other’ is represented, an enemy which needs to be controlled and conquered. Likewise, a number of strategies have been revealed that emphasize the positive role played by western militaries, legitimizing their actions and presence in Somali waters. These representations contribute to a discourse echoing Orientalism where the ‘Rest’ are represented in ways bene- ficial to the West. By representing pirates negatively and western militaries positively, the BBC legitimizes the West’s self-interested activities in Somali affairs. But these discourses run counter to Somali interests. History has shown that foreign interests, influences and interventions are partly responsible for Somalia’s piracy and other problems. What Somalia needs is establishing a function- ing Somali government. As Middleton (2008: 12) observes, ‘The most power- ful weapon against piracy will be peace and opportunity in Somalia’. Despite claims of objectivity and ‘informing the world about the world’, the international BBC website perpetuates a type of Orientalism that irritates an already volatile and dangerous situation to the disadvantage of Somalia and Somalians.

### Iran/NK Nuclear Orientalism

#### The affirmatives anxiety about an Iranian or North Korean nuclear strike ties into a broader narrative or Nuclear Orientalism that posits non-Western countries as irrational in order to exaggerate their threat

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Once again, the Crazy Emperor of the Hermit Kingdom – North Korea – is threatening nuclear war. Or so the media would have us believe. The BBC and other news outlets have taken to publishing maps with concentric rings donating the speculative ranges of North Korea’s creaky missile systems. One never tested missile might possibly reach Alaska and do for Sarah Palin and the polar bears. The basic idea purveyed by the media and by US spokespersons is that Oriental despotisms -as Iran and North Korea are regularly portrayed – cannot possibly be trusted with nuclear weapons. Accordingly, US policy, to which the UN and much of the world have subscribed, is that it will “never accept” an Iranian or North Korean bomb. While rational people would never use a nuclear weapon except in circumstances in which it was rational to do so, unbalanced, crazy types might decide to unleash their nuclear arsenals, or turn them over to terrorists, or what not. It would seem that only rational Western nations like the US can be trusted with nukes. Images of Mad Mullahs and Asiatic Despots aside, there are obvious reasons why Iran and North Korea would want nuclear weapons. Most significantly, a nuclear weapon is a guarantee that they will not suffer the same fate as Iraq in 2003. One of the only times it is rational and credible to make nuclear threats is in a situation of existential crisis – when regime survival is at stake. For this reason, no one invades or pushes too far a power armed with nuclear weapons. Were Iran or North Korea to use a nuclear weapon in any other circumstance, they would face obliteration. Since nuclear weapons can be traced to their origin, it would be suicidal for these countries to provide weapons to terrorist groups. Such groups do not have a country to lose, unlike the leaderships of Iran and North Korea. So if Iran and North Korea turn out to have rational reasons for pursuing nuclear weapons, and are likely to be governed by the same realities of nuclear deterrence that constrained the US and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, what about the rationality of US policy? For one, for the US to say it will “never accept” what is already a reality is an absurdity: North Korea already has the bomb. It must now be treated as a nuclear power. More broadly, the recent history of US foreign policy is not exactly a testament to rationality. In response to a terrorist attack which killed nearly 3,000 of its citizens, the US invaded two countries, starting wars that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands. Ten years later, it has lost both of those wars and broken its budget. Luckily, not every country that suffers from terrorism reacts with such deadly and self-defeating spasms of revenge and blood lust. North Korea has in living memory suffered from the wanton destructiveness of US policy. This is a fact which must be remembered in the face of media images of North Korea’s supposedly irrational militarism and aggressiveness. Over the three years of the Korean War, in the words of General Curtis LeMay, the US Air Force “burned down every town in North and South Korea”. The US used 12,000 pound “Tarzan” bombs until there were no more targets for them, in addition to thousands upon thousands of bombing sorties. Thousand pound napalm bombs were dropped from B-29s to “wipe out all life” in tactical localities. Towards the end of the war, the US bombed North Korea’s dams. One resulting flood “scooped clean” 27 miles of river valley. Moreover, it is the US which has made repeated nuclear threats against North Korea, despite the fact that North Korea has never posed a serious threat to the US. The use of nuclear weapons was considered several times during the Korean War, both tactical and strategic. In April 1951, B-29s with nuclear weapons were deployed to Guam, ready for use if China escalated its conventional involvement in the war. Later in the war, lone B-29s simulated nuclear attack runs on Pyongyang. Over the course of the war, a million North Korean civilians were killed by US, UN and South Korean forces. This history offers some perspective on the recent crisis, which began not with North Korean threats but with US and South Korean war games and manoeuvres. These included practice sorties by two nuclear capable B-2 stealth bombers sent over South Korea, loudly announced in the media so that the point would not be lost on North Korea’s leaders. North Korea responded with bombast, including the incredible notion that it was preparing an amphibious invasion of the US. Guam, still a base for US nuclear bombers, was “threatened” by North Korea’s jury-rigged missiles. In turn, the US deployed its equally ineffective but much more expensive THAAD missile defence system to Guam. One wonders what is more laughable: the idea that North Korea could hit a speck in the Pacific like Guam or that the boondoggle offspring of Ronald Reagan’s Star Wars might actually work. What is not laughable is the fact that it is the US which has a consistent pattern of threatening the use – including first use – of nuclear weapons. No one is in doubt that US nuclear weapons actually work, and the US remains the only power ever to have used them in anger. Notably, it used them in a situation in which it was itself no longer threatened. The North Korean bomb may be an uncomfortable fact of life. But so too is the US bomb. And none of us should make any easy assumptions about the rationality of the leadership of either country, however.

### Middle East

#### **Views of the Middle East as a melting pot of conflict uphold orientalist views of the region as “Allah’s Martyr” or the Western enemy that needs to be eradicated**

Assayag 7(Assayag, Jackie, 5-1-2007, "East and West: orientalism, war and the colonial present," https://journals.openedition.org/etnografica/1943?lang=en)**//BRownRice**

The world does not exist to provide us with illustrations for our theories. Conver­sely, our theories do not engender the world. Nevertheless, intellectuals are more than ever fascinated by “performatives” or “self-fulfilling prophecies”. In fact, the debate on the “clash of civilizations” introduced by the Orientalist pro-sionist Bernard Lewis and amplified by the conservative political scientist Samuel Huntington has transformed religious experiences into political categories devoid of historicity or of contingency. Consequently, this dispute has renewed mutatis mutandis the imaginary geographies of the Orient, which for that matter are more Middle than Far Eastern.1 Today, the executioner’s crown, and that of the victim and the martyr, incontestably goes to the Muslim. His fiendish figure has taken the place of the diabolic figure of the Communist, as enemy within and without.2 It was because the Soviets advocated Marxism that the Americans supported Islam, then the Taliban (even if Islamism cannot be reduced to CIA manipulation, nor “Talibanism” to an “instrumentalization” of the ISI, the Pakistani intelligence agency).3 While the “reds” are on the way of extinction in terms of threat, the “greens with beards” abound and wage war everywhere in the world “in the service of Evil”, as is emulously repeated. Even though the “United States of Amnesia” did not invent this pattern of discourse – France has done it beforehand – their ideologues and politicians have greatly contributed to its dissemination by supporting radical Muslim movements, simple militants or (more or less powerful) state representatives. 4 This is the thesis supported by Olivier Roy (2001) and Nilüfer Göle (2003). 6This metamorphosis of cold war enemies has been accompanied by a transformation of the idea of war since the 1980s. While the monopoly of states over high technologies of destruction has been established, less complex technologies have seen an unbridled proliferation. The diffusion of the latter was even encouraged by various geopolitical and mercenary interests, by virtue of the complicity of private intermediaries or of state representatives who employ “revolutionaries” or finance “terrorists”. The individuals or groups engaged in warlike activities in Africa, or in certain regions of the Middle East or Asia, are no longer modern states, nor traditional regimes, but are rather a new breed of voluntary actors called “warlords”. These warlords are in fact the modern products of a configuration of global and local forces.4 Their proliferation has entailed shifts between categories of war entrepreneurs, terrorists, insurgents or those fighting for freedom and ethnic or national liberation, thereby creating ambiguity and uncertainty regarding the roles and aims of each. The simultaneous reconfiguration of terrorism as a sole global force – the aforementioned “Muslim terrorism” – has ultimately subsumed all expressions of violence, protest and vindictiveness under the figure of the “Enemy”. This figure, reviled by the politicians in the North, but frequently raised to a hero by a number of media in the South, was conceived as a totality before being vanquished in the interest of universalism incorporated in the American nation. This focalization gave rise to mirror-image effects: the martyrs of Allah henceforth assimilate the destruction of the “Western Enemy” into its numerous impious avatars, the two centres of which are the United States and Israel. 5 For further consideration of this question one can refer to two articles by Jackie Assayag (2002a, (...) 7It seems clear today that the complicated situations linked to war and terror in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, as well as in Palestine and Iraq, generate communitarian imaginations of catastrophe that encourage political, mafia-like or eschatological bricolages. The scheming intricacies of the “crusade against the axis of evil” provoke aggressive responses, political and cultural, conducive to the extension of lawless zones and to the political implementation of cruelty. All of them foster in the end an economy of fear or of panic that redesigns the architectures of hate and the perimeters of established knowledge and of powers, in the West as in the East, in the North as in the South.5 6 On the dialectics of transparency and secret conspiracies in the new world order, cf. the evocative (...) 8The confrontation of geopolitical cosmologies with the local conceptions of ordinary people in an interconnected world largely influenced by mass media engenders a great many rival intrigues. The proliferation of expositions fosters rumours and the sense of humiliation, nourishes nostalgia as well as resentment, foments fear of conspiracies and fuels the desire for revenge, when it does not arouse mobilizing passions according to divergent, if not contradictory, interests. The “savage war of peace” – the expression is from Rudyard Kipling and refers to the repression carried out in the colonies – has drawn the front line in terms of “civilization” or “barbarism”. Consequently, a multiplicity of actors endeavour to redirect the flow of real or occult powers with a view to reviving the war or establishing peace, as much in villages and neighbourhoods as in the framework of regions and states, as well as in the midst of transnational organizations, notwithstanding their penchant for transparency.6 7 The derealization is particularly pronounced in Palestine, because one has been given to believe fo (...) 9Above all, this horizon of expectation and desire in societies that are more than ever inclined to paranoid crises, in both the South and the North, fosters new connections and previously unknown fragmentations on the basis of narratives that favour spatial and mental fictions incorporating history – teleology or eschatology. Far from bringing the people of the world closer together, the aforementioned globalization engenders “mutual exoticization” inside frontiers and beyond continents: enemies within and without, stereotype against stereotype, reciprocal allocation of hostile prejudices, in short, globalization of insecurity and of fear (Assayag 2005). Thus the modern colonial imagination imposes itself (on the basis of political economy), as the “great [ideological] game” between the empires (Russian and British) was orchestrated in the second half of the nineteenth century (Meyer and Brysac 2002). The colonial present, lying in ambush in minds and clinging on to life, has clear territorial bearings: Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine; either so many political impasses that illustrate a “besieged cartography”, that is to say, an ever-changing configuration of borders, or a production of topological imaginations that are both disputed and derealizing.7

#### Narratives of reform in the Middle East where the West is ‘reforming’ the Other serve the legitimate the west’s neoliberal rule

Wearing 21(David Wearing, University Of London, Ukcorresponding Author, 9-2-2021, "The myth of the reforming monarch: Orientalism, racial capitalism, and UK support for the Arab Gulf monarchies," SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/02633957211041547)**//BRownRice**

The narrative of ‘reform’ in Saudi Arabia, promoted by the kingdom’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, and taken up by governments and media commentators in the United States and the United Kingdom, was undermined by the October 2018 killing of Jamal Khashoggi, an exiled Saudi journalist critical of the Crown Prince’s rule. The Crown Prince himself likely ordered the assassination (Barnes and Sanger, 2021). The dissonance between the projected image of benign liberalisation and the silencing of Khashoggi poses questions about the nature and role of the narrative of Saudi ‘reform’ within Western public discourse, which this article will attempt to shed light on. The narrative of the ‘reforming’ monarch is not new, and is consistent with the juxtaposed, binary caricatures of Orientalist discourse, wherein the West is cast as axiomatically progressive and modern, in contradistinction with an East mired in a backwardness determined by its culture and traditions. In this context, the purported Arab ‘reformer’ is presented as the ideal ally of the progressive West, attempting to drag his society up towards what are taken to be our own higher standards. As such, the ‘reform’ narrative serves two important discursive functions. First, it legitimises Western support for authoritarian rule with the implied but false promise that the regime in question is working to achieve some form of meaningful and transformative change. Second, by moving the explanatory focus for the persistence of authoritarianism away from the historic collusion of governing elites in both the East and West, and firmly onto the terrain of cultural difference, it serves to reinforce the West’s self-image as liberal and democratic, despite its sustained support for authoritarian rule. In fact, Western support for Gulf monarchs, once the latter are cast as ‘reforming’, becomes proof, rather than disproof, of the liberal nature of Western power. Authoritarianism is thus externalised as an Arab trait, or problem, and a sense of Western innocence is preserved. Crucially, by legitimating Western support for these monarchies, this racialising discourse serves to facilitate the ongoing incorporation of the Gulf region into global capitalism on terms favourable to the interests of the Atlantic powers. That is to say, the process of racialising the Gulf is a constitutive element of the capitalist relations between the region and the West. To this extent, we are dealing here with an instance of ‘racial capitalism’. This article will critically analyse the ‘reform’ narrative in the case of UK relations with Saudi Arabia primarily, but also with reference to Bahrain. These illustrative cases will be set within the structural context of UK relations with the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (‘GCC’, comprising Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman). Notwithstanding the heterogeneity across these six states, they constitute a coherent geopolitical bloc from the point of view of UK foreign relations. Maintaining support for monarchical rule in the GCC has long been a policy of high strategic value to the British state and British capitalism. The article begins by outlining the role that Britain has played in sustaining authoritarian rule in the region. Noting the contradiction between these practices and the political philosophy of democratic liberalism in which the British political class is steeped, it contends that, beyond the material self-interest of the British state and British capitalism, we must look to the role of ideology and discourse to gain a more complete understanding of how these relationships are justified and thus rendered sustainable politically. The article then draws on the concept of ‘racial capitalism’, noting how certain peoples have been racialised within western discourse so as to justify integrating them into the global capitalist system in a subordinate position. It utilises the concept of ‘Orientalism’, to examine the specific processes of racialisation to which this article pertains. The narrative of the ‘reforming monarch’ emerges from Orientalist discourse, and the article discusses the nature and lineage of that narrative, and the ways it has been employed in the UK-Gulf context. Particular attention is paid to the emergence of Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, and the utility of the ‘reform’ narrative as a defence of continued British support for the Saudi kingdom. Here, the treatment of women’s rights within the discourse provides an especially telling illustration of the dynamics in play. The article concludes that racialising discourse is an important component of the political economy of UK-GCC relations, shoring up and even sharpening Britain’s self-image as a liberal presence on the world stage, obscuring its sustained commitment to authoritarian rule and thereby facilitating the maintenance and renewal of the ties between British and Gulf capitalism. These conclusions are reached through analysis of contemporary texts which convey the British government’s narrative on UK-GCC relations. This analysis situates that narrative within long-established discourses around relations between the West and the Middle East, identifying familiar or adapted tropes and evaluating the work they are doing at key moments. The analysed texts include transcripts of parliamentary debates and select committee hearings, as well as official statements by ministers. Particular attention is paid to moments of scandal, crisis, or change, where the discourse has been mobilised to justify UK support for monarchical rule. These moments include the 2011 uprising in Bahrain, the mass execution carried out in Saudi Arabia in January 2016, and the 2018 visit to the United Kingdom of Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman.

### NATO

#### **US-NATO security cooperation is a further perpetuation of the western military-security state, resulting in relentless racialization of “The Orient”**

Amin-Khan 12(Tariq Amin-Khan, 2012 New Orientalism, Securitisation and the Western Media’s Incendiary Racism, [https://mascriticalrace.files.wordpress.com/2017/10/neworientalism.pdf)**//BRownRice**](https://mascriticalrace.files.wordpress.com/2017/10/neworientalism.pdf)//BRownRice)

The Long War may be a war against militant Islam, but it is also against those Muslim-majority states that do not accept the empire’s diktats. An analysis of the rise of militant Islam is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is important to note that militant Islamist and Salafist groups have become a powerful social force in many Muslim-majority states and have violently confronted the post-colonial state in pursuit of their dogmatic and narrow doctrinaire ideas. However, the current resistance of militant Islam against the USA and its NATO allies cannot be seen as anti-imperialist, as the objective of anti-imperialism is the social and economic liberation of imperialised society—this seems contrary to the goals of militant Islam.49 US and NATO military commanders have used fear in trying to defeat militant Islamists. Reliance on this tactic remains, even though it has been unsuccessful in instilling fear among Afghani and Iraqi Islamists—despite their dehumanised and brutalised treatment. The Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib were subjected to this inhuman treatment, which still continues with some modification in Guantanamo Bay, while the USA and NATO take no responsibility for the deaths of unarmed innocent children, women and men by their militaries or by pilotless aerial drone attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen, among other Muslim-majority states. WikiLeaks’ release of footage showing a US military helicopter deliberately targeting two unarmed Iraqi journalists working for Reuters, along with other men and two children, is a poignant reminder of how little the lives of the orientalised are valued.50 Similarly, Western politicians and the media have also used fear to justify the increased suppression of due process, introduction of anti-terror laws, and heightened use of surveillance and intimidation in their respective states. The invocation of fear during the Long War parallels the recent cold war history. The USA used fear—of the ‘red menace’—to construct the security state through the enactment of the 1947 National Security Act that also created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Likewise, the fear of the ‘Muslim terrorist’ in late 2001 led to the enactment of the Patriot Act and the US security state propelled the notion of securitisation, which was universalised beyond the borders of the USA to Canada, the rest of the Western states and to key client post-colonial states, in order to launch the war on terror. However, as noted earlier, the current era of securitisation is at a historically unique moment. While it may incorporate some old Orientalist tropes, and some ideological and imperialist motives may be similar to those of the cold war period security state, there is little relationship to the latter. During the Cold War’s post-McCarthy era although the US security state guided its militarism, fed the arms race by strengthening the military– industrial complex, and presided over its imperialist expansionism for world hegemony, Western societies actually became more open. Due process was generally respected, movements for civil rights, women’s liberation, gay rights and democratic change generally blossomed, and anti-democratic practices and the high-handedness of Western political leaders were broadly challenged. In its current specificity the security state and securitisation have been enormously strengthened by the suppression of dissent and civil liberties with the corresponding expansion of anti-democratic practices and intrusive surveillance within Western states. Simultaneously xenophobia and societal/ anti-Muslim racism have been fuelled by the Western media’s incendiary racism. The USA and its NATO allies have persistently violated the sovereignty of many Muslim-majority states at will, through aerial drone attacks, intrusive surveillance and military occupation.51 This focus on militarisation and securitisation has also allowed the field of security studies to proliferate. Scholars in this field appear to be on a self-fulfilling mission of promoting securitisation, given the number of journal articles that are silent on the invasiveness of surveillance and the antidemocratic character of security regimes. A recent book by Stuart Croft, however, was expected to provide critical intervention on security issues and securitisation.52 It turns out that, despite Croft’s desire to broaden the discussion of identities within particular time and space, he ends up essentialising identity without analysing power or the role of dominant identities. He also does not examine imperialist domination and racialisation; in effect he reinforces securitisation as social constructions rooted immemorially in history, which he claims have a mutual impact on both the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ (p 92). To treat the securitiser and the securitised as coterminous and to contend that they are mutually affected by security regimes means that there is no analysis of power or understanding of powerlessness and racialisation. Similarly, to claim as Croft does, that the ‘securitisation of Islam is not a unique event’ as it is just another social reconstruction among hundreds in history, albeit of a different ‘Other’ (p 259), is to be unmindful of the colonial legacy and the consequences of current imperialist forays in Muslim-majority states, as well as to ignore the deep racism and xenophobia prevalent in Europe and North America. Croft’s ahistoricist views on the subject allow him to maintain that, just because Catholics suffered during the formation of Britain and the Irish through British imperialism, and that the Dutch, Germans and Jews were targeted in Britain, it is now the turn of Muslims to also join the throngs of oppressed people (pp 39–44, 74, 259)— which is indeed a very disturbing rationale for the prevalence and intensification of xenophobic oppression and violence in society. This enables him to conveniently opt out of interrogating securitisation, a field in which he is completely invested. In effect, Croft’s approach ‘normalises’ the securitisation of the ‘Other’ as an uneventful ahistorical phenomenon. And the most that he can then do is to undertake a proper post-structuralist textual analysis of xenophobic writings against Muslims and Islam by British ‘public intellectuals’, politicians and religious leaders, and compare them to the atrocities against the Catholics and the Irish or the ridiculing of the Dutch—to further reinforce his historicist approach (see chapters 1, 5 and conclusion). The effect of such an undertaking, while it recognises that securitisation creates xenophobic responses from the dominant community, is to make a mockery of due process for the securitised and to remain inattentive on how their rights are consistently trampled by the coercive arm of the Western state. But Croft is not interested in challenging the notion of securitisation at the level of the state; rather, he seeks merely to move beyond the Copenhagen School of security studies to offer a theory of securitisation that is more encompassing of identities, time and space (see pp 77–91). In other words, he wants theory to account for the role of influential non-state actors, and media and cultural elites, as well as the military and the police (which are really part of the state’s coercive arm) in shaping the securitisation regimes (pp 70–85). Croft’s penchant for conceiving the development of the securitisation process as outside the state (through the actions of individuals) is so overwhelming that he dwells at length in his text on the notion of ‘ontological security’—the idea that the nature of the security of the self is effectively a ‘relationship between identity, narrative and security’, which is ‘achieved [almost reflexively] through the creation of a series of relationships performed through everyday routines and practices’ (p 17). But the nature of this type of framing completely omits the role of the state and focuses mainly on his notion of ‘ontological security’, which becomes a coping mechanism for the individual to deal with the ‘benefit’ or the fallout from securitisation. This approach therefore permits Croft to treat the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ as coeval, and to exclude the security state and its securitisation policy from a critical gaze. I have argued here that securitisation is a historically specific process, a post-cold war phenomenon that emerged as the US model of the security state was universalised in the aftermath of the September 11 events, and the paradigm was emulated by all Western, and some key client Muslimmajority states. Furthermore, I have also tried to show that racialisation is deeply embedded in, and a concomitant part of, securitisation through discussions on the niqab, sports, terrorism suspects, and incendiary racism. To ignore racialisation as a process of dehumanisation and to treat it merely as a form of ‘othering’ (an oxymoron that inoculates the dominant group from absorbing the suffering of the ‘Other’) authorises writers like Croft and others in his field of security studies to focus on deepening securitisation without really problematising the role of the Western nation-state and the media in the ongoing subjugation and xenophobic treatment of racialised communities. In addition to the dehumanised treatment of the Muslim and people who ‘look like Muslims’ in European and North American societies and by the US and NATO militaries, racialised immigrants and Muslims are made scapegoats for Europe’s social ills, and are even blamed for the continent’s economic woes. Journalists and writers—Mark Steyn, Barbara Amiel, Melanie Phillips and Robert Spencer—have referred to the ‘demographic threat’ of Muslims overwhelming Europe and other Western countries in apocalyptic terms, and have even developed a new term for their characterisation: ‘Eurabia’.53 Given this attitude, and as long as some of the incendiary racist media coverage peddles anti-immigrant and antiMuslim vilification and fables about ‘Eurabia’, hatred and the new Orientalism will eat away at European and North American societies in the Long War era.

#### NATO expansion is fundamentally orientalist and serves to isolate the eastern “Other” in need of protection by mighty West

Kuus 4 [Merje Kuus, Merje Kuus is Professor of Geography at the University of British Columbia. She studies diplomacy and transnational institutions., 8-1-2004, “Europe's eastern expansion and the reinscription of otherness in East-Central Europe”, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1191/0309132504ph498oa]//AA

Abstract: This article examines how EU and NATO enlargement is framed by the dichotomy of Europe versus Eastern Europe, and how the enlargement process simultaneously transforms that dichotomy. I argue that the double enlargement is underpinned by a broadly orientalist discourse that assumes essential difference between Europe and Eastern Europe and frames difference from Western Europe as a distance from and a lack of Europeanness. I suggest that in order to expose and undercut this reinscription of otherness, research on East-Central Europe should engage with postcolonial theory in a more direct and sustained fashion. Key words: European Union and NATO enlargement, Europe, East-Central Europe, orientalism, East European studies, geopolitics. I Introduction Accounts of European Union (EU) and NATO enlargement reveal a double framing of East-Central Europe. On the one hand, these enlargements are said to finally make Europe 'whole and free'. Evocations of a uniting Europe and eroding divisions abound in journalistic as well as academic writings about the double enlargement. On the other hand, these same accounts betray a tacit distinction between Europe and Eastern Europe. Within this framework, some parts of Eastern Europe - the EU accession countries - are eagerly striving to become fully European, while other parts - in particular Russia - are deemed not yet sufficiently European to be considered for a full membership in Europe. This article investigates that dual framing of East-Central Europe as simultaneously in Europe and not yet European. It examines the ways in which EU and NATO enlargement - often explicitly or implicitly folded together as the eastern expansion of Europe1 - are underpinned by an opposition between Europe and Eastern Europe, while inciting a reconfiguration of that opposition. My question is not what assumptions or claims about East-Central Europe are correct, but how these assumptions enable and constrain public and scholarly discussion about EU and NATO enlargement. By examining how conceptions and demarcations of Europe and Europeanness inform the discourse of the double enlargement, the article makes a twofold contribution to political geography. First, while the constitutive role of Eastern Europe in European identity construction is well documented in historical research, I elucidate how the discourse of Eastern Europe informs the present round of EU and NATO enlargement. I suggest that the double enlargement is underpinned by a broadly orientalist discourse that assumes essential difference between Europe and Eastern Europe and frames difference from Western Europe as a distance from and a lack of Europeanness. Enlargement reconfigures the specific borders of Europe but not the underlying dichotomy of Europe and Eastern Europe. On the basis of this inscription of otherness, I explore the possibilities of theorizing EU and NATO enlargements in terms of postcoloniality. The term 'postcoloniality' is used here not in the sense of 'after' coloniality but to denote current ongoing practices of constituting Eastern Europe as not yet European, and 'postcolonial theory' thus refers to a set of theoretical perspectives within which questions of constituting places occupy a central position (Sidaway, 2000: 591). An engagement with postcolonial theory would not fold East-Central Europe into a generalized non-West, but enable us to situate EU and NATO enlargement in the production of difference and alterity hitherto highlighted in 'non-Western' contexts. Secondly, the article outlines both the internal consistencies within the discourse of Eastern Europe as well as the fluidity and flexibility of that discourse. I argue that the concept of Eastern Europe persists precisely because of this flexibility, which makes it supremely convenient for both West and East European constructions of Europe. While most analyses of the European idea focus on how this idea is produced in power centers, such as Brussels or Washington, I focus on how it is maintained in Europe's power margins. Specifically, I explore how the opposition of Europe and Eastern Europe is used by the accession countries themselves, and I link Western orientalization of the accession countries to these countries' othering of states further 'East'. I thereby underscore that the categories of Europe and Eastern Europe are not monolithic, but function as a series of Europes and Eastern Europes that fit into and reinforce the broader construction of otherness. The discourses of Europe and Eastern Europe are neither simply imposed on the accession countries, nor do they simply reflect an authentic East European view. Rather, these discourses are reproduced through the reverberation of othering practices between the West and the accession countries. The argument will proceed by highlighting the persistent - if implicit - categorization of Europe into a fully European core and the not-yet-fully European Eastern Europe within the enlargement discourse. In particular, I point out how this discourse construes the accession states as learners or adopters of European norms. I then challenge the notion of the learning process by examining the rhetorical strategies employed by Central European intellectuals of statecraft to discursively locate their countries in Europe while othering their Eastern neighbors, particularly Russia. In an attempt to start conceptualizing these practices of othering, the article subsequently explores the possibilities of using postcolonial theory to gain fresh insights into the EU enlargement discourse. The conclusion will highlight how my findings challenge the habitual ways of analyzing East-Central Europe. 11 Still 'not well brought up': EU and NATO enlargement as a learning process The notion that Eastern Europe needs advice from Europe predates the current round of EU enlargement. This notion was invented in the eighteenth century, when Eastern Europe was demarcated as being of Europe by geography but still in the process of becoming European (Wolff, 1994: 7). Eastern Europe became one of the generalized 'others' necessary for Europe's self-image (Neumann, 1999). Crucially, it emerged not as irredeemably alien but as a halfway house between Europe and Asia. Eastern Europe was not simply backward, but a learner, an experiment, and a testing ground, 'a gigantic specimen to which the most advanced legal and administrative ideas could be applied with a completeness impossible in western Europe' (Neumann, '1999: 78). Voltaire and other enlightenment philosophers both criticized Russian despotism and admired Catherine the Great's 'Westernizing' experiments.2 This conception of East-Central Europe has undergone a number of transformations, but its premise of otherness has persisted. During the cold war, as the Soviet bloc became a precondition for Western self-identity, the image of a half-oriental Russia and helpless satellite states was condensed in elite and popular discourses (Dalby, 1990; Pietz, 1988; 0 Tuathail and Agnew, 1992; Sharp, 20O0).3 East European studies were deeply ideological, closely linked to Western governmental and intelligence circles, and insulated from theoretical debates in the social sciences (Lieven, 2001: 2; Verdery, 1997). Roeder (1999: 743) remarks that: 'The years prior to 1989 were the glory days for area specialists. The Cold War gave our special knowledge unique value: we knew the enemy and it was "ours". Central and eastern Europe was treated as a uniform bloc, and much of the research on it was "mere footnotes to Sovietology"' (Garton Ash, 1989: 180). One could say that much of East European studies at that time represented not an engagement with but a disengagement from the complexities of East-Central Europe in favor of simple binaries such as West versus East. In the post-cold war era, this disengagement has persisted, not simply as a waning legacy of an unfortunate mistake, but as an unspoken premise of EU and NATO enlargement. As the double enlargement is framed in terms of teaching and learning community values and norms (see Schimmelfennig, 2000), the accession countries are tacitly demarcated as not-yet-fully European (for an expose, see Ilves, 1999; 2001). French President Jacques Chirac's remark that EU accession countries displayed a 'not well brought up behavior' (BBC News, 2003) when their foreign policies differed from France is a good example of this premise of alterity.i The 1999 expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic did not as much undermine the Europe versus Eastern Europe division as shift it further east. Some commentators have claimed that it even accentuated 'the growing chasm' between those states anointed as bona fide Europeans, slated for fast-track incorporation into Western security and economic structures, and 'the others' - relegated to the margins of Europe (Bialasiewicz and O'Loughlin, 2002). Thus, even though EU and NATO enlargement processes have undermined the cold war era division of Europe into two, they have simultaneously fueled a threefold division of the continent into the European core, the Central European applicants not yet fully European but in tune with the European project, and an eastern periphery effectively excluded from membership (Agnew, 2001; Paasi, 2001). The image of a single Europe has given way to a multitier patchwork Europe with varying degrees of Europeanness and Eastness, yet a generalized East has remained a defining characteristic of European identity construction (Neumann, 1999). Area studies are deeply implicated in the reproduction of Eastern Europe. Brubaker (1998: 281) notes that research on East-Central Europe still tends to be built on a series of oppositions such as reason and passion, modern tolerance and ancient hatreds, civic nationhood and ethnic nationalism. The disengagement from the complex realities of East-Central Europe is still tacitly justified by the need to struggle against communism, this time against its legacies; and the segregation of East European studies from critical social theory has persisted5 (Brubaker, 1998; Lieven, 2001: 4). The comparison between Eastern Europe and the West still tends to turn into a comparison of the former with the latter, clearly ascribing 'normality' to one side only, against which the 'other' has to measure itself (Horschelmann, 2001: 986). The West is conceived as a model that the EU accession countries - framed as a blank sheet with no (proper) institutions and laws - ought to follow (Cohen, 2001; Grabher and Stark, 1996). In the early 1990s, East-Central Europe was indeed not upgraded but 'downgraded' in the scale of development. It was no longer treated as a second world - antagonistic but capable of industrial innovation - but as a variant of third world - and hence a space under Western tutelage (Cohen, 2001; Wedel, 2001). Despite the abundance of studies on East-Central Europe, relatively little has been said on European representations of that region. Very few social scientists have endeavored to trace Western (re)invention of Eastern Europe engendered by postsocialist transformations and EU enlargement (Bunzl, 2000: 76). It is readily acknowledged that Soviet influence was a kind of colonialism, but there is much less willingness to examine Western policies toward East-Central Europe in terms of postcoloniality. Even after the disastrous results of Western economic aid campaigns to East-Central Europe, transitology6 has displayed a 'spectacular unwillingness' to use transformations in East-Central Europe to examine the familiar categories of Europe, market or democracy (Cohen, 2001: 267; Verdery, 1997; 2002). The reified contrast of Eastern and Western Europe, within which EU accession becomes a kind of relocation from Europe's East to Europe proper, has perpetuated two seemingly opposite types of accounts on East-Central Europe: one of linear transition to the West and the other of 'old' patterns of geopolitics. Both conceive the agency of the accession countries in terms of following Europe or failing to do so, and both pervade not only Western but also local accounts of East-Central Europe. Importantly, much of social science in the accession countries also operates with such naturalized concepts of the past and the future (Lagerspetz, 1999). By emphasizing nation building and the restarting of history, this scholarship reinforces the cliche that East European countries are embroiled in nationalist fantasies that must be kept in check by the West.

### North Korea

#### The 1ac’s threat construction of North Korea as massive nuclear security threat follows the trend of nuclear orientalism – the alt is a prereq to the aff

Gurrola 21(VALERIA GURROLA, Asia Media Staff, 3-1-2021, "NORTH KOREA: NUCLEAR ORIENTALISM AND THE HERMIT KINGDOM," https://asiamedia.lmu.edu/2021/03/01/north-korea-nuclear-orientalism-and-the-hermit-kingdom/)**//BRownRice**

VALERIA GURROLA WRITES – Nuclear Orientalism deeply permeates US media. In December 2019, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un warned the US of a “Christmas gift” dependent on the outcome of nuclear negotiations with the Trump administration. Days after the announcement, satellite images uncovered new activity at the previously dormant Sohae Satellite Launching Station in North Korea. This active missile test site is the same one that North Korea had dismantled nineteen months earlier, in alignment with Chairman Kim’s commitment to the UN Security Council’s mandate to denuclearize. The sudden announcement and reassembly of the Sohae Station in December 2019 has caused US media to speculate about what the ‘gift’ would entail, ranging from a nuclear test to a missile test, or even… a vase? In the frenzy of miscommunication, Twitter users jokingly shared biased tweets about the supposed gift. One Tweet by the user @JerMunji reads, “Well it was a nice run being here. I enjoyed my time,” speculating, obviously, that the Hermit Kingdom would wage nuclear warfare against the US. But these reactions to North Korea’s December 2019 announcement reflect the bias known as “Nuclear Orientalism” against North Korea. Nuclear Orientalism is the deeply ingrained notion, held by the rest of the world, that non-Western countries cannot be trusted with nuclear warheads. This double-standard traces back to the 1970s, when the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which granted the five of them the power to yield nuclear warheads. What to make of this situation? For one thing, the US has an extensive record of adding to nuclear tension (and of course is the only nation to exercise the atomic option in warfare.) The United States has an estimated total of 5,800 nuclear warheads, whereas North Korea has an estimated total of just 40. North Korea, then, poses no real threat to nuclear warfare, despite what many American politicians and nuclear pundits fear. Instead, nuclear weapons provide countries such as North Korea protection from US aggression. During the Korean War, the US transported nuclear weapons to the Pacific Ocean so as to threaten surrounding countries from intervening in the war. Although the US never acted on those threats, US B-29 bombers simulated nuclear warfare against Korea. By the end of the war, an estimated one million North Koreans lost their lives due to US involvement. Fear of a nuclear world war dramatically increased after President Trump’s term in office, but these fears reflected bias rather than shrewd political assessment. In truth, the only way to move forward is to grant North Korea nuclear power rather than force it to denuclearize. Clear-headed talks on the topic of global denuclearization cannot begin without first discussing, and dismissing, the sad untruth of the concept known as Nuclear Orientalism.

### Russia

#### **The 1ac’s fears of Russia are rooted in a history of the west’s constant othering of Russia – the alt is a prerequisite to break down the orientalist barriers between the status quo and truly understanding Russia**

Blachford 20(Kevin Blachford, “Western orientalism and the threat from Russia”, Jun 30 2020, page 357-361)**//BRownRice**

Western orientalism and russia Russia’s invasion of Georgia, annexation of Crimea and willingness to support Assad in Syria, challenged Western presuppositions of the post-Cold War era. The revival of tension between NATO powers and Russia has also ended the post-Cold War optimism that Russia would Westernize and become a Western style liberal democracy. The following, aims to provide a critical examination of the discourse surrounding tensions with Russia. As Western analysts have rushed to explain Russia’s belligerence, there is a frequent recourse to simplistic cultural explanations. In looking to Russia’s foreign policy actions since the Georgian war of 2008, “many Western observers,” have concluded, “Russia and the Russians defy logic.” 52 The failure to adequately engage with Russian politics and develop a deeper understanding of Russian foreign policy reflects a long trend of Western discourse to see Russia as defined by its geography and culture. It is the legacy of a Soviet and Tsarist past which is used to understand Russia’s actions today.53 Thomas Graham even argued that Europe has a “Russia problem” stretching back 200 years based on a cultural “values gap.” 54 Graham further argued that contemporary tensions could essentially be traced to the Tsarist policies of the post-Napoleonic era. Explanations of Russian foreign policy have often relied on a primordialist perspective to explain Russia’s actions. That only by looking long back into Russia’s history and national identity can we understand Russia’s contemporary foreign policy. To explain Russia’s actions in the international sphere, Western observes look to Russia’s long history and expansive geography;55 but this primordial explanation is used in a deterministic manner. Because of Russia’s history and geography it is accused of following a recurring “pattern” of conflict with the West.56 Historical and geopolitical explanations are not orientalist by themselves, it is the tendency to reduce these explanations to a deterministic approach which is orientalist. Western foreign policy then becomes portrayed as rational, responding to incentives, while Russia is portrayed as being guided by some historic impulse or flaw in its culture. The fighting in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea has been interpreted as a “frontal challenge to the post-Cold War European regional order.” 57 Russia’s actions created surprise and shock for analysts and policy makers alike, but there have been few serious investigations into Russia’s strategic decisions. Instead, Western public discourse has followed an orientalist trend in blaming an irrational leadership and its Eastern culture. The use of force by Russia is also seen as uniquely linked to Putin’s leadership. The Ukraine and Georgia crisis is blamed on Putin’s “unique response” 58 and Putin’s “choice.” 59 There seems little attempt to explore either the workings of the Russian leadership or to consider in more detail why Russia chose to intervene. Instead, there is a tendency to embrace simplistic arguments blaming Putin’s “unconstrained, erratic adventurism.” 60 Western analysts argue Putin’s “surprise policy decisions,” and his “rashness,” “have astounded even expert analysis.” 61 What is significant about the attempts to blame solely Putin is that he is seen as uniquely responsible. Putin as the sole figure involved is then portrayed as an “ideologue” 62 and as a “gambler.” 63 His actions are not seen as the rational choice of a leader responding to a realpolitik environment. However, counter arguments have been made which show Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine was not an irrational opportunistic gamble, but an attempt to coerce Kiev into negotiations.64 But while such alternative explanations have been discussed in academic publications they have not been widely covered within the Western media. The Ukraine crisis has, however, been widely covered in the media for its use of hybrid warfare. The surprise and confusion these events created within Western political commentary was intertwined with an orientalist perspective that sought to highlight Russia’s cultural differences to the West. Hybrid warfare has been described as a conflict between “East and West.” 65 What is significant in this portrayal is that Russia’s hybrid warfare is then viewed in omnipotent terms which exaggerates Russia’s power and ability.66 Western observers have long demonized Eastern tactics in war as irrational, deceptive and underhanded.67 In describing Russia’s actions, Western analysts repeat this formula by accusing Russia of using “shadowy tactics” 68 of being “sneaky” 69 and using tactics based on “deceit.” 70 Hybrid warfare is further interpreted with reference to the Ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu.71 The reputation of Sun Tzu as an Eastern general willing to use deception and secrecy to win battles is then compared to Russia’s own use of asymmetric warfare.72 But crucially, this historical analogy devolves further into an orientalist perspective when Russia is accused of being, not just a “sneaky” Easterner, but by not playing by “the rules.” 73 Russia’s use of asymmetric warfare is not interpreted as a rational response to material or strategic constraints, but is blamed for being deceptive. The significance of these critiques is that Russia is accused of not acting in a manner acceptable to the West. Russia’s hybrid war is understood as breaking the rules and as Martin Zapfe argues, Russia “seems to have rejected the established Western playbook.” 74 It is the “strategic culture” of Russia which is seen to be at fault in rejecting Western ways of war.75 These portrayals of a Russian East as enigmatic and dangerous, diverging from Western norms shows an orientalist perspective.76 Looking to Sun Tzu in order to understand contemporary military strategy can be illuminating. But what makes these perspectives problematic is the way Russia is viewed as acting in a way that the West would never contemplate. For example, Russia is accused of being uniquely better suited to hybrid warfare because of Putin’s “central guiding authority.” 77 This ignores that the concept of hybrid warfare originated with the US78 and Western uses of deception, covert tactics or proxy fighters becomes essentially ignored. Rod Thornton argues further that, “the basic problem across the board is that liberal democracies have an inherent distaste for producing anything at the strategic level that resembles propaganda or could be classed as psychological warfare.” 79 The long US history of propaganda and covert war in both the Cold War and the War on Terror is therefore negated and exempt from consideration. As Rory Cormac and Richard Aldrich have argued, much of IR, “offers a simplistic view of secrecy” and Western covert action by taking “plausible deniability at face value.” 80 Attempts to critically analyze Russia’s use of asymmetric warfare have therefore failed to fully engage with the West’s own use of covert warfare. Russia’s actions are no doubt threatening to the West and are problematic in raising tensions. But in adapting an orientalist perspective, Western discourse surrounding Russia has limited our understandings of these conflicts. The US and its allies routinely use covert action as part of the War on Terror but Western war is still seen as fundamentally different to Russia’s Eastern way of warfare. As Jonathan Caverley argues, Russia has 4,000 troops involved in the Syrian “war,” while the US has had 10,000 personnel involved in Afghanistan 19 years after the invasion and yet, this is not considered as a “war.” 81 It is described as a NATO support mission. Debates over the nuance of these definitions are not meant to confuse our understandings of war, but can help to illustrate our presuppositions. As this section has shown, Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Syria and Georgia have often been understood through cultural explanations. There is a risk, however, of such cultural explanations slipping into an essentialist and “ahistorical myth.” 82 Conflicts are not just about physical security, but raise existential questions in relation to the self and the other. Narratives of conflict can also lead to the reproduction of conflict as ontological security for one group can lead to insecurity for another.83 The following section will therefore examine how cultural explanations have led to an othering of Russia as separate and distinct from an American led Western liberal order. Western identity: Europe, Russia and orientalism Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Syria have considerably raised tensions and security concerns for Europe and the Atlantic alliance. Russia’s belligerence toward the West also continues to pose a security threat. Russia’s aggressiveness challenges not just the Western understanding of European security, but challenges Western ideas of identity. As the following explores, in resorting to the use of force and in challenging Western powers, Russia has created self-doubt in Western narratives and the ontology of Western ideas about political order. At the end of the Cold War, Russia and Europe sought to find new ground for cooperation after decades of mutual distrust. The West sought to consider the place of Russia within European society and political order; and debate centered on the question of “is Russia a European Power?” 84 In 1999, the European Union’s common strategy toward Russia made use of conciliatory language that emphasized the shared cultural and ideational values between the two sides. The strategy declared that “the European Union welcomes Russia’s return to its rightful place in the European family in a spirit of friendship, cooperation, fair accommodation of interests and on the foundations of shared values enshrined in the common heritage of European civilization.” 85 Richard Rosecrance captured the zeitgeist of the optimism when he argued that “developed states are putting aside military, political and territorial ambitions as they struggle not for cultural dominance but a greater share of world output.” 86 As Zbigniew Brzezinski also argued, Russia had the opportunity to “join” into this “democratic community of nations.” 87 For liberal internationalist thinkers, the expansion of Europe had a “desecuritizing effect,” 88 which would inevitably expand to one day include Russia. Such liberal internationalist arguments believed in globalization as a homogenizing process. The expansion of the European Union was represented as a distinctly European model of progress, which rested on benign conduct, open borders, economic interdependence and the rejection of military force. Liberal internationalist scholars therefore see contemporary Russia as rejecting this “distinctly European model of international conduct.” 89 The expansion of the EU as a civilian power was largely interpreted as devoid of geopolitical or security significance. John Mearsheimer has been one of the most vocal critics of these “liberal delusions” and argues the West is to blame for provoking the Ukraine crisis.90 With the return of tensions between NATO and Russia, critics now lament “Europe’s Shattered Dream of Order.” 91 Such optimism always presumed that a Russian democracy would ultimately show “acquiescence to American foreign policy preferences.” 92 The revival of tensions therefore challenges this narrative. As Neumann argues, the post-Cold War era believed in an idea of Russia “as a learner” of Western ideas.93 Implying that Russia would inevitably become more like the West. Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that the “only path” was for “Russia, like Ukraine,” to “become a real democracy.” 94 The former American ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul asked “who lost Russia?” 95 Such a question implied Russia is essentially a bad student that has not learned the lessons of Western modernization and has become lost on the path to Western modernity. The climate between Russia and the West has now radically changed from the optimism of the immediate post-Cold War era. Observers now conclude that the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia seem to “live in different worlds.” 96 Russia’s development has not followed the lines of Western liberal democracy and Russia’s willingness to use military force has created a stream of self-doubt and questioning over Western narratives. Russia’s use of force in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria has challenged Western narratives and understandings of international order. This can be seen with the way that the conflict in Syria raised many difficult choices for the NATO alliance in regards to ideational norms of human security and the responsibility to protect. President Obama called the use of chemical weapons within Syria a “game-changer” and warned this would be a “red line” that the US could not accept.97 But while the US refrained from a full scale intervention, Western powers intervened through air strikes, covert means and the sponsorship of local armed groups. As the philosopher John Gray observes, for Western leaders ISIS could only be destroyed if Syria was “reconstituted as a democratic polity under the rule of “moderate forces.” 98 Russia’s intervention in support of Assad changed the tide of the conflict and challenged Western ideas about liberalism and order. Russia’s “obstruction” of Western intervention99 has been interpreted as part of a “crisis” in the lack of American leadership.100 Former Vice President Joe Biden called to “defend the liberal international order” and he argued that resistance to liberal internationalism and a desire for a return of spheres of interest was a movement that “is principally led by Russia.” 101 The Western liberal international order is challenged by many structural and systemic problems, but the resurgence of concerns surrounding Russia has created a renewed sense of insecurity. This has led to an outpouring of “nostalgia” 102 and questioning of are we now seeing “The End of Liberal International Order?” 103 Hal Brands argues that the divisions between Russia and the West are not just clashes over geopolitical influence, but are about fundamentally different conceptions of “governance, political values, even morality.” 104 He further argues that the US should engage in this ideological competition to defend a liberal order. The vision of a liberal international order assumes a relative homogeneity of the West that does not reflect reality. It also creates a cultural divide between those considered seen as part of the “West” and those considered as outside this order. Russia’s failure to acquiesce toward the policies of a self-identifying liberal democratic order are therefore increasingly seen in civilizational terms in which Russian culture has rejected the West. The NATO alliance has reacted to tensions with Russia through a crisis of ontological insecurity, which has sought an “attempted restoration of a known normative order for the North Atlantic alliance.” 105 This has involved shoring up alliance commitments and reestablishing NATO’s ability to deter Russian power. For many Western observers, Russia’s intervention in Georgia was a precedent that would encourage Russian aggression against post-Soviet and new NATO states.106 The annexation of Crimea and the use of hybrid war was also seen as a particular threat to the Baltic states. Analysts expected a “domino” like repetition of hybrid war being used in the Baltics107 and this allowed NATO to reinforce a narrative of an Atlantic alliance built on Western liberal democratic norms. The significance of these developments are reflected in the way that Russia and the NATO alliance are now seen as radically different identities. This paper has so far argued that the West has sought to otherize Russia through endorsing a distinction between the liberal democratic West and a non-Western “spoiler” 108 which seeks to defy liberal Western norms, as defined by Russia. Typologies of oriental and Western act to categorize distinctions and shape identities. As Said argues, “the result is usually to polarize the distinction- the oriental becomes more oriental, the Westerner more Western.” 109 As the following section explores, Russia has equally sought to shape an identity that is distinct and different from the “Western” identity of the US and its NATO partners.

#### The 1ACs quest for NATO deterrence against Russia stems from Western delusion of liberalism that reinforces the oriental narrative of East vs. West

Blachford ‘20 [Kevin; Kevin Blachford (PhD) (Kevin.Blachford@baltdefcol.org) is a Lecturer of International Relations at the Baltic Defence College, Estonia and the Estonian School of Diplomacy.; 6-30-20; “Western orientalism and the threat from Russia”; https://www.academia.edu/43769141/Western\_orientalism\_and\_the\_threat\_from\_Russia; Comparative Strategy; accessed 7-8-2022; AH]

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#### The otherization of Russia is Orientalism-The wests Russianophobia contributes to escalated tensions in IR-Will only lead to more sinophobia against China

Max Parry 19[Max Parry, an independent journalist and geopolitical analyst and his work has appeared in Counterpunch, Global Research, Dissident Voice, Greanville Post, OffGuardian, and more, "The Orientalism Of Western Russophobi",6-3-2019, Countercurrents, https://countercurrents.org/2019/03/the-orientalism-of-western-russophobia/, 1LEE]

Russia has historically possessed a unique and ambivalent identity located between the East and West, having been invaded by both European and Asian empires in previous centuries. Said included Russia in Orientalism in his analysis of European countries and their attitude toward the East, but did not note that Russia is in many respects the Orient within the Occident, as more than 75% of its territory as the largest nation in the world is actually located in Asia while three quarters of its population live on the European side. Russia may be partly European, but it is certainly not Western. Then again, Europe is not a continent unto itself but geographically connected to Asia with the arbitrary division between them based on cultural differences, not landmass, where Russia is an intermediate. Expansionism under Peter the Great may have brought Western European ‘cultural values’ and modernization to Russia, but the majority of its territory itself remains in Asia.

Even after the presumed end of the Cold War, Russia has been excluded from the European Union and instead joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), while developing strong ties with China. As recently disclosed documents from the National Security Archive prove, NATO has broken its promise to Mikhail Gorbachev during the George H.W. Bush administration that it not expand eastward following Germany’s enrollment. It has since added 13 countries since 1999, 10 of which were former Warsaw Pact states. Russia’s alliance with China has been solidified precisely because it is still not treated in the same regard as other European nations even after the adoption of a private sector economy. In order to justify its continued armament and avoid obsolescence, NATO has manufactured an adversarial relationship with Moscow.

Contrary to the widespread perception of his rhetoric, in terms of policy-making President Trump has been equally as hostile to Moscow as his predecessors, if not more so in light of the U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). What the usual suspects behind the attempted soft-coup against him fail to understand is that Trump’s tact toward Putin is more likely an inverted version of the ‘only Nixon could go to China’ strategy, an unexpected style of diplomacy based on the pragmatic objective of containing Beijing by dividing America’s two primary foes. The liberals still in denial about their election defeat continue to underestimate Trump, but the Chinese are not fooled. The architect behind Nixon’s détente with Mao, Henry Kissinger, is even believed to have encouraged Trump to ease tensions with Moscow in order to quarantine China and don’t think they haven’t noticed. Ultimately, the divide between Trump and his enemies in the establishment is really a disagreement over strategy in how to surround China and prevent the inevitable downfall of the U.S. empire.

The ongoing demonization of Moscow is ultimately about China as well. It was only a matter of time until the uncertain allegations of election interference were also leveled against Beijing without proof as a Joint Statement from the U.S. intelligence agencies recently showed. Make no mistake — underneath the West’s Russophobia lies Sinophobia and as Washington’s real geopolitical challenger, China will in due course emerge as the preferred bogeyman. The bipartisan hawkishness has created an environment where rapprochement and diplomacy of any kind is seen as weakness and even a sign of treason, making the prospect of peace seemingly impossible. As China continues to grow, it will find itself more squarely in the crosshairs of imperialism, regardless of whether Trump’s strategy to renew relations with Moscow against Beijing is successful. Until then cooler heads at the highest levels of government must prevail as they thankfully did at the height of the first Cold War for the sake of peace between Russia, the U.S. and the entire world.

### Russia-China alliance

#### Their fears of a Russian-Chinese alliance are rooted in fears of cultural differences from Western identity, thus imposing westernism upon the rest of the world and increasing military tensions, resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy

Blachford 20(Kevin Blachford, 30 Jun 2020, page 362, Western orientalism and the threat from Russia)**//BRownRice**

Russia’s ontological security rests on promoting its cultural differences to the West as a civilization apart. With the rise of China and the shift in global economic power to the pacific, Russia’s foreign policy is increasingly looking to the East. Tensions with the West have also pushed Russia into a closer alignment with the leadership of China. Joint military drills in 2018 have shown that, for Russia, the East provides challenges and opportunities.119 Systemic theories of the balance of power might expect Russia to join with the US in order to contain China.120 This has not happened as systemic theorists would perhaps predict and instead, Russia is increasing its promotion of a Eurasian cultural identity that is separate from the West. Although cultural differences alone are not enough to explain the current tensions between Russia and the NATO partners, Russia’s ontological security has become tied to the promotion of a discourse in which, cultural and civilizational differences are repeatedly emphasized. Civilisational differences are also becoming reinforced by the securitization of Russia’s cultural identity and “national memory.” 121 Sergey Lavrov has argued that Russia’s place as a Eurasian power can be traced to its history under the Golden Horde in which the Rus “bent but did not break.” He further argued that the Mongol invasions of Russia “facilitated the emergence of a new Russian ethnos.” 122 Lavrov links this period of Russian history to its contemporary importance in “asserting the independent role of the Russian state in Eurasia.” For Russia, advocating a distinct non-Western identity is a way to secure itself against perceived Western interference. But these patterns of behavior also help to further and deepen the security and political divides between NATO and Russia. The ontological insecurity of the West is therefore built on the West constituting itself against Russia and vice versa, thereby, reproducing “mutual insecurities” and reinstating “historical animosities” instead of alleviating them.123 Viewing the security challenges of Russia and NATO through the divides of distinct and separate civilizations helps to securitize cultural identities and increase military tension.

### Russian Hybrid Warfare

#### The 1AC’s over-exaggeration of Russian hybrid warfare furthers an orientalist myth of the Russian threat that restricts our understanding of the Ukraine conflict and turns the case by perpetuating conflict.

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The fighting in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea has been interpreted as a “frontal challenge to the post-Cold War European regional order.”57 Russia’s actions created surprise and shock for analysts and policy makers alike, but there have been few serious investigations into Russia’s strategic decisions. Instead, Western public discourse has followed an **orientalist trend in blaming an irrational leadership** and its Eastern culture. The use of force by Russia is also seen as uniquely linked to Putin’s leadership. The Ukraine and Georgia crisis is blamed on **Putin’s “unique response”58 and Putin’s “choice**.”59 There seems little attempt to explore either the workings of the Russian leadership or to consider in more detail why Russia chose to intervene. Instead, there is a tendency to embrace **simplistic arguments blaming Putin’s** “unconstrained, erratic adventurism.”60 Western analysts argue Putin’s “surprise policy decisions,” and his “rashness,” “have astounded even expert analysis.”61 What is significant about the attempts to blame solely Putin is that he is seen as uniquely responsible. Putin as the sole figure involved is then portrayed as an “ideologue”62 and as a “gambler.”63 His actions are not seen as the rational choice of a leader responding to a realpolitik environment. However, counter arguments have been made which show Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine was **not an irrational opportunistic gamble**, but an attempt to coerce Kiev into negotiations.64 But while such alternative explanations have been discussed in academic publications they have not been widely covered within the Western media. The Ukraine crisis has, however, been widely covered in the media for its use of hybrid warfare. The surprise and confusion these events created within Western political commentary was **intertwined with an orientalist perspective** that sought to highlight Russia’s cultural differences to the West. Hybrid warfare has been described as a conflict between “East and West.”65 What is significant in this portrayal is that **Russia’s hybrid warfare** is then viewed in omnipotent terms which **exaggerates Russia’s power and ability**.66 Western observers have long demonized Eastern tactics in war as irrational, deceptive and underhanded.67 In describing Russia’s actions, Western analysts repeat this formula by accusing Russia of using “**shadowy tactics**”68 of being “sneaky”69 and using tactics based on “**deceit**.”70 Hybrid warfare is further interpreted with reference to the Ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu.71 The reputation of Sun Tzu as an Eastern general willing to use deception and secrecy to win battles is then compared to Russia’s own use of **asymmetric warfare**.72 But crucially, this historical analogy devolves further into an orientalist perspective when Russia is accused of being, not just a “sneaky” Easterner, but by not playing by “the rules.”73 Russia’s use of asymmetric warfare is not interpreted as a rational response to material or strategic constraints, but is blamed for being deceptive. The significance of these critiques is that Russia is accused of not acting in a manner acceptable to the West. Russia’s hybrid war is understood as breaking the rules and as Martin Zapfe argues, Russia “seems to have rejected the established Western playbook.”74 It is the “strategic culture” of Russia which is seen to be at fault in rejecting Western ways of war.75 These portrayals of a **Russian East as enigmatic and dangerous**, diverging from Western norms shows an orientalist perspective.76 Looking to Sun Tzu in order to understand contemporary military strategy can be illuminating. But what makes these perspectives problematic is the way Russia is viewed as acting in a way that the West would never contemplate. For example, Russia is accused of being **uniquely better suited to hybrid warfare** because of Putin’s “central guiding authority.”77 This ignores that the concept of hybrid warfare **originated with the US**78 and Western uses of deception, covert tactics or proxy fighters becomes essentially ignored. Rod Thornton argues further that, “the basic problem across the board is that liberal democracies have an inherent distaste for producing anything at the strategic level that resembles propaganda or could be classed as psychological warfare.”79 The long US history of propaganda and covert war in both the Cold War and the War on Terror is therefore negated and exempt from consideration. As Rory Cormac and Richard Aldrich have argued, much of IR, “offers a simplistic view of secrecy” and Western covert action by taking “plausible deniability at face value.”80 Attempts to critically analyze Russia’s use of asymmetric warfare have therefore failed to fully engage with the West’s own use of covert warfare. Russia’s actions are no doubt threatening to the West and are problematic in raising tensions. But in adapting an orientalist perspective, Western discourse surrounding Russia has **limited our understandings** of these conflicts. The US and its allies routinely use covert action as part of the War on Terror but Western war is still seen as fundamentally different to Russia’s Eastern way of warfare. As Jonathan Caverley argues, Russia has 4,000 troops involved in the Syrian “war,” while the US has had 10,000 personnel involved in Afghanistan 19 years after the invasion and yet, this is not considered as a “war.”81 It is described as a **NATO** support mission. Debates over the nuance of these definitions are not meant to confuse our understandings of war, but can help to illustrate our presuppositions. As this section has shown, Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Syria and Georgia have often been understood through cultural explanations. There is a risk, however, of such cultural explanations slipping into an **essentialist and “ahistorical myth**.”82 Conflicts are not just about physical security, but raise existential questions in relation to the self and the other. **Narratives of conflict** can also lead to the **reproduction of conflict** as ontological security for one group can lead to insecurity for another.83 The following section will therefore examine how cultural explanations have led to an othering of Russia as separate and distinct from an American led Western liberal order.

### Russia-Ukraine

#### **The objectification of Ukraine as a “chess piece” in a game between the West and Russia plays into orientalist and colonialist thinking.**

Belafatti 14 (Fabio Belafatti, "Orientalism reanimated: colonial thinking in Western analysts’ comments on Ukraine", Euromaidan Press, https://euromaidanpress.com/2014/10/27/western-commentators-should-rid-themselves-of-old-prejudices-dating-back-from-the-age-of-colonialism-before-commenting-on-eastern-european-affairs/, 10-27-2014, Accessed 7-19-2022)//ILake🪐

Like all historical interpretations, Russia’s reading of Ukraine’s history is based on a selection of facts and meanings that acquired a precise function due to specific political priorities. Nobody should be able to seriously argue that Crimea/Donbas/Ukraine/[…] should be Russian because Russia sees it as part of its history: in order to do so, one has to first give for granted that Russia’s interpretation of history is for some reason intrinsically superior to any other, which is of course nonsense. But that’s not the end of it. For pro-Russian commentators, the fact that Crimea was non-Russian for thousands of years doesn’t matter. What matters is that it was Russian for less than two centuries – which is nothing in historical perspective. The Russian vision and experience of this territory-object is automatically seen as more important, more “noble,” and therefore more significant than millennia of non-Russian history of the region. The tragedies of other peoples – which, incidentally, greatly contributed to making this region more “Russian” – become completely irrelevant. All the rest, all the non-Russian peoples, occupy that massive “neutral” space between Russia and “the West.” All of these nations are of course the result of a construction of historical experiences and traditions. But this is exactly the point: these identities are as “artificial” as the Russian one. And there is no reason to believe that the Russian identity should be regarded as being on a different level, ordained with some sort of a-historical nobility. We (Western and Eastern Europeans alike) all come from a process of creation of identity, and so does Russia: its perceptions, feelings and understanding of history didn’t descend from heaven: they developed (or, more precisely, they were developed) as a result of precise events, strategies and agendas. They don’t deserve more respect than any other. Unfortunately, pro-Russians bestow on them nobility that they deny to any contending interpretation. The result is the nonchalant, “orientalist” use of the idea of “spheres of influence,” a concept that they would correctly reject in any other case. Ignoring “the rest”: old habits die hard The practice of denying the dignity of active subjects of non-Russian peoples of Eastern Europe is a long story. We Western Europeans regularly accept the idea that this part of the World falls within Russia’s “sphere” or should just be Russian. This generates appalling ideas that Russia is right in interfering in Ukraine because it already “had to give up” the Baltic States in the past and “the West” really shouldn’t “deprive” it of other countries, or that Ukraine is too important for Russian national identity because of the Kyivan Rus, as if this was enough to ignore the desires of the millions of people who had (and have) to suffer to allow Russia to freely define its identity. For far too many Western experts what really matters is the Russian feelings. Everything else, what Ukrainians, Poles, Moldovans, Balts, Georgians, Armenians may think, is much less significant, because it’s just the feeling of “others,” subaltern subjects, unworthy of the dignity of actors, at best reacting victims of an orientalist interpretation of history that Westerners apply far too often to their Eastern European neighbors. The disproportionate attention for Russia’s feelings, the solidarity for the Russian “tragedy” of losing its empire and the insensitivity to other peoples’ priorities become possible only if one places the Russian nation in a hierarchically superior position, applying the orientalist misconception that only a former power can have the dignity of an actor. European colonialists saw the East as a mere object they could play with. Pro-Russian commentators see Eastern Europe in the same way: Russia can do as it pleases, for this is seen as part of the natural geopolitical order. Eastern Europe as a dummy: incapable of action? Pro-Russian commentators’ orientalist thinking emerges in the way they portray Ukraine as a country incapable of action on its own initiative. They invariably see Eastern European countries as objects manipulated by the West. This follows what was described above: if Russia is seen as the only state worth of the dignity of “actor” and Eastern Europe as a passive, hierarchically subordinated object, it’s then inevitable that any independent action by any Eastern European state must be the result of a Western interference. Unsurprisingly, pro-Russian commentators almost never speak in terms of “access of Eastern Europe into NATO,” but of “NATO/EU expansion in Eastern Europe.” The “East” is seen as a land of conquest – by nature subordinated to Russia – in which “the West” engages in dangerous games against its “legitimate” owner. Local actors are insignificant: their role in the whole NATO/EU enlargement process is ignored. Former communist countries are seen as victims of an inclusion in Western security structures carried out against their will. This is of course nonsense: the integration of Eastern Europe in Euro-Atlantic security structures happened in two directions, with a very intense activity from Eastern actors that Western actors have often found far too pressing. In pro-Russian analyses, though, nothing of this appears: Eastern European states are denied the dignity of actors in the process and the very idea that tens of millions of people in the region may have wanted at many points in history to change their alignment is ruled out completely. This is not just post-Soviet nostalgic thinking: it’s outright racism. If Eastern Europe looks west, this must be due to “Western interferences,” “pressures,” “NGOs” or whatever scapegoat pro-Russians can come up with to make sense of Russia’s failures. There must be something “Western” in action that “destabilizes the Eurasian space”; they refuse to accept that there may be genuine local interests among Eastern European peoples to realign their own countries and that, if anything, it’s actually Russia who should be held responsible for destabilizing the region with its opposition to the desires of its former imperial subjects. It may be interesting for pundits who talks about “the West destabilizing Eastern Europe” to think from this perspective for a second and see if their position still holds. Eastern Europeans as marionettes: are we not being racist? This orientalist approach leads to deny the sincerity of any pro-Western protest in Eastern Europe. No one with a bit of knowledge of Eastern Europe could seriously think that Brussels or Washington may really mobilize millions of people in countries such as Ukraine. No matters how much support there can be from “outside,” it’s internal factors that at the end of the day mobilize people, especially when there’s a risk of getting killed. It’s absurd to think that someone would risk getting shot just because a bureaucrat in Brussel told him to do so. It is therefore racist to think that nobody east of the EU may want an order of things in which Russia doesn’t dominate, as if we “Westerners” were the only ones worth of, or capable of fighting for, things like rule of law, human rights and so on. These beliefs play a reassuring role for Russia itself: better to pretend that Eastern Europe’s inclusion in NATO/EU results from an anti-Russian conspiracy rather than recognizing the failure of one’s own model and the fact that, simply put, numerous countries in Europe still fear Russia’s intentions. Why we should get rid of “Orientalism” The main victim of these stereotypes is our ability to correctly understand Eastern Europe. Western influences cannot be ignored, but it is deeply wrong to see the Ukrainian pro-democracy movement as a detour from a supposedly “natural,” inevitable order of things in which we don’t even consider Ukrainians as worth of dignity of active subjects and nation. The risk is to lose the ability to understand the role of local actors, their choices and their feelings. It’s fascinating to focus only on great powers’ strategies, seeing Eastern Europe as a chessboard over which two players face each other. However, no matter how enjoyable grand strategies may be for pundits and general public alike, Eastern Europe is not a football pitch and we as Westerners should seriously stop looking down at the small nations of Eastern Europe as a bunch of subaltern realities, while seeing Russia as the only nation worth of consideration and dignity. Ridding ourselves of these misconceptions should be the first, compulsory step for anyone who wants to comment on Eastern European affairs. [1]Coming from a different starting point, Anton Shekhovtsov has briefly argued along similar lines in a very good article published while this contribution was undergoing final revision. I am grateful to him for raising the topic and I hope my contribution will add more to the debate. [2]To get an idea of how absurdly simplistic and misleading this concept is, I suggest reading the chapter about Ukraine in Timothy Snyder’s The Reconstruction of Nations.

#### Russia and Ukraine are the same song and dance

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* Critiques Russian colonialism

Modern Manifestations The reactions to Russia’s current war against Ukraine, general support to Ukraine aside, have also revealed some long and unprocessed legacies of Russian imperialism in the mindscapes of many in various western quarters of the world when it comes to the difficulty of seeing and acknowledging a distinct Ukrainian subjectivity that is not defined by another power laying a historical claim to Ukrainians as “Little Russians.”22 Up until this war, Ukraine’s history has not really been considered worthy of becoming data points in the study of international politics.23 Russian imperialism and colonialism are among the many blind spots of the academic field of IR and the broader postcolonial studies. The former suffers generally from West-centrism and a very short memory, bordering on presentism; a tendency towards abstract theorizing at the expense of mastering historical detail, and an odd set of (im)moral principles masked as “rules of international conduct” – at least in its mainstream version of crude realism, which tends to be the most opinionated of the many theoretical streams of the discipline whenever a war breaks out anywhere in the world with a “great power” participation.24 The latter tends to reduce the intra-European struggles to the self-infatuated “narcissism of minor differences,”25 neglecting to discuss Russian colonialism on par with the Western colonial practices in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. Combined, the two fields end up pigeonholing Russia and its former imperial subjugates under the banner of the Russian/Slavonic and East European area studies (or postcommunist studies in the IR’s historically shorter-sighted version of the subfield) with a clear privileging of the Russian part and to the general detriment of understanding the “eastern world” in the study of international politics.

### Security

#### Surveillance is a form of power relations that allows Western domination over the Orient—it functions as a mode of representations that legitimize violence

**Anand 07**—Reader, IR, U Westminster. PhD, politics, Bristol (Dibyesh, Western Colonial Representations of the Other, http://staff.bath.ac.uk/ecsda/DAnandNPSArticleMar07.pdf,)//AN

Note – epiphenomenal = a secondary question/phenomenon

Within the context of European imperialism, the issue of the representation of natives was often considered as belonging to the realm of scientific objective ethnography, journalistic commentaries, or fiction.2 A clear boundary was said to exist between fiction and non-fiction writing. It was presumed that, unlike fiction, non-fiction writing such as literary and popular journalism, exploration and travel writings, memoirs of colonial officials, and so on is unmediated by the consciously aesthetic requirements of imaginative literature.3 Emphasis was on the recording of observed facts. However, as argued by scholars from fields as diverse as postcolonial studies,4 anthropology,5 and international relations,6 such views are no longer tenable. Starting with Said,7 the enterprise of postcolonial theory has unpacked the notion of neutral academic expertise and highlighted how Western knowledge and representations of the non-Western world are neither innocent nor based on some pre-existing “reality,” but implicated in the West’s will to power, and its imperial adventures. The image of a scientific, apolitical, disinterested, knowledge-seeking “gentleman” braving all odds to study non-Western cultures has been revealed as hollow. For instance, Colin Mackenzie, the first surveyor general of Madras in India, was clear about his necessary complicity in the brute realities of colonial power. He conflated the role of the soldier and the scientist and wrote: That science may derive assistance, and knowledge be diffused, in the leisure moments of [military] camps and voyages, is no new discovery; but . . . I am also desirous of proving that, in the vacant moments of an Indian sojourn and campaign in particular . . . such collected observations may be found useful, at least in directing the observation of those more highly gifted to matters of utility, if not to record facts of importance to philosophy and science.8 The mask of objectivity in the colonial discourse hid relations of inequality and domination. Fiction as well as non-fiction writings were permeated with various strategies of representation. These were not epiphenomenal but central to the ways in which the Other was sought to be known. What Rana Kabbani points out about travel writing holds true for non-fictional writings in general: during imperialism, it ultimately produced “a communal image of the East,” which “sustained a political structure and was sustained by it.”9 Various forms of representing the non-West—visual (films, television, photographs, paintings, advertisements, and so on) as well as textual (such as fiction, travelogue, journalism, ethnography, and anthropology)—were closely linked to the production of imperial encounters. Asymmetry of productive power is a common trait shared by these encounters. The contemporary neocolonial world too “bears witness to the unequal and uneven forces of cultural representation involved in the contest for political and social within the modern world order.”10 It is not only the represented (here the colonized, the third world, the South) who are subjects of and subjected to the process; even the representer (the colonizer, the first world, the West) is constructed by representational practices. This in no way implies similar experiences for the colonizer and the colonized (the representer and the represented). It only indicates that though everyone is subjected to representational practices, the impact differs according to the existing power relations. To illustrate this point, while both the West and Tibetans are subjects of Exotica Tibet, and the latter are not mere victims but exercise their agency through creative negotiations, the West does not have to construct its identity according to the perception of Tibetans. Westerners exoticize Tibet, and in turn, Tibetans exoticize the West. But while Western exoticization has a defining productive impact on Tibetan identity discourse,11 the same cannot be said of Tibetan exoticization of the West. This reflects the asymmetry in their power relations. A concentration on Western representations does not deny the fact that representational practices were prevalent in non-Western societies too. In fact, historically, all cultures and civilizations have had their own particular representational practices for perceiving those they considered as Other. But— and this is a crucial qualification—it was only with modern European imperialism that the capacity to convert these representations into truth on a systematic and mass scale emerged. What makes such representational practices distinctly modern is their productive capacity. Production of knowledge about the Other through representations goes hand in hand with the construction, articulation, and affirmation of differences between the Self and Other, which in turn feeds into the identity politics amongst the representer as well as the represented. Essentializing and Stereotyping the Other The practices of essentializing and stereotyping the Other underlie different strategies of Western representations. Essentialism is the notion that some core meaning or identity is determinate and not subject to interpretation. Ronald Inden writes that essentialist ways of seeing tend to ignore the “intricacies of agency” pertinent to the flux and development of any social system.12 In colonial context, we find essentialism in the reduction of the indigenous people to an “essential” idea of what it means to be “native”—say, Africans as singing–dancing–fighting, Chinese as duplicitous, Arabs as cruel and oppressors of women, Tibetans as religious, and so on. Imperialism drew its strength from representations of natives as quintessentially lazy, ignorant, deceitful, passive, incapable of self-governing, and the native rulers as corrupt and despotic. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the British officials involved during the 1903–1904 invasion of Tibet saw it as something welcomed by “ordinary” Tibetans seeking deliverance from their Chinese and monastic overlords. Captain Cecil Rawling in a military report in 1905 wrote: “It seems to be the general wish of the inhabitants of that country (Tibet) that they should come under British administration.”13 Curiously, Alistair Lamb’s own assessment that “when dealing with the primitive peoples of Central Asia, the problem often was not how to expand one’s power but how to prevent its indefinite expansion”14 too puts the onus of responsibility for imperial expansion on the victims themselves. This is made possible by their essentialist representations as requiring paternal imperialism—a mix of iron fist and velvet glove. A stereotype is a one-sided description of a group/culture resulting from the collapsing of complex differences into a simple “cardboard cut-out,” seeing people as pre-set image and “more of a formula than a human being.”15 It reduces people to a few simple characteristics, which are then represented as fixed by nature. “Stereotyping reduces, essentialises, naturalises and fixes ‘difference.’”16 Stereotypes function as a marker between norm and deviancy, between “us” and “them.” As Said argues, stereotypical images of the Orient’s separateness—“its eccentricity, its backwardness, its silent indifference, its feminine penetrability, its supine malleability”—have been part of Western discursive practices for a long time.17 Stereotyping flourished to justify imperialism as a civilizing mission—the restless, honest, active, exploratory, masculine, enlightened, modern spirit of the “white man” stood in contrast to the laziness, deceit, passivity, fatalism, femininity, backwardness, and traditional spiritlessness of the natives. For example, Captain John Noel’s films Climbing Mount Everest (1922) and The Epic of Everest (1924) developed the “contrast between the extroverted, aggressive, and manly British climbers with the introverted, passive, and squalid but mystical Tibetans.”18 Stereotyping is a simplification not because it is a false representation of a given reality but because it is an arrested, fixated form of representation that denies the play of difference. Let me illustrate this with an example from the story of the first two men to reach Mount Everest—Tenzing Norgay and Edmund Hillary. Reaching the summit, Tenzing Norgay says he felt the warm presence of the mountain, buried an offering to the gods, and said in prayer: “I am grateful, Chomolungma”; Hillary took photographs to survey the area, urinated on the summit, and later told one of the other climbers, George Lowe: “Well, George, we knocked the bastard off.”19 This difference in attitude may be due to cultural factors. But to interpret humility as passivity and fix the identity of Tenzing Norgay (read as representative of sherpas and other natives) as essentially passive in contrast to adventurous, scientific Hillary (read as white man) leads to a reified and fixated form of representation (excluding those who do not “fit” in the image). Stereotyping is not about expressing cultural difference, but fixing it in a pre-given socio-cultural milieu with extreme power differentials. Stereotyping served imperialism at both representational and psychic levels—supporting the idea of paternal domination and acting as a kind of perceptual blinder protecting the colonizers from discomforting consciousness of either poverty or guilt.20 It allowed the participants in the massacre of Tibetans at Guru (March 31, 1904) that took place during the British invasion of Tibet to blame it on the “crass stupidity and childishness of the Tibetan general,”21 malevolent monks, superstitious Tibetan soldiers—everyone except themselves. We must liberate the ordinary natives from their brutal leaders—this sentiment can be seen in Colonel Francis Younghusband’s account of the 1903–1904 “expedition” to Tibet where after criticizing Tibetans for being crafty, immoral, over-religious, dirty, and lazy, he says “there are in them latent potentialities for good, which only await the right touch to bring them into being.”22 We may recall Napoleon’s proclamation in 1798 upon entering Egypt: “Peoples of Egypt, you will be told that I have come to destroy your religion; do not believe it! Reply that I have come to restore your rights, to punish the usurpers, and that I respect more than the Mamluks God, His Prophet, and the Quran.”23 Though in everyday conversation we tend to use stereotype only for negative images, stereotyping has within it dualism and ambivalence.24 As Michael Hunt in his study of hierarchy of race and American foreign policy points out, the Americans created for “Orientals” two distinctly different images: “a positive one, appropriate for happy times when paternalism and benevolence were in season, and a negative one, suited to those tense periods when abuse or aggrandizement became the order of the day.”25 While sometimes a positive stereotype may be politically and socially helpful for a group, in the long run it reifies and imprisons the represented subjects in their own arrested image. This problem can be seen most clearly in the case of Tibetans who seem to be prisoners of their stereotyped images. Alluding to the real effects of the language of stereotype about Tibet, Donald Lopez points out that it “not only creates knowledge about Tibet, in many ways it creates Tibet, a Tibet that Tibetans in exile have come to appropriate and deploy in an effort to gain both standing in exile and independence for their country.”26 However, these stereotypes legitimize only certain goals and actions geared toward achieving them—the prevalent stereotypes paint Tibetans mainly as passive victims requiring outside help. And this outside support comes at a price. As Jamyang Norbu says, “however hopeless their cause or marginal their survival, Tibetans are better off living their own reality than being typecast in ethereal roles in the fantasies of the West.”27 Strategies of Representation In spite of commonalities and consistencies, it is complexity, oppositionality, and ambivalence that lie at the heart of Western colonial representations. Imaginative practices through which the imperial West came to represent the Other can be interrogated through the various strategies of representation involved. Though there was always a will to reify the represented, this was undermined by the nature of representation—it was not a singular act, but one necessitating repetition. There always was a paradox in the Western representations of other cultures—an unresolvable tension between transparency and inscrutability, desire and disavowal, difference and familiarity. Therefore Exotica Tibet is not a distinct phenomenon devoid of contrariety; rather, it is defined by a “true complexio oppositorum, a rich complexity of contradictions and oppositions.”28 So near, yet so far! As Slavoj Zizek puts it: The very inconsistency of this image of Tibet, with its direct coincidence of opposites seems to bear witness to its fantasmatic status. Tibetans are portrayed as people leading a simple life of spiritual satisfaction, fully accepting their fate, liberated from the excessive craving of theWestern subject who is always searching for more, AND as a bunch of filthy, cheating, cruel, sexually promiscuous primitives . . . The social order is presented as a model of organic harmony, AND as the tyranny of the cruel corrupted theocracy keeping ordinary people ignorant . . . 29 The following section of this article identifies the most common discursive strategies marshalled in the representation of the non-Western Other in the context of Western imperialism and uses Exotica Tibet as the main empirical site of investigation. Archive Archive is commonly understood as a place or collection containing records, documents, photographs, film, or other materials of historical interest. But archive can be taken to refer to a repository of stored memories, information, myths, rumours, and legends.30 Encounter with the Other did not take place in a vacuum—it was understood within pre-given images. What was knowable then was shaped by imperial prerogatives as well as pre-existing “knowledge.” This included those found in classical writings, religious and biblical sources, mythology, traveller’s tales (which in any case hardly differentiated between description and legend), and fictional writings. These provided the cultural framework through which others were seen, described and represented. Orientalism itself performed an archival function—generalizations abounded as the attitude was “pick an East, any East”31 and the story will be the same. As Said puts it: “In a sense Orientalism was a library or archive of information commonly and, in some of its aspects, unanimously held.”32 In situations where the culture was relatively unknown—like the Tibetan—hearsay, legends, and fantasies performed an ever more important archival function.33 Representers of Tibet especially before the 19th century often drew upon these archives, supplementing the rare missionary and travellers’ accounts. Hugh Richardson’s argument that the early allusions of Westerners reveal little more than that the Tibetans had a reputation in neighbouring countries for “strange ways and rare magical powers”34 holds true even for the 20th century. Evaluation of Tibet and its people was based on an archive that made very little distinction between myths, legends, hearsay, and facts. Western writers constructed “facts” not by referring to the place of Tibet but through repetition and cross-reference. Gaze Surveillance is a technique through which, under an overpowering gaze, the non Western subject is rendered “a knowable, visible object of disciplinary power.”35 The gaze is not mere innocent curiosity: “to gaze implies more than to look at—it signifies a psychological relationship of power, in which the gazer is superior to the object of the gaze.”36 Through observation, examination and interpretation objects are differentiated, categorized, and identified, and made ready to be acted upon. Objectification (fixing its essence) of the gazed goes hand in hand with its subjectification—gaze and surveillance are productive of identity of the gazed. Surveillance as a strategy for representing the Other and rendering it disciplined is characterized by the all-knowing gaze of a white “man,” the colonial master, the West. It enables both the visual possession of the body of the gazed and an interposition of technique which safely conceals the body of the gazer.37 Observations then are presented as dispassionate, objective facts. The gaze is disembodied—statements are made as if there is no seer behind the observations. This is not to say that non-Westerners are visually impaired, powerless to gaze back at the West. But the authority of imperialism for a large part of the modern period ensured that mastery and control remained a possession of Western “man.” The “monarch of all I survey” rhetorical gesture remained peculiar to the West.38 Establishment of mastery through surveillance, gaze, and observation were accompanied by consolidation of shades of political dominance over the object of the gaze. Appropriation was done in the name of scientific curiosity, ethnographic material gathering, protection of simple masses from their own despotic rulers, or the spread of progress. British colonial and military officials who went inside Tibet often wrote their accounts as scientific exploration, or as exciting adventure,39 or simply as “everyday” observation.40 Behind the innocent sounding descriptions of travel like the “narrative of a plant hunter’s adventures and discoveries”41 lay the violence of imperialism. Though their gaze might be considered as one of adventurer or romantic in Europe, the effect on the natives was the same as some steely-eyed militarist—the establishment and institutionalization of control through political rule and knowledge formation. To know is a prelude to possess, especially if there is a huge asymmetry of power. Such asymmetry led to situations where it was perfectly acceptable for a participant in the Tibet mission of 1903–1904 to say: “In fact the visible riches and treasures of Lhasa fairly made our mouths water. The Tibetans however would not sell, and to our honour be it said; although Lhasa was a fair object to loot, and lay in our power, not a farthings worth was forcibly [author adds this word in pen in a typed text] taken from it.”42 Securing priceless artefacts through coercion and displaying them in the private and public collections in the West was an essential feature of Western imperialism. Paradoxically, the project of rendering the Other knowable and the image of it as primitive and simple went had in hand with recognition that there are elements of inscrutability and mystery that eluded complete understanding of the Other. While discussing his own failure to fathom the unease of Phuntsog, a Tibetan who is seen no longer as “authentic” native as he has learnt the language of the imperialist, Edmund Candler, an early example of embedded reporter (a Daily Mail reporter accompanying the British invasion of Tibet in 1903–1904), calls him a “strange hybrid product of restless western energies, stirring and muddying the shallows of the Eastern mind. Or are they depths? Who knows? I know nothing, only that these men are inscrutable, and one cannot see into their hearts.”43 Frustrated with the inaccessibility, invisibility and inscrutability of “the Orientals,” Western desire subjects them to a relentless investigation. Veil becomes a metaphor for all that invites, titillates, and yet resists Western knowing. It is “one of those tropes through which Western fantasies of penetration into the mysteries of the Orient and access to the interiority of the other are fantasmatically achieved.”44 Surveillance and gaze facilitate other representational strategies that fix the Orient, the Other, particularly those that seek to classify, differentiate and provide identity to the Other (and in turn to the Self). Differentiation–Classification Differentiation and classification, two crucial factors in the formation of the modern subject,45 are also evident in Western representations of the Other. The ideational differentiation between the West and the Rest underpins these representations. The need to articulate one’s personal and collective self in terms of identity comes from an internalization of this principle of differentiation. Classification occupies a central place in any account of non-Western people. It polices discourses, assigns positions, regulates groups, and enforces boundaries.46 What Lobsang Rampa47 says about his own treatment in the West reflects the dominant Western attitude toward the exhibition of Oriental curiosities: “Unfortunately, western people looked upon me as a curio, as a specimen who should be put in a cage and shown off as a freak from the unknown. It made me wonder what would happen to my old friends, the Yetis, if the westerners got hold of them—as they are trying to do.”48 Given the taxonomizing predilection and conceit of Western imperialism, we can hardly disagree with Rampa’s conjecture about the fate of the yetis: “(If)Western Man had his way, our poor old yetis would be captured, dissected, and preserved in spirit.”49 While some classifications may be essential for understanding, often the classification of non-Western peoples went hand in hand with the hierarchization and racialization of cultures. Classifying the Other as barbarian or savage validated its dehumanization and was seen as justification for use of violence to impose European norms.50 At the top were the white Europeans and at the bottom were “primitive” Africans and aboriginal populations in the “new world.” Chinese, Arabs, Indians, and others occupied different positions in the hierarchical table. The 19th and 20th century obsession with racializing culture can be seen in the case of Tibetans too where different commentators sought to identify characteristics of the Tibetan “race.” A typical example was Graham Sandberg who was unflattering in his comments about the “Tibetan race as ‘a weak and cowardly people, their pusillanimity rendering them readily submissive.’”51 The fact that racism has less to do with colour and more to do with power relations becomes evident in the British treatment of Irish as “coloured,” as “white negroes,”52 during the 19th century. Captain William Frederick O’Connor’s observation at the start of the 20th century about Tibet is illustrative: “Common people are cheerful, happy-go-lucky creatures, absurdly like the Irish in their ways, and sometimes even in their features.”53 On the other hand, French traveller Alexandra David-Neel finds that dobdobs, the Lhasa monk “police,” looks like a “real negro.”54 Differentiation, classification and identification, when combined with racialization, evolutionism and hierarchization, lead to the debasement and negation of most non-Western natives and idealization of some.

### Ukraine

#### Ukraine crisis increasingly reveals that orientalism still dominants IR-The protection of the white Ukraine, but not the numerous crisis in the middle east shows the wests contiuation of discrimination-To be clear the author supports Ukraine

Sawafta 22[Suja Sawafta, Assistant Professor of Arabic Studies, Modern Languages and Literatures at the University of Miami, "Orientalism, Ukraine and the social disease of selective solidarity",3-3-2022, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220303-orientalism-ukraine-and-the-social-disease-of-selective-solidarity/, 1LEE]

Orientalism is an ever-evolving, ever-mestasising social disease, which as of late has moved the world's most powerful leaders to decry the Russian invasion of Ukraine with a remarkable gusto that was largely absent six months ago with the fall of Kabul, or six years ago when Syrian refugees, fleeing the tyranny of Assad's Russian-backed regime, made the arduous journey across the Mediterranean in search of a passage to Europe. No comparable echoes of despair were heard with regards to the Armenian/Azerbaijani battle over the Republic of Artsakh, and while the dispossession of Palestinians in Sheikh Jarrah, Silwan and the other areas of Israeli-occupied Jerusalem briefly lit up social media with messages of global solidarity, no comparable immediate international action or globally-led sanctions have been offered as a sign of solidarity to brown and black bodies facing political aggression or invasion.

Sweden, Finland and Switzerland did not consider setting aside their neutrality for Syria or Afghanistan, both altered forever by Russian interference and occupation. FIFA has not placed indefinite bans on other military aggressors and selectively chooses not to fine footballers with European teams who have expressed solidarity with Ukraine while those who do so for Palestine face penalties. Many news outlets, including the BBC and CBS have featured commentators — including journalists and global leaders — who have expressed their shock at the fact that Ukrainians, who are "relatively civilised, relatively European", are facing a crisis that they seem to think should be reserved only for those with melanated skin. Along the same lines, Georgian-Ukrainian politician David Sakvarelidze said that the situation in Ukraine made him "emotional" because he is seeing "people with blonde hair and blue eyes being killed every day." Western media platforms all echo the same general sentiment: how could it be that people who look European, and live in a Christian majority-country, are fleeing their homes in 2022?

The same question did not seem to shake Europe to the same degree in the 1990s when Bosnian Muslims, many with blonde hair and blue eyes, were not granted the same courtesy because of their religious background. Moreover, Ukrainian Jews were not granted this same courtesy of care during the Holocaust, and so on and so forth.

Instead of asking such questions, Global North leaders should ask themselves why they believe that the people of Asia, Africa, the Arab world and Latin America, as well as the indigenous tribes of the Americas, should alone experience the sum of all suffering and injustice in the world; and why they fail to recognise and take responsibility for the centuries-long oppressive practices that elevated them to a global political precipice at the expense of more than half the global population of seven billion people. Why are Europeans — White people on whichever continent they have colonised — entitled to an elite brand of safety, security and humanity while the victims of their foreign policies are doomed to live in a purgatory of poverty and social inequity?

In short, the level of selective solidarity with Ukraine, one that is not afforded to other vulnerable populations, should be the default benchmark for global solidarity and action. People should not have to have blue eyes and blonde hair to receive our sympathy and support. Yet, the commentary that has been on full display since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated to us otherwise. It has proven that Orientalism is alive and well and that the rhetoric of dehumanisation and cultural superiority that was set in motion with the Crusades is still with us, and is probably here to stay.

There are many lessons that can be learnt here, but the one major takeaway as far as I am concerned is that if people of colour and members of minority groups do not see their own liberation and standing in solidarity with Ukraine as mutually exclusive phenomena, why are the privileged leaders and citizens of the world's wealthiest and most powerful countries so committed to nourishing this divide? Why are brown and black Ukrainians, visiting students or refugees, being thrown off the trains evacuating the country whilst others with lighter skins are allowed to flee to safety? It is high time that we all understand that there is no excuse for racism, orientalism or selective solidarity when the planet is on fire; that sooner or later we will have to contend with the rage of Mother Nature in a warming world; that climate change cares not for skin colour or man-made wars.

And to be clear, I stand in solidarity with the people of Ukraine just as I stand in solidarity with all oppressed people. It is the only just, ethical and humanistic position to take.

#### The 1AC’s drive to protect Ukraine from “marauding Russians” is shaped by media that has been monopolized by Western powers in order to propagate Orientalist narratives that deny Russia agency, ignore the Western role in the Ukraine crisis, and turn the case by perpetuating conflict.

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Russian invasion on Ukraine has evoked considerable outpouring of compassion across the world. Western media poignantly portrayed the plight of Ukrainians and glorified the resistance of the Ukrainians in the face of marauding Russians. The portrayal of Ukraine as an western country that has been pierced by the barbaric assault of the Russians has been a running thread in the media’s framing of the war. The portrayal is striking due to considerable orientalist overtones and racist connotation. Besides, attribution of relatively more importance to Ukraine crisis while the other crisis was conveniently overlooked-raises the question as to whether such selective moral righteousness is indicative of orientalist overtones. Wars in the post-cold war era are marked by a striking similarity ,due to the fact that media has exerted considerable sway in interpreting the war and shaping the dynamics of war. Media has legitimized certain war while it mobilized public opinion against others. In this era,the yardstick of legitimacy is bestowed largely by the media. The role of media in shaping war is partly exercised by media’s framing strategies. Media framing entails a sociological and cognitive endeavor that interpret the events from a particular viewpoint and furnishes convincing evidence by means of news-stories to further reinforce the frame. The framing of war stems from the stance of media towards a particular war or any political event. The framing strategy of media is particularly efficacious in shaping and influencing the dynamics of the war-due to the fact that the actual realm of warfare and the covert diplomatic maneuvers concerning war is undertaken in sheer secrecy and always remains remote from the public. Hence, media provides avenues for general mass to remain conversant of the realities of the war. However, media is at liberty in portraying war by underscoring certain frames to mobilize public opinions for that particular perspective. As general people can’t discriminate between true and spurious portrayal ,the framing of war from biased viewpoint becomes more convenient for the media. Hence, there is an inextricable relationship between modern war and media, as media framing ultimately justifies the war. As the bulk of the media outlets with a global reach emanates from western countries, the international media landscape is unduly skewed towards the west. This provide west with a leverage in framing war from their vested vantage point. This ensues that western country exerts a monopoly over the “framing” international political issues. Especially, in the case of conflict, this framing endeavor appears far conducive for these countries as it provides west with the power to legitimize and delegitimize war in line with the interests of the western world. The blatant manifestation of abuse of this monopoly of media is exhibited in the framing of the Iraq war. In line with the dominant narrative of the United States which stipulated that Iraq possess WMD and hence constitute grave menace to world security, western media are deplorably complicit in legitimizing American war effort and consequent destruction wrought by United States under the pretext of securing civilians and restoring democracy. This event illustrates the reinforcing role that war plays in legitimation of war. In terms of U.S. invasion of the Afghanistan in 2021 and concomitant toppling of Taliban, the media perpetuated the prejudices about general Afghani people and amplified the threat posed by Islamic terrorism. This portrayal facilitated western domination over the Afghanistan for two decades, as the phenomenon of intervention has been conveniently transfigured into benign benevolence aimed at ameliorating Afghanistan. Besides, western intervention in Libya or Syria ,all has been portrayed from the lens of western onus in redressing the miseries of people in these countries. Moreover, media legitimized and reinforced western war mission by trumping narratives and sustaining it . While the act of war by any country is deplorable to the conscientious people ,western media however reserve the monopolistic right to labeling war as “Just” and “Unjust”, in line with the geopolitical interests of the western countries. This has been accentuated by the western media portrayal of the Ukrainian crisis. The orientalist connotation in the war evident even on the eve of the war, as Russian security concern had been spurned and NATO had only amplified its security by intruding in close proximity to Russia. This is sheer manifestation of callousness as it is understandable that U.S. would not brook such hostile maneuverings against U.S. in its close contiguity, a fact which perhaps been concretized in the proverbial Monroe Doctrine. Moreover, the fact that only western security concern is legitimate and Russia’s security concern represents aggression from the part of Russia, is a notion that is emblematic of the orientalist disposition of the west, whereby west and other are gauged with different yardstick and Others are not entitled to the privilege of having “security” at all, let alone concern about security. Moreover, the west had been utterly callous and disrespectful about the sensitivities of Russia ,and this belligerence from West has stoked consternation in Russia and precipitated the outbreak of war.

### US

#### The US constitutes itself as the protector of the good going to war against Others who make up the enemies of civilization

Assayag 07 – Anthropologist and a Professor of Research at the CNRS affiliated at the Maison Française, Oxford (Jackie, “East and West: orientalism, war and the colonial present”, pg 265-266, 5/1/07, <https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/3723/372339154012.pdf>, Accessed 7/16/22)//mackerel

The question of treating the adversary as an “enemy” haunts nations as well as empires. It obsesses them all the more as the response to this question is in limbo: what to do with a person who withholds his assent, announces his disagreement or remains indifferent? Must he be treated as a foreigner, the hostis, or is he to be considered as an enemy? And what treatment is to be reser¬ved for the enemy? For the philosopher, the question of hostility tends to go together with that of difference and identity: it constitutes the blind spot of the future of (in)humanity. But, for the historian and anthropologist, the figure of the enemy is a red thread, or rather the barbed wire, that makes it possible to locate the territories of otherness and to delimit the imaginary spaces of civilization or barbarism, when it does not serve to protect the geography from terrors about everywhere in the world. Carl Schmitt, master that he was of the “friend-enemy” distinction, did not fail to inquire as to the contemporary enigma of “this being, the foreigner, and such that ultimately conflicts with him would be possible that cannot be resolved, neither by a set of general norms established in advance, nor by the sentence pronounced by a reputed uninvolved and imperial third party” (Schmitt 1972: 67); thinly-veiled praise of the “state of exception”.

The American strategy, which consists in representing the United States as a “universal nation” articulating global values and combating for this reason the “enemies of civilization”: terrorists, tyrants or barbarians, has similarities with the Hegelian version of the *Weltgeist*; and this all the more so as Mesopotamia is one of the cradles of civilization.23 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Hegel had seen the *Weltgeist* pass by in the figure of Napoléon, that product of the French Revolution, mounted on a horse at the time of his entrance into the town of Jena. Some one hundred and fifty years later, Theodor Adorno perceived it, not on horseback, but “on the wings of a headless rocket” – an allusion to the V-2s of Hitler, robot-bombs that, like Fascism, “allied the most advanced technical perfection with the most total blindness”. At the beginning of the third millennium, the American neo-Straussians think to incarnate the *Weltgeist* because the United States army – the instrument of the race of lords fighting against the wretches of the earth – has struck down the enemy and smashed the “Axis of Evil” blazoned by Saddam Hussein, the former ally of the West against Iran in the process of “Khomeinization”.

Inspired by the neoreaganian cocktail of internationalist idealism and Realpolitik concocted by the conflicting alliance of messianic neo-conservatives (Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle), of confederate fundamentalists (George W. Bush, Karl Rove), of imperial nationalists (Richard Cheney, Ronald Rumsfeld) and realist traditionalists (Condoleeza Rice, Colin Powel),24 the victory of the “coalition” in Iraq would have justified the use of the armed forces to remodel wide regions where “the damned of the earth” for the greater part live; this dynamic of four schools, thinking diversely about the conflict between virtue, liberty and corruption, is the American “Machiavellian moment”, according to the typology of John Pockock.25 But the consequences on the “ground” and for the concerned populations of this “Wilsonism in boots” – the formulation is from Pierre Hassner (2003: 199) – allows one to think that it is nevertheless a question of a Pyrrhic victory: the promises of modernization through colonization have been systematically deferred and always supplanted by the ontological difference between “us” and “them” – *tertium non datur*.

What now prevails is a sombre vision of globalization, that of a fight to the death between two worlds, extending over all continents, between the “Empire of the Good”, incarnated by America, and the “Empire of Evil”, incarnated by Islamic terrorism. But this novelty goes back to schemas that are as old as the United States itself, insofar as this self-proclaimed “exceptional”, “unilateral” and “providential” “imperial republic” has an idealistic or utopian component qualified as “indispensable”. It remains that today the (Texan) sheriff is no longer reluctant26 to trigger pre-emptive strikes in order to eradicate Evil in the name of the Good and of the universal empire – it’s all one.

### US-China Trade

#### Discussions of US-China trade relationships are impossible to separate from Yellow Peril tropes, depicting those that refuse to conform to the capitalist market as security threats

Ooi and D’arcangelis 17(Su-Mei Ooi and Gwen D’Arcangelis, 2017, Framing China: Discourses of othering in US news and political rhetoric, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2059436418756096>, )**//BRownRice**

China as cheat: currency squabbles The merchandise trade deficit that the US maintains with China—which grew to a total of US$365.7 billion in 2015 before falling to US$308.9 billion in 2017—has been a long-standing issue of concern for the United States (United States Census Bureau, 2016, 2017). The trade deficit is often attributed to unfair trade practices and the artificial undervaluation of China’s currency. The United States has registered numerous trade disputes with China over the years via the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism with success. Up to 2010, China has, moreover, kept its national currency undervalued to drive exports. This dimension of US–China trade relations is of interest here because China has, since 2005, adopted a more flexible exchange rate regime and gradually revalued the yuan—not least because of political pressure from the United States. Indeed, in May 2015, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that the Chinese yuan was no longer undervalued (The Wall Street Journal, 2015). The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) estimated that the yuan had, in fact, been most recently overvalued about 32% compared to its trading partners, and the most expensive among 60 countries (Forbes, 2015). US political rhetoric has so far been out of step with these changes and has failed to explain the reasons for which previous motivations to undervalue the yuan no longer hold. In a charged exchange between candidate Mitt Romney and President Obama in the 2012 presidential debate, for example, the former accused the latter for failing to call out China as cheat: “China has been a currency manipulator for years and years and years … and the president has a regular opportunity to label them as a currency manipulator, but refuses to do so” (Paletta & Davis, 2012a). Romney went on to build on this image of China to shore up his credentials: “On day one, I will label China a currency manipulator, which will allow me as president to be able to put in place, if necessary, tariffs where I believe that they are taking unfair advantage of our manufacturers” (Paletta & Davis, 2012b). At the time, the yuan had already increased by 11% since 2008. The trope of China as cheat can be read in light of historical constructions of China as the Yellow Peril, a notion that continues to shape depictions of the Chinese as cunning, sneaky, and immoral in US political rhetoric today. These stereotypes emerged in the late 1880s to fuel antiChinese sentiment, when United Statesians responded to the influx of Chinese labor and settlement as a threat to White wages, White social dominance, and family structure. These depictions helped to justify harsh immigration laws barring Chinese settlement. In the current context, depictions of China reinvoke this older Orientalist trope to paint not only a similarly suspicious figure but also a tenuous economic partner with the potential to turn into the Red Peril that refuses to abide by the rules of the capitalist market. This was again perceptible when the yuan was devalued by 2.3% to bring it more in line with a market-determined rate in the Fall of 2015 (US Treasury, Oct 2015). That markets and politicians are sensitized to the slightest downward movement in China’s currency value was underlined by the agitation with which Congressional representatives reacted to the devaluation of the yuan. The US Treasury, which played a key role in pressuring China for a market-determined currency, was cautious in its initial response; however, Congressional critics such as Senator Charles Schumer (NY-D) went on the record saying that this move was indicative of China’s attempt to “double down” on currency manipulation and that the yuan “should be barred from consideration as a global reserve currency by the IMF” unless China “stops artificially devaluing” it. Indeed, he is quoted as saying that “China has rigged the rules” for years in “play[ing] games with its currency” (Bradsher, 2015). Furthermore, Republican Senator Rob Portman said that the devaluation was yet another “harsh reminder” that China “refuses to play by the rules” (Portman, 2015). Republican Senator Lindsey Graham joined the chorus by stating that “today’s provocative act by the Chinese government to lower the value of the yuan is just the latest in a long history of cheating” (Graham, 2015). The timing of the 2015 devaluation of the yuan did palpably advantage China at a time when exports were slowing, but there remains a discrepancy between the depiction of China as cheat and the complex economic reality of today. As growth rates slow and capital outflow takes place, undervaluing the yuan is no longer in China’s best interest. In the longer term, China is also likely to avoid a policy of undervaluation as it attempts to rebalance the economy toward domesticdriven growth, as a stronger Chinese yuan increases the purchasing power of its population. Importantly, its (now successful) bid to have the IMF recognize the yuan as an official reserve currency on par with the US Dollar, Euro, British Pound, and Japanese Yen constrains significant devaluations. In this regard, pro-business newspapers such as The Wall Street Journal have gone some way in providing the counterweight to the image of China as currency manipulator through more objective economic analysis. Yet, conclusions such as “China likely isn’t regressing” suggests that only tentative conclusions are drawn about China’s ability to conform to fair rules of play (“China’s Currency Policies Win Cautious Praise Abroad,” 2015). While some journalists have underlined the economic interdependence between the United States and China (Mallaby, 2005; “Paulson’s China Victory” 2006) and pointed out that China has become a “punching bag” since the 2012 partisan presidential electoral politics (Paletta & Davis, 2012a), space has also been given to presidential hopefuls to perpetuate the image of China as cheat by framing the yuan’s recent downward slide as “foreign currency cheating” (Trump, 2016). The long-standing Orientalist narrative of China’s cheating behavior, its destabilizing effect on the global rules of the liberal trade regime and the negative impact on US corporate interests and job security, remains easy to invoke after being the predominant theme in US public discourse on US–China economic relations. This narrative helps to bridge the gap between reality and fiction and turns an economic partner into an enemy. Enemy-making in the economic realm is particularly problematic, moreover, because polls indicate that the US public tends to pay significant attention to the economic relationship with China precisely because it most directly affects them. Gallup’s 2014 annual world affairs poll indicated that more Americans perceive China as an economic threat than a military one, unsurprising since China’s impact on the US job market feels more immediate to Americans than military developments in Asia (see Figure 1).

## Links – K Affs

### Afropess – includes the alt in here

#### Wilderson’s theorization of antiblackness is too totalizing and forces Asians into violent spheres of whiteness cementing them as junior partners to whiteness which precludes alternative strategies of navigating racialized power structures – takes out their solvency

Gotby 16 (Alva Gotby, “Body, Geography, Exteriority : Race and spatiality in the writings of Denise Ferreira da Silva” 2016) mahintha

This problem also indicates a broader issue, which is that Wilderson’s account absolutises the exclusion of black people - an ”ontological” exclusion that is detached from actual historical processes yet in some sense seems to depend on those processes. But what is political ontology? Here, I think it can most usefully be described as the naturalisation of certain relations of power, through various institutions and processes. However, Wilderson suggests that groups can be banished from those ”ontological” relations altogether (while simultaneously arguing that blackness is determined by gratuitous violence, thus ignoring the fact that this violence is a form of relation), and that ontology, once it is instituted, operates on a level that is detached from material and historical processes. This political ontology thus becomes next to impossible to change, because once instituted by a historical process, it becomes almost dehistorical. While I agree that it is difficult to overstate the importance of race for the constitution of the modern world, I think this absolutising of antiblackness might serve to renaturalise it as an totalised and unchanging condition, thus ignoring the multitude of strategies through which racial power operates. Indeed, Wilderson explicitly states that he is not interested in how raciality came to be, but rather wants to describe it as an ontological paradigm of power.82 For Ferreira da Silva on the other hand, the ”how” of race cannot be neatly separated out from the ”what” of race.83 Thus, we must look at the processes of knowing that instituted the racial - rather than an absolute ontology of race as exclusion, Ferreira da Silva proposes an ontoepistemology of racial difference. As I have shown, she criticises the use of exclusion as a model for understanding race. Much of that criticism does not apply to Wilderson’s theory - for example, he does not presuppose a prepolitical subject beyond the mechanism of exclusion. Rather, he suggests that blackness is a form of desubjectivation.84 He also does not naturalise racial bodily traits as the explanation for exclusion, as he uses Hortense Spillers’ concept of flesh to describe racial embodiment. Flesh, in Spillers’ terminology, is a politically produced being, not a natural minimal level of life.85 However, I find Wilderson’s account limiting because it tends towards doing one thing that Ferreira da Silva puts under the label ”the logics of exclusion,” namely to create an almost entirely negative statement of the being of (certain) racialised people. In his insistence on black people as the only group which is completely excluded from humanity, he lumps Asian and Arab people together with white people in the category of masters, providing very little justification for doing so.86 Thus, one racialised group is placed in total negativity, while other non-white groups are fully included in the sphere of the human. He does place Native Americans in a liminal position, half- way between the human and the antihuman, life and death. This move strikes me as rather U.S.- centric, and Wilderson tends to waver on the spatial extension of this racial ontology - does it apply to North America or the whole world? Moreover, to place Asians and Arabs solidly within the sphere of humanity, while blacks are completely excluded, obscures how the racial produces degrees of differentiation. With Sylvia Wynter, we might consider raciality as gradual deviation from the purported norm of Man, rather than as the total nonrelationality of one racial group from others.87 With Ferreira da Silva, we might say that racial bodies are ordered on a scale of transparency/affectability, where blackness occupies the position unsublatable affectability, the body so close to dying that it can never be represented as subjectivity unmediated by death. Wilderson’s account does not give a very clear account as to why white capacity is dependent on black incapacity. Instead he merely states that it is so, thus not explaining how whiteness is constituted. While Ferreira da Silva and Wilderson share a commitment to what I would call the radical exteriority of the racialised subject, in the sense that it is a subject that cannot be included into humanity and universality, Ferreira da Silva’s account provides us with a key to how this mechanism of exteriority work. Because her account does not rely on the pure negativity of the racialised other, she can state that what has been positioned as exterior is the affectable subject. Again, exteriority is different from exclusion because it does not necessarily connote negativity, or being deprived of something.

#### Vote neg for transnational Asian-Black solidarity---only through rejecting totalizing forms of theorization and US-centric epistemologies can we enable intersectional critique that allows for collective survival

Liu 20 (Wen Liu | “Internationalism Beyond the “Yellow Peril”: On the Possibility of Transnational Asian American Solidarity” | DOI: 10.5070/T8112050102 | DOA: 7/17/2022 | SAoki)

However, the point of Asian–Black solidarity is neither recentering Asian American experiences in the struggle toward police abolition nor placing racism against Black and Asian American communities in the same comparative framework. These approaches would minimize Black people’s repression by the carceral state and fall into the unproductive logic of an “Oppression Olympics.” The 1960s slogan that some Asian Americans have repopularized—“Yellow Peril Supports Black Power”—in order to support the current movement2 has stirred up debates relating to Asian Americans’ relationship to the ongoing Black struggles. While it highlights the historically bounded fate and formation of the Asian American and Black Power movements,3 it should also remind us that the 1960s Asian–Black solidarity was made possible by the antiimperialist positions of anti-Vietnam war and the decolonial movements in the global South. The Orientalist depiction of Asian nationals as “foreign enemies” during World War II constituted the “perpetual foreigner” status of Asian American subjects, thus demanding an Asian American critique of racial exclusion and the US empire. In other words, the demand for racial inclusion and equality as the basis of Asian–Black solidarity without problematizing the transnational reach of US imperialism is not only anachronistic but also counterproductive. As Minju Bae and Mark Tseng-Putterman articulate, the interconnected events of Orientalist racialization of the Asian body as virally contagious and BLM’s uprisings against policing “require an analysis that sutures the discourses of antiblackness and Orientalism, not as equivalent but constitutive components of global racial capitalism,”4 rather than flattening the differences of white supremacist operations under the US nation-state. In the midst of a global pandemic and social upheavals, how will transnational Asian–Black solidarity take shape? Currently living in Taipei, Taiwan, I am involved in an emergent circle of diasporic Asian radicals who write and organize around the vibrant left-leaning movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong and seek to build international solidarity based on a critique of both US and Chinese imperialism. This new activist milieu that has been described as “transnationally Asian”5 not only rejects Asian American assimilationist politics and the narrow focus of liberal international politics around democracy and human rights, but also actively seeks cross-national and cross-racial points of racial encounters and challenges the orthodox Western leftist takes on social movements that often defer to a reductionist binarism of “capitalism versus communism.” For example, a Hong Kong activist was excluded from participating in a BLM solidarity event hosted by the Sunrise Movement, an American youth–led climate organization, due to some US leftists’ Twitter commentaries that misrepresented Hong Kong’s protests against Beijing’s increasingly harsh conditions of authoritarian control as being funded by the US military. Writers from Lausan, a leftist Hong Kong press, have condemned such mischaracterization of Hong Kong’s ongoing mass movement as merely manipulated by US imperialism and, instead, insisted on the importance of building alliances between Hong Kong’s struggle against authoritarianism and BLM’s vision of police abolition.6 From this single case, one can understand that building transnational solidarity is complex and arduous work, both conceptually and practically. It requires us to maneuver from one ideological trap to another across geopolitical contexts and locally specific historical conditions. While transnational iteration is emancipatory and necessary to achieve a genuine form of Asian–Black solidarity, it must be built on a bidirectional and bifocal analysis instead of merely relying on the US-centric epistemology of what constitutes leftist politics. By seeking transnationalism from the West toward the non-West and not vice versa, it’s easy to fall into the logic of Western “China apologists” or neo-Cold War logic, dismissing the interasian conflicts that also have global ramifications. To put it in another way, as China criminalizes Hong Kong’s fight for fundamental democratic rights and implements mass arrests of young activists under the National Security Laws,7 a progressive Asian American politics must not only be focused on racial relations domestically but challenge multiple forms of Empire beyond the borders of the US. Only through this multidimensional transnational praxis can we begin to see the underlying mechanisms that allow BLM activists from Minneapolis to Seattle to adopt Hong Kong protesters’ strategies against the police. 8 These possibilities for alliance among “transnationally Asian” activists include protesters in Hong Kong and the US using umbrellas and tennis rackets to protect themselves from tear gas, the joint coalition between Taiwanese indigenous organizations and Black Lives Matter Taiwan calling out racism,9 and Singaporeans debating whether to topple their colonial monuments.10 Our current shared struggles against the rapid right-wing turn of global hegemonies do not draw lines between the simple binaries of “East vs. West,” “white vs. Black,” or “authoritarianism vs. democracy,” but underscore the interconnected fights against the militarized police state, neoliberal capitalist order, Han supremacy, and the continued impacts of Euro-American coloniality. The “yellow peril” may have been a useful metaphor describing the shared racialization of the Asian body against white supremacy and US imperialism; the politics of internationalism in the present conditions requires a much more nuanced analysis of interregional geopolitics across the transpacific. The possibility of transnational Asian American solidarity must be situated beyond the framework of “one united race against one empire.” Indeed, the fastgrowing infection and mortality rates of Covid-19 show that the virus cannot be simply contained by national borders, and our racial critique must also be extended transnationally. When a disease is racialized, it not only exposes the racial inequalities built in the global public health infrastructures but also how mechanisms of national security require the domination of subjects who are deemed to be “outsiders.” Rather than falling into a nationalistic blame game based on the Cold War logic—choosing sides between one empire (the US) and another (China)—the pandemic requires us to engage in the racial justice and antinativist struggles in our different localities as well as hold one another’s movements accountable to an internationalist vision of collective survival.

### Baudrillard

#### Baudrillard’s analysis of simulation is Orientalist – creates hierarchal structure that reproduces violence

Almond 7 (Ian, literary scholar and writer, Professor of World Literature at Georgetown University, Published in 2007 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, “THE NEW ORIENTALISTS: Postmodern representations of Islam from Foucault to Baudrillard”) RR Jr

The passage is remarkable for a number of points. First of all, we in the West are hampered by truth. Here Baudrillard, bringing in both Nietzsche and Derrida, seems to link the history of mimesis, of truth and representation, in the West with a certain naïveté. This naïveté, it seems, is ultimately logocentric – the delusion of correspondence theory, still nurtured by modernity, that an image must necessarily correspond to ‘something’ on the other side of it. Arabs (and, oddly enough, Romanians – not for the first time does the Islamic East and the Soviet/Orthodox East become united in common opposition to Protestant capitalism) possess a cynicism which enables them to see truth as purely functional, rather than representational. Of course, the unpleasant implication of the passage is that lies are second-nature to the Arab mind – unhampered 170 | Islam, ‘theory’ and Europe by the burden of sincerity, enlightened as to the real nature of ‘unconditional simulacra’, the irrelevance of the signifier to the signified, the Arab sees no distinction between truth and lies, between fact and fiction, between the genuine and the fake. Although this idea is reminiscent of a common Western conviction of nihilism in the Oriental mind – the secret maxim of Nietzsche’s Assassins (‘Nothing is true. Everything is Allowed’) – Baudrillard provides a surprisingly original justification for this cliché by an appeal to the iconoclast/Islamic prohibition of the image, a historical reference he has already made use of elsewhere (see Baudrillard’s belief that the Iconoclast’s ‘rage to destroy images arose precisely because they sensed this omnipotence of simulacra’).14 Because Muslims and iconoclasts already believe images to be haram or unclean, they have no moral reservations about misusing them in order to obtain what they desire. Hence the West’s naïveté which rises from its idolatry of the image, its over-sanctification of a non-existent truth, its deluded belief in the image’s divine referent. Baudrillard’s Arabs, the passage suggests, manipulate images with greater dexterity than their Western counterparts because they know them to be nothing more than idols, false gods, empty signs. For all its Islamic stereotypes and Oriental clichés, the most positive gesture towards Islam in Baudrillard’s text lies in his straightforward recognition of the ‘Enlightenment Fundamentalist’ (p. 80), an acknowledgement which, while omitting to exempt Islam from the charge of fundamentalism, sees standard ‘rational’ objections to it as groundless, dogmatic and equally dangerous: ‘We do not practise hard, fundamentalist traditionalism, we practise soft, subtle and shameful democratic traditionalism by consensus. However, consensual traditionalism (that of the Enlightenment, the Rights of Man, the Left in power, the repentant intellectual and sentimental humanism) is every bit as fierce as that of any tribal religion or primitive society’ (p. 79). If Islam is an honest, open, unashamed fundamentalism, the beliefs one could almost redefine here as ‘Western traditionalism’ are more hypocritical, forever pretending to be something they are not, forever claiming their opposites (superstition, religion, tribalism) to be radically different from themselves. This denial of the Enlightenment’s universal exclusiveness and moral/ontological superiority over the superstitions and tribalisms it tries to denounce is a gesture we have seen in all the thinkers examined in this book – an unconscious sympathy with Islam as an unjustly defamed primitivism, an impatience with modernity’s self-denial and 200-year-old ignorance of what it really is.

### Fem

#### Modern feminist movements follow the trend of western othering and constantly exclude “The Orient” making the patriarchy inevitable – the alt is a prerequisite to their method – otherwise they solidify hegemonic discourses that continue to oppress all women, “Other” or not

Bahramitash 10[(Roksana Bahramitash, October 22 2010, The War on Terror, Feminist Orientalism and Orientalist Feminism: Case Studies of Two North American Bestsellers, page 226-227)**//BRownRice**](https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1080/10669920500135512)

In the post-colonial world, the rise of feminism as a social movement in the Western world has improved the status of women in Australia, Europe, and North America, and many gains have been earned in employment and the legal domain. However, these changes tend to benefit mainly white middle-class women. In North America, for example, non-whites, immigrants, and the indigenous Indians continue to suffer from poverty and discrimination, and their women remain at the bottom of society. These realities tend to be absent from the analysis of white middle-class feminists who dominate the mainstream discourses on the issue of gender. This situation is especially true with respect to discussions of Third World women. Increasingly, white-middle class feminism, or liberal feminism, has become embedded as part of hegemony. Since Margaret Mead’s Sex and Temperament was published in 1926, comparing Western women and their relationship to their men with that of women in ‘primitive’ societies has become common, especially in the United States. Nader argues that the comparison has been more implicit than explicit but the comparison always assumes the experience of women in Western countries as the self and that of women in the Third World as the Other. As Said points out, Orientalism is a discourse that Orientalizes the Orient for the purpose of Occidental consumption.19 Mohanty argues that liberal feminism produces colonial knowledge systems when referring to the ‘thirdworld,’ which is comprised of a monolithic category.20 It is through the discourse that creates the Third World woman that the First World is brought out as privileged and singular. But the West is dominated as much by patriarchy in ideology and government as is the East. The dominant ideology is preserved in the West by avoiding any criticism of the way immigrant, non-white, and economically disadvantaged women are treated; their lack of status vis-a`-vis the sources of power and their lack of access to economic resources strengthens the hegemony. This ‘ignorance’ is at the heart of the problem with liberal feminist analysis, and in many respects it is a continuation of the imperial era.21 According to Trinh and Mohanty, in their critique of liberal feminist imperialism, ‘feminist opportunists seem to speak to the third world through a shared vocabulary which insists: They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.’22 Women of color and other feminists have been criticizing liberal feminism for more than a decade, and we now have a large body of literature about the problems of Oriental feminism.23 The growing critique of Orientalist feminism has been prompted by its alarming impact and its popular appeal in North America. Orientalist feminism is popularized through novels and films, and it has become a ‘boom industry’ that has created huge problems for Muslims. ‘True’ accounts, such as the book and movie Not without My Daughter, helped to incite racist, anti-Muslim and anti-Iranian feelings across Europe and North America;24 in the aftermath of 11 September, this genre has gathered a new momentum. During the colonial period, the colonizers believed they were bringing civilization to the Orient. Now President Bush wants to bring democracy to the same region, and with the same methods of the past: war and occupation. Of course, Bush also wants to protect civilization from barbaric terrorists, so there is a war on terror in tandem with a drive to export democracy. And what better way to earn the necessary public support for these colonial campaigns than by going back to the proven colonial strategy of focusing on the Muslim world’s treatment of women? The most effective propagandists for this effort, however, are not government employees but rather ‘independent’, self-proclaimed feminists whose personal experiences with the situation of women under Islam impart an aura of authenticity to their portrayals of the primitive and misogynist nature of the religion. It is in this sense that we need to examine the books by Brooks and Nafisi, both of which have reached large audiences.

### PoMo/Foucault

#### Postmodern and Foucauldian depictions of an dominant and evil West repressing a passive and weak East only furthers Eurofetishism and establishing a perpetual Otherization of the Eastern countries.

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https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203145494-11/orientalism-poverty-theory-three-decades-john-hobson; accessed 7-17-2022; AH]

These problems of hyper-elitism, hyper-structuralism and Eurocentrism/ **Eurofetishism** are also found in much of postmodern theory, the effect of which is to write out of the script of world politics the contributions of subaltern and non-Western agents.6 Here, the tendency is to exaggerate the power of the West to contain and repress the East, with the latter all too often appearing as a mere passive object of the former. And it is of course deeply ironic that postmodernists such as Baudrillard, Lyotard, Mouffe, Deleuze and Foucault have tended to reify the West as a self-contained entity while failing to recognize the interactive relationship between East and West, precisely because Said’s conception of Orientalism/Eurocentrism rests on the Self/Other identity-formation process that Foucault first emphasized. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Said later criticized Foucault for ignoring the role of Eastern resistance in the making of global politics (Said 1994: 29–30, 335–6). Accordingly, Thompson’s critique of Althusserianism can be applied to much of postmodernism and Gramscianism insofar as they not infrequently constitute a ‘structuralism of stasis’ (Thompson 1995: 6), thereby returning us to the problem of Eurofetishism once more. A recent thrust of CIRT has seen the emergence of an everyday life approach, which draws much of its inspiration from Michel Foucault’s (1980) concept of governmentality, as well as from the Marxist scholar Henri Lefebvre (1976). Three key critical IR theorists of note here are Paul Langley (2008), Matt Davies (2005) and Matthew Paterson (2007). As I have argued in detail elsewhere, this approach focuses on a ‘logic of discipline’ (Hobson and Seabrooke 2009). Here, the aim is to reveal how structures of power discipline, and are translated into, the practices of everyday life in order to denaturalize that which appears as natural and as ‘common-sense’. Thus Langley, for example, shows how the transformation of pensions from ‘defined benefits’ to ‘defined contributions’ has transformed the practices of everyday life. In this case, while the individual perceives himself to be a ‘free investing subject’ who engages in financial self-discipline in order to accumulate long-term savings for his future pension, such a predisposition internalizes the repressive neoliberal politics and the idiom of the ‘ownership society’ that was fi rst proclaimed by Margaret Thatcher. Similarly, Matthew Paterson (2007) critically interrogates the idea of the car as enhancing individual autonomy, arguing that the expansion of the carowning public leads not to greater freedom but to greater environmental damage and ultimately to exacerbated levels of global injustice. My problem is not with what has been done – for these approaches undoubtedly produce all manner of excellent insights – but with that which has not been considered. Such approaches take the initial fi rst step of critique but do not fully follow through by revealing modes of subaltern agency in the making, not only of everyday life but also of the West and of world politics. The bigger point here is that much of CIRT’s critical modus operandi is to reveal structures of power, withthis being seen as an inherently emancipatory (intellectual) praxis. In his interview in this volume, Robert Cox echoes this tendency when he argues that critical theory’s prime purpose is to critique existing power structures in order to open up an emancipatory space (this volume, 20). My purpose is by no means to undermine the importance of this move but rather to argue that we need to go one step further and follow through on this by considering how subaltern and everyday actors exercise agency in the making of their own lives, as well as those of others around and beyond them. For it seems to me that failure to do so leads back into the hyper-elitist, hyper-structuralist and Eurofetishist traps of rendering subaltern and Eastern agents, in the phraseology of Thompson, as but ‘mere träger or vectors [ie., passive victims] of ulterior structural determinations’ (Thompson 1995: 2–3). The route out of this cul de sac, then, requires revealing the bottom-up Eastern agential practices that also shape the West and world politics.

## Impact

### Framing

#### **Utilitarianism is trapped in self-referential ethics – justifies white supremacy**

Velasquez et al 12 [Manuel Velasquez, Claire Andre Thomas Shanks Michael J. Meyer, Charles J. Dirksen Professor of Management at Santa Clara University , Applied Ethics Associate Director at Santa Clara University , Senior Associate Dean of Arts and Sciences at Santa Clara University, Professor of Philosophy at Santa Clara University , <http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/decision/calculating.html>, 2012]

While utilitarianism is currently a very popular ethical theory, there are some difficulties in relying on it as a sole method for moral decision-making. First, the utilitarian calculation requires that we assign values to the benefits and harms resulting from our actions and compare them with the benefits and harms that might result from other actions. But it's often difficult, if not impossible, to measure and compare the values of certain benefits and costs. How do we go about assigning a value to life or to art? And how do we go about comparing the value of money with, for example, the value of life, the value of time, or the value of human dignity? Moreover, can we ever be really certain about all of the consequences of our actions? Our ability to measure and to predict the benefits and harms resulting from a course of action or a moral rule is dubious, to say the least. Perhaps the greatest difficulty with utilitarianism is that it fails to take into account considerations of justice. We can imagine instances where a certain course of action would produce great benefits for society, but they would be clearly unjust. During the apartheid regime in South Africa in the last century, South African whites, for example, sometimes claimed that all South Africans—including blacks—were better off under white rule. These whites claimed that in those African nations that have traded a whites-only government for a black or mixed one, social conditions have rapidly deteriorated. Civil wars, economic decline, famine, and unrest, they predicted, will be the result of allowing the black majority of South Africa to run the government. If such a prediction were true—and the end of apartheid has shown that the prediction was false—then the white government of South Africa would have been morally justified by utilitarianism, in spite of its injustice. If our moral decisions are to take into account considerations of justice, then apparently utilitarianism cannot be the sole principle guiding our decisions. It can, however, play a role in these decisions. The principle of utilitarianism invites us to consider the immediate and the less immediate consequences of our actions. Given its insistence on summing the benefits and harms of all people, utilitarianism asks us to look beyond self-interest to consider impartially the interests of all persons affected by our actions. As John Stuart Mill once wrote: The happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not...(one's) own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In an era today that some have characterized as "the age of self-interest," utilitarianism is a powerful reminder that morality calls us to look beyond the self to the good of all.

#### Err on the side of probability to check psychological bias toward long improbable internal link chains

Yudkowsky 8 – cofounder of Machine Intelligence Research Institute [Eliezer, research fellow at MIRI, “Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgment of Global Risks,” Machine Intelligence Research Institute, pp. 7-8, 2008, <https://intelligence.org/files/CognitiveBiases.pdf>, Accessed 6/29/15]

The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of “A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983” or “A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983.” The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman 1983). In Johnson et al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively. According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible. People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats—such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (2008) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against “movie-plot scenarios” of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster (Schneier 2005). Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: “X is not an existential risk and you don’t need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E”; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. “We don’t need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely.” Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios. More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). That is, people tend to overestimate the probability that, e.g., seven event+s of 90% probability will all occur. Conversely, people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures 2 survive after 4 years (Knaup 2005). Dawes (1988, 133) observes: “In their summations lawyers avoid arguing from disjunctions (‘either this or that or the other could have occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusion’) in favor of conjunctions. Rationally, of course, disjunctions are much more probable than are conjunctions.” The scenario of humanity going extinct in the next century is a disjunctive event. It could happen as a result of any of the existential risks we already know about—or some other cause which none of us foresaw. Yet for a futurist, disjunctions make for an awkward and unpoetic-sounding prophecy.

#### The world has already ended for people of color—a death culture focused on extinction masks the oppression and exploitation of white supremacy

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In April, 1979, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency released a report on the effects of nuclear war that concludes that, in a general nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, 25 to 100 million people would be killed. This is approximately the same number of African people who died between 1492 and 1890 as a result of the African slave trade to the New World. The same federal report also comments on the destruction of urban housing that would cause massive shortages after a nuclear war, as well as on the crops that would be lost, causing massive food shortages. Of course, for people of color the world over, starvation is already a common problem, when, for example, a nation’s crops are grown for export rather than to feed its own people. And the housing of people of color throughout the world’s urban areas is already blighted and inhumane: families live in shacks, shanty towns, or on the streets; even in the urban areas of North America, the poor may live without heat or running water. For people of color, the world as we knew it ended centuries ago. Our world, with its own languages, customs and ways, ended. And we are only now beginning to see with increasing clarity that our task is to reclaim that world, struggle for it, and rebuild it in our own image. The “death culture” we live in has convinced many to be more concerned with death than with life, more willing to demonstrate for “survival at any cost” than to struggle for liberty and peace with dignity. Nuclear disarmament becomes a safe issue when it is not linked to the daily and historic issues of racism, to the ways in which people of color continue to be murdered. Acts of war, nuclear holocausts, and genocide have already been declared on our jobs, our housing, our schools, our families, and our lands. As women of color, we are warriors, not pacifists. We must fight as a people on all fronts, or we will continue to die as a people. We have fought in people’s wars in China, in Cuba, in Guinea-Bissau, and in such struggles as the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and in countless daily encounters with landlords, welfare departments, and schools. These struggles are not abstractions, but the only means by which we have gained the ability to eat and to provide for the future of our people. We wonder who will lead the battle for nuclear disarmament with the vigor and clarity that women of color have learned from participating in other struggles. Who will make the political links among racism, sexism, imperialism, cultural integrity, and nuclear arsenals and housing? Who will stand up?

### Undesirable Brownness

#### American Orientalism has become a double-edged sword—racialization has created “undesirable brownness” and “desirable brownness”—those who are undesirable have become “the terrorist,” subjugated by the violence of surveillance, while those who are “desirable” have become an image of America’s model minority and the exotic “East”

**Bald 2015** --- Associate Professor of Writing and Digital Media At MIT. (Vivek, “American Orientalism”, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/american-orientalism)//AN

One day in early October 2001, three weeks after the Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, Ansar Mahmood was out delivering pizzas in the town where he lived and worked in the Hudson River Valley, north of New York City. Mahmood was a green-card-holding immigrant from Pakistan. He had recently written to his sister back home about how beautiful the valley was, and he wanted to send her a picture. That day, as the sun began to set, he pulled over at a scenic spot and asked two men who were nearby to take a picture of him against the backdrop of the serene river and colorful fall foliage. In an interview with author and activist Irum Shiekh, Mahmood remembered receiving a call from his boss soon afterward; police were at the pizzeria and wanted to speak to him. Unknown to Mahmood, the area where he had earlier taken a photo was close to a water treatment plant. Someone had called the police to report that a suspicious-looking man had been there, taking photos of the plant. Mahmood would spend most of the next three and a half years incarcerated in detention centers with other South Asian and Muslim men, and in and out of courts fighting for his release. While authorities found no evidence to support terrorism charges against Mahmood, they prosecuted him for helping two friends from Pakistan, who—again, unknown to him—had stayed in the United States after their visas expired. Ansar Mahmood was one of countless Sikh, Muslim, and “Muslim-looking” immigrants and citizens who bore the weight of the backlash that unfolded across the United States following the 9/11 attacks. In schools, Muslim and South Asian American children and youth were harassed and bullied. The FBI and local police agencies put an unknown number of Muslim Americans under surveillance, monitoring email and phone communications and social media activity, and infiltrated Muslim communities and places of worship. Thousands of men and women who were deemed “suspicious” by authorities or citizens or who were found to have minor immigration infractions were arrested, detained, and deported. Others, such as Balbir Singh Sodhi, Waqar Hasan, Vasudev Patel, and Sukhvir Singh were murdered by self-styled “patriots” in the gas stations or convenience stores where they worked. In the American media, images of Muslim terrorists—including, increasingly, men and women from Pakistan—multiplied: in Hollywood films, on television, on the news, in popular video games, and in the rhetoric of anti-Muslim commentators and politicians. In March 2004, as Ansar Mahmood sat in a federal penitentiary in upstate New York awaiting “deportation for life” back to Pakistan, Newsweek published an article entitled “American Masala.” The piece was prompted by the arrival of Andrew Lloyd Webber’s lavish, Bollywood-inspired musical Bombay Dreams on Broadway. Newsweek declared that “[t]he timing couldn’t be better,” asserting that the musical, “which tells the story of a young man from the slums who rises to film stardom,” was “an apt metaphor for the growing visibility of a new generation of South Asians in the United States . . . who are making their mark everywhere from Hollywood to Wall Street.” The article cited South Asian American bankers, politicians, CEOs and entertainment executives, alongside authors, actors, and film directors. It pointed to the high profile of South Asians in Silicon Valley and the most elite U.S. colleges and universities, and noted that the median income of an Indian American family was 65 percent above the national average. While briefly acknowledging that this did not tell the entire South Asian American story, the article was upbeat as it pointed to “chai at Starbucks,” Punjabi bhangra music on HBO’s The Sopranos, South Asian fashions “at Barney’s in Beverley Hills,” and “yoga studios on every corner.” A week later, Time Out New York published a first-of-its-kind South Asian-themed special issue, also prompted by the opening of Bombay Dreams. Time Out presented a larger and more varied group of South Asian American musicians, artists, and writers than Newsweek and explicitly mentioned the post–9/11 backlash that some members of the community were experiencing. Still, the glitter and excitement of Bollywood seemed to overwhelm the issue’s portrait of “South Asian New York.” The colorful cover of Time Out featured Bombay Dreams’ two female leads in bouffant hairdos, bindis, and flapper-style mini dresses next to the bold heading: “Spice Girls.” The contrast was stark. One group of South Asians had become objects of fear and derision and targets of immigration enforcement and extra-legal violence. Another group of South Asians was being heralded for their social, economic, and cultural contributions to the United States. The aftermath of 9/11 had brought into relief a deep set of divisions within the South Asian American community. In some ways, these years called into question the very utility of “South Asian” as an identity marking the common experiences of Americans with roots in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka­. These were nations that shared colonial histories as different parts of British India and Ceylon, but they were now divided by military, religious, and ethnic conflicts on the subcontinent, and their diasporic communities had significantly different levels of power, income, and influence in the United States. Initially, South Asian Americans of every class, nationality, and religious background seemed to share equally the fears and dangers of the post–9/11 backlash—of government profiling and individual acts of violence. This is a moment historian Vijay Prashad has recently described as “the day our probation ended.” But by 2004, divisions began to emerge—between Indians on one side and Pakistanis and Bangladeshis on the other; Hindus on one side and Muslims and Sikhs on the other; established, middle- and upper-class immigrants on one side and recent, working-class immigrants on the other. These divides occurred in part because some South Asians actively sought to distinguish and distance themselves from others. But at a deeper level, the divisions were the result of U.S. government policies that singled out specific South Asian groups (such as the NSEERS program, which required the registration of male noncitizens from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan), and by the onslaught of media that demonized men with beards and turbans and women with hijabs. By the time Bombay Dreams opened, the complexities that lay beneath the surface of “South Asian” identity were flattened into a powerful binary; South Asian Americans were either model minorities or national threats. But this was not merely a post–9/11 phenomenon. In fact, the division between the feared and the desired, the denigrated and the celebrated, has been a defining feature of South Asian racialization in the United States for over one hundred years. Since the late nineteenth century when travelers and migrants first began arriving in significant numbers from British India, Americans have imagined South Asians simultaneously as exotic and barbaric, as magical and menacing, as beneficial and perilous. And for decades, federal immigration laws and popular culture have worked together to make these distinctions, to distinguish desirable from undesirable South Asians. The negative impact of these distinctions is not shared evenly. Today, such differentiations have their greatest effect on those who are already most vulnerable—most surveilled and policed—in our communities: the poor and the working class, recent and undocumented immigrants, women with dependent immigration status, Muslim and Sikh women and men. In the thirteen years since 9/11, xenophobia, Islamophobia, and acts of anti-South Asian, anti-Sikh, and anti-Muslim violence have remained consistently high, and they show little sign of abating. Given such stakes, it is important that we understand the longer history of denigration and celebration—of phobias and philias—that has defined the experiences of South Asians in the United States. Fear and Exclusion On an early September night in 1907, fifteen hundred white lumber mill workers set off on a rampage against Indian immigrants in the coastal town of Bellingham, Washington. The Indians, also mill workers, were predominantly from Punjab; most were turbaned Sikh men. The rioters saw the Indians as aliens, outsiders, and racial inferiors who were taking away American jobs, jobs that should go to white men. As they made their way across Bellingham, the mob, according to historian Joan Jensen, swept down to the waterfront . . . where many of the Indians lived. Battering down the doors, the mob . . . pocketed money and jewelry, and dragged Indians from their beds . . . Those who did not move fast enough were beaten . . . Fifty men stormed the surrounding mills, pulled Indians from their bunks and began to burn the bunkhouses. By the end of the night, two hundred Indian men, beaten and bruised, had been rounded up like cattle into Bellingham’s City Hall. Over the next days, most of the Indians chose to leave Bellingham, and the United States, in search of work in British Columbia. Local white residents cheered as their train rolled out of the station. It is not well known among Americans today that immigrants from British colonial “India”—that is, from present-day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh—were entering the United States alongside the Irish, Italians, Greeks, Germans, Poles, Russians, and other Europeans during the “golden age” of immigration between the 1890s and 1920s. It is also not well known that, though their numbers were small, these Indian or “Hindu” migrants (“Hindu” being a racial term applied to all South Asians) figured prominently in the public outcry for restrictions on immigration. Members and supporters of the West Coast-based Asiatic Exclusion League were the first to promote the idea that a nefarious horde of “Hindus” was about to swamp the United States. But their discourse became national in scope, and came to include claims that thousands of Indian and Chinese seamen (the former, primarily Muslims from present-day Bangladesh) were jumping ship, smuggling drugs, and engaging in human trafficking through northeastern ports. In the opening decades of the twentieth century, in newspapers, public speeches, and congressional testimony, Indian immigrants were portrayed as a looming threat to the United States. Alongside other Asian laborers, Indians were viewed in much the same way that immigrants from Mexico, Central America, Haiti, and elsewhere south of the U.S. border have been in recent years. At the same time, as historian Seema Sohi has argued, Indians occupied a unique place in the broader anti-Asian rhetoric of the early twentieth century. Because Indian nationalist exiles had been using what they believed to be the safety of U.S. soil to plan and coordinate anti-colonial activities against the British, they became a focus of the state’s broad efforts to quell political radicalism in the 1910s. While West Coast labor leaders warned of a “Tide of Turbans” sweeping in from the Pacific to take away American workers’ jobs, congressional advocates for exclusion warned that Indian immigrants were promoting subversion, Bolshevism, and anarchism, and were a threat to national security. In 1917 British, Canadian, and U.S. officials collaborated to round up dozens of Indian men for conspiring to smuggle arms through the United States to overthrow British rule on the subcontinent. Their San Francisco trial was not only front-page news across the country but became the most expensive federal trial up to that point in American history. The anti-Indian agitation that began with the 1907 Bellingham riots came to a kind of culmination by 1917. In early February—a month before the first arrests in the “Hindu-German Conspiracy” case—Congress passed a sweeping Immigration Act. The Act capped off thirty-five years of increasingly restrictive anti-Asian immigration laws that had begun with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. The 1917 law’s key provision broadened the scope of exclusion; it prohibited all labor immigration from what it defined as the “Asiatic Barred Zone,” a huge swath of territory that stretched from Afghanistan and the eastern Arabian peninsula in the West to China and the Southeast Asian archipelago in the East. While immigration had become more and more difficult for Indian workers in preceding years, crossing the U.S. border was now a criminal act. Indians who were already in the country faced other restrictions: laws forbidding them from owning property and, in 1923, a Supreme Court decision that rendered them ineligible from becoming U.S. citizens. The early twentieth century is often trumpeted as the moment in which the United States truly became a “nation of immigrants.” For the vast majority of people from what is now known as South Asia, it was the moment in which the United States became a nation of immigrant exclusion. “Incredible India” What is striking about the events described above is that they unfolded amid what was also the first widespread American fashion for goods, entertainment, and spirituality from India and “the Orient.” In recent years, scholars such as Kristin Hoganson, Holly Edwards, and John K.W. Tchen have given us a rich portrait of this era. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Orientalist ideas about a mysterious, mystical, and alluring East—ideas for the most part rooted in the art, literature, and material spoils of European colonial encounters—had traveled across the Atlantic, circulating among the United States’ political, economic, and cultural elites. Following their counterparts in London and Paris, the upper classes of New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Chicago outfitted their homes with porcelain from China and Japan; textiles, embroidery, and brass work from India; and rugs from Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Then, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, “Oriental goods” and the ideas, images, and desires they evoked, spread across class lines and to every corner of the country. The United States was rapidly transforming into a nation of factories and department stores, of consumerism and entertainment spectacles. Working- and middle-class Americans not only had more disposable income than ever before, but, in the words of cultural historian William Leach, they were now surrounded by “a new powerful universe of consumer enticements.” There was something about Western fantasies of India and “the East” that thrived in this new mass consumer culture. American marketers could use ideas and images of “India”—largely blurred together with the Middle East and North Africa—to make their goods and entertainments more alluring. Consuming goods, reading stories, watching performances, and witnessing “natives” from “the East” gave ordinary Americans access to something that was simultaneously exotic and sophisticated. Silks, perfumes, rugs, and hookahs, along with yoga, mystic philosophies, and tales of far off colonies, deserts, and jungles, all connected Americans to a world they imagined as adventurous, magical, spiritual, free from constraints, and ripe with possibility for refashioning themselves and their relation to the world. At the same time, it cannot have been a coincidence that Americans were drawn to the British colonial experience in India at this very moment—when, after completing its colonial expansion across North America and taking control of new territories in the Spanish American War, the United States had become a rising global power in its own right. There was, in other words, something else significant about the idea of “India.” Britain’s rule over India—and all the goods, images, and “knowledge” it implied—symbolized imperial power itself. For Americans, to own the goods and consume the stories associated with British colonial rule on the subcontinent gave them a sense of their own increasing imperial knowledge and power. At the turn of the twentieth century, “India” seemed to be everywhere in U.S. consumer culture. One of the earliest Orientalist fantasy images to enter into American mass culture was that of a maharajah, sultan, or amir smoking a hookah, surrounded by dancing harem girls. Earlier in the nineteenth century, this image had been the subject of British, French, and American Orientalist paintings. By the turn of the twentieth century, scenes of Oriental harems and palaces turned up in advertisements, on picture postcards, and on the covers of Tin Pan Alley sheet music. The sexualized figure of the Eastern dancing girl appeared in spaces of high and low culture alike. The dancer “Little Egypt” became a national sensation after performing at the Chicago World’s Fair. Isadora Duncan performed her adaptation of the Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam barefoot and in flowing robes for the elite women of Newport, Rhode Island. Ruth St. Denis danced in Indian “nautch” style, in a sari and gold jewelry on a Broadway stage, while “Oriental dancers” of various backgrounds performed in the nation’s brothels and burlesques. In the meantime, in what Edwards has described as “the most sustained campaign to capitalize on oriental motifs,” American tobacco companies made the imagery of harems, hookahs, and palaces central to the marketing of a wide range of their products: Mecca, Camel, Fatima, Omar, and Mogul cigarettes, Hindoo pipe tobacco, Royal Bengal cigars. One 1915 advertisement for Mogul Cigarettes showed the silhouette of a cigarette-smoking, turbaned Mughal emperor, reposing on a pillow under the Saracen arches of his palace as he watches a curvaceous dancing girl; nearby, two musicians play, an attendant waves a fan above him, a servant approaches with a steaming teapot (drawn to evoke Aladdin’s magic lamp), and a male guard stands by, wielding a scimitar-shaped sword. The popularity of such imagery among American men suggests a kind of imperial envy; a fantasy in which they could step into the imagined world of the British empire, supplant the maharajahs and amirs of that world, and take possession of their riches as well as their sexually adventurous, compliant young “nautch girls.” The same fantasy world connected American women to a different sexual imaginary. Middle-class white women encountered notions of Oriental princes, palaces, and harems in the rapidly expanding realm of popular fashion and home décor. As elite suffragists challenged political exclusion and the varied confines and restrictions of Victorian womanhood, U.S. women’s magazines and department stores marketed—and middle-class women increasingly bought—the ornate flowing silks and cottons, perfumes and interior furnishings associated with “nautch” dancers, harem “maidens” and their imagined worlds. As Hoganson, Gina Marchetti and others have argued, wearing and displaying Eastern fabrics, jewelry, and decorative items became ways for the American “new woman” to stake a claim to independence, sophistication, and ultimately, a liberated, post-Victorian sexuality. If turn-of-the-century Americans were drawn to the sensuality of the harem, they were equally drawn to the spirituality of yoga and Hindu philosophy. The most prominent emissaries of Hindu thought from this period were the Vedantist Swamis Vivekananda and Abhedananda, whose lectures in the United States were widely covered in the press as they themselves filled public halls from New York to San Francisco. Today the Vedantists are most well-remembered for the following they developed among urban elites, but Vedantism perhaps had its greatest impact in other social realms. In 1898 a local Nebraskan paper that printed one of Abhedananda’s lectures described him as a bearer of ancient occult powers and presented his lecture as a rare revelation of the “secrets” and “marvelous psychic powers” of “Hindu sages.” It was in this vein—as a corpus of ancient Hindu secrets that promised self-improvement, self-empowerment, and occult power—that Vedantism spread widely across the U.S. popular consciousness. This was in no small measure due to the efforts of William Walker Atkinson, a former lawyer from Chicago who founded a mail-order book business, the Yogi Publication Society. Under a series of “Indian” pseudonyms—Yogi Ramacharaka, Swami Panchadasi, Swami Bhakta Vishita—Atkinson wrote and sold an astonishing number of books on “Yogi Science” and “Oriental Occultism.” Atkinson appears to have operated like a one-man production line, taking the books and lectures of the Vedantists, reworking them to appeal to the desires and sensibilities of the American mass market, and then branding them with “East Indian” names for authenticity. In this process, Atkinson often turned Vedantist ideas on their heads, presenting them as principles for achieving the most worldly of goals. In one text, for example, Atkinson (as Ramacharaka) explains a key idea of karma yoga—selfless work toward the betterment of the world—by citing an American “captain of industry” who declared “I cannot help but feeling . . . that the things I do are done for some other people, possibly the race . . . I get no special pleasure from my money, although I feel a keen interest in the game of making it.” Atkinson’s approach provided a blueprint for any number of Americans, up to the New Age and yoga entrepreneurs of the present day, who have sold South Asian philosophical and religious ideas as avenues to individual power and success. In this sense, Atkinson differed little from the American tobacco companies of his era—he too turned notions of an exotic “East” into profit in the West. It was through circuses and exhibitions, however, that fantasies of India appear to have reached the widest audience and reaped the greatest returns. In many ways, “Oriental” empires in the Western imagination—with their lavish displays of wealth and color, their air of the magical and the mystical—were tailor-made for turn-of-the-century American showmen, who sought to draw in audiences and outdo competitors with their offerings of dazzle, wonder, and pageantry. Between the 1890s and 1910s, Indian and “Oriental” themes, stories, and visual tableaux multiplied across the many forms of American mass entertainment, from New Orleans’ Mardi Gras parades, to Coney Island, to Barnum & Bailey’s circuses and the Wild West shows of Buffalo and Pawnee Bill. According to curator and historian Jennifer Lemmer Posey, during this era American circuses began to open each performance by staging a large-scale themed procession. These spectacles often centered on the world’s great empires, and “Oriental” and British colonial themes became some of the most common. Barnum & Bailey staged Oriental India in 1896, The Mahdi, or for the Victoria Cross in 1897, and The Wizard Prince of Arabia, an “Indo-Arabic Spectacle,” in 1914. The poster for the latter was bright and lavish, featuring elephants, camels, musicians, dancing women, and bearded, turbaned men stretching to the horizon. Bold headlines promised audiences “1250 Actors and Actresses, 300 Dancing Girls . . . and 250 Singers in Weird Oriental Choruses.” Audiences in every corner of the United States were drawn to such spectacles; for most Americans, these were probably the most immediate encounters with “India” and “Indians” that they had ever had. Desirable and Undesirable Brownness Between 1904 and 1917, while working-class and expatriate Indians were targeted in acts of xenophobic violence, denounced as economic and political threats and marked for exclusion, white Americans continued to fantasize about exotic “India,” which provided a seemingly endless supply of material for consumption. However, then as now, xenophobia and Indophilia were not simply contradictory attitudes that played out in two separate social spheres—that is, South Asians were not simply denigrated in political debates over immigration restriction while they were simultaneously celebrated in popular culture. Instead, each sphere generated its own set of distinctions between who was desirable and who was not, and each set of distinctions reinforced the other. The anti-Asian immigration laws of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are commonly known as “exclusion acts” and the years that they were in effect as the “exclusion era.” However, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, the 1885 Alien Contract Labor Law, and the 1917 Immigration Act were never straightforward acts of Asian exclusion, nor was the 1965 Hart-Cellar Immigration Act—the law that is credited with ending the exclusion era—an act that fully “opened the door” to Asian immigration. All four of these Acts—in effect and in intent—helped define who within Asian populations was welcome and who was not. In crafting the restrictions of the 1882, 1885, and 1917 Acts, U.S. lawmakers delineated specific categories of Asians who were, in fact, legally permitted to enter the United States, to be educated here, and to work. These “provisos” that were tacked onto the exclusion laws, in different combinations and at different times, permitted entry of: merchants, students, the servants of traveling royalty and foreign government officials, “professional actors, artists, lecturers, or singers,” workers with specialized skills not available in the United States, “government officers, ministers . . . missionaries, lawyers, physicians, chemists, civil engineers, . . . authors,” as well as nurses and “persons belonging to any recognized learned profession.” Although the number of South Asian immigrants entering under these exemptions was small, the so-called exclusion laws introduced a logic that certain South Asians were admissible—or desirable—because of their class, education, and profession. This was ultimately the logic enshrined in the “occupational preferences” provisions of the 1965 Immigration Act; the legislation brought thousands of South Asian doctors, engineers, and other professionals to the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, while keeping working-class migration to a minimum. In mass culture, distinctions between the desirable and undesirable South Asian largely came in the form of specific “positive” and “negative” representations; if the prince or swami was an object of fascination and even admiration, the laborer, servant or “lascar” seaman was an object of ridicule (a heavily accented, solicitous buffoon) or inspired suspicion and fear. These images were plentiful, for example, in turn-of-the-century news stories describing the Muslim ship workers from the subcontinent who were a growing presence in U.S. ports. A 1910 article in the Los Angeles Times was typical; the writer described the ship’s Punjabi engine crew as “both striking and mysterious. They [have] hooked noses and piercing black eyes that seem to stab you to the backbone when they turn to look you over.” In other media, including adventure stories in popular magazines and early silent films, the same maharajahs and amirs whose images were used to sell tobacco were presented as villainous enslavers of white women, while the same Oriental dancing girls who were objects of desire for American men were portrayed as devious and ready to ensnare them. The fact that such racial representations could be slippery, contradictory, and malleable is perhaps unsurprising. But the images of East Indians that circulated in turn-of-the-century mass culture set up another, more significant distinction—not between the (desirable) wise swami and the (undesirable) malicious lascar, but between the (desirable) imaginary Indian and the (undesirable) Indian immigrant. To put it differently: in the realm of culture, Indians were desirable to the extent that they lived up to American expectations of India. The fantasies became the standard up to which real people were held. Dance historian Priya Srinivasan provides a case in point in her account of the first performance by a troupe of actual Indian “nautch” dancers in New York City. Before the troupe arrived in 1880, any number of images of Eastern dancing girls had been produced by Western writers, painters, performers, and advertisers—usually slim, fair-skinned women in sheer, flowing fabrics. When American audiences were faced with the difference between these imagined “Oriental maidens” and real Indian women performing on a New York stage, the Indian women were swiftly denigrated and dismissed. “[A]udiences were shocked by the color of the dancers’ skin,” and disappointed by their “lack of eroticism.” One reviewer described the troupe’s dances as “exceedingly grotesque,” while another asserted that “the order of intellectual development to which they belong is apparently not high.” Acceptability Politics As Srinivasan argues, American Orientalism is too often seen as a “positive” set of ideas about “the East” that, while shallow and stereotypical, does little damage beyond justifying Western appropriation of Eastern “cultures.” White Americans’ embrace of yoga, bindis, belly dancing, and henna “tattoos,” or their celebration of immigrant “success” (praising South Asians for being naturally smart, spiritual, or hard-working) is seen, in other words, as a kind of “benign” racism. But Orientalism is a double-edged set of ideas, standards, and expectations. In the realms of both immigration law and popular culture, the desired and the denigrated have always been inextricably linked; they are defined in relation to one another, with a line drawn between them. If South Asian Americans cannot prove that we belong on one side of the line, then we fall on the other. Today, “desirable” South Asian Americans are defined in much the same way as they were at the turn of the twentieth century. Those who are most celebrated (in mainstream venues as well as community-based media) look almost identical to those who were singled out for admission to the United States a century ago when the majority was excluded: the “actors, artists, lecturers, singers, lawyers, physicians, civil engineers, authors” who were allowed entry by the “provisos” of the 1917 Asiatic Barred Zone Act. At the same time, South Asians who can provide white Americans with access to the East of their imaginings—the self-help gurus who bestow ancient wisdom, the chefs who reveal the secrets of spice, the performers who give their audiences a taste of the exotic, or the ethnic organizations whose colorful yearly parades add to the multicultural mix of America—are lauded, too. In many ways, today’s “undesirable” South Asians are also defined in terms similar to those of a hundred years ago. Like Ansar Mahmood and the workers of Bellingham, those who bore the brunt of special registrations, FBI raids, detentions, and deportations in the years since 9/11, and those most targeted in acts of xenophobic violence, have been recent working-class immigrants—taxi drivers, convenience store clerks, shop workers, gas station attendants—and those who displayed outward markers of their ethnicity and faith. What we now know as the “Islamophobia industry”—the commentators, politicians, church and white supremacist groups, and the think tanks and policy organizations that produce a constant flow of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant rhetoric—functions much as the Asiatic Exclusion League once did; they trade in the same sorts of fear-mongering and violence. Yet, we live in a different time. The United States no longer receives its notions about South Asia and “the East” second-hand from imperial Britain. The U.S. military is engaged in its own imperial pursuits stretching from Iraq and Yemen to Afghanistan and Pakistan, while record numbers of Americans travel to India and Nepal each year as spiritual and “wellness” tourists. These entanglements supply Americans with a steady stream of images of a simultaneously threatening and exotic twenty-first century “Orient.” At home, the power and resources of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant groups continue to grow, as does the consumption of “Eastern” cultural commodities by average Americans. Meanwhile, South Asian, Arab, and immigrant Muslim Americans now number in the millions in this country, and as wars and other conflicts rage in our countries of origin, we face the fallout on our doorsteps. Since 9/11, in other words, the dividing line between the celebrated and the denigrated has sharpened, and the stakes of being on one side or the other, heightened. But South Asian American history shows us that it is not enough merely to prove that we belong on the “acceptable” side of the dividing line. Such an approach does nothing more than strengthen the racial ideas that have defined and limited us as a group since the early 1900s. If we value justice more than mere assimilation, we must join the growing number of immigrant rights, African American, Sikh, and Muslim American activists and critics, who are no longer focused on moving our communities from unacceptable to acceptable, but are instead challenging the terms of our acceptability.

### Islamophobia

#### Orientalism has a clear relationship with Islamophobia

Beck et al. 17 [Elizabeth Beck is a professor in the School of Social Work at the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies., 4-1-2017, "Undoing Islamophobia: Awareness of Orientalism in Social Work," Taylor & Francis, Journal of Progressive Human Services, Volume 28, 2017 - Issue 2]//AA

The Runnymede Trust (1997) defines Islamophobia as “unfounded hostility towards Muslims, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims.” Because our discussion centers on anti-Arab and anti-Muslim oppression, it is important to note that neither do all Arabs identify as Muslims, nor are the majority of Muslims Arab. Our use of the terms Muslim, Arab, and individuals of Arab descent includes people who claim these identities, as well as those who are marked as such. Singh (2016) uses the term apparently Muslim to explain the ways in which brown skin and other markers are used to categorize and oppress individuals who may be from a variety of backgrounds. We further note that Islamophobia is used to describe a form of racism that lumps together disparate peoples. Orientalism and Orientalist views underlie the production, reproduction, and acceptability of Islamophobia. Orientalism is the mechanism that supports unfounded hostilities toward people holding or perceived as holding Arab and/or Muslim identities, and it is used to describe a form of racism. We use the term in both instances, in much the same way that people use bigotry as both one of the mechanisms that support racism and as a form of racism. We focus on Arab Orientalism, which includes people from countries in the southern end of the Levant and the eastern end of the Maghreb. Like other authors who explore gendered Orientalism, we also include Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran in our discussions. When exploring stereotypical or Orientalist images, we use the signifiers Arab, Muslim, and brown. These signifiers emphasize the conflated nature of racial and religious constructs within Orientalism. We use brown to highlight the ways in which Islam has been racialized by the West. We use the ideas associated with whiteness, for example, “an ideology blinding people to a silent and invisible mainstream benchmark” (Baltra-Ulloa, 2013, p. 94) to explore Orientalism within in the context of hegemony and cultural dominance (e.g., White/Western/Christian/hetero-normative).

#### Orientalism and Islamophobia cause oppression, furthers the War on Terror, and legitimizes violence against women

Beck et al. 17 [Elizabeth Beck is a professor in the School of Social Work at the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies., 4-1-2017, "Undoing Islamophobia: Awareness of Orientalism in Social Work," Taylor & Francis, Journal of Progressive Human Services, Volume 28, 2017 - Issue 2]//AA

Harmful consequences of Orientalism and Islamophobia As is the case for any form of racism, there are transnational and national consequences for oppressed individuals and groups. In order to support a larger framing of Islamophobia, we provide macro examples that comport with social work’s support of social justice and Mukherjee and Chowdhury’s (2014) call for international social work that understands the dynamics of imperialism. A number of Arab, Arab-American, Muslim, queer, cultural, and postcolonial scholars argue that gendered Orientalist visual representations of the Eastern Other have been deployed to further the war on terror (see, for example, Abdulhadi, Alsultany, & Naber, 2011; Abu-Lughod, 2013; Naber, 2012; Stabile & Kumar, 2005). The authors note, for example, how prolific and sensationalized images of repressed women in burqas provided additional liberal support to a controversial war in Afghanistan. For example, in the 18 months following September 11th, there was a six-fold increase in the number of newspaper articles focusing on women in Afghanistan (Stabile & Kumar, 2005), including descriptions of burqas as body bags and trash bags. Abu-Lughod (2013) and Naber (2012) argue that the West’s support of dictatorship, globalization, occupation, war, and drone strikes, all of which are associated with the war on terror, have devastating effects on indigenous populations. However, the above circumstances and events, as Abu Lughod and Naber point out, are glossed over. Thus the dominate vision of horrific events in the Middle East is limited to violence against women, which both absolves the West of its violent acts and keeps attention from the devastating effects of dictatorship, globalization, occupation, war, poverty, and drone strikes. Scholars further discuss the way in which Western interventions delegitimize local and indigenous feminist and governmental responses to violence and oppression. Abu-Lughod (2013) provides an example as she argues that the process of court reform in Pakistan lost momentum and strength when problems, rather than progress, were highlighted in Western media. Kahf (2011) argues that the exaggerated nature of the Pity Committee leads to an exaggerated response in which gender oppression is denied by defenders of Islam. According to Kahf (2011), Orientalism creates the conditions in which authentic conversation cannot materialize, therefore eluding “genuine complex analysis of gender relations in the world of Islam” (p. 121) by its exaggerated description of violence against women. Naber (2012) similarly found, in her research with Arab American youth, that Orientalism makes it very difficult for Arabs in the United States to talk openly about and address sexism and homophobia within their own communities because of fears related to reinforcing Orientalist views. She additionally argues that attributing violence against Arab women by Arab men exclusively to culture erases the role of colonization, imperialism, compulsive heterosexuality, and global support of patriarchy in the lives of Arabs, Arab Americans, and Muslims (Naber, 2012). This narrow discourse can also lend itself to internalized oppression, which is of critical importance to human service workers. A number of Muslim, Arab, and Arab American feminists and LBGTQ scholars and activists discuss the ways in which the West’s defining of the East’s problems takes attention from their own work in the areas of activism, scholarship, and reform. Specifically, when individuals working in these spheres must take time from their agendas to respond to erroneous or exaggerated claims about Islam (Jarmakani, 2010; Naber, 2012). Of interest to social workers in the West is the way in which a hyper-emphasis on gender-based violence in the East diminishes the reality of violence and discrimination in the United States. For example, the 1,000 or so women who are killed under the pretext of “honor” in Pakistan often receive more attention than the 1,500 killed in “crimes of passion” in the United States (Charania, 2014). While the West attributes honor crimes to such factors as the patriarchy of Islam, the attendant subordination of women, and a culture of violence, similar factors are not always equally embraced in the West’s narrative about its own violence against women, despite its known ubiquitous nature.

### Racist

#### Orientalist discourse serves to subjugate “The Other” to endless racialized violence for the sustenance of whiteness

Sharma and Sharma 3(Sanjay Sharma, Brunel University London · Department of Social and Political Sciences PhD, and Ashwani Sharma, White Paranoia: Orientalism in the Age of Empire, September 2003)**//BRownRice**

The affective power of the images, however, is not secured by what they simply wish to signify, but rather, in how they accomplish it. In the Western imagination, they cannot be conceived in any other way than being manufactured. Yet, the boundary between what these photographs denote and connote is seemingly rendered impossible to maintain or grasp. Their imaginary force works by a monstrous transgressive immediacy which threatens to short-circuit the ordered Manichean representational schema of the “West and the Rest. ” Islamic culture, as the absolute Other of the West, has been unleashed —and Islamaphobia rationalized. The original suspicion of racialized Others as an external threat to security and culture of the West materializes into a paranoid reality. The threat has transmuted, however, and it is now as much from within than without: Al-Qaeda really are everywhere, and unstoppable because of their haunting omnipresence. Bush ’s twin declarations of the “war against terrorism ” and the “axis of evil ” not only seek to reassert an imperialist hegemony through an incredulous bifurcation of global political relations, they also express the dread of contagion in the fear of losing control . The Islamicized representations of the West described above are not the hybrid cosmopolitanism envisaged by the political imaginary of a liberal multiculturalism. The identity and superiority of the West has traditionally been discursively produced by Orientalist systems of representation based on maintaining a rigid and absolute difference against its “Other. ” However, Edward Said alludes to an ambivalence in the Western fascination and fear of the Other that lies at the heart of the discourse of Orientalism. If, following Said, the representations of the East (as despotic, barbaric, exotic, sensuous, spiritual . . .) are actually disavowed Western projections on to the Other, what happens when this material, imaginary, and representational boundary appears to breakdown and implode? Our contention is that contemporary Orientalism is figured on a boundary in jeopardy of being unable to maintain its own apparatus of power. This is not to say that Orientalism ’s disciplinary capacity has been diminished. As a matter of fact, the Western multicultural desire for otherness is a motor force to a deterritorializing capitalism in the new globalizing Empire (Hardt and Negri 2000). Nevertheless, as the consumption of otherness accelerates in the fractured global economy of racialized bodies, information, media, fashion, ethnic cuisine, and displaced labor, Orientalism’s ability to regulate and objectify the Other has become increasingly vexatious. Contemporary Orientalism is confronted, infiltrated, and defied by its own abjured structure of exclusion. Considered as a historically specific racializing regime of power–- knowledge fixated on difference, Orientalism has been, par excellence, a cultural racism. Perhaps this accounts for why the relationship between Orientalism and Whiteness (as an exnominated racial category) has been underplayed. In this article, we wish to explore how a contemporary Orientalism, as inscribed in cosmopolitan culture, is intimately tied to the production of a paranoid white subjectivity. The political necessity of “making whiteness strange” in order to divest its power (Dyer 1997) is not, however, the key concern here, as identifying white paranoia does not necessarily undo its agency or violence. Our intention is to interrogate a contemporary politics (pathology) of a self-fashioning Whiteness, whose empty universality as the measure of humanity is unraveling in the age of Empire. Orientalism Now . . . Empire establishes no territorial centre of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentred and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command (Hardt and Negri 2000: xiii). In their sweeping account of the emergence of a new post-imperialist political constitution of world order, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri insist that fixed boundaries and limits are no longer the defining features of an “inclusive” Empire. On the contrary, mobile borders and the multiplicity of difference, labor, and commodities are the drive and desire of Empire. The authors announce that a new operation of power and rule has emerged—a global postmodern sovereignty—which thrives on “differential hierarchies” and “hybrid fragmented subjectivities.” They contrast this with the essentializing power of imperialism, in its will to manage the Other through colonial terror and domination. The “crisis of modernity” has been most acutely expressed in the invariable exigency of a Manichean division between an emergent Europe and its abject Other. That which is excluded and negated gives birth to a positive identity for the European colonizer (Said 1978). Said has cogently argued that the inverted absolute difference of the Other is essential for the possibility and maintenance of a superior Occident. The requisite Other is then not what is merely excluded, but has to be acknowledged at the same time. Hardt and Negri take this up when they highlight that the dialectical recognition of otherness is an “intimate” kind of estrangement for the colonizer. They write: Knowing, seeing, and even touching the colonized is essential, even if this knowledge and contact take place only on the plane of representation . . . This intimacy in no way blurs the division between the two identities in struggle, but only makes more important that the boundaries and purity of identities be policed (Hardt and Negri 2000: 127). It was Frantz Fanon (1986) who clearly demonstrated that the policing of the racial/cultural boundary was a profound site of anxiety for the white European. In reality, its transgression (and violent consequences for the Other) has been the norm rather than the exception. But it is the ineluctable necessity of upholding and sustaining the besieged boundary of absolute difference that produces such dread. Why else, as Homi Bhabha (1994: 77) contends, are “the same old stories of Negro’s animality, the Coolie’s inscrutability . . . told (compulsively) again and afresh . . .”? In their exposition of Empire, Hardt and Negri read postcolonial theory as importantly deconstructing and challenging essentialist racial binaries of modernity. Yet they accuse theorists such as Bhabha and Said as operating with an anachronistic dialectical notion of colonial power that can only seek to displace a binaristic hierarchy, by the postcolonial incantation of hybridity and difference. The failure to fully grasp the new modality of a decentered and deterritorializing global power, results in postcolonial theory marking the shift towards Empire, rather than being able to challenge its extant form of rule. This is not the place to challenge Hardt and Negri’s rather reductive reading of what they characterize as “post-colonial theory.” However, their project compels us to consider how Orientalism operates in the age of Empire. Even though Orientalism’s bifurcating racialized structure (inside/ outside) appears to be at odds with the subsumption of difference in Empire, what unites the discourses of Orientalism and Empire is the interest in (cultural) difference. “Real subsumption,” according to Hardt and Negri, has no “outside” for the expansion of capitalism. It does not exclusively lead to the exclusion or obliteration of difference; rather, it can equivocally produce differential hierarchies and hybrid subjectivities in the incorporation of all forms of life. These authors argue that the racism of Empire is a cultural (or imperial) neo-racism of segregation, which primarily integrates others (differences are ordered and controlled). It is distinguished from the colonial racism of division and hierarchy, which takes place across the racial boundary of Self/Other (differences are excluded and negated). Following Deleuze and Guattari, they contend that cultural racism needs to be conceived as a “strategy of differential inclusion,” as opposed to the absolute exclusion of the Other. White supremacy functions . . . through engaging alterity and then subordinating differences according to degrees of deviance from whiteness. This has nothing to do with the hatred and fear of the strange, unknown Other. It is a hatred born in proximity and elaborated through degrees of difference of the neighbor. . . Subordination is enacted in regimes of everyday practices that are more mobile and flexible but that create racial hierarchies that are nonetheless stable and brutal (Hardt and Negri 2000: 194). While these authors properly maintain that a contemporary racism “rests on the play of differences” instead of a Manichean bio-racial divide, Policar (1990: 100) reminds us that the two formulations “easily flow into each other and so that they cannot be found in a pure state.” The issue is not just one of historical specificity, as the practice of Western racism has been irrevocably imbricated with culture (see Young 1995). To highlight, contra Hardt and Negri, that Orientalist discourses have embodied both colonial and cultural racisms is an obvious but necessary point to make. Arguably, the marking of “cultural” otherness has been the cardinal differentialist racializing operation of Orientalism. Said observed a shift in the regime of colonial power during the nineteenth century which “turned the Orient from an alien into colonial space” (1978: 211). This materialization of power over the “Orient” attempted to penetrate its “cultural, temporal, and geographical distance . . . expressed in metaphors of depth, secrecy and sexual promise . . . the ‘veils of an Eastern bride’ or ‘the inscrutable Orient’...” (Said 1978: 222). The closing down of distance between the West and its Other in the actual encounter with the spaces and bodies of the “Orient” did not result in existing boundaries melting away. Colonial governmentality was onerously preoccupied with maintaining a racial and cultural divide. For the colonizer, the ambivalent coupling between racism and sexualized desire for the Other was undoubtedly the most destabilizing and perverse to police. And the popular colonial tales of Westerners “going native” or insane in exotic foreign lands were thinly disguised warnings for not getting too close to the Other. As Deborah Root notes, the exoticism of the Other has worked: . . . by generating excitement and delirium precisely from the viewer’s ambivalent relationship to difference, qualities that in one context are classified as negative—such as violence—can with the proper distance produce delight, desire, and of course, the edge of danger and ambiguity that supplies an added frisson (1995: 34).

#### **Westerncentric political discourses engage in a process of constant othering, where “The Other” is always depicted as subhuman and subjected to endless violence – turns case**

Garcia 19(Paola Garcia, Sep 22, 2019, "On Orientalism and the Dehumanization of the Other," Inside Arabia, https://insidearabia.com/on-orientalism-and-the-dehumanization-of-the-other/)**//BRownRice**

The dehumanization of the “Other” is at the core of most of humanity’s tragedies. It is responsible for all manner of violence, whether physical, spiritual, or intellectual. Nationalism necessarily places one’s culture as superior to all others, making that which is culturally different inferior and less human, rendering it at worst inert material to be subjugated for one’s benefit and at best a mere source of entertainment. We live in a time plagued by these issues. We are encountering terrifying ideologies and politics that are racist to their core. We are dealing with the resurgence of fascism, neo-Nazism, white supremacism, institutionally endorsed racial, sexual and gender discrimination, walls, apartheids, anti-immigrant laws, and it goes on and on. These catastrophes all stem from “othering,” that is, from thinking that those who are different from us are inferior and threatening by default. Behind the othering lens, there is little room to acknowledge the humanity inherent in every single culture and individual. The Quran fittingly states, “We have . . . made you into nations and tribes, so that you might come to know one another.”[2] Citing scripture carries the risk of being perceived as irrational and unaware of what is appropriate in intellectual discourse. However, if we disregard the source and focus on the idea itself, we will find it extremely pertinent to the discussion. The notion of knowing one another is crucial because it implies a relationship of equals. It assumes the existence of a common denominator between them: humanity. This understanding appears, regrettably, to be lacking in today’s world. In Timothy Mitchell’s excellent book, Colonizing Egypt, we learn that “We” have been attempting to know not each other, but the “Other,” the lesser object of our exploitative designs. This “We” can stand for any individual, discipline, institution or nation that systematically views cultures other than its own as inferior and often, even subhuman, a view which nationalism tends to produce and promote. In the United States, we presently have a president who unapologetically brags about his racist views and boasts about the supposed inferiority of cultures different from his own. This tragically deranged man has fought and continues to fight tooth and nail to have these chauvinistic views implemented as the laws of our land: travel bans for Muslims, a wall to keep “threatening intruders” away, racial slurs turned into political slogans, immigrants in cages, children dying in detention centers, away from their parents, etc. The appalling examples abound. In the Trump era, xenophobia, narcissism, and anger have become normalized and even glorified, seen as an effective means to make our country “great.” In the Trump era, xenophobia, narcissism, and anger have become normalized and even glorified, seen as an effective means to make our country “great.” The situation is heartbreaking, and only by reflecting and fixing our hearts about how each of us sees “others” can we begin to veer from the destructive path we are on. Professor Edward Said 1935 2003 Professor Edward Said (1935-2003) This type of bigotry has its counterpart in the intellectual world. As Edward Said articulately explains in Identity, Authority and Freedom: “If the authority granted our own culture carries with it the authority to perpetuate cultural hostility, then a true academic freedom is very much at risk, having as it were conceded that intellectual discourse must worship at the altar of national identity and thereby denigrate or diminish others.”[3] Said, who had several conflicting identities, including Palestinian, American, and academic, asserted that he found it impossible to identify with the “triumphalism of one identity because the loss and deprivation of the others are so much more urgent.” Similarly, citing Said, Nora Akawi explains that “‘to make the practice of intellectual discourse dependent on conformity to a predetermined political ideology’ or predetermined canon of learning, western or other . . . ‘is to nullify intellect altogether.’”[4] And this is what has happened in much of our learning about “other” cultures, learning which promotes the views that lead to today’s devastating politics. “We” have “triumphed” in defining “our” culture as superior and this gives “us” the right to look down at whatever “we” want, in whatever form “we” want and for whatever purpose “we” deem worthy. This triumph has come at a great loss. The price of excluding all the others is actual poverty of the spirit, allowing us to keep only “dust”, projections, and imaginings that stand in for reality. The price of excluding all the others is actual poverty of the spirit, allowing us to keep only “dust”[5], projections, and imaginings that stand in for reality: “‘Think of it no more!’ wrote Nerval to Théophile Gautier, of the Cairo they had dreamed of describing. That Cairo lies beneath the ashes and dirt, . . . dust-laden and dumb.’ Nothing encountered in those Oriental streets quite matched up to the reality they had seen represented in Paris. Not even the cafés looked genuine. ‘I really wanted to set the scene for you here’, Nerval explained, in an attempt to describe the typical Cairene street, ‘but . . . it is only in Paris that one finds cafés so Oriental.[6]’” The reality for these “travelers” was the French representation of the “Orient.” Anything else, was unacceptable. The Orient itself, in this case, Cairo, appeared to them completely chaotic, incomprehensible, disappointing. The “Orient” they found existed outside of their “world of exhibition,” lacked “genuine” cafes, and was empty of most of what they expected to encounter. The “Orient” Europe had produced was a much better “Orient” than the one inhabited by other (lesser) types of human beings. They desperately wanted foreign countries to mirror the “Orient” they had brought with them. But, to their disillusionment, this foreign, non-European “Orient” would reflect everything but the image embedded in their imagination. This foreign “Orient” seemed to have nothing to do with their manageable, easily representable, homegrown “Orient.” Later, colonialists attempted to force and forge their “Orient” into being, in the European mold of “order” and “progress” that, in their view, should reign globally. The alleged preeminence of western culture and Euro-American supremacism are promoted and exported all over the globe, unconsciously accepted by many everywhere as the truth. Although most cultures have engaged in some form of othering throughout history, in western modernity and post-modernity, othering has been taken to an unprecedented level, with the most atrocious consequences: genocides, apartheids, all forms of colonialism, the destruction of native peoples and cultures, atomic bombs, nuclear weapons, etc. The alleged preeminence of western culture and Euro-American supremacism are promoted and exported all over the globe, unconsciously accepted by many everywhere as the truth. It takes, however, little awareness to realize that these supposedly superior cultures are built, to a lesser or greater degree, primarily on the edifice of an overarching underlying value: pure material progress at the expense of ethics and human values. In other words, the chief value of our time and culture is the worship of material wealth above all else. This “theology of progress” makes us believe that unbounded economic and material prosperity is the ultimate aspiration of human beings, and what will make one “happy.” This “theology of progress” makes us believe that unbounded economic and material prosperity is the ultimate aspiration of human beings, and what will make one “happy.” In reality, it leaves people spiritually bankrupt, mentally and emotionally sick, willing to do pretty much anything, including poison their own people (the food industry/medical industry mafias), for profit. These are values that come directly from our western liberalism and monstrous form of capitalism and which, sadly, most of the world is striving to adopt. It is, therefore, worth approaching the issue of “Orientalism” as just another expression of “Othering,” a toxic and inhumane perspective on the differences that in actuality make our society a vibrant and powerful melting pot. For without the mosaic of races, cultures, languages and heritage, society will wither and die. Diversity is the mother of creativity and expansion, it is to be valued and encouraged. The mark of a great society is its ability to embrace others, cultivate their uniqueness, and mold their contributions into a sacred wholeness. The “others” are Us, the separation is but an illusion.

### R/C of everything!

#### Othering as a process undergirds every conflict – O/W and turns the aff

Powell 14(John A. Powell, November 2014 "The Problem of Othering: Towards Inclusiveness and Belonging," Othering and Belonging, http://www.otheringandbelonging.org/the-problem-of-othering/)**//BRownRice**

The problem of the twenty-first century is the problem of “othering.” In a world beset by seemingly intractable and overwhelming challenges, virtually every global, national, and regional conflict is wrapped within or organized around one or more dimension of group-based difference. Othering undergirds territorial disputes, sectarian violence, military conflict, the spread of disease, hunger and food insecurity, and even climate change.1 In a remarkably candid and wide-ranging recently published interview, US president Barack Obama cited tribalism and atavism as a source of much conflict in the world.2 In his view, many of the stresses of globalization, the “collision of cultures brought on by the Internet and social media,” and “scarcities,” some of which will be exacerbated by climate change and population growth, lead to a “default position” to organize by “tribe—us/them, a hostility toward the unfamiliar or unknown,” and to “push back against those who are different.” To see the extent to which group-based differences shape contemporary global conflicts, consider a few less prominent examples from recent headlines: Violence erupted between the ethnically Burmese Buddhist majority and the Muslim ethnic minority Rohingyas in Myanmar in 2012. Since then, hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas have been driven from their homes and denied full citizenship rights, despite having lived in Myanmar for centuries.3 In June 2015, President Obama called upon Myanmar to end discrimination against the Rohingyas.4 In early April 2016, violence erupted in Nagorno-Karabakh, a predominantly ethnically Armenian enclave in southwestern Azerbaijan, where over sixty people were killed and dozens more remain missing. The Armenian population is Christian in the predominantly Muslim country and favors secession and reuniting with bordering Armenia. In the fall of 2015, the Turkish government ordered a military attack on separatist Kurds in southern Turkey, and subsequently instituted a curfew in Kurdish-majority towns.5 Turkey waged military campaigns against Kurds in Syria and northern Iraq, and is afraid that Kurdish rebels are intent on carving out a Kurd nation-state out of the territory of all three states. Group-based identities are central to each of these conflicts, but in ways that elude simplistic explanations. It is not just religion or ethnicity alone that explains each conflict but often the overlay of multiple identities with specific cultural, geographic, and political histories and grievances that may be rekindled under certain conditions.6 In June 2015, a white supremacist walked into a black church in Charleston, South Carolina, during a prayer meeting and shot and killed nine African Americans congregants, including the pastor.7 The incident prompted deep soul-searching in this former confederate state, which ultimately led to the removal of the historical confederate battle flag from flying atop the state’s capital building upon discovering that the shooter had symbolically wrapped himself in that flag.8 The incident was a painful reminder of how bitterly contested the history of race and the legacy of Civil War and the failed secessionist cause remains. Recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels also prompted soul-searching among publics in Western Europe, regarding the lack of cultural and geographic integration of ethnic and racial immigrant groups (many of whom hail from former European colonies) and the persistence of discrimination.9 As one resident of a French banlieue put it, “You do everything for France, to be accepted, but you feel you’re not welcome.”10 These ethnically identifiable enclaves, a product of urban policy and discrimination as much as housing choice, are a source of alienation and were the site of riots in 2005.11 In an interview shortly after the Paris attacks, in which he refused to use the term “Islamaphobia,” French prime minister Manuel Valls explained that “[i]t’s difficult to construct a single term that captures the variegated expressions of a broad prejudice.”12This article proposes the term “othering” as an answer to Valls’s challenge. “Othering” is a term that not only encompasses the many expressions of prejudice on the basis of group identities, but we argue that it provides a clarifying frame that reveals a set of common processes and conditions that propagate group-based inequality and marginality. Although particular expressions of othering, such as racism or ethnocentrism, are often well recognized and richly studied, this broader phenomenon is inadequately recognized as such. “Othering” is a term that not only encompasses the many expressions of prejudice on the basis of group identities, but we argue that it provides a clarifying frame that reveals a set of common processes and conditions that propagate group-based inequality and marginality. We define “othering” as a set of dynamics, processes, and structures that engender marginality and persistent inequality across any of the full range of human differences based on group identities.13 Dimensions of othering include, but are not limited to, religion, sex, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status (class), disability, sexual orientation, and skin tone. Although the axes of difference that undergird these expressions of othering vary considerably and are deeply contextual, they contain a similar set of underlying dynamics. In this article, we are primarily concerned with group-based othering. Othering and marginality can occur on a group basis or at the individual level. We have all likely experienced the discomfort of being some place or with people where we did not feel that we belong. For many of us, this feeling is transitory and relatively harmless, such as the discomfort of entering into a conversation in which we are not well versed or the embarrassment arising from being dressed inappropriately for a place or occasion. In this article, our focus is expressions of othering that are more enduring and systematically expressed on the basis of group-based identities or membership. “Othering” is a broadly inclusive conceptual framework that captures expressions of prejudice and behaviors such as atavism and tribalism, but it is also a term that points toward deeper processes at work, only some of which are captured by those terms. It is not uncommon, for example, to hear commentators refer to Islamaphobia or ethnocentrism as “racism,” although religion and ethnicity are not racial categories.14 Similarly, antigay and lesbian marriage laws or exclusionary gender norms are expressions of othering, yet those who suffer under them are not defined by ancestry, nationality, religion, or tribe. The fact that so many leaders and writers fumble when describing these expressions of prejudice while grasping for imprecise analogies underscores the lack of a readily accessible term or frame that reflects the full set of intended meanings. “Othering” is a broadly inclusive term, but sharp enough to point toward a deeper set of dynamics, suggesting something fundamental or essential about the nature of group-based exclusion. Similarly, the term “belonging” connotes something fundamental about how groups are positioned within society, as well as how they are perceived and regarded. It reflects an objective position of power and resources as well as the intersubjective nature of group-based identities. The language of Othering and Belonging does more than capture and describe processes and forces that undergird group-based marginalization and inequality. Othering and Belonging is a pithy and accessible framework by which we might more productively discuss and develop a range of inclusive responses to group-based marginalization and inequality. Without purporting to offer comprehensive or exhaustive analysis, this article investigates the forces that contribute to othering and interventions that might mitigate some of the excesses. First, we explore conditions under which processes of othering seem to arise and in which specific group-based identities become socially significant. Second, we begin to illuminate the critical forces that structure othering in the world and by which categorical boundaries and meanings emerge and become institutionally embedded. Finally, we turn toward solutions. We will examine a spectrum of responses to othering and critique many of them as well-intended failures.

#### Orientalism is the root cause of all of their impacts---all modern knowledge is contaminated

Vukovich 11 [Daniel F. Vukovich is currently an Associate Professor at the University of Hong Kong., 11-21-2011, “China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the PRC”, Taylor & Francis, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203145579/china-orientalism-daniel-vukovich]//AA

Occidentalism, or internalized orientalism In Chen Xiaomei's celebrated work, the problematic of orientalism is met by an affirmation of “Occidentalism,” in direct response to Said's charge that to imagine a corresponding Occidentalism is absurd. Said's point - ignored by Chen and others - is not that the Eastern “others” are incapable of “othering” or imagining their colonizers. (This was clear even to the old colonists themselves.) But there simply is no institutionalized discourse and global, organized power/knowledge formation called Occidentalism. We are not likely to see S.O.A.S. morph into S.O.O.A.S. - the School of Oriental and Occidental and African Studies. Nor will we see Qinghua offering courses in Occidental Studies. Said argued that there is an unequal distribution of power - in terms of knowledge as much as capital and realpolitik - between the Occident and the Orient, or the core and its peripheries. He sought, in short, to produce a recognition that colonialism (the historical world system) also has to do with unequal knowledge-production and distribution. Or as Timothy Brennan has put it, the “actual conditions of knowledge” in the world are “nothing like [a] perfect see saw.”42 This point is lost, however, in many critiques - inversions - of orientalism. Thus Edward Graham, writing some years before Chen et al., would claim that orientalism only partly applies to studies of China, because Said's approach “can as logically be taken to Chinese views of the non-Chinese world” (41). Chen expertly analyzes post-Mao poetry and drama and the various imaginings of the “Occident” that Chinese writers and artists, full of cultural capital, deploy against the state. And as Chen aptly notes, the Dengist (and later) state can be seen to have its own, “official” occidentalist complex (now sitting awkwardly beside a neo-Confucian one). We can add that the catch-up mentality -which presupposes material and cultural backwardness - stems not only from the May 4 era but also from the 1980s up to the present; it continues its second life after dying a first death in the confident, radical, and embargoed Maoist years. But it is difficult to see how contemporary Chinese Occidentalism stands as a disproof of Said's argument about the material and worldly phenomenon of orientalism. Do they not confirm the power of orientalism and the history of Western colonialism by showing the fetishistic but real existence of orientalism's indispensible flip-side? Occidentalism is not the equivalent of orientalism, for the reasons of power and institutionalization. It is only notions of “level playing fields” and the “free marketplace of ideas” that can make it seem so. As Said insisted, orientalism is not merely an idea. The production of knowledge is itself a material, institutional, and global affair that is bound up with not only educational institutions, but capitalism and, thus, colonialism and empire. Orientalism and Occidentalism are two halves of a whole that do not add up. In addition to Occidentalism's resurgence there is another development that seemingly calls into question the relevance of orientalism now. This is that it is often ethnically and even mainland-born Chinese intellectuals who are the purveyors of what I have been calling Sinological-orientalism. Examples of work from the former group would have to include Hong Kong scholar Rey Chow's corpus in cultural studies, widely influential in the U.S. But it must be said that her work on mainland China has often been conventionally tendentious vis-à-vis the P.R.C. (demonizing “Maoists’ in China and in American English departments, reproducing Cold War accounts of totalitarianism, and so forth).43 Examples of the more recent group of “representative Chinese” are numerous, but one can certainly index a scholar like Pei Minxin who, like many of the Western experts I examine in Chapter 2, consistently argues along universalist lines for the necessity of a bourgeois civil society for the forward-development of China.44 At any rate, this demographic development marks the passage of time - and progress -from an older, more unambiguously colonial era of globalization and Sinology. But does it call into question the “model” of Said's book? For an overly historicist reading it may appear so. Orientalism is a white man's burden and the dominated do not have permission to narrate. We seem to have moved from this situation where “they must be represented” to one in which they, the Other, are doing it themselves. But this begs a number of questions as to what is being represented, i.e. the actual knowledge that is being produced as well as where it hails from (its genesis, as opposed to origin). There is also the Marxist question about such knowledge production: in whose interest is it conducted? This suggests continuities within Sinological-orientalism: the discourse of lack and China's tortuous path to normalcy, the Cold-War-meets-oriental-despotism dynamic, and so on. Moreover, given the American provenance/dominance of postwar China studies as well as cultural globalization since the early 1980s, Sinological-orientalism represents the triumph of one “Occidental’ educational system as much as anything else. Sinification at the level of skin color only takes one so far. It must also be said that Chen's Occidentalism is overdetermined by the same anti-communist and anti-state agenda as Zhang's. Chinese fetishizations of the Occident are to be valued precisely because they are somehow used against the Party-state, a symbolic subversion of authoritarianism. The logic here is a direct legacy of the Cold War: if a text or figure “dissents” from the regime at hand, it is therefore “good,” of aesthetic value, and certainly worth writing about. Anti-official Occidentalism is subversive and resistant simply because it is anti-Party-state, and the latter is monolithically bad and illegitimate. This is, in short, characteristic area studies discourse and also of a piece with standard 1980s Chinese liberalism. What such occidentalist intellectuals are dissenting from, and in the name of what, are questions that go begging. No justification of this “obviousness” is necessary. The fact that a stridently elitist, liberal text like the documentary series He Shang - Chen's key example of “counter-discursive” Occidentalism - can be filled with the most dubious valorizations of Western colonialism and racist notions about the Chinese peasant mentality, is insignificant. Thus passages like the following from Zhang Gang and Su Xiaokang's script pass unmarked by Chen: In the vast, backwards rural areas, there are common problems in the peasant makeup [suzhi or “quality”] such as a weak spirit of enterprise, a very low ability to accept risk, a deep psychology of dependency and a strong sense of passive acceptance of fate. (Su 169) While such learned statements seek to diagnose the “feudal” mentality of the peasants and the “Chinese national character,” they are nothing but the type of sanctioned discourse that the revolution had to overcome and that has known a new lease on life ever since the great reversal. Outside of the a priori belief that the Communist government is an unmitigated evil whose dissolution is to be desired by all right-thinking liberal democrats, it is hard to understand why this type of anti-peasant Occidental cosmopolitanism is to be valued. But it does make the case for understanding Occidentalism not as a “counter-discourse” but as an internalized orientalism. Or call it both if you like, but hold on to the basic contradiction that the “counter” aspects may be anti-Party but are also thoroughly reactionary. Elite occidentalist liberals may have permission to narrate, but questions about the class and political content of their discourse go begging. So, too, does Occidentalism's genesis and location within the global, uneven production of knowledge.45

### Root Cause – Russia War

#### The Otherization of Russia as an Eastern and irrational actor is the root cause of geopolitical tensions and conflict.

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Edward Said’s seminal study, Orientalism,19 provided an account of how Western cultural identity is shaped, formed and defined through comparison and contrast to an Eastern orient. For Said, the orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality [and] experience.”20 Said’s groundbreaking study showed the West’s ideological suppositions in viewing the orient. Although originally developed from the colonial era, orientalism illustrates how the West defines itself and its view of others. Orientalism is a view based on an “imaginative geography” and can be used to understand how the West portrays the East.21 Orientalism provides a framework to understand cultural constructs and purported differences.22 In this case, the following study looks to the othering of Russia as an Eastern power. Western portrayals of the East have shaped identities and culture, but “crucially, it is not the actual, geographic East and West (wherever located) that is at issue” it is the portrayal of distinctive and opposing cultures.23 Russian imperial expansion in the 19th century, has itself, often been a source of orientalism within the work of Russian geographers, and anthropologists, coming into contact with people in Central Asia.24 However, in contemporary politics, Russia is increasingly described in orientalist terms that helps to otherize Russia as a distinctive culture that differs to a liberal democratic West. The following section argues that it is cultural differences that are seen to be a primary cause of geopolitical tensions. Geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West are commonly understood in cultural terms. This goes beyond an examination of differing national interests, to become an ideological divide between a liberal democratic West and an irrational Russian East. The Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S. was often expressed in ideological terms. Russia was portrayed in the Cold War as an oriental enemy based on godless communism against America’s liberal democracy.25 What is significant about the portrayal of the opposing sides in the Cold War is that cultural explanations were used to explain state behavior. The Soviet Union was seen as an irrational enemy that was more likely to use nuclear weapons.26 The Cold War conflict was also viewed as an “irreconcilable struggle between two fundamentally different value systems.” American culture was celebrated for its embracing of personal freedom, while the Soviets were understood as an oppressive empire.27 Since the end of the Cold War, the West has assumed that tensions would disappear and Russia would become more “Western.” Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Crimea have led to the revival of tensions, but crucially, Russian culture is again seen to be a major cause for conflict. The fall of the Berlin Wall led the West to assume that “as Russia became more prosperous it would become more like other European countries.”28 The post-Cold War era saw an ideological wave of support for a Fukuyama-esque future in which Western style liberal democracy would spread inexorably across the globe. Underpinning these views was an ideological belief in the evolution of progress and a triumphalist understanding of Western modernity.29 Liberal scholars in IR have continued to claim that “there is ultimately one path to modernity.”30 This ideological understanding of politics in evolutionary terms views an American West and a liberal international order as the highest form of modernity. Russia’s own interests and understandings of political order can therefore be dismissed because of “Russian backwardness.”31 The triumphalist post-Cold War mood led liberal scholars of IR to argue that the West and Europe was in a fundamental new era. The EU was celebrated for achieving a Kantian Peace,32 having created a new approach to international politics through acting as a “civilian”33 and “normative” power.34 Conflict and war within Europe was believed to have been all but essentially eradicated. The political order of European security based on international institutions and collaboration was celebrated for creating a Europe “whole, free and at peace.”35 Some scholars even went so far as to claiming Europe had moved into a new historical era through creating “post-Clausewitzian political cultures” that openly questioned “the utility of force.”36 Russia’s own willingness to use force in defence of its national interests has therefore caused disbelief amongst elites within Europe. Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Crimea caught European elites by “surprise”37 and led to criticisms of Western elites being caught “napping.”38 The end of the Cold War created a Western ideology, which believed in a “prolonged sense of inevitability about Russia rejoining the West.”39 Russia’s use of force in defence of its interests led one observer to declare the West is “discovering that Russia’s understanding of events, its discourse, methods and calculus of risk differ from its own.”40 The annexation of Crimea appeared to show that Western triumphalism had misunderstood Russian culture and identity, that the West had simply “got Russia wrong.”41 Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its involvement in the politics of Ukraine has been explained largely through a cultural lens. According to Mark Galeotti, Russia believes that it is fighting a “political” war and “faces an existential cultural” threat from the “West.”42 In trying to understand the Ukrainian crisis, Russia’s use of hybrid warfare is explained as originating from a particular “ideological vision and political ambition”43 and from the “worldview” of Russian elites and society.44 Russia’s actions in Ukraine are also attributed to the way the Russia’s leadership “look at the world.”45 Anatol Lieven argues that overused analogies comparing Russia’s actions to Nazi Germany also imply that Russia’s leadership is a “force of absolute evil, drawing on deeply rooted, malevolent elements of Russian culture.”46 It is the “culture” of Russian society and its elites that is uniquely blamed for “the return of geopolitics” to Europe.47 Analysts have rushed to also explain these tensions as a new “East-West” confrontation48 in which Russia’s non-Western culture has exacerbated the divide between NATO and Russia. This East-West divide continues an orientalist tendency within Western security debates. The idea of a “West at war with an East conceived as radically other is pervasive and longstanding” within political discourse.49 The War on Terror is just one recent example of a long propensity within Western security discourse to fall into an orientalist perspective. But it is during conflict and warfare that an orientalist perspectives frame an “us” versus “them.” Political discussions on the War on Terror often portrayed a “law abiding, Christian and Western civilization” as threatened by an irrational Eastern enemy that was “ever-resistant to modernity.”50 In trying to explain the return of geopolitical competition to Europe, there is an orientalist tendency to see Western states as acting rationally, responding to incentives; while Russian foreign policy is shaped by a resistance to modernity and the Russian culture of its elites, or by a primordial instinct traced to its national character and the weight of its history.51 As the following section explores, Western political discourse toward Russia is often framed through this orientalist lens.

### T/C – US-Russia War

#### The affirmative’s Russo-Orientalist justifications for hostile, anti-Russia military operations guarantee nuclear war and extinction by further entrenching hostilities and divisions between the West and the Russian “Other”.

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The arguments made against Russia are often weak or hypocritical, and U.S. commentators still subscribe to a “**Russo-Orientalism**” that views the country as a mysterious **dangerous Other**. I believe we should be speaking not so much about East and West as about deep psychological phenomena like life and death drives. There are cultures where the death drive is stronger: just think of the Aztecs. Of course, such cultures can possess great aesthetic value and may have their heroic aspects. But the history of the twentieth century provides very strong evidence that this instinct is dominant in Russia as in few other countries. — Igor Pomerantsev Russia is not a country that wants stability. Russia is a country that is interested in chaos. It created chaos in Ukraine. Who are Russia’s friends? It backed Assad! — Anne Applebaum It is a question that the West has habitually pondered ever since the October Revolution of 1917: what to do about Russia? In particular—and to frame the issue in contemporary terms—should the West maintain, or even escalate, its current aggressive posture towards Russia? Or should it be seeking political, economic, and military détente? Elementary moral and logical reasoning would seem to suggest that it choose the latter option. After all, it is **indisputable** that the **West’s adoption of an increasingly hostile attitude** towards the most heavily nuclear-armed state on Earth increases the likelihood of a full-blown **nuclear war** between East and West—a war which, according to a recent Princeton University study, would kill 34 million people within just its first few hours, and which many experts believe would likely result in the **extinction of the human species**. Indeed, in an ominous recent statement, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists remarked upon how the recent increase in tensions has led “governments in the United States, Russia, and other countries [to] appear to consider nuclear weapons more-and-more usable, increasing the risks of their actual use”—which, in turn, is a key reason why their vaunted “Doomsday Clock” is currently set at 100 seconds to midnight, “the **most dangerous situation that humanity has ever faced**.” Nevertheless, polling data suggests that there is significant support among citizens of **Western societies to pursue the escalation option**. A recent Pew poll has indicated that Western Europeans’ attitudes towards Russia are increasingly bleak: citizens of both Western European nuclear powers—the United Kingdom and France—now have less favorable opinions of Russia today than they had in the early 2010s (in the U.K.’s case, significantly less favorable). Even more ominously, a Gallup poll published earlier this month noted that Americans’ image of Russia has hit a “historic low,” with 77% of U.S. citizens having a “very/mostly unfavorable” view of the country, while another poll has found that a third of Americans now identify Russia as the United States’ “chief enemy.” (Incidentally, the feeling is mutual: a recent Russian poll has found that almost half of all Russians regard the U.S. as their greatest enemy.) Though it is, perhaps, tempting to dismiss such results as the product of irrational fears stoked by Western countries’ politicians and media systems, there is, at the very least, some evidence to suggest that some Western citizens are being persuaded to support a more aggressive posture towards Russia on the basis of rational argumentation. One such piece of evidence are the results of a recent debate at the Oxford Union—arguably the world’s most prestigious debating society—in which the motion “This House Believes the West Treats Russia Unfairly” ended up being defeated. But an even better, and more immediately quantifiable, piece of evidence is the results of a “Munk Debate”—a semi-annual series of debates named after its main sponsor, Canadian businessman Peter Munk – which took place in Toronto, Canada, on the 10th of April, 2015. The resolution to be discussed was: “Be it resolved, the West should engage not isolate Russia.” Arguing for the resolution were the Russian-French-American journalist Vladimir Pozner and the late American scholar of Russian studies Stephen F. Cohen; arguing against it were the former Russian chess world champion Garry Kasparov and the historian and journalist Anne Applebaum. Before the evening’s debate, the audience members were polled: 58% said they supported the resolution, while 42% said they were against it. At the end of the debate, the numbers had shifted dramatically: a majority (52%) now claimed to be against the resolution, and only 48% claimed to be in favor of it. In other words, Applebaum and Kasparov had apparently succeeded in persuading (at least) 10% of the audience to change their minds and, in doing so, had emphatically won the debate. Anyone interested in understanding the reasons for the growing Western antagonism towards Russia should be interested in the question: how did Applebaum and Kasparov win? Moreover, were the reasons they gave for “isolating” Russia rational ones? And more specifically, did they clearly and carefully explain how the supposed benefits of adopting a more confrontational approach towards Russia would outweigh the cost of increasing the likelihood of mass nuclear annihilation and potential human extinction? As the reader may determine for themselves at their own leisure, the reasons for Applebaum and Kasparov’s success were, at the very least, not purely due to inherent rationality of their respective arguments. For instance, audience perceptions were almost certainly influenced by the fact that, at one point in the debate, Pozner embarrassingly forgot the dates when several Central and Eastern European countries became members of NATO (he initially claimed that Poland and a “unified Czechoslovakia” joined in 1991, when in fact Poland and Czech Republic joined in 1999, and Slovakia only in 2004), and then, rather bizarrely, claimed that this didn’t matter because he was interested in “facts” rather than “dates”). Moreover, Kasparov’s apparent (and, to my mind, inexplicable) ability to make the audience laugh also likely contributed to his debate team’s eventual triumph—though his overall contribution to his team’s performance is uncertain, given his boorish behavior all evening and the manifest absurdity of some of his arguments, for instance, his suggestion that Ukraine should be provided with nuclear weapons so as to deter a Russian invasion (“Ukraine [used to have] the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world. […] If some of these warheads were aimed at Moscow today, Putin would never have crossed the Ukrainian border.”) Indisputably, however, the main reason for the winning team’s success was the performance of Anne Applebaum. Not only did she prove adept at providing classic debate “zingers” and ad hominem attacks (e.g., claiming, without evidence, that Cohen harbored “repressed nostalgia” for the Soviet regime), but her speeches and responses routinely received the loudest applause of the night. But what actual arguments did Applebaum make? These can, I think, be fairly neatly separated into four distinct categories. (Unless otherwise stated, the following quotes are drawn from a lightly-edited transcript of the debate published as the 2016 book, Should the West Engage Putin’s Russia? The Munk Debates.) Economic — Russia is “one of the most unequal countries in the world” – indeed, according to Applebaum, it is essentially a “feudal empire” in which the “political rulers [are] literally the country’s owners.” Moreover, Russian political and economic elites “badly need to keep the international financial system safe for [their] corrupt money”; in particular, their “ample use of tax havens” is a “disaster for ordinary Russians” as it deprives the Russian government of vital tax revenue. Thus, Applebaum claimed, “we need to get Russian money out of the Western financial system.” Political — Russia uses its vast energy resources and infrastructure to “blackmail and bully its neighbors,” particularly those in Eastern and Central Europe. Furthermore, Russia has “invested heavily in anti-European, anti-transatlantic, and even fascist political movements all across Europe” (e.g., a Russian bank reportedly lent 9 million euros to far-right French Presidential candidate Marine Le Pen during her campaign). Thus, Applebaum concluded, “we need to get Russian money out of European politics.” Media — Russia “has invested massively in an enormous system of disinformation”, including “web sites, ‘fake’ think tanks [and] a vast army of Internet trolls,” which are “designed to create chaos and confusion” in the West. Thus, Applebaum claimed that the West must “work harder to identify Russian lies and get them out of our media.” Military — Russian President Vladimir Putin has tried over the last couple of decades to create in Ukraine “a copycat, colonial version of the political system he invented in Russia.” This, in turn, primarily explains why the Ukrainian “Maidan Revolution” of 2014, and subsequent war with Russia and Russian annexation of Crimea, took place. Thus, Applebaum ominously suggested, the West needs “to make Putin pay a high price for invading a neighbor [i.e. Ukraine] so he doesn’t invade another one.” Presumably, were Applebaum to make the same argument today, she would also cite as supporting evidence: (i) Russian hackers’ alleged interference in the 2016 US presidential election, and (ii) Russia’s military—and subsequent credible allegations of war crimes—on behalf of the Assad government in Syria in late 2015. (Indeed, in more recent articles Applebaum has excoriated Russia on both of these grounds.) In short: Russia is bad. Moreover—at least on the charitable version of this argument—Russia is so bad that we in the West are morally compelled to adopt a more openly confrontational posture towards it, even if this means escalating the risk of nuclear apocalypse and concomitant human extinction. (Interestingly, and somewhat relatedly, Applebaum is someone who appears to be curiously unperturbed by the prospects of nuclear war; indeed, she once even suggested that Western leaders “might occasionally have to drop a mention of NATO’s nuclear weapons into the conversation” with Russian leaders—that is, verbally threaten Russia with the prospect of a nuclear first strike.) Undoubtedly, there are some elements of truth to Applebaum’s argument. After all, Russia is a highly unequal country—by some measures, the world’s most unequal country—in which those with economic and financial power wield a highly disproportionate amount of political influence. It is also a country that suffers enormously from various kinds of corruption, and in which members of the political and economic elite are routinely able to funnel their money out of the country via the Western financial system. Furthermore, it is a country which has invested heavily in media organizations designed to promote its own interests and point of view. And it is also a country that, unquestionably, has violated Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty, both through its military support of pro-Russian proxy forces in the country’s east and by its annexation of Crimea (the latter of which was declared to “have no validity” by the UN General Assembly). Nevertheless, the fact that Applebaum appeals to some **true facts does not mean that her argument is good**. Indeed, upon reflection, it becomes clear that there are at least three significant problems with it. Firstly, there is nothing distinctively Russian about much of the behavior that Applebaum criticizes. Why, specifically, should we as Western citizens attempt to get Russian money or Russian lies out of Western finance or politics—as opposed to money or lies in general? Presumably, Applebaum would respond to this point by claiming that Russian money and lies are particularly nefarious, but that other sources of money and lies are not. Indeed, in a pre-debate interview Applebaum appeared to go even further, and suggested that Russian influence in general—which would include, apparently, cultural influence—is especially pernicious, and should be **eradicated from Western society** (“I think we really need to think about getting Russian influence out of our societies”). But, even putting aside this claim’s apparent **xenophobia** (could the same be said about, e.g., Mexican influence?), Applebaum does not provide any reason to think that “Russian influence” is especially pernicious—at least, compared to (e.g.) Chinese, or Israeli, or Saudi influence—and nor, for that matter, does she explain how one could attempt to eliminate “Russian lies” from Western media in a manner compatible with the “Western value” of freedom of speech. Secondly, if the main goal is to stop Russia from engaging in the above-mentioned behavior, it is, at best, unclear why isolating Russia offers a more effective means of achieving this goal than engaging with it. In particular, if the goal is to, say, stop Russian oligarchs laundering their money through Western banks, it surely stands to reason that this would best be achieved by allowing or even encouraging Russian financial investigators and litigators to work in cooperation with Western ones. After all, money laundering and the use of tax havens are widespread practices among members of the global economic and political elite—indeed, they are, by their very nature, global problems. Isolating one country as a means of solving them would appear to be not only unhelpful, but actively counter-productive in the achievement of this goal. The third and most obvious problem with Applebaum’s argument, however, is the blatant hypocrisy. After all, the country of which Applebaum is a citizen, namely the United States, is also a **highly unequal society** (by some measures, even more unequal than Russia), in which the rich routinely engage in tax evasion and avoidance, often through the use of tax havens; it also uses its energy resources to bully Central and Eastern European nations, for instance by pressuring Europe to buy American as opposed to Russian natural gas; it also funds media outlets that promote its interests and points of view; it also (routinely) **violates the sovereignty** of nation states (either directly or by supporting proxy military forces); and it also routinely **interferes in other countries’ media and electoral processes** (including Russia’s). All of which raises the obvious question—one which remained curiously unasked by Pozner and Cohen during the debate: if Russia’s nefarious behavior constitutes a sufficient reason to try to isolate it, why shouldn’t the rest of the world adopt a similarly hostile attitude towards the United States? Usually, this is the point in the conversation at which Applebaum, as well as other writers and thinkers who are in favor of the West adopting a more confrontational approach towards Russia, would bring out a key weapon in their rhetorical arsenal: namely, the accusation of whataboutism—a notion which, according to The Guardian’s former Moscow correspondent Luke Harding, is “practically a national ideology” in Russia. Indeed, in her new book, Twilight of Democracy, Applebaum lambasts whataboutism not just for “mirror[ing] Putin’s own propaganda,” but also because “it is an argument for moral equivalence, an argument that undermines faith, hope, and the belief that we can live up to the language of our Constitution.” Whataboutism, then, is clearly supposed to be bad. But what, exactly, is it? According to Merriam-Webster’s dictionary definition, whataboutism “is a rhetorical device that involves accusing others of offenses as a way of deflecting attention from one’s own deeds.” It is also, we are told, a “logical fallacy, because whether or not the original accuser is likewise guilty of an offense has no bearing on the truth of the value of the original accusation.” So construed, whataboutism certainly is a logical fallacy: if person A accuses person B of nefarious deeds, B’s reverse-accusation of A’s hypocrisy does not, by itself, refute A’s original accusation. (If I accuse you of stealing my wallet, your counterclaim that I stole your phone, even if true, doesn’t thereby mean that you didn’t steal my wallet.) The problem, however, is that in the context under discussion—namely, the validity of arguments to the effect that the West should attempt to isolate Russia—it is **inapplicable**. Recall Applebaum’s central claim: it is because Russia has committed various moral and legal crimes that the West should attempt to isolate it. The counterclaim being made here is not the blanket denial that Russia has committed (many of) these crimes; rather, it is the claim that, if the mere committal of such crimes constitutes a sufficient reason for a country’s isolation, then the United States should be isolated as well. In other words, the counterclaim being made here is not the logical fallacy of “whataboutism,” but rather a simple, manifestly logical application of reductio ad absurdum. This fact can be further brought into focus by imagining the reverse scenario, in which hawkish, “anti-American” Russian intellectuals argue for Russia’s adoption of a more hostile posture towards the United States. In support of their view, such people might mention, for instance, the U.S.’s history of genocide, slavery, colonialism, and racism; its recent (and not-so-recent) destructive **military interventions**; its use of **drone strikes**; its enormous current levels of inequality; its enforcement of brutal and illegal sanctions against sovereign nations; its banking system’s overwhelming responsibility for the 2008 **financial crisis**; its aggressive pursuit of novel **nuclear weapon technologies**; its imposition of disastrous “shock therapy” economic policies around the world (including in Russia); its expansion of NATO, a hostile military alliance, right up to Russia’s borders, despite multiple promises to the contrary; its interference in other country’s elections (including, again, in Russia); its prosecution of whistleblowers; and its support for its dictators and oppressive regimes around the world. Now imagine if, in response to such accusations, the Applebaums of this world responded by alluding to the fact that Russia, too, is hardly an innocent player on the global stage, and that it, too, is guilty of many (though not all) of the crimes it accuses the U.S. of committing. In such an instance, would it be legitimate for the Russian hawks to accuse Applebaum & co. of “whataboutism,” and of thereby committing a logical fallacy? Or would, rather, Applebaum & co. simply be pointing out the hypocrisy of their interlocutors, as a straightforward means of demonstrating the absurdity of their professed viewpoint? Indeed, the term “whataboutism,” at least insofar as the term is actually used, does not typically refer to logical fallacies of the kind spelled out above. Instead, it is more often part of a broader rhetorical technique used predominantly by Western intellectuals to deflect, or even silence, charges of hypocrisy when they, or other intellectuals, criticize foreign adversaries, including (but not limited to) Russia. Here, for example, is Applebaum herself, in Twilight of Democracy, castigating (then-) U.S. President Donald Trump for allegedly employing the tactic: In a 2017 interview with Bill O’Reilly of Fox News, [former President Donald Trump] expressed his admiration for Vladimir Putin, the Russian dictator, using a classic form of “whataboutism”. “But he’s a killer,” said O’Reilly. “There are a lot of killers. You think our country is so innocent?” […] This way of speaking – “Putin is a killer, but so are we all” – mirrors Putin’s own propaganda, which often states, in so many words, “Okay, Russia is corrupt, but so is everyone else.” Pace Applebaum, this is not a “classic form of ‘whataboutism,’” at least according to the dictionary definition of the term quoted above. After all, Trump is not disagreeing with O’Reilly’s assertion that Putin is a “killer”; indeed, if anything, he is fully agreeing with it. (In the original video, Trump visibly nods in agreement when O’Reilly claims that Putin is a “killer”; moreover, as the quote above attests, Applebaum herself construes Trump as agreeing that Putin is a “killer.”) He is, therefore, emphatically not attempting to refute the truth of his interlocutor’s original assertion. Furthermore, nor is he even the person being accused. He is merely pointing out the incontestable fact that the United States—the country of which himself and O’Reilly are citizens, and of which Trump himself was the then-elected leader—also bears responsibility for killing people. But in what meaningful sense, then, is this an instance of whataboutism, let alone a “a classic form” of it? When did simply recognizing your own country’s crimes become a logical fallacy? (In fact, the context of the interview makes it plausible to think that Trump was, in fact, also employing a reductio ad absurdum-type argument here. Just prior to O’Reilly’s claim that Putin is “a killer,” Trump was discussing the prospects of Russia and the US forming a partnership to defeat ISIS and “Islamic terrorism all over the world.” Thus, Trump might, not entirely unreasonably, be construed as implicitly arguing as follows: “If being a ‘killer’ disqualifies one from forming a partnership to defeat ISIS or terrorism, then we – namely, the United States – are also thus disqualified. But this is crazy. So, Putin’s being a killer shouldn’t disqualify him from partnering with us to defeat ISIS.”) So far, there does not in fact appear to be any good reason whatsoever for the citizens—and, by extension, the governments—of Western countries not to seek better relations with Russia. Arguments which purport to establish that the West should maintain, or even escalate, current tensions with Russia either have little to do with Russia specifically (e.g., the use of tax havens by Russian oligarchs, when in fact such practices are widespread amongst members of the political and financial elite in many countries) or are deeply hypocritical, insofar as many of the crimes that Russia is accused of have also been committed, sometimes in much worse form, by the West. (Indeed, by parity of reasoning, such Western crimes could just as easily be appealed to by Russian intellectuals as a means of justifying their more aggressive posture towards the West.) Moreover, the argumentative ploy often used as a means of deflecting the charge of hypocrisy—namely, the appeal to whataboutism—is, in fact, a rhetorically pernicious term of art, for it allows Western intellectuals to repeatedly denounce (often real) Russian crimes, whilst simultaneously rhetorically protecting themselves or their own countries from the charge of hypocrisy. (“We are accusing you; and any attempt from you to criticize us is not just playing into Putin’s hands, but is, in addition, logically fallacious.”) In short, the **arguments** not only do not come anywhere near passing the almost impassably high bar of **justifying** increasing the likelihood of **nuclear apocalypse**, but they are **logically worthless** in their own right. There is, however, **one final element** of Western discourse about Russia that should be discussed here; one which, indeed, likely needs to be eliminated in order for concerned Westerners to be able to effectively engage their fellow citizens and governments into adopting a **less hostile posture** towards Russia. Moreover, it is an element that, I think, plays a **crucial**—**albeit often unnoticed**—role in providing legitimacy to many of the arguments often made by those, like Applebaum, who seek to further **entrench division and hostility** between Russia and the West. This is, for want of a better word, the **Russo-Orientalist nature** of much of the discourse itself. **Russo-Orientalism**, in short, is a certain way of thinking or talking about Russia, according to which it is viewed as a monolithic, radically different, (semi-)mysterious and dangerous entity which is, above all, **hostile to the West**. Moreover, in analogy with **“classical” Orientalism** in Edward Said’s sense, Russo-Orientalism plays a crucial role in **legitimizing contemporary Western policies towards Russia**. That is, it is because Russia is perceived as semi-**mysterious, hostile, and fundamentally “Other”** to the West which explains why we, too, are encouraged to adopt—and, indeed, often find it easy to accept adopting—an **openly confrontational attitude towards it.**

### Setcol Impact

#### Settler Colonialism

Inwood and Bonds 16 (Joshua Inwood & Anne Bonds | “Confronting White Supremacy and a Militaristic Pedagogy in the U.S. Settler Colonial State, Annals of the American Association of Geographers” | <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2016.1145510> | DOA: 7/19/2022 | SAoki)

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Finally, a third pillar is orientalism, grounded in the belief of the inferiority and threatening menace of non-Western nations and peoples (Smith 2012).1 This introduces into the United States a state of permanent warfare in which the nation is consistently besieged by enemies (externally and internally); as a consequence, there is a constant need to protect “the well-being of empire” (Smith 2012, 69). The foundational rationales of slavery, genocide, and orientalism contour the white supremacist settler state: The founding moments of US nationalism [meaning the social and cultural identity of the nation] are foundational to both state and culture. The US was conceived in slavery and christened by genocide. These early practices established high expectations of state aggression against enemies of the national purpose and that valorized armed men in uniform as the nation’s true sacrificial subjects. (Gilmore 2002, 20) These logics are reformulated and continue to take shape in an era of ostensible color-blindness predominated by official discourses and government commitments to racial equality. Even as overt racism is eschewed, taken for granted socioeconomic hierarchies, racial exploitation, and the redistribution of wealth reproduce and sustain white supremacy. The U.S. settler state internalizes a “righteous violence” predicated on an expanding “quest for total security” that has come to characterize domestic and foreign policy (Hixson 2013, 198). Although there are myriad ways to explore the interrelations between state-sanctioned violence and militarism, we find the connections between domestic policing and the U.S. military-industrial complex to be particularly illustrative. Kraska and Cubellis (1997) noted that there is a long history of collusion between the military and police departments in the United States and the military paradigm is an important organizing principle within the development of modern policing practices, organization, and tactics (e.g., Bittner 1970; Manning 1977; Enloe 1980; A. Hall and Coyne 2012). These practices took on added significance during the latter half of the twentieth century as U.S. cities faced increased pressure to “get tough on crime” and as local police departments developed specially trained tactical teams, commonly referred to as Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams (Kraska and Cubellis 1997). The interactions between the military and domestic police practices intensified yet again during the “war on drugs” and in a post–11 September 2001 world where domestic terror concerns have fueled the explosive growth of military and police cooperation (A. Hall and Coyne 2012). Although ostensibly unconnected to questions of race and economic inequality, militarism is fundamentally linked to structural violences of poverty and social difference (Loyd 2009, 2014), and the pursuit of total security connects settler state militarism across scales, legitimating the expansion and protection of the nation-state, the policing of its borders and communities, and internal and external monitoring and surveillance in the name of defense. Securing the white supremacist settler state relies on racial, gender, and class hierarchies that enable the coherence of an imagined nation with clearly marked inclusions and exclusions. That is, the targeted and widespread violence that characterizes the U.S. settler state—seen in everything from the genocide directed toward Native peoples to the criminalization of communities of color—depends on and reinforces discursive constructions that demonize those who stand in the way of the settler state and, more often than not, culminates in national campaigns against those beyond the scope of U.S. settler state justice. The indiscriminate killing associated with this kind of violence is easily dismissed as an unfortunate consequence of war (Hixson 2013). U.S. interventionism relies on a “defensive solidarity ... built on the institution of slavery and the racialization of Blackness” that reaffirms white supremacist cultural identity by managing both internal and external threats (Loyd 2009, 406). These practices continue even after the settler state has displaced and “removed” native peoples who had previously occupied the land, creating political landscapes with an aggressive propensity for violence (Veracini 2010). This understanding of the United States as a settler state is significant for theorizing militarism, we argue, because it situates the persistent violences of genocide and slavery as enduring structures shaping social and political economic relations. Rather than being projects of the past, settler practices are central to the continued development and futurity of the United States. A settler colonial perspective disrupts the spatial imaginaries of war by emphasizing the ongoing racialized violence necessary to secure contested, although taken for granted, homelands in settler nations. Moreover, it connects the indiscriminate violence stretching from U.S. settler colonial history to contemporary military engagements (Hixson 2013). As Blackhawk and Apache helicopters swoop and attack and Tomahawk cruise missiles explode, and as U.S. Special Forces head into “Indian country” to search and destroy the enemy, the ramifications and taken for granted sensibilities of settler geographies become all too clear (Hixson 2013, 198). Hixson (2013) further clarified, “American settler colonialism is a winnertakes-all proposition that demanded the removal of indigenous peoples and the destruction of their cultures,” and these geographies have “profound consequences for national identity and subsequent foreign policy” (197). The settler state is premised on permanent war, inscribing militarism and violence into everyday geographies and naturalizing racialized power hierarchies and the dispossession and erasure of racialized bodies.

## Alt

### De-sinologizaton

#### The alternative is de-sinologization, involving recognizing the existing consequences of current academia and viewing Sinologism as alienated knowledge and understand its subconscious contamination and distortion. Only then can humans reflect upon their flawed epistemologies and reorient their understanding towards mutual respect and equality to the previously isolated “Other”.

Gu 12 [Gu, Ming Dong, Ming Dong Gu is currently Professor of Chinese and Comparative Literature at the University of Texas at Dallas., 10-1-2012, "Sinologism: An Alternative to Orientalism and Postcolonialism," Taylor & Francis, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203084472/sinologism-ming-dong-gu]//AA

Conclusion A theory of self-­ conscious reflection Sinologism as alienated knowledge All human knowledge is, to varying degrees, conjectural or hypothetical in nature, and is produced by the creative imagination of human beings who encounter certain needs that have arisen in specific historical and cultural settings. This is the funda - mental reason why I deem knowledge about China and scholarship in China– West studies as intellectual commodities. As intellectual products created by the human imagination, they are invariably subjective in nature. The subjectivity of Sinologism was intensified after China was brought into the global system of capitalism in modern times. The commodification of knowledge has caused China knowledge to deviate considerably from its original purposes. Nevertheless, scholars in the field do not self-consciously realize the subjectivity of their scholarship. This gives rise to sinologization. As intellectual commodities, both Sinologism and sinologization are derivatives of Sinology, and neither of them is Sinology per se. Rather, they are alienations of Sinology, China knowledge, and knowledge production. For this reason, Sinologism should be redefined as alienated knowledge in general and alienation of Sinology and China– West studies in particular. In what way is Sinologism an alienation of knowledge? “Alienation,” according to Raymond Williams, is “one of the most difficult words in the language,” and has multiple denotations and connotations. In intellectual thought, alienation in its general sense refers to a process whereby “man is seen as cut off, estranged from his own original nature” 1 and “the world man has made confronts him as stranger and enemy, having power over him who has transferred his power to it.” 2 My redefinition of Sinologism as alienated knowledge takes the line of thought developed by Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx. In Hegel’s theory of alienated culture, human beings created a culture through their activities, but the created culture becomes an alien force that confronts them. 3 In Feuerbach’s theory of alienated religion, 4 human beings create the idea of God, which becomes an alien force that makes them worship it, thereby controlling them. Influenced by Hegel’s and Feuerbach’s theories, Marx posits his theory of alienated labor: [M]an creates himself by creating his world, but in class-­ society is alienated from this essential nature by specific forms of alienation in the division of labour, private property and the capitalist mode of production in which the worker loses both the product of his labour and his sense of his own productive activity, following the expropriation of both by capital. 5 In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 , Marx elaborates on what is not alienation and how alienation comes into being as a result of private labor and capitalist mode of commodity production: Let us review the various factors as seen in our supposition: My work would be a free manifestation of life , hence an enjoyment of life . Presupposing private property, my work is an alienation of life , for I work in order to live , in order to obtain for myself the means of life. My work is not my life. 6 In Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx, alienation is essentially self-­ alienation, and to be alienated is to be separated from one’s own nature and one’s work. In fundamental ways my conception of Sinologism as an alienated intellectual product is related to Marx’s idea of alienated labor and commodity fetish. In labor, the original objective of work is to create products that satisfy human needs so that human beings can lead a more fulfilled life. But because of the capitalist mode of production, which aims at making profits as its sole goal, the original human purpose is forgotten and the created product becomes something which no one except the market has control over. In a similar way, Sinology and China studies originally aim at producing scholarship and knowledge on China for information and education. But due to various forces, political, ideological, ethnic, and aca - demic, knowledge and scholarship on China become intellectual commodities that deviate substantially from the original purpose, which is to inform and educate people about China and Chinese culture. And the knowledge and scholarship pro - duced frequently contradict and compromise the producer’s original intentions. Marx views the appearance of alienation as a result of capitalism. In my view it is not by sheer coincidence that Sinology began to deviate from its original aim at producing knowledge, and embarked on its way to Sinologism, at approx - imately the same time as the capitalist mode of production sought to expand the world market and to turn everything into commodities. According to Marx, alienation can be overcome by restoring the truly human relationship to the labor process; with employment as a way people can express their human nature and as a way they can fulfil their human potential. In a similar vein Sinologism as an alienated form of Sinology and China– West studies is endowed with the great potential to restore China knowledge production and scholarship to a healthy state of true knowledge and scholarship. My inquiry into Sinologism is basically a cultural critique that deals with alienated knowledge of China– West studies. Just as Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx have shown that the history of human culture is explicitly marked by alienation, and alienation is largely unconscious in nature, the inner logic of Sinologism is largely unconscious in two fundamental ways. First, the problematic of Sinologism is beyond our conscious awareness. Few scholars engaged in sinologistic practices are aware of the fact that they come under the sway of an unconscious motivating force that controls the epistemology and methodology of their scholarship. Second, even though we are consciously aware of its presence in the various problematic manifestations, for various reasons (ethnic, political, and academic) we tend to ignore them or consciously deny them, because no one would admit that he or she is engaged in epistemological and methodological colonization in terms of Western-centric cultural theories and models. What is paradoxical is that oftentimes, misperception, misconception, and misrepresentation in China–West studies are self-consciously made without the scholars’ awareness of their biases, prejudices, and false consciousnesses. I have provided ample analyses of such cases. In this sense, the inner logic of Sinologism, which is a form of cultural unconscious, is both conscious and unconscious. It is con - scious in its manifestations, but unconscious in its motivations. Like a psycho - logical complex, it is essentially a compromise formation incorporating conflicting and contradictory motives, desires, causes, rationales, and goals. It is relatively easy to repudiate its manifestations, but hard to get at its root causes. As alienated knowledge, Sinologism poses an obstacle to scientific, objective, and reliable knowledge and scholarship in China– West studies, and hinders healthy and meaningful exchanges and dialogues in cross-­ cultural studies. We must go beyond it. But how? Sinologism operates on an inner logic, which is the cultural unconscious. As unconscious can be made conscious by special procedures, the most effective way to deal with the problem is to adopt a strategy similar to psychoanalytic procedures that are based on the rationale of making one aware of unconscious desires and fears, phobias and anxieties, depressions and compulsions. The foregoing chapters have been preoccupied precisely with this central objective. The analyses have mainly focused on how to recognize the inner logic as well as criticize the dazzling manifestations of Sinologism in a variety of scholarly fields. In this concluding part, I wish to make some further reflections on Sinologism and offer some thoughts on where studies of Sinologism should be heading and how we can turn alienated symptoms of Sinologism into healthy creative energies in knowledge production. Making the unconscious culture conscious Sinologism is, in the final analysis, an unconscious culture operating on the logic of a cultural unconscious that alienates the production of knowledge and scholarship. To de-alienate Sinologism I think we need, first of all, to start a process of de-sinologization and de-ideologization, and engage in critical reflections on how to make the cultural unconscious conscious and how to turn Sinologism from a deconstructive theory to a constructive theory of academic criticism. To accomplish de-sinologization, the first move is to adequately recognize the consequences of sinologization. I have discussed the various phenomena of sinolo - gization in a previous chapter, but did not define the concept in rigorous terms. Now, in this concluding section, I will attempt to provide a clear definition. Sinologization is an undeclared but tacitly administered institiutionalization of the ways of observing China from the perspective of Western epistemology that refuses, or is reluctant, to view China on its own terms, and of doing scholarship on Chinese materials and producing knowledge on Chinese civilization in terms of Western methodology that tends to disregard the real conditions of China and reduce the complexity of Chinese civilization into simplistic patterns of development modeled on those of the West. Sinologization has serious consequences in almost every aspect of Chinese culture and society. I have dealt with a broad spectrum of them in earlier chapters and do not need to tackle them further. As a scholar of literature and culture, my study is mainly concerned with Sinologism in the domains of literature, language, thought, and other areas of human science. Since the logic of Sinologism is a cultural unconscious that has penetrated deeply into people’s minds, it exists in practically all areas of scholarly research and knowledge production. Hence, future studies of Sinologism ought to extend to other fields of social and natural sciences. The manifestations of Sinologism in those fields have scarcely been touched. Inquiries into those areas will surely produce new findings and insights that will give us inspiration to go beyond Sinologism. De-sinologization is to self-consciously de-institutionalize the sinologistic ways of observing China and doing scholarship on Chinese materials. It involves two major aspects: one pertaining to Chinese scholars, the other relating to non-­ Chinese scholars. De-­ sinologization for Chinese scholars is to be aware of the drawbacks and shortcomings of sinologistic ways of doing scholarship, to recognize the limits and limitations of Western concepts and conceptualizations, to overcome a blind faith in the effi - cacy of Western theories, and to self-­ consciously reject the intellectual habit of doing scholarship in terms of the culture-­ specific models and methodologies of the West. In the final analysis it is a process of intellectual emancipation of a mind shackled by Western perception, conception, and generalization, a spiritual restoration of the faith in one’s own abilities and creative power, and a resuscitation of one’s zeal for original creation. De-­ sinologization for non-­ Chinese scholars is to have a clear awareness of the inevitable subjectivity of one’s per - spective of observing China, to be on guard against doing Chinese scholarship on Western terms, and to strive to produce knowledge and scholarship on China in as objective and scientific a manner as possible. People may say that my idea of depoliticization of knowledge is an illusion. After all, Terry Eagleton, Frederic Jamesson, and many other theorists have con - vincingly argued that all criticism is political criticism and that all knowledge is ideologically laden. 7 Does this mean that it is impractical to call for apolitical ways of knowledge production about China? I don’t think so. On the contrary, I believe that precisely because of the pervasiveness of political influences, depoliticization of knowledge production is highly necessary for objective ways of doing scholarship on China. To a great extent the success of de-sinologization depends on depoliticization of knowledge and scholarship. The fundamental issue that differentiates my conception of Sinologism from Orientalism and Occidentalism is a drive at depoliticization of scholarship and knowledge production. Although it is not entirely possible to separate politics from scholarship, we should strive for disinterested production of scholarship, and set as an ideal the practice of striving for knowledge production for knowledge’s sake, not alienated knowledge at the service of any ideological agenda. It is likely we cannot completely cleanse scholarship of political influence, but we should do as much as possible to strive to depoliticize scholarship and advocate scholarship for scholarship’s sake. A practical way to come close to the idea would be a hermeneutic approach to knowledge production and scholarship, based on the recognition that China is a great book that requires repeated reading and fresh interpretation. Whither Sinologism? Sinologism is largely a new conceptual category. Its studies have not yet formed a complete system. With the tentative exploration in this inquiry, where should our future exploration of Sinologism lead us? By way of conclusion I will offer some further reflections. First and foremost, we should continue to explore the rise, origin, historical evolution, characteristic feature, present-­ day condition and inner logic, and extend that exploration beyond the fields of the humanities and social sciences. The current study has its focus on language, literature, thought, and culture. Future inquiries should be broadened to include the diverse fields of politics, economics, diplomacy, medicine, society, technology, and natural sciences, and other areas directly related to China knowledge production and cross-cultural studies. Second, studies of Sinologism should not be limited to goals that set out to expose biases and prejudices against China, correct errors and misrepresentations concerning Chinese civilization, and dispute misperceptions and misinterpretations of Chinese materials: although all these objectives are legitimate in the process of analysis. A significant direction we should take is to get behind and beneath all the identified problems in order to uncover the motivations, mental frameworks, attitudes, and rationales for all those phenomena. In other words, a more important objective is to discover the inner logic responsible for the problems arising in scholarship on China–West studies. In conceptual terms, the fundamental goal should be to discover the epistemological and methodological sources of the dazzling phenomena under the rubric “Sinologism.” Third, we should raise people’s awareness of the pitfalls of sinologistic knowledge production, and show its grave consequences in the context of globaliza - tion, which, among other things, includes obstructing cross-cultural exchanges and causing epistemic inertia and the atrophy of the original creativity of non-­ Western peoples. Sinologism should contribute to the clarification of scholarly issues in the application of Said’s theory of Orientalism to Sinology and China– West studies. Last, but not least, as it is preoccupied with knowledge and scholarship, critiques of Sinologism should offer a new paradigm in China– West studies. It should compel us to reflect on the status quo, problems, and future improvement in China knowledge production in the worldwide context of globalization. Specifically, Sinologism should engage in reflections on the existing paradigms and approaches constructed on Western-­ centric theories and teleology of scientism, and initiate a viable shift in the existing paradigm of China studies from Western-­ centric models and pseudo-­ scientific teleology to genuinely scientific ways of knowledge production about China. The ultimate aim for studies of Sinologism is to encourage and promote the production of objective knowledge about China, free from bias, prejudice, subjective attitudes, and political interference of any kind. This last aim may seem rather utopian, given the widely accepted view that knowledge is constructed and truth, even in natural sciences, is not free from subjectivity. Nevertheless, I wish to insist that even though there is no absolutely objective knowledge, it is always a sublime endeavor to strive to make our produced knowledge as free of subjectivity as possible. In the non-­ academic dimension, Sinologism is an intellectual commodity, created by a diverse array of people including Westerners, Chinese, and others, to meet the demand for Chinese knowledge by different countries and regions of the world. Just as a commodity requires modification and improvement in content, form, quality and packaging in response to market needs, Sinologism as an intellectual commodity changes in accordance with the demand for China knowledge in different historical periods and by different geographical areas. In one historical period, it took on a romantic picture of Khan’s empire described by Marco Polo; in another historical period, it is represented as the ideal state ruled by philosopher-­ kings in Leibniz’s and Voltaire’s accounts; in still another historical period, it was bleakly presented as a fossilized civilization like a mummy; in modern times, it assumed the scary image of Red China with the menacing power of the Yellow Peril in history. Recently, against the backdrop of an economic boom and impressive industrial achievement, there have appeared two opposite images of China: a blindly optimistic view that predicts the twenty-­ first century to be China’s century; another pessimistic view that forewarns of the imminent implosion of the Chinese economy and the collapse of its government. Although its packaging constantly changes, the invariable constant in Sinologism is the inner logic that operates at its core: the unconscious logic of Western-centric intellectual consumerism. How can we get out of the prevalent intellectual consumerism? I have redefined Sinologism as an alienation of Sinology and knowledge production. This redefinition contains insights for going out of Sinologism as alienated intellec - tual commodity and for restoring the original purpose and function of Sinology and knowledge. But how can we overcome alienation in Sinologism? A viable way out of Sinologism is to get off the beaten track of sinologistic thinking and engage in epistemic and methodological reflections on how to approach China– West studies from a genuinely academic perspective. As a critical theory Sinolo - gism inevitably overlaps with Orientalism and postcolonialism, but, as I have already discussed in this study, it has some distinctive differences. Orientalism has its strengths in critiquing Western imperialism and colonialism, but it has little to say about the role of colonized people in the creation of Orientalism. Postcolonialism has made up for some of its inadequacies, but it remains an ideology-­ dominant political criticism. In my view the theory of Sinologism should not become a theory of ideological criticism, but should strive to be a theory of critical reflection on how to do scholarship and how to produce knowledge in ways relatively free from the interferences of politics and ideology. For example, through critical analysis of the problems in produced knowledge about China since Marco Polo’s times, and the problematic views, attitudes, and evaluations of Chinese civilization by the Chinese themselves, Chinese and Western scholars engaged in China– West studies might self-­ consciously conduct reflections on the guiding principles, methodologies, conceptual paradigms, and research outcomes as part of their efforts to locate more scientific, objective, and fair ways of doing China scholarship. In so doing they may find inspiration and insight for decolo - nizing, depoliticizing, and de-­ ideologizing Chinese scholarship. A theory of self-­ conscious reflection The ideology of Sinologism has obstructed Chinese and Western scholars in their perception and representation of China. It has in turn blurred Western and non-­ Western people’s own vision and understanding of their own cultures, because a true understanding of one’s own culture requires the mirror image of another culture. Consequently there is an urgent need for self-­ conscious reflec - tion on the part of both Westerners and non-­ Westerners alike. There is also a pressing need for the Chinese to understand their own culture. As Sinologism has penetrated almost all strata of Chinese academia and all aspects of Chinese social life, it has become an obstacle to the healthy development of Chinese society. The inundation of Western ideas and scholarship into China in the 1970s during the initial stage of Reform and Openness made it possible for Chinese academia to emancipate its mind, but it has also intensified the cultural uncon - scious centering on intellectual colonization, and strengthened the epistemological and methodological inertia of the Chinese mind and caused the atrophy of scholarly creativity and originality. It has become the consensus that the presentday prosperity of Chinese scholarship is based on introduction, imitation, repro­ duction and duplication. Numerous scholars deplore the low degrees of originality and creativity in Chinese academia. Almost all academic fields are content with low-­ level duplication of Western academic achievements. This is especially so in the social sciences and humanities. To introduce popular Western theories into China has become an assuredly successful way to fame and honor in Chinese humanities and social sciences. The appearance of a new Chinese coinage, shanzhai 8 (literally, a fortified mountain village, figuratively, copy, counterfeit, fake, duplicate, copycat, etc.) vividly reflects the scholarly status quo and a social mentality, which shows little interest in original creation but is only content with copycatting. It has confirmed from the linguistic per - spective my identified problems of epistemic and methodological inertia, which is also endemic in the fields of natural sciences and technology. If a field of science and technology can rely on Western expertise, Chinese scholars seldom produce original work and achievements. Only in those areas where Western expertise is not available, Chinese scholars have produced original and creative work. Chinese society has a strong predilection for the Nobel Prizes, but it can be safely said that so long as the mentality of Sinologism is not eliminated, Chinese science and technology have no hope of reaching the height worthy of a Nobel Prize, because sinologistic thinking is the natural enemy to originality. Chinese academia is in need of a second mental emancipation since the beginning of Reform and Openness. The critical theory of Sinologism and its paradigm of reflection may contribute to this second emancipation. From another perspective, Sinologism has hampered fruitful dialogues between China and West in particular and the cultural exchanges between different cultures in general. Sinologization is even more devastating for other third-­ world cultures, as it is capable of causing epistemic inertia and atrophy of original creativity of non-Western countries and peoples. In the worldwide context, the critical theory of Sinologism may contribute to the global enterprise of intellectual and mental de-colonization. It may help people of Third World countries become aware of grave consequences of “spiritual colonization” and “self-­ colonization,” overcome intellectual and academic inertia, and produce original and creative work in academic as well as in cultural domains. Ultimately, it may help overcome alienations of Sinology, China knowledge, and knowledge production in cross-cultural studies. The core of Sinologism in China– West studies and cross-­ cultural studies is the cultural unconscious arising from the false consciousness of ethnic, national, inter-­ national, inter-­ cultural differences, and ideological programming. In his study of the political unconscious, Jameson argues that “the neo-­ Freudian nos - talgia for some ultimate moment of cure , in which the dynamics of the unconscious proper rise to the light of day and of consciousness and are somehow ‘integrated’ in an active lucidity about ourselves and the determinations of our desires and our behavior” is a “myth,” and “the Marxian ideological analysis: namely, the vision of a moment in which the individual subject would be somehow fully conscious of his or her determination by class and would be able to square the circle of ideological conditioning by sheer lucidity and the taking of thought,” a “mirage.” 9 I accept the ever-­ presence of politics in all discourses, but I do not subscribe to the idea that there is no disinterested approach to the production of knowledge and scholarship. Here, I will analyze a case to show why I think this is so. In her influential article, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Spivak expresses a concern over “the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of the Other as the Self’s shadow.” 10 She cites the British outlawing of sati , the Hindu practice of sacrificing a widow by burning her on her husband’s funeral pyre as an example. While the British intervention was for the most admirable humanitarian reasons, the act serves to reinforce the perception of the difference between British “civilization” and Indian “barbarism,” thereby justifying the British colonial rule and Kipling’s famous (or notorious) saying that it is “the white man’s burden” to civilize the colonized peoples. As Hindu culture was written out of law, going underground due to the British intervention in colonial history, Spivak worries lest present-­ day intellectuals may commit similar acts of condescension to those of the British colonists when they represent the oppressed. I wish to relate this to a similar historical practice in China. Foot-­ binding was a tortuous custom imposed on Chinese girls in pre-­ modern times by the male-­ dominated patriarchal society. It was finally abolished as a result of the concerted efforts of Chinese and Western missionaries. The anti foot-­ binding campaigns were initiated by the Chinese, but were inspired by Western ideas, and Western missionaries played a significant role in it. Western missionaries supported the campaign because they considered foot-­ binding as running counter to Christian beliefs. Although their position was colored considerably by Western-­ centric beliefs, because the missionaries did not view the practice as a case that demonstrated Western cultural superiority over Chinese cultural inferiority, their intervention was seldom, if ever, viewed in the same light as that for the British abolition of sati . The British humanitarian intervention was accompa - nied by negative reactions, precisely because the British colonialists made use of their humanitarian acts to strengthen their political control of India. If the British had not contaminated their intervention with political motives, the abolition of sati would have been a most praiseworthy act. Recently a friend of mine who has read my articles on Sinologism published in Chinese journals, had an extended conversation with me. He found no problem with my analyses of Sinologism, but took issue with my advocacy of depoliticization and de-­ ideologization of scholarship and knowledge. He posed this question: how can you engage in a disinterested scholarly study of issues that are by nature and function, ideologies? As an example, he cited Marxism in China. My answer is: it is true that Marxism is an ideology and a reigning ide - ology in China, but it does not mean that one cannot study it from an apolitical and non-­ ideological perspective. I agree that there is no absolutely ideology-­ free scholarship, but there is relatively disinterested scholarship. In Edward Said’s rebuttal of the attacks on his Orientalism , he repudiates Bernard Lewis’s charge of “a violation of the very idea of disinterested scholarship.” 11 I have demonstrated in Chapter 2 that though he and Lewis argue from diametrically political positions, both of them in effect agree on one thing: there is disinterested scholarship. 12 I, too, firmly believe that there is disinterested scholarship and there are relatively neutral, objective, and bias-­ free approaches to knowledge production. My whole study has shown that Sinologism is an unconscious culture with the logic of a cultural unconscious. As the cultural unconscious is deeply hidden in China– West studies, Sinologism will not be a short-­ lived phenomenon. Recognition of its logic and rationale will be the first step to going beyond it, but its ultimate disappearance will rest upon the emergence of a truly human, rather than ethno-centric, mentality, based on the understanding of different cultures in terms of our common humanity and a bias-free reverence for facts, truths, intellectual equality and integrity. Once freed from the unconscious logic of Sinolo - gism, cross-­ cultural studies will no longer rely on Western theories as universal paradigms, but use them as reference frameworks to study the historical conditions ­ of non-Western cultures and societies, and there will appear truly s cientific and objective approaches to non-­ Western materials, resulting in bias-­ free knowledge about non-­ Western cultures. In the field of China–West studies, so long as we become fully conscious of the logic of Sinologism and guard against its appearance in knowledge and scholarship, we will eventually be able to usher in a “golden age” when knowledge about China and other cultures is pursued for its own sake, free from the interference of the political ideologies of colonialism, Western-centrism, ethno-centrism, and other political and ideological agendas. And there will appear genuine understanding and appreciation of traditions and cultures other than one’s own, which will facilitate the fostering of peace and harmony in the world and contribute to the healthy development of globalization. Conceived and pursued for this ultimate goal, the conception of Sinologism is not a theory of ideological critique but a critical theory of self-conscious reflection.

### Alt – Epistemological Shift

#### Only reorienting our thinking eastward through ecologies of knowing can disrupt colonial notions of supremacy - vote neg to resist the Western epistemology that serves as the basis for global oppression and environmental destruction.

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Far from being an expert in China or East Asia, 16 I read Peters’ article through my own work that, in part, centers on critical theories/pedagogies, and comparative and international education (CIE). Through critical pedagogical lenses, I see Peters’ overall argument as calling for **(re-)reading** the politics of the **‘threat’**, questioning if it emerges from (neo)coloniality and epistemologies of the North. Peters details a histography of sociopolitical delegitimization on how non-western othering has encouraged Western assimilation and the need to disrupt the politics of Western supremacy. **Comparative work is essential** here, but comparative fields inherently form contested terrains. CIE work becomes problematic when non-contextually positioning one educational system as ‘best’ for all others to blindly assimilate to. Opposingly, critical CIE is crucial for better understanding the commonalities and differences between educational systems to allow for true contextual lending and borrowing. Two important notations need to be given. First, critically reading the world is largely comparing what we ‘know’ with new knowledges, so such comparative problematizing the self’s ingenuous knowledges is also needed beyond the professionalized CIE field. This includes critically reading our own comparisons guided by Western benchmarking. Second, ‘education’ here is beyond schooling to include non-formal and informal models (e.g. public pedagogy through Hastie’s comparisons with Nazism). Largely avoiding giving explicit self-analysis, Peters calls on readers to reflect upon what needs to be **(un)learned** from hidden curricula of Western supremacy. I read Peters’ article through the lenses of Said’s (1979) Orientalism and Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2016, 2018) calls to **counter epistemologies** of the North’s dominance and **resulting oppressions**. As such, Peters critiques Western policymaking to thwart ‘threats’ of losing global hegemony through de-Orientalization and dethroning epistemologies of the North. I see two conundrums which are difficult but not impossible to overcome through teaching for critical literacy. First, such reflectivity is meaningless and without transformative praxis if epistemological dominance is not critically problematized. Hidden curricula of untethered Western supremacy without contextuality that Peters argues hardens the difficulty of its disruption, but also amplifies its necessity. For example, this coincides with my article on being a self-defined Freirean scholar in China in which I problematize both Western-centric rubrics of ‘quality’ academics and how, ironically, Western academics too-often do not **critically compare themselves** within their self-legitimized rubrics (see Misiaszek, 2018). The second conundrum I see is the perceived ‘threat’ of a global paradigm shift of epistemologies of the North eastward and thus Orientalism is disrupted, not by ceasing epistemological dominance but rather shifting them eastward. Two issues come to mind here. One is de Sousa Santos’ framing the grounding of epistemologies of the North with **coloniality, patriarchy, and capitalism**. Peters argues China’s lack of histories of being the colonizer and China is ‘becom[ing] a vast and encompassing global capitalist power’ but not the Western perception of a ‘capitalism and liberal democracy [a]s a holy combination’. Second, epistemologies of the South should not replace Northern epistemological dominance, but rather exist to **counter them for teaching**, learning and decision-making through ecologies of knowing (Santos, 2018). Without question, global **epistemological shifts will occur**, but their processes and emergent outcomes should be read as possibilities rather than fatalistically determined already. Not writing in a fatalistic manner, Peters’ leaves open the possibilities for these upcoming shifts by learning from the politics of supremacy and dominance to **avoid global oppressions** and **planetary unsustainability** from continuing/reoccurring. Unfortunately, if we learn or not is questionable.

### Kill America

#### Vote neg to have the dragon of Yellow Peril emerge from its lair of the American psyche and bring about the death of America

Lyman 2000 (Stanford M. Lyman | “The "Yellow Peril" Mystique: Origins and Vicissitudes of a Racist Discourse” | <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20020056> | DOI: 10.1023/A:1022931309651 | DOA: 7/17/2022 | SAoki)

CHINESE AMERICA AND THE YELLOW PERIL: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

In the last year of the nineteenth century, Theodore Roosevelt wrote to Spring Rice, a British diplomat, boasting, "Together . . . the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race . . . can whip the world."302 A few years later, he was not that sure. And neither were the U.S. presidents who came after him. For the next one hundred years first China, then Japan, then China again would rise up in America's public consciousness as a threat to the West in general and the United States in particular. In each era of this yellow peril mystique Americans of Asian heritage, whether immigrant aliens or native-born citizens, would suffer outrages directed against their character, culture, opportunities, and, often enough, their very lives. Whether cast as members of a "race," a "civilization," or a "culture," Asian Americans are treated as bearers of virtually ineradicable traits that, are at least implicitly assumed to be "inherited." Thus, Professor Huntington asserts that civilizational "differences are the products of centuries"303 and that cultural differences are "far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes."304 For Huntington, as Robert G. Lee has pointed out in his thoroughgoing critique of the "clash of civilizations" thesis,305 Asian Americans, together with all those representatives of other non-western civilizations residing in America, are imagined to threaten the U.S. with "de-Westernization." This is a fate so terrible, Huntington-sounding very much like Homer Lea - warns, that "if Americans cease to adhere to their liberal democratic and European-rooted political ideology, the United States as we have known it will cease to exist and will follow the other ideologically defined superpower [the Soviet Union] on the ash heap of history."306 However, it is the Asian American victims of individuals and groups that have been moved to murderous action who have become the real martyrs to such apprehensions. Robert G. Lee has summarized some of the most lethal of the attacks that have occurred since the re-emergence of the yellow peril in the American mind-life and the imposition of what he calls the "mere gook rule," i.e., the rule that any Asian American is a "gook" worthy of extermination: Most notorious have been the murders of Vincent Chin in Detroit; Navorze Mody, an Indian American, in New Jersey;. . . Vandy Phorng, a Cambodian American, in Massachusetts in 1987; Jim Loo a Chinese American, in North Carolina, and five Cambodian and Laotian American children in a Stockton, Calif., schoolyard, in 1989; Hung Trong, a Vietnamese American, in Los Angeles in 1996 . . ., [and] the killings of scores of Asian American shopkeepers and cabdrivers ... [as well as] twenty-five Korean American shopkeepers . . . killed by non-Korean assailants [in the two years before the Los Angeles riot of 1992].307 And, what is to be done? Rose Hum Lee, writing in 1960, after the Korean conflict had ended but before the Vietnam War, the temporary competitive advantage of Japan, or the national security fears about China and America's Chinese had revived a new yellow peril, thought that "Now is the most auspicious time [for Chinese residing in the United States] to strive for total and unreserved integration into the American society" and put the burden of accomplishing this on the Chinese themselves: "Regardless of where the peoples of the United States of America originated, they must strive to fit in to the new social climate which emerged in American society and the world after World War II."308 Forty years later we can see that such a program, even if it is desirable - and some of the new multiculturalists have registered their dissent from it - has not been effected. Even after being designated as one element of the Asian American "model minority,"309 a veritable role model for other ethnoracial groups experiencing race prejudice, discrimination, and poverty, Chinese Americans discover that in times of crisis they are thrust back into the special category reserved for internal enemies.310 The idea of America, or the entire Occident for that matter, being in peril from the "yellow" people has something of a "geological" character. It is deeply embedded in the Occidental consciousness of itself, a consciousness that, until recently, took "whiteness" to be a fact of nature needing neither an "archaeology" nor a sociological deconstruction,311 and "Orientalism" to be its utter and absolute antithesis.312 It is an all-too-neglected element in the "American dilemma" that, despite numerous efforts over the past half-century, has not been re solved.313 Robert Park once pointed out that "A more thorough investigation of the facts would probably show that minorities, racial, cultural, and national, have always sought the freedom and protection of the more inclusive imperium."314 No doubt this is true, but two questions arise with respect to that claim: How is that freedom and protection to be gained? What forms of social and cultural organization are most conducive to both liberty and security? None of the proposed processual and institutional answers to these questions-assimilation, acculturation, amal gamation, on the one hand; congregation, pluralism, ethnic power, and multiculturalism on the other-has as yet proved either effective or become likely to be fully realized.315 The lair of the yellow peril's fire breathing dragon is to be found in the winding labyrinth of the American psyche. It is one of the "idols" of the American mind in a society that, as Harold Isaacs pointed out so presciently in 1975, is "fragmenting and retribalizing ... at a much more rapid rate, certainly, than [it is] moving toward any more humane kind of humanhood in the arrangement of [its] social and political affairs."316 Asian Americans, not only Wen Ho Lee, are thus waiting for an outcome still unclear and more than likely to be unsatisfying.

### Retooling of rhetoric

#### Thus, the alt is a retooling of rhetoric – in order to decolonize western academia, we adopt a “global intellectual posture”—rather than adhering to the 1ac’s epistemological failures of “yes or no” questions, we pose a critical analysis of colonial discourses (maybe retag this)

Biswas 7(Shampa Biswas, Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist, 2007, page 117 - 123)**//BRownRice**

The recent resuscitation of the project of Empire should give International Relations scholars particular pause.1 For a discipline long premised on a triumphant Westphalian sovereignty, there should be something remarkable about the ease with which the case for brute force, regime change and empire-building is being formulated in widespread commentary spanning the political spectrum. Writing after the 1991 Gulf War, Edward Said notes the US hesitance to use the word ‘empire’ despite its long imperial history.2 This hesitance too is increasingly under attack as even self-designated liberal commentators such as Michael Ignatieff urge the US to overcome its unease with the ‘e-word’ and selfconsciously don the mantle of imperial power, contravening the limits of sovereign authority and remaking the world in its universalist image of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.3 Rashid Khalidi has argued that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq does indeed mark a new stage in American world hegemony, replacing the indirect and proxy forms of Cold War domination with a regime much more reminiscent of European colonial empires in the Middle East.4 The ease with which a defence of empire has been mounted and a colonial project so unabashedly resurrected makes this a particularly opportune, if not necessary, moment, as scholars of ‘the global’, to take stock of our disciplinary complicities with power, to account for colonialist imaginaries that are lodged at the heart of a discipline ostensibly interested in power but perhaps far too deluded by the formal equality of state sovereignty and overly concerned with security and order. Perhaps more than any other scholar, Edward Said’s groundbreaking work in Orientalism has argued and demonstrated the long and deep complicity of academic scholarship with colonial domination.5 In addition to spawning whole new areas of scholarship such as postcolonial studies, Said’s writings have had considerable influence in his own discipline of comparative literature but also in such varied disciplines as anthropology, geography and history, all of which have taken serious and sustained stock of their own participation in imperial projects and in fact regrouped around that consciousness in a way that has simply not happened with International Relations.6 It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power. Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the disciplinary traps that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think globally and politically. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking politics seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the global seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about feeling and thinking globally concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power. 17Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.2

#### Voting neg enforces a retooling of rhetoric in debate – reject western centric scholarship that is the root of the violence we’ve described thus far – allowing for non-Western scholarship rejects orientalist outlooks on the world, allowing for “pluri-versality”

Andrews 12. [Nathan Andrews University of Alberta, “The Big Bang Theories of International Relations (IR): Who Said What, When, How, and What’s Missing”, June 13-15, 2012, Canadian Political Science Association URL: [https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2012/Andrews.pdf]recut](https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2012/Andrews.pdf%5drecut) **//BRownRice**

First, non-Western IR reveals the possibility of a field of study that clearly represents the name ‘international’. IR is characterised by a ‘representational deficiency’, as I call it, because it lacks the proper incorporation and recognition of the various approaches that can help it to be properly ‘international’. To be sure IR has been called different names including an “American social science” (Hoffman 1977), a “not-so international discipline” (Waever 1998), a “hegemonic discipline” (Smith 2002), a “disjunctive empire” (Yew 2003) and a “colonial household” (Agathangelou and Ling 2004; Inayatollah & Blaney 2004). This discussion did not begin just today. Thus, I emphasise this deficiency not because it has not been discussed; it is because not much attention has been devoted to it still. And if we should continue to claim that the discipline is indeed ‘international’, the prominent scholars should not remain just North Americans and some Europeans. To cite one example, a recent publication titled, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations (Griffiths et al. 2009), reveals a tall list of all the theorists who matter in IR. The list cannot be rehearsed here but the key point to note is that while this list includes theories – from realism to historical sociology – none of the theorists listed is of a non-Western origin, although not all of them necessarily uphold a western ontology as defined above. The argument here is validated by the fact that out of fifty so-called ‘key thinkers’ in IR, not even one African, South American or Asian scholar is cited. This is not due to mere forgetfulness. Rather, it does indicate that “the ‘who’ of IR studies continues to be a select number of academics hailing primarily from the countries of the core” (Tickner 2003, 296). Let me add that it is not just about hoping that “the days of the Third World being on the margins of the discipline of International Relations will soon be over” (Caroline and Wilkin 2004, 255) but by doing something about the current state of affairs in a more sustainable manner. Second, bringing in non-Western IR de-centres and de-territorializes the ‘norm’ or status quo by shifting the discipline from the myopic singularities (‘single stories’) of pervasive mainstream conceptions. As Hobson (2012) shows, IR narratives have portrayed a “West Side Story” as the purpose of the discipline is to promote and defend Western civilisation (cited in de Carvalho et al. 2011, 750), a case where broader disciplinary dialogue has been rendered irrelevant. And this is simply the outcome: “the Eurocentric give away lies in the point that they reified the West and denied the East agency” (ibid., 752). However, such a myth becomes normalised as ‘common sense’ because 1) the historical literature on 1648 is hardly read and scrutinised; 2) IR scholars prefer to rely on standard and mainstream textbook discussions in areas outside their expertise; and 3) there is an inherent tendency towards ‘presentism’ – the here and now (ibid., 756). To Acharya and Buzan (2007),the absence of non-Western IR theory has been perpetuated not by the absolute lack of what constitute the ‘good life’ in the non-West but rather by ideational and perceptual forces, which fuel a mixture of “Gramscian hegemonies, and ethnocentrism and the politics of exclusion” (288). To them, this is further facilitated by the Eurocentric framing of world history and the fact that most mainstream IR theory has its origins in Western philosophy and political theory. Thinking post-Western IR will have to be able to overcome these shortfalls by rewriting the West’s own history to reveal its biased representation in standard textbooks, and scholars must be ready to read outside the mainstream box for a better understanding of the genealogies that undergird most of the popular concepts in IR. In this regard, I will agree with Welch (2003) that IR theorists should stop reading Thucydides because such reading makes them think of only wars and the overbearing power of ‘the strong’, inhibiting the contribution/influence ‘the weak’ can make/have. Third, the incorporation of non-Western worldviews will propel the field of study towards “pluri-versality” instead of universality (see Mignolo 2009), which is good for the variety and diversity of its objects of study. Steve Smith, in his 2003 Presidential to the International Studies Association, did not mince words when he posited that “the discipline of International Relations has been a very partial one. It has been a view decidedly from somewhere, and that somewhere has been the world of the wealthy, imperial powers” (2004, 507). He argued that theorists should desist from hiding “behind the mask of value-neutrality and empiricism” to theorise in a manner that will make the discipline less hegemonic (ibid., 514). This hegemony does not only reside in the theories propounded but also the medium through which they become known. Herman Daly, a non-IR scholar, gave the following revelation in his 1996 publication. In 1994 I decided to leave the World Bank to return to academia. I certainly had no illusion that I was leaving blindness and corruption behind and entering a realm of truth and honesty... If I had harboured such an illusion it would have quickly been dispelled by an experience with the MIT Press that taught me that prestigious universities can sometimes be less committed to free speech and open debate than commercial publishers (Daly 1996, 10). This is a general statement that may not be relevant to a discussion of IR as a so-called ‘discipline’ but it is instructive in showing the epistemic imperialism that exists in the academy. Waever (1998) in tracing the evolution of IR from Germany, France, the UK and the US has also shown this parochialism in leading IR journals and publication houses. The outstanding question is, what is the essence of our scholarship if certain opinions will be shut down by those (gatekeepers) who possess the technological and distributive instruments requisite for the spread of these opinions?12 This hegemony needs to be overcome by opening up the discipline to diversity and variety not just within the West but also from the non-West. This trend has resulted in the perception of Africa, for instance, as a conformist continent or a “follower-society” that will continue to imitate the west without any clear theoretical, empirical or even ideological originality (Adele 2000, 8). While some theorists argue that the existence of ‘original’ non-Western IR may be difficult to find or perhaps non-existent (see Bilgin 2008; Qin 2007), I argue that this difficulty resides in the fact that efforts have not been made to find them. Additionally, it does also depend on how we define theory. If the definition of theory takes up the rationalist straightjacket, where ‘good’ theory is measured by its six positivist criteria, namely; accuracy, falsifiability, explanatory power, progressivity (as opposed to degenerating in its research programs), consistency (with what is known in other areas) and parsimony (Vasquez 1995, 230) then some non-Western contributions that employ critical narrative inquiry or ‘thick descriptions’ will not conform. But IR needs to move past this Archimedean point to embrace the criticality, reflexivity, and self-consciousness of the ‘reality’ it tries to explain. Finally, by looking outside the West for alternative definitions of what IR entails we will be thinking of a ‘post-racist’ discipline (see Hobson 2007) through a decolonisation of the subject matter, management of knowledge, and concepts/methods, and academic independence or potentially interdependence. Until quite recently, there was some kind of an embedded silence even among critical scholars of the role of non-Western ideas/knowledge in IR. How critical and emancipatory can we get if indeed we exclude the very people we seek to emancipate from the frontiers of such debates? As it stands now, the empire of IR has become a house full of (over)privileged white American and a few British men (and a few women additions) who accept only their interpretations as what constitutes the ‘real world’. According to Shilliam (2011), “the attribution of who can ‘think’ and produce valid knowledge of human existence has always been political; but it was made all the more so in the nineteenth century when Georg Hegel gave the philosopher a central role in the development and cultivation of the modern self” (2, emphasis in original). Arguing that world order is continually characterised by imperialism, Saurin (2006) notes that the need to decolonise IR is imperative. Right from the time IR is said to have come into existence, that is 1919, the assumptions, concepts, and language of inquiry have been “infused with imperial and colonial reasoning” (ibid., 24). And due to its primary quest “to nationalise social scientific enquiry” resulted in several illusions of what IR is (ibid., 31); these illusions or ‘foundational myths’ were facilitated by the prevailing Eurocentrism in world history – a modernity based on European discovery of ‘the rest of the world’ (see Halperin 2006). A post-racist IR will not only require the centering of marginalised interpretations and voices, but also the re-interpretation (and potential de-centering) of prevailing ones to reveal their obscured shortcomings. It would also require the field of study to think beyond its decidedly stringent Western, rationalist framework by moving beyond the essentialist characterisations of ‘the West’ and ‘the rest’ as depicted by Huntington (1993) and an absolute abolishing of Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man (1992)13 in terms of deorientalising the ‘other’14 because civilisation “never has a final definitive form” (Cox 1995, 14; see also Shani 2008).

#### **Orientalism is only rejected by an incorporation of “The Orient’s” point of view on an international scale – the alt is key to embracing a more critical evaluation of their research and generalizations**

Chandran 14(Pavitha Chandran, 06-21-2014, "Orientalism – Postcolonial Studies," https://scholarblogs.emory.edu/postcolonialstudies/2014/06/21/orientalism/)**//BRownRice**

Said calls into question the underlying assumptions that form the foundation of Orientalist thinking. A rejection of Orientalism entails a rejection of biological generalizations, cultural constructions, and racial and religious prejudices. It is a rejection of greed as a primary motivating factor in intellectual pursuit. It is an erasure of the line between ‘the West’ and ‘the Other.’ Said argues for the use of ‘narrative’ rather than ‘vision’ in interpreting the geographical landscape known as the Orient, meaning that a historian and a scholar would turn not to a panoramic view of half of the globe, but rather to a focused and complex type of history that allows space for the dynamic variety of human experience. Rejection of Orientalist thinking does not entail a denial of the differences between ‘the West’ and ‘the Orient,’ but rather an evaluation of such differences in a more critical and objective fashion. ‘The Orient’ cannot be studied in a non-Orientalist manner; rather, the scholar is obliged to study more focused and smaller culturally consistent regions. The person who has until now been known as ‘the Oriental’ must be given a voice. Scholarship from afar and second-hand representation must take a back seat to narrative and self-representation on the part of the ‘Oriental.’

### AT: retooling fails

#### They misunderstand the alt – we don’t get rid of western IR but rather incorporate the orient’s point of view as well

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Response: ‘Global IR’ Sharing these concerns, more recent studies have begun to pay greater attention to the globalisation of IR in an attempt to render the discipline more inclusive. It sets out to safeguard against a tug of war between Western and non-Western IR and a subsumption of one of them in favour of the other. Amitav Acharya is probably the most passionate scholar in this regard. In his presidential address at the annual convention of the International Studies Association in 2014, Acharya explained what ‘Global IR’ is or should be. His background assumption is this: IR does ‘not reflect the voices, experiences … and contributions of the vast majority of the societies and states in the world’ (Acharya, 2014: 647). Yet, instead of arguing for a counter (i.e. ‘non-Western’) approach, he presented the possibility of a ‘Global IR’ that transcends the divide between the ‘West and the Rest’. In his views, IR should be ‘a truly inclusive’ discipline that recognises its multiple and diverse foundations. What ‘Global IR’ calls for is not to discard or disavow Western-centric IR, but rather to render it more inclusive and broader, so that it reflects voices and experiences outside the West more fully (Acharya, 2016). In this regard, Acharya and Buzan (2017) have recently noted as follows: while the development of national schools can contribute to the goal of a Global IR … our key concern about any national school is whether it can ‘deprovincialize’ – i.e. travel beyond the national or regional context from which it is derived in the first place. (Acharya and Buzan, 2017: 361)

### Travelers Knowledge

#### **Vote neg and reject the aff to endorse models of the Traveler’s Knowledge, which allows us to disrupt our own and structural modes of Orientalist and colonialist thought and lead to true liberation.**

Leonardo 18 (Zeus Leonardo, "Dis-orienting Western Knowledge", The Cambridge Journal of Anthropology, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26945997, Autumn 2018, Accessed 7-19-2022)//ILake🪐

Contrapuntal analysis is not a cavalier, relativist or feel-good point about making room for everyone in the rainbow collaborative. One wonders how Said, had he lived longer, would have made sense of President Trump. Following the logic of contrapuntal co-existence, curriculum then becomes an instance in the musical ensemble of learning how we live with others as part of living with oneself. He writes: We should regard knowledge as something for which to risk identity … academic freedom as an invitation to give up on identity in the hope of understanding and perhaps even assuming more than one. We must always view the academy as a place to voyage in, owning none of it but at home everywhere in it. (Said 2000: 403) The traveller’s knowledge, secure but contingent, becomes a way of knowing without the ideological excesses of either certainty or indeterminacy. Said sometimes showed little patience for infinite play, Derrida being on the receiving end of some of Said’s criticisms (1983), as much as Said derided the chauvinism in what Freire (1994) once called ‘smug Marxis[m]’. As well, Said (1994a) does not fraternize with ethnic triumphalism when he pronounces, ‘I have no patience with the position that “we” should only or mainly be concerned with what is “ours”’ (xxv). Said encourages us to be at home in exile and to stand with the exile wherever we find a home. We need not agree with Bachelard’s (1964) ‘epistemological rupture’, appropriated as the ‘epistemological break’ by his former student, Althusser (1971), to arrive at Said’s basic point that the geo-politics of knowledge requires not only an inversion of a previous system but a more complete overhaul or transformation of that system. Decolonizing the curriculum through nationalism, even a counter one at that, is only one necessary step towards liberation. As Said (2000) notes, one of the first sites of change after decolonization was the schools, such as the Arabization of the curriculum and changing intellectual norms, including values to be taught. The inversion of orientalism comes in two possible forms, the first and more benign being nationalism, the second and more nefarious being occidentalism. Having successfully avoided the second does not guard against the limitations of the first. As an epistemological limit, nationalism encourages schools and students to become different but Said ponders the importance of becoming something else altogether. Said (2000) fears that nationalism in the university has represented not freedom but accommodation, not brilliance and daring but caution and fear, not advancement of knowledge but self-preservation. Not unlike the Fanon ([1961] 2005) of The Wretched of the Earth, who was apprehensive that the native bourgeoisie after decolonization would become a conservative force, Said questions nationalism’s ability to change what Althusser (1971) calls the ‘problematic’, which is not the generation of new knowledge for its own sake, even its revolutionary form, but knowledge as a new theory of society. Sans the science fetish of Althusser, Said calls for a new function of knowledge. Likewise, he critiques postmodernism’s attempt to knock high culture off its pedestal in favour of celebrating popular culture. This move may be a nod to studying former NBA player Shaquille over Shakespeare but it replaces one form of essentialism with another as a knee-jerk reaction to western knowledge and its pretences, in one fell swoop. Here Said sides with the official party line of the Frankfurt School with respect to the culture industry (Horkheimer and Adorno 1976). To Said, over-celebratory analysis of popular culture is intellectual provincialism disguised as the opposite of elitism. But worldly in his approach, Said is able to keep his ear to the ground as well. Apposite to the fury over Saul Bellow’s incendiary comment (paraphrased here as ‘Show me the African Proust … or Zulu Tolstoy!’), Said shows his contempt for the former Nobel Prize winner’s impertinence even as Said is able to admit Proust or Tolstoy’s greatness (and Bellow’s, for that matter) (see Said 1994a: 25 and 328). Classically trained in European letters from grade school to grad school, Said assimilated the European canon if only later to be able to interrogate it. He did not accomplish this feat without also enjoying in no small way the pleasures of engaging the ‘great works’. He is not a cheerleader of popular culture and took some pride in critical judgement about rarified art, classical music and high literature without their fetish. Said was far more familiar with Leavis and Whitehead than he was of Beavis and Butt-Head. In this sense, he is as conservative as they come, something of which he admits being guilty. He was able to launch one of the most searing and searching critiques of orientalism and imperialism, particularly in literature, only by going through, and not around, the great works. In order to accomplish this, he had to wade through what Matthew Arnold (1867) was fond of calling ‘Culture’, or the best that a society has produced. Travelling curriculum and the decolonization movement The Decolonial Group travels to Barcelona, Spain every summer to hold its summer school and annual meeting. Not to be equated with postcolonial scholars like Bhabha, who concentrate on the colonial history between European centres and the Southeast Asian corridor, the Decolonial Group focuses its assault on the relationship between Latin America and the handful of European nations that have a virtual monopoly on philosophical thought, particularly its epistemological roots. From Dussel to Grosfoguel, this second articulation of colonial criticism shifts the debate to another territory in the geo-politics of knowledge on the nature of what Walter Mignolo (2002) calls the ‘colonial difference’. That said, I am not making a radical cut between postcolonial and decolonial writers as ultimately separate movements, even if they maintain important distinctions from one another. The ‘post’ in postcolonial is by and large compatible with the ‘de’ in decolonial; both are anti-colonial and anti-imperialist. Both do not reject Marxism outright but neither do they find its uptake of race to be satisfactory. For Said, Marxism’s main contestatory framework between workers and owners of capital cannot explain what he sees as the more-than-economic strife tearing up the global social fabric, not the least of which is the role of imperialism. Although their points of reference differ and the decolonial scholars are more at home in the social sciences and philosophy department than the literary-based postcolonialists, decolonial and postcolonial scholarship converges on a common target of critique: Eurocentrism. Decolonizing the curriculum or colonization of cognition takes as its starting point the critique of colonial-imperial relations. But Said, like his close colleague Noam Chomsky, was always clear that power asymmetries, while formidable, were ultimately not indomitable. Said (2004) insisted on worldliness not only as a way to arrive at a text’s immanent structure as indefatigably historical but as a way of being in the world, of being with others. The comparatist Said was never radically separate from the teacherly Edward and the latter made appearances now and then in the philologist’s prose. In other words, the university classroom is a social laboratory for testing the integrity of his otherwise lofty ideas, such as contrapuntality (2001), intellectuals as amateurs (1994b) and the hermeneutics of exile (2000). Always working against the grain, Said nevertheless promoted what Freire ([1970] 1993) would have called ‘generosity’, which guards against the bad faith that creeps in after decades of trying to explain the underbelly of a hidden history, a certain misanthropy and necrophilia. Although it seems the two never actually met in person, Said and Freire were conceptual travellers with a shared destination. As a professor of comparative literature for many decades at Columbia University, a Harvard doctoral student in the 1960s and a host of boarding school experiences before that, Said has a sort of bookish biography. He experienced colonial schools in several countries, travelled all over the globe and was as erudite as they come. These travels were both literal and existential for the younger Said, an unsettling time that impacted his intellectual work and made the more mature Said less inclined to settle for silver-bullet, single-axis explanations about the nature of historical experience (see also Leonardo 2013). By the time he wrote the Introduction to Culture and Imperialism, he announces that it is ‘an exile’s book’ (1994a: xxvi). Travel is the exile’s mode of nomadic living and Said could hardly avoid bringing this constitutive part of his social conditioning into his teaching and opinions about pedagogy. Our model for academic freedom should therefore be the migrant or traveler: for if, in the real world outside the academy, we must needs be ourselves and only ourselves, inside the academy we should be able to discover and travel among other selves, other identities, other varieties of the human adventure. (Said 2000: 403) This is not the kind of travel one finds on a cable channel endorsed by Rupert Murdoch. And it is not the sort of travel that mainstream multiculturalism is successful in propagating, perhaps captured by the guilty pleasure of watching ‘American Idol’. Said’s travelling theory, as outlined in a book chapter by that title (1983), encourages the practice of knowledge as unsystematic (in the sense of abandoning originary thinking), unexpert (in the sense of reconstructing authority) and unexploratory (in the sense of positioning itself against discovery). The de/ postcolonial traveller remains ‘skeptical and critical, succumbing neither to dogmatism nor to sulky gloom’ (Said 1983: 230). This is a form of learning that differs from the institutional apparatus we call ‘schooling’ that is more concerned with socialization’s teleological function than the educational function that prepares students for the ‘incalculable’ and ‘irreducible’ other (see Biesta 2010). It differs from uncritical forms of ethnic-based pedagogy because a travelling pedagogy interrogates any essentialist arrival at questions of identity, ethnic or otherwise. The image of the traveler depends not on power but on motion, on a willingness to go into different worlds, use different idioms, and understand a variety of disguises, masks, and rhetorics. Travelers must suspend the claim of customary routine in order to live in new rhythms and rituals. Most of all, and most unlike the potentate who must guard only one place and defend its frontiers, the traveler crosses over, traverses territory, and abandons fixed positions, all the time. (Said 2000: 404) Not unlike Giroux’s (1992) ‘border pedagogy’, Said’s suggestion is not meant to be a form of trendy artifice. It is a traveller’s perspective without the baggage of tourist mentality. It is a cultural politics of responsibility for the other who represents no ultimate instrumentality but for the desire to co-exist in a relation of difference without derision. It is not a fetish of the new in the capitalist sense of commodity production amidst the old story of exploitation, but a newness that reminds us of the dynamism and motion of real, historical life. In Said’s words, ‘Peace is the state of distinctness without domination, with the distinct participating in each other’ (2000: 172). As a politics of difference, knowledge is forged in the interstices between self and other, where the other is not the foil for the self but its contrapuntal partner. If the colonial-imperial lifeworld is maleducative because it fixes knowledge as something to be discovered and then imposed, then the decolonial imperative is to insist on its openness. Just as history is there for the taking, as Freire always insisted, knowledge is there for the making. If the colonial situation is a process of layered enclosures, then decolonization is the unveiling of its harms through complete disclosure and then looking for escape hatches. Colonized subjects occupy a central role in this truth and reconciliation process, but there is so much distortion to their development that educators must at least be Fanonian in their suspicions that forms of self-violence, or refusals about what the self has become under the colonial regime, are a necessary part of decolonization (see Leonardo and Porter 2010; Leonardo and Singh 2017). That is, colonial regulation of being, from the Manichean division of people to apartheid in everyday life, subverts the colonized’s ability to establish clarity about their predicament. For so long, knowledge of the world served the master race’s whims, compromising the subordinate races’ true desires for liberation, often aspiring to be like the colonizer in search of an authentic image of the human (Freire [1970] 1993). Dis-orienting the desire to become suboppressors is at least half the task. For Said, the mistake has been oppositional thought’s ability to stop at the door of liberation by settling for sovereignty or independence. Settling down is seductive, especially after so many years of movement where the colonial body is treated as something to be carted around or displaced from one location to another. This was sometimes articulated with the educational system involving Native Americans in the US, for whom boarding school was a form of enclosure, physically and intellectually (Dog and Erdoes 1999). It may be a natural reaction to desire stillness in its many manifestations, from nationalism to nascent essentialism. Travelling curricula prefer to emphasize the dynamic history that provides the backdrop of knowledge and pedagogy. Intellectuals may be able to fix or freeze it, but this is a temporary condition in order to answer the exigencies of life, university or otherwise. Said’s de/postcolonial perspective represents a pronounced ambivalence that opens up rather than closes off potentialities, dislodges the potentate that has structured academic life ever since the first westerner walked onto its shores. It is an education worth the name, a culture shared rather than a superior one that hovers, and a knowledge defined by what it can reveal rather than what it covers.

### AT: Perm

#### The perm fails – Western pursuits of “freedom” and “democracy” hold fundamental epistemologies that reject local cultures, further cementing orientalism into US foreign policy that ensures cooperation between the East and the West fail.

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The **failure of Afghanistan** should open our eyes to the fact that **we don’t really know** other countries and cultures at all. In the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, then British Prime Minister Tony Blair expressed his conviction that the people of Iraq would welcome “liberation” by the United States and Britain. He **refused to listen** to warnings that Britain’s imperial record in Iraq would in fact lead them to regard British military intervention with instinctive distrust and hostility. Yet Blair was also the first British prime minister to apologize in public for the crimes of the British empire. As with Western liberal internationalists in general, this acknowledgement of past national sins did not qualify in any way Blair’s assumption of the right to lecture other nations on their sins, tell them how they should be governed, and invade them in the name of building democracy. This combination of attitudes is inexplicable in rational terms — but makes perfect sense as a manifestation of secular religion. In a religious context, how often have loud public confessions of personal sinfulness provided the justification for ferocious condemnation of the sins of others? This combination is to be found in those American liberal internationalists who have acknowledged and apologized for systematic American support for savage Middle Eastern dictatorships — **only to demand** that people in the Middle East trust their promises that this time, a U.S. administration is **really, truly sincere** about bringing democracy to the region. Why on earth, on the basis of all past evidence, should any Arab or Iranian trust such promises? Indeed, on the basis of their past record, would you buy a used car from these drummers for democracy? Blair’s combination of **ideological fanaticism** and the total **historical illiteracy** on which it depends was starkly revealed in his July 2003 speech to the U.S. Congress justifying the invasion of Iraq: “Ours are not Western values. They are the universal values of the human spirit and anywhere, any time, ordinary people are given the chance to choose, the choice is the same. Freedom not tyranny. Democracy not dictatorship.” This belief **permeated the rhetoric of the Bush administration** after 9/11, the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002, and the “Freedom Agenda” for the Middle East. In the words of that NSS: “The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom – and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy and free enterprise…People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children – male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society…” In a somewhat less blatant form, this continues to form the core ideological doctrine of most of the Western media and vast range of Western institutions, including those aid ministries engaged in promoting “governance reform” elsewhere in the world. The **denial** of the importance of **local histories and traditions**, as well as the lessons drawn from the imperial history of the West, is **intrinsic to the American and European** sense of **ideological mission** in the world, which underpins their claims to **global and regional hegemony**. It is also to some extent **intrinsic** to how the Western bureaucracies concerned operate. Bureaucracy, as well as ideology, demands universal templates, universally applicable. For the bureaucracy to function smoothly (as opposed to the achievement of **actual change**), **local expertise is more a hindrance** than a help. Furthermore, the fact that in many parts of the world, the priority of personal safety (known in British officialdom as “The Duty of Care”) means that Western officials can barely travel outside the capital cities, or even outside their own embassies and international hotels. After a couple of years, having failed to develop any serious knowledge of one society, they hop on to try to implement identical programs in another society — which they also **fail to study**. The result: programs that have only the most tangential relationship to local reality, and consequently, don’t stand the remotest chance of even limited success. For example, British officers and officials working in Helmand province of Afghanistan were on the most part completely ignorant of the local Battle of Maiwand in 1879, in which Afghans defeated a British army. Every Helmandi knew of this battle, and most were convinced (absurdly, but still) that a key motive for the British military presence today was to get revenge for Maiwand. Academia has played its own part in **undermining** the West’s ability to engage meaningfully with political, social and economic developments elsewhere in the world. Recent decades have seen a steep decline in history and area studies (and foreign languages in the United States and UK). Their place has been taken by disciplines based overwhelmingly on Western **liberal prejudices masquerading** as objective general theories, with “rational choice theory” as the crassest version of this.

# K – Techno-orientalism

## 1NC shell

#### We are living in the age of fear politics – the war on terror ended years ago yet today’s politicians still insist on the expansion of the western security state – fear-mongering rhetoric like that of the 1ac serves the purpose of continuing the political project of collective political fear

Robin 11(Corey Robin, 2011, “The Politics of Fear”, https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/22/the-politics-of-fear/)**//BRownRice**

In my 2004 book Fear: The History of a Political Idea, I argued that “one day, the war on terrorism will come to an end. All wars do. And when it does, we will find ourselves still living in fear: not of terrorism or radical Islam, but of the domestic rulers that fear has left behind.” When I wrote “one day,” I was thinking decades, not years. I figured that the war on terror—less the invasions, wars, torture, drone attacks, and assassinations than the broader atmosphere of pervasive and militarized dread, what Hobbes called “a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known” and an enemy is perceived as permanent and irrepressible—would continue at least into the 2010s, if not the ’20s. Yet even before Osama bin Laden was killed and negotiations with the Taliban had begun, it was clear that the war on terror, understood in those terms, had come to an end. As early as the 2004 presidential campaign, Democratic candidate John Kerry had hinted at such a possibility in an interview with Matt Bai in The New York Times Magazine: When I asked Kerry what it would take for Americans to feel safe again, he displayed a much less apocalyptic worldview. “We have to get back to the place we were, where terrorists are not the focus of our lives, but they’re a nuisance,” Kerry said. “As a former law-enforcement person, I know we’re never going to end prostitution. We’re never going to end illegal gambling. But we’re going to reduce it, organized crime, to a level where it isn’t on the rise. It isn’t threatening people’s lives every day, and fundamentally, it’s something that you continue to fight, but it’s not threatening the fabric of your life.” A Kinsley gaffe if ever there was one, Kerry’s comment may have helped seal his fate in that election. Even so, it laid down a marker of what has essentially come to pass: Though the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan go on, though the United States continues to assassinate actual and suspected terrorists throughout the Middle East and Central Asia, though security lines continue to snake around airport corners, the high-octane politics of fear we saw in the aftermath of 9/11 has, for all intents and purposes, dissipated. The threat of terrorism is no longer the focus of our days—indeed, probably hasn’t been since 2006; it is instead a nuisance, something the government continues to fight but not something threatening the fabric of our lives. Yet, as others in this symposium have noted, the political infrastructure of fear—the bureaucracies and institutions created in the wake of 9/11, the profiling and practices of surveillance, the laws and enforcement agencies—survives. We still have a Department of Homeland Security and a Patriot Act, Guantánamo is open for service, and what my colleague Jeanne Theoharis calls “Guantánamo at home”—the draconian policies and procedures, directed primarily at Muslims and Arabs, in the federal prison system—has not been scrutinized or even discussed. And all this, it hardly needs be said, nearly three years into the Obama Administration. From these polar realities—a thinning atmosphere of political fear, an expanding infrastructure of political fear—I draw two conclusions. First, the politics of fear is far less dependent upon the actual psychic experience of the public than analysts would have us think. While many believe that the individual emotions of the citizenry propel the policies the government pursues, I see little evidence of that. Even if we assume that each and every member of the public is experiencing fear, that experience still doesn’t explain the policies. A frightened population could just as easily inspire the government to pursue policies that would dampen rather than arouse fear. It is politics that produces policies, not fear. In any event, the public’s putative experience of fear cannot explain the persistence, indeed the enhancement, of the kind of government policies and practices we’ve seen in the last five years or so. A combination of bureaucratic inertia and partisan interests, in which neither party has much incentive to do anything on behalf of a persecuted minority—the sorry stuff, in other words, of old-fashioned political science—explains far more than do speculation and experiments in social or cognitive psychology. Second, journalists and scholars too often assume that the public is united in its fear because the objects of fear—terrorism, radical Islam, and so on—are equally threatening to each and every member of the public. But as Hobbes understood so well, men and women do argue about political threats—whether they exist, whom they threaten, whence they come, how to respond to them. They argue about political threats for the same reason they argue about other political matters: Perceptions of harm are dependent upon beliefs about good and evil, justice and injustice, and experiences of harm are mediated by material factors such as one’s standing in the world. Indeed, it was this profoundly human penchant to argue about threats that drove Hobbes to insist it was among the sovereign’s most important duties to simply decide, to declare by fiat, whether a nation was threatened or not—and that it was among the subject’s most important duties to allow the sovereign to make that decision. Far from assuming that this right of the sovereign to identify public threats would be easily accepted, however, Hobbes understood that it had to be defended through a comprehensive effort of popular instruction—a project, judging by the debates over national security that have punctuated American history from its inception (remember the Hartford Convention?), in which few governments have ever succeeded. That sovereigns have to assert that they are the deciders of our fears testifies to the fact that national security is no more a source of unity than Social Security. As we’ve seen over the last decade, citizens still disagree about threats and how to respond to them, and they experience political fear in different ways. A Muslim or Arab citizen of the United States might well be more afraid of government surveillance than of a terrorist attack. An unemployed middle-aged woman may be more concerned about economic insecurity or poverty than Al Qaeda. And even threats that do temporarily command the public’s attention seldom yield united responses beyond the very short term. A unity of fear, then, is not an artifact of mass psychology; it is a political project, crafted through leadership, ideology, and collective action. Like many political projects, it often fails, or at least does not fully succeed. And when it fails—dissenters question whether we need be afraid, citizens cease to pay attention to “orange” and “red” alerts, parties focus on other items of public concern—governments either try to enlarge the infrastructure by insulating it against the vagaries of public opinion, or dampen the dissent. Again, old-fashioned politics. Since 9/11, we’ve gotten used to the phrase “the politics of fear.” It’s high time we started taking the politics part more seriously.

#### [Links]

#### **Techno-orientalism is one manifestation of orientalism that involves viewing Asians as technologically superior. The aff’s propagation of information capitalism asserts its usage of U.S. dominance as means to reaffirm harmful stereotypes and perpetuate superiority over developing nations.**

Roh et al. 15 [David S. Roh, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara., 2015, "Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media," pp. 1-20: “Technologizing Orientalism”, Rutgers University Press, [https://muse.jhu.edu/book/40896]//AA](https://muse.jhu.edu/book/40896%5d//AA)

A century has passed since British author Sax Rohmer introduced the character Dr. Fu Manchu, whose particular brand of Eastern mysticism wedded with Western science both terrorized and titillated readers and audiences alike. Appearing in 1912, the character is perhaps one of the earliest and most potent instances of techno-Orientalist expression. A figure of unnatural, unknowable peril who must be kept from acquiring knowledge lest it be used against the Western subject, Dr. Fu Manchu is at once brilliant and technologically challenged. In one part of the serial, Dr. Fu Manchu plots to strengthen China by kidnapping European engineers, suggesting the Orient’s lack of technological prowess and desire for Western technology. Yet, in another, he is described as possessing “all the cruel cunning of the entire Eastern race, accumulated in one giant intellect, with all the resources of science, past and present.”1 Both of the past and the future, his monstrous form captured Western ambivalences toward what it regarded as the mysterious power of the East, manifesting in strange contradictions. Throughout the twentieth century, variations of that premodern-hypermodern dynamic in speculative visions of Asia and Asians have been recycled numerous times.2 Exemplars include the villainous Khan Noonien Singh in Gene Roddenberry’s Star Trek universe, the leader of a group of superhumans who attempt to take control of the Starship Enterprise; the Chinese scientist Dr. X in Neal Stephenson’s novel, The Diamond Age (1995), a counterfeiter using “a gallimaufry of contraband technology” (73) to steal Western innovations; and most recently The Mandarin in Iron Man 3 (2013), a clear revival of Dr. Fu Manchu played cleverly by Ben Kingsley in a tongue-in-cheek fashion.3 But Western speculations of an Asianized future are not always consolidated in a singular fictional figure as in Fu Manchu, Dr. X, or The Mandarin. The yellow peril anxiety of an earlier, industrial-age era embodied by Fu Manchu found new forms across cultures and hemispheres as Asian economies become more visible competitors in the age of globalization and rapid technological innovations. One needs to witness only the speculative fictional worlds of Maureen McHugh’s novel China Mountain Zhang (1992), Joss Whedon’s television series Firefly (2002), and Gary Shteyngart’s novel Super Sad True Love Story (2010) to trace persisting anxieties over the past three decades of a Chinadominated future. All of these worlds feature Western protagonists struggling to navigate a sociopolitical landscape in which China is the dominant global empire with a superior technological edge. Beyond the focus on China, paradigmatic works such as William Gibson’s Japan-based oeuvre (including Neuromancer), Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner, and the Wachowskis’ The Matrix films have also burnished in the Western consciousness Asian-influenced visions of the future underpinned by a familiar yet estranged mixture of Orientalist sensibilities. These examples perfectly illustrate our definition of techno-Orientalism: the phenomenon of imagining Asia and Asians in hypo- or hypertechnological terms in cultural productions and political discourse.4 Techno-Orientalist imaginations are infused with the languages and codes of the technological and the futuristic. These developed alongside industrial advances in the West and have become part of the West’s project of securing dominance as architects of the future, a project that requires configurations of the East as the very technology with which to shape it. Techno-Orientalist speculations of an Asianized future have become ever more prevalent in the wake of neoliberal trade policies that enabled greater flow of information and capital between the East and the West. Substantial criticism of techno-Orientalism emerged in the mid-1990s when cultural theorists began to trace its manifestations and theorize its causes and implications. Kevin Morley and David Robins, Toshiya Ueno, and Kumiko Sato, principal trailblazers of the field, laid much of the valuable groundwork. Morley and Robins’s Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes, and Cultural Boundaries (Routledge, 1995), in which a definition of “techno-Orientalism” first saw print, remains the most cited in critical assessments of technological and Orientalist discourses; however, Ueno has probably written most extensively about techno-Orientalism as a discursive cultural phenomenon in the era of what he identifies as the “post-Fordist social environment of globalization” (223). “The basis of Orientalism and xenophobia is the subordination of Others through a sort of ‘mirror of cultural conceit,’” Ueno explains. “The Orient exists in so far as the West needs it, because it brings the project of the West into focus” (223). Whereas Orientalism, as a strategy of representational containment, arrests Asia in traditional, and often premodern imagery, techno-Orientalism presents a broader, dynamic, and often contradictory spectrum of images, constructed by the East and West alike, of an “Orient” undergoing rapid economic and cultural transformations. Techno-Orientalism, like Orientalism, places great emphasis on the project of modernity—cultures privilege modernity and fear losing their perceived “edge” over others. Stretching beyond Orientalism’s premise of a hegemonic West’s representational authority over the East, techno-Orientalism’s scope is much more expansive and bidirectional, its discourses mutually constituted by the flow of trade and capital across the hemispheres. As Ueno observes, techno-Orientalism is first and foremost an effect of globalism. “If the Orient was invented by the West,” he writes, “then the Techno-Orient was also invented by the world of information capitalism” (228). Technological developments, driven by the imperial aspirations and the appetites of consumerist societies on both sides of the Pacific, propel the engines of invention and production. In its wake, Western nations vying for cultural and economic dominance with Asian nations find in technoOrientalism an expressive vehicle for their aspirations and fears. Our volume, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, documents past and current constructions of the role of Asia in a technologized future and critically examines this proliferating phenomenon. Dr. Fu Manchu illustrates just one way in which techno-Orientalist imagery pervades Western cultural productions in the early twentieth century. The principal locales of techno-Orientalist projects as they developed in the late twentieth century have primarily been Japan and China. Ueno, whose influential analyses of “Japanimation” in the mid-1990s seeded the field of technoOrientalist studies, observes, “In Techno-Orientalism, Japan is not only located geographically, but is also projected chronologically. Jean Baudrillard once called Japan a satellite in orbit. Now Japan has been located in the future of technology” (228). Morley and Robins put a finer point on the temporal dimension of the spatial construction: “If the future is technological, and if technology has become ‘Japanised,’ then the syllogism would suggest that the future is now Japanese, too. The postmodern era will be the Pacific era. Japan is the future, and it is a future that seems to be transcending and displacing Western modernity” (168). Whereas Japan’s dubious honor as the original techno-Orient was bestowed in the eighties with the help of the cyberpunk movement, the techno-Orientalizing of China occurred roughly a decade later.5 China was not yet a competitor in the global economy in the 1980s, when the West focused its wary gaze on what it saw as an invasion of Japanese capital investments and imports into Western economies. When China was recognized as a newly industrialized country (NIC) in the 1990s and its influence in the global economy increased, it, too, became once again a target of techno-Orientalist fashioning. The discourse on China’s “rise” in the U.S. context, consistent with techno-Orientalist contradictions, has focused on constructing its people as a vast, subaltern-like labor force and as a giant consumer market whose appetite for Western cultural products, if nurtured, could secure U.S. global cultural and economic dominance. This dual image of China as both developing-world producers and firstworld consumers presents a representational challenge for the West: Is China a human factory? Or is it a consumerist society, like the United States, whose enormous purchasing power dictates the future of technological innovations and economies? Japan and China are thus signified differently in the techno-Orientalist vocabulary. Both are constructed as competitors and therefore threats to the U.S. economy; but while Japan competes with the United States for dominance in technological innovation, China competes with the United States in labor and production. To put it in starker terms, Japan creates technology, but China is the technology. In the eyes of the West, both are crucial engines of the future: Japan innovates and China manufactures. And as Asia, writ large, becomes a greater consumerist force than the West,6 its threat/value dualism commensurately increases. These differences in the technological signification of Japan and China manifest themselves in the fictive forecasts of the Asiantinged future. If Japan is a screen on which the West has projected its technological fantasies, then China is a screen on which the West projects its fears of being colonized, mechanized, and instrumentalized in its own pursuit of technological dominance. India, another NIC, has also found itself under the techno-Orientalist gaze as a consequence of U.S. outsourcing practices. As a much maligned business strategy, outsourcing has provoked extremely negative public sentiments in the United States. These opinions find expression in a particular strand of techno-Orientalist discourse that consolidates China and India as the chief threats to the U.S. service and labor sectors. These Asian nations serve as the scapegoats for corporate decisions to move service and manufacturing jobs abroad and bear the brunt of the resulting xenophobic antipathies. Chinese and Indian workers, for instance, are routinely portrayed in techno-Orientalist and technophobic vocabularies; call center employees in India adopt Western Christian names and mimic the linguistic and idiomatic style of Americans, a practice so ubiquitous as to be parodied cinematically in romantic comedies such as Outsourced (2006), conjuring images of Dickian androids (or Blade Runner’s “replicants”) who simulate human behavior and threaten the distinction between “real” and “fake” Americans. Glossy spreads of endless rows of Chinese workers in corporate factories and towns in mainstream magazines such as Time and Wired seal the visual vocabulary of Asians as the cogs of hyperproduction. In the NIC contexts, techno-Orientalist discourse constructs Asians as mere simulacra and maintains a prevailing sense of the inhumanity of Asian labor—the very antithesis of Western liberal humanism. Discursive Conspicuity, Critical Invisibility As this collection demonstrates, techno-Orientalism occurs across genres and disciplines—history, art, literature, film, television, video games—but the majority of the criticism coalesces around literature and film, particularly in the genre of speculative fiction (SF). This is unsurprising; techno-Orientalism finds some of its most pervasive expressions in SF because of the genre’s futurist esprit of contemporary existential, racial, and technological anxieties. Nevertheless, we identify a disciplinary narrowness to SF in the extant scholarship that our project attempts to broaden. Even as techno-Orientalism in SF has been documented by several incisive studies in recent decades, critical studies of Orientalism in the long history of FIG. 0.1. Factory workers in China. Source: Photo by Steve Jurvetson. Licensed under Creative Commons 2.0. SF are scarce. A survey of the essays published in the genre’s flagship journal, Science Fiction Studies, founded in 1973, confirms the critical neglect. A search with the term “Orientalism” in the journal’s archives yielded only nine substantive essays that address Orientalism, four of which are book reviews. A search with the term “techno-Orientalism” yielded, even more negligibly, two review essays. Similar searches in Extrapolations, another major academic venue for SF criticism, yielded equally scant results. And when PMLA, the lingua franca of academic scholarship in literature and languages, published a special issue on science fiction in May 2004, no mention of Orientalism could be found— this despite the fact that SF’s propensity for projecting and amplifying contemporary racial and imperialist attitudes is well documented.7 Indeed, the conceptualization of techno-Orientalism as a recognizable discursive effect of the postindustrial age may have been the clarion call for addressing this gap in the genre. Orientalism in SF during the pre-cyberpunk era may have suffered critical neglect because of the perception that the “yellow peril” has been kept in check by the mechanisms of immigration and exclusion acts that were in place for much of the midcentury. It took the repeal of the immigration acts in 1965, coupled with the entrance of Japanese capital and imports into the U.S. economy in the late seventies, to precipitate a renewed wariness toward all things Asian, onto which the West once again projected agendas of cultural hegemony and technological dominance. Cyberpunk, with its fetishizing gaze upon Japan as a seductive and contradictory space of futuristic innovation and ancient mystique, sharply focused the SF critical and creative lenses upon Asia. Substantial criticism of techno-Orientalism thus emerged in the mid1990s with the contributions of Morley and Robins, Ueno, and Sato. Critical momentum continued with Takayuki Tatsumi’s 2000 historiography of Japanese SF in Science Fiction Studies (SFS), and a 2002 special issue of SFS on Japanese speculative fiction, guest edited by Takayuki Tatsumi, Christopher Bolton, and Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., introduced Japanese SF and cyberpunk visions to the Western audience. Sato’s important and incisive 2004 intersectional analysis of what she describes as “the four different categorical spheres, namely, Western cyborg philosophy, American cyberpunk, Japanese cyberpunk, and Japanese theory of uniqueness known as nihonjinron” (335–336) and Christine Cornea’s chapter “Techno-Orientalism and the Postmodern Subject” in Jacqueline Furby and Karen Randell’s Screen Methods: Comparative Readings in Film Studies (Wallflower Press, 2006) sustained the necessary critical interest in the field. These studies, however, constitute the bulk of the critical history of technoOrientalism. Other studies in recent years, such as Mimi Thi Nguyen and Thuy Linh Nguyen Tu’s Alien Encounters: Popular Culture in Asian America (Duke, 2007), Wendy Hui Kyong Chun and Lynn Joyrich’s 2009 special issue of Camera Obscura, “Race and/as Technology,” Chun’s New Media, Old Technologizing Orientalism • 7 Media: A History and Theory Reader (Routledge, 2005), and Lisa Nakamura’s Cybertypes (Routledge, 2002), made significant contributions to critiques of Orientalism in popular culture and mainstream media. Yet, despite technoOrientalism’s growing prevalence in the Western cultural consciousness, and in SF more specifically, it has been generally ignored in academic and popular cultural spheres. A special issue of the literary journal MELUS, titled “Alien/Asians” (2008) and edited by Stephen Hong Sohn, expanded the critical scope of the phenomenon and drew it closer for theoretical scrutiny. Sohn’s introduction persuasively conveys the urgent need for vigilant documentation and analysis of the ever-growing techno-Orientalist vocabulary. The eight essays in the issue examine a range of techno-Orientalist instantiations in SF within U.S., Japanese, Chinese, and Indian contexts, from “a cyberpunk-inflected Asian future” to “the cyborg technologies intertwined with Asian American bodies” (Sohn 15). The essays, Sohn writes, “investigate how alternative imaginaries provide fertile terrains to consider the prospects of racial subjectivity and identity” (15). The essayists take a hard look at the work of SF luminaries such as Philip K. Dick, Ursula K. Le Guin, William Gibson, Neal Stephenson, and William S. Burroughs, whose work consciously or unconsciously traded in technoOrientalist tropes, as well as the work of Asian American and Asian Canadian writers such as Karen Tei Yamashita, Amitav Ghosh, and Larissa Lai, who mount metafictional critiques of techno-Orientalist tropes in SF. Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, therefore, has two objectives. The first is to continue the work begun by the aforementioned predecessors, to “consider the prospective thesis that cultural production is still invested in parsing out how the yellow peril continues to be a mode to draw from, write against, challenge, negotiate, and problematize” (Sohn 6–7). The volume argues that while Orientalism defines a modern West by producing an oppositional and premodern East, techno-Orientalism symmetrically and yet contradictorily completes this project by creating a collusive, futurized Asia to further affirm the West’s centrality. The second objective is constructive. While we critique the dehumanizing effects of the technoOrientalist gaze, we also see an opportunity for critical reappropriations in texts that self-referentially engage with Asian images; indeed, as an example, Asian SF writers have already taken to the trope to create the SF cottage industry in which the subject and setting are Eastern. There is of course the danger that Asian and Asian American creators might internalize techno-Orientalist patterns and uncritically replicate the same dehumanizing model. However, thanks to its global and mass appeal, the speculative imagination in television, graphic novels, or science fiction is by no means the purview of single national traditions. Even as techno-Orientalism has become more pervasive, it has also engendered counterdialogue in those same cultural and political spaces. Global Consumption While Orientalism as a critical lens describes how Western discourse discursively catalogues or frames the East, it has always been trained on domestic— that is, Western or U.S.—configurations against the Orientalized Other. Edward Said notes his “real argument is that Orientalism is—and does not simply represent—a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with ‘our’ world” (12). Techno-Orientalism, with a vision of the future that is global in scope and reach, adds a wrinkle to the critical commonplace that Orientalism actively produces and reproduces an oppositional East to cement Western hegemony. Particularly within the realm of SF, techno-Orientalist tropes have been absorbed, reenvisioned, and replicated by other sites of cultural production, with interesting geopolitical implications.8

#### [Alt]

## O/V

#### Techno-Orientalism paints Asian subjects as robotic and expendable forms of technology that manifests in racialization and dehumanizing violence domestically

Roh et al. 15 (David S. Roh, Betsy Huang & Greta A. Niu | *Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media* pg 10-14 | DOA: 7/19/2022 | SAoki)

If SF and its variants in historiography, cinema, and new media provide the content of techno-Orientalist expressions, we believe that Asian American studies equips us with the best critical and theoretical toolboxes for documentation and interrogation. Asian American studies has always attended to constructions of culture, race, and the body partly because U.S. techno-Orientalist imagination has its roots in the view of the Asian body—the Chinese body, most specifically—as a form of expendable technology, a view that emerged in the discourse of early U.S. industrialization. From the earliest era of Asian peoples in the United States, their technical abilities were both lauded and erased. An exemplar is the Chinese men who composed more than half of the labor force that completed the transcontinental railroad’s western portion over the high Sierra Nevada mountains to Promontory, Utah, in 1869. In the campaign to extend the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the American Federation of Labor argued in their publication, Some Reasons for Chinese Exclusion, Meat vs. Rice, American Manhood against Asiatic Coolieism: Which Shall Survive? (1902), that the Chinese male body differed radically from the American male body. The publication argued that the Chinese laborer could withstand physical deprivations that American and European laborers could not (American Federation of Labor et al. 5, 14, 16, 18). This constructed difference rationalized discriminatory policies against Chinese railroad workers. Meat vs. Rice did not argue the Chinese had particular technical skills that were valuable for constructing the transcontinental railroad. On the contrary, the publication claimed the Chinese body simply did not require the conditions of safety, sustenance, and shelter that bodies of European descendents required. Implicit in their argument is a threat to the superior European laborer’s way of life or culture by a kind of unfeeling superhuman antithetical to the West’s liberal humanist credo. The U.S. techno-Orientalist imagination is thus rooted in this view of the Asian body as a form of expendable technology—a view that emerged in the discourse of early U.S. industrialization and continued to evolve in the twentieth century. In 1982, a twenty-seven-year-old Chinese American named Vincent Chin was beaten to death by two white men in Detroit. The attackers, Ronald Ebens and Michael Nitz, were autoworkers in a U.S. auto industry that was losing market share to Japanese cars. Though China drafter, did not work in automobiles, Ebens and Nitz viewed him as representative—indeed, an embodiment—of Japanese auto manufacturing as they beat him with a baseball bat, reminiscent of Americans smashing Japanese-made cars in reaction to increasing auto imports in the early 1980s. 9 The callous brutality of Chin’s death evinces something more than racial hatred; Chin not only was perceived as a convenient stand-in for the Japanese automotive industry, but embodied its traits—unfeeling, efficient, and inhuman. In Ebens and Nitz’s eyes, they were Luddites striking down the automatons that had been sent in to replace them. Techno-Orientalist discourse completed the project of dehumanizing Vincent Chin by rendering him as not only a racialized Other, but a factory Machine that had to be dismantled by Ebens and Nitzto reclaim their personhood, subjectivity, and masculinity. 10 The shock and outrage over Chin’s murder served as a critical rallying cry under which a coalition of ethnic-specific groups joined as Asian Americans. In the twenty-first century, the perceived economic threat of Japan and its automobiles has given way to China. Despite the fact that China does not have a particularly strong reputation as a high-tech nation, techno-Orientalism’s robust flexibility allows for seamless transplantation to another national site. China’s rapid economic rise is largely credited to its vast manufacturing base, which, coupled with cheap labor and less regulation, has made it an attractive production location for many tech companies, including Apple and Dell. And although the vast majority of Chinese cannot afford the iPads and iPhones they produce, we see in U.S. media a representational shift, using techno-Orientalist conventions, transforming Chinese from mindless workers to sinister agents. For example, in October 2010, a U.S. PAC called Citizens Against Government Waste uploaded a commercial titled “Chinese Professor” on YouTube. Set in Beijing, China a.d. 2030, the commercial depicts a male professor lecturing in a large hall accompanied by high-tech gadgets. The lecture consists of conservative talking points regarding the decline of the United States. As colorful images of fallen nations scroll behind him, the professor explains, “America tried to spend and tax itself out of a great recession. Enormous so called ‘stimulus spending,’ massive changes to health care, government takeovers of private industries, and crushing debt.” He concludes, “Of course, we owned most of their debt, so now they work for us.” With echoes of Fu Manchu, the professor smiles directly into the camera, eliciting his students’ mirth. By presenting the Chinese professor, the students, and the lecture as moving seamlessly between the lecture hall technology and the tablet screens that students hold in their laps, this video implies that China now leads the world in technological production and consumption. The encoded secondary message of the commercial sidesteps the reality of China’s still developing technological penetration by projecting a present-day existential fear into a vision of the future, with technology supposedly rooted in U.S.-based innovation. It is an elegant solution that effectively alarms the uninformed viewer by using a pan-Asian technological conflation to elide reality and implicitly accuse China of stealing U.S. intellectual property. Thus, although the national actors and the details are quite different from the automobile industry of the 1980s, we have a similar techno-Orientalist narrative: U.S. jobs and manufacturing are being stolen by inorganic, technologically infused persons who threaten not only our economic but humanistic integrity. SF’s techno-Orientalist tendencies have become so common as to merit incisive parody. The animated series Futurama takes place a thousand years in the future, and both skewers and pays homage to SF conventions. In an episode from the sixth season, Futurama depicts the launch of the new “EyePhone,” a jab at Apple’s handset, as a pillory of modern consumerism. The series’ white protagonist, Fry, asks a retail clerk of South Asian descent, “you’re from one of those ethnicities that knows about technology; why is it called an EyePhone?” (Sandoval). Depicted in the show as having an intelligence level on par with Homer Simpson, Fry is not meant to be taken seriously, and often acts as a vessel for twentieth-century ignorance in a progressive future. What is notable in this exchange is how the producers of Futurama have Fry explicitly verbalize a familiar techno-Orientalist trope—Asiatic bodies functioning as gatekeepers, facilitators, and purveyors of technology. In this episode, the South Asian clerk literally acts as the final node on the assembly line that has been largely produced by robotic arms—the clerk reaches through the drapes to pull an EyePhone from a pile and we see mechanical limbs swinging about the factory. He is an assembly line automaton with a human skin, and his affectless, bored intonation belies his true nature as a machine. A less self-aware show might leave it at that, but Fry’s graceless pronouncement underscores the techno-Orientalist trope, taking SF to task while simultaneously paying ironic homage to the genre. This same technologizing convention that Futurama so sharply satirizes is found in numerous literary works, including David Mitchell’s Cloud Atlas (2004). Mitchell’s six stories link together characters and narratives spanning past, present, and distant future. Consequently, Mitchell’s novel has the unenviable task of repeatedly establishing the framing for each separate story line. An economical method for quickly thrusting the reader into the speculative Future is to use a technologized East Asia, as he does in the story “An Orison of Sonmi-451.” The setting of Nea So Copros, the “corpocracy” of what appears to be a unified Korea sometime after the twenty-second century, is where we are introduced to our enslaved narrator, Sonmi-451, a cloned “fabricant” designed to serve in a fast-food restaurant. Mitchell paints Korea as the setting for high technology, enforced consumption, and excessive advertising; and his larger social critique lies in the mirroring of the fabricants who must serve and the “purebloods” who must constantly consume, a master-slave dialectic that relies on cannibalism, erased from view, and technology, projected into high visibility. Sonmi-451eventually gains self-awareness, knowledge, and power to create a declaration of rights for enslaved fabricants and oppressed classes, but only after she reads the classics of Western civilization (187, 193). Thus, Mitchell’s novel reinforces both the perception of Asia as the definitive site for technophilic and technophobic speculations of an oppressive future and the view that only a Western-coded subject can truly realize liberal humanism in such an environment

#### Saids work shows orientalism as hegemonic--It can most usefully be applied to the new techno-orientalism that dominates western fear of the easts rise.

Phillipe Mather 20[Phillipe Mather, teaches film studies for Campion College at the University of Regina, "SHANGHAIED IN SINGAPORE: DOGMAS OF ORIENTALISM ",9-1-2020, Canadian Journal of Film Studies, https://web-s-ebscohost-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=e1a22f1c-a75f-4785-9a85-4133d9426c1b%40redis, 1LEE]

In conclusion, I find that Said’s work helps us understand the underlying evaluative and prescriptive logic of Orientalism as a hegemonic discourse, and it does so without being essentialist in its analysis, and without overlooking its more ambivalent and contradictory qualities. In fact, it could be argued that the dogmas can be “applied” in a way that describes a fair range or variety of representations that one finds in Orientalist films, including concepts such as Homi Bhabha’s discussion of “ambivalence,” concerning identity politics in the colonial encounter.37 Bhabha’s focus on a psychoanalytical explanation for racist discourse, as opposed to Said’s essentially political approach, leads him to downplay strict colonizer/colonized and master/slave binaries, and develop instead the notion of a double consciousness, expressed in the colonizer’s simultaneous fear and desire for the Other, as we have discussed regarding exoticism. For the colonized, this manifests itself as hybridity, an uneasy combination of submission to authority and “sly civility,” a subtle form of resistance in which the colonized both imitates and mocks the colonizer,38 which partly describes the character of Ong Chi Seng in The Letter. Despite expressing disappointment at Said’s “reluctance to engage with the alterity and ambivalence in the articulation of these two economies [latent and manifest Orientalism],” Bhabha quotes the passage from Orientalism in which Said describes the West’s vacillation between the familiar and the alien, which produces a median category encapsulating the complex issue of power and desire.39 The analytical usefulness and therefore heuristic value of the dogmas lie in their simplicity, and the possibility of using them to chart the evolution of Orientalist discourse in film, noting both enduring themes and new variations.

One such variation is techno-Orientalism, which refers to the Western envy and fear of a technologically superior Orient, which certainly applies to contemporary Singapore. To be shanghaied has also acquired new connotations, as noted by Singaporean architect William Siew-wai Lim, which include “being seduced [to] incidentally discover an imaginary paradise of tomorrow” and “being overwhelmed, misled, and conned by the virtual explosion of mythical opportunities and the get-rich-quick syndrome.”40 At the nine-minute mark of Hitman: Agent 47, we are introduced to the headquarters of Syndicate International, thanks to a dramatic forward track and upward pan from the ocean to an ominous low-angle view of the Syndicate’s skyscraper on Singapore’s Boat Quay, crowned by an ostentatious letter S. A superimposed title identifies Singapore as the location, which triggers the techno-Orientalist associations, as the dragon-beast of steel and glass emerges from the water to threaten the world with its plans to create an army of genetically engineered killers. However, we quickly realize that the Syndicate is run primarily by foreign expatriates, with a Frenchman at its head, which sidesteps some Orientalist concerns. On the other hand, when one considers the far-reaching powers of the Syndicate, including that of tapping into Changi Airport’s security camera network, overriding what could only be controlled by the Singapore government itself, one must describe this foreign influence as imperialistic in its assumptions. As Shohat and Stam put it, so-called classical Hollywood films continually “recycled the formulae of European supremacy vis-à-vis globally dispersed others, with the White European always retaining his or her ʻpositional superiority’ (Edward Said’s term).”41 Even though the Syndicate’s boss, Antoine Le Clerq, dies at the film’s end, Hitman: Agent 47’s erasure of cultural difference can be equated with a seemingly anachronistic yet enduring colonial perspective, regardless of whether we attribute this perspective to the film’s writers or their chosen narrative genre. Less well known is the 2004 science fiction film Cyber Wars (Kuo Jian Hong, 2004), set in the futuristic city of Sintawan (a thinly disguised Singapore), in which the Caucasian protagonist seeks help from an Asian character who serves as the guru of Cyberlink, the city’s Orwellian computer network. In one scene, the virtual interface with Cyberlink showcases techno-Orientalism, combining representations of the past and future: futuristic virtual reality technology leads the characters to a Chinese herbal shop, featuring spices with magical properties. The Western hero has been shanghaied by Asian technology and has landed on a virtual boat floating in a disorienting urban environment made up of neon lights flashing Chinese-language characters. Fears of dehumanization through technology are overlayed onto historical prejudices about unfeeling, machine-like Asians who show very little gratitude for receiving the gifts of Western science, much like Sax Rohmer’s evil Dr. Fu Manchu.

## FW

### Eschatology DA

#### Eschatology DA---Yellow Peril is a dualism of state-sanctioned eschatology and apocalypticism that drives discursive conversations of Western anxieties to naturalize imperialist understandings of the world---you evaluate our impacts prior to the AFF to account for the disconnect in the material implications of the American nation state its Orientalist fantasies

Man 18 (Jessica Man | Master of Arts degree in Asian American Studies | *“The Perfect Type of Industry”: 2012 and Apocalyptic Visions of the Asian Century* pg 1-6 | DOA: 7/8/2022 | SAoki)

Donald Trump’s comments on China after his assumption of the presidency have left American journalists scrambling to make sense of his opinions. Once having accused China of “raping” the United States on the campaign trail (Diamond, 2016), he has recently expressed great admiration for President Xi Jinping as the leader of a world superpower; he proclaimed in a stump speech that China committed “one of the greatest thefts in the history of the world” (Smith, 2016) in its trade relations with America, but on March 4th, 2018, praised Xi for eliminating the two-term limit on China’s presidential office, remarking off-handedly that “[America] might want to give that a shot someday” (Liptak, 2018). Accordingly, this statement made the headlines of several major publications and provoked intense speculation on Trump’s perception of the office of the President and suspicion about his ultimate goals in governing the United States. For all the psychological, political, and economic analyses that have tried to make sense of Trump’s “flip-flopping” attitudes toward foreign relations, it has thus far remained unclear where and how the President formed his opinions on Chinese trade policy. His avowed affection for Fox News and other conservative media outlets, who have long held concerns about Chinese economic ascendancy, might be the root of his campaign-trail vitriol. However, his more recent remarks supporting the Chinese presidency and begrudgingly expressing admiration for the policies he had previously excoriated display a kind of economic sportsmanship more attuned to his background as a businessman with interests in playing to the most profitable market. These are both reasonable hypotheses, and there is hardly any precedent to expect an elected official to hold to campaign promises, but it is inaccurate to the past century and a half of U.S.-China relations to say that Trump is “flip-flopping” on China. Rather, he is exposing two sides of the same political outlook that has driven our foreign policy in the East Asian arena for so long – two sides that have co-existed for as long as the West has feared the East: the dualism of Yellow Peril. In order to truly understand this strange relationship between China and the United States, we must first look back to the origins of the Yellow Peril and trace its development at the beginning of the 20th century. The term itself was coined by Russian sociologist Jacques Novicow in 1897 to describe the Sinophobic logic pervasive in the Western discourse of nationalist economic anxiety. In the essay “Le Péril Jaune,” he dissected several common arguments laid forth for the suppression of Chinese workers, most prominently that they were naturally satisfied with being paid a lower wage than whites, were predisposed to find pleasure in hard work, and would ultimately destabilize the world economy in China’s favor through the sheer size of their workforce. They represent what Jack London refers to as “the perfect type of industry” (78), a people naturally inclined and suited to hard work, with few economic goals or aspiration beyond their station. Such arguments were the driving force for the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and were popularly supported by organizations like the Asiatic Exclusion League through the turn of the century. They were only fueled by reportage on wars in the Pacific where Eastern nations were beginning to assert their military power, first against each other, and then – unthinkably – against Western civilizations. The Russo-Japanese War heralded change on an apocalyptic level for the West. Russia, having only recently established itself as a European power under the controversial Romanov dynasty, lost several major conflicts against a Westernized Japanese military and was forced to make major concessions to a nation that, in the Western imagination, had primarily been the setting for lush, courtly Orientalist fantasies like The Mikado and Madama Butterfly. The Japanese, it seemed, had mastered the ways of the West much faster than anyone had predicted, and the West was beginning to pay the price for its inattention. China, where Japan threatened mastery of the long-feared hordes of cheap labor, was cast in a new and immediately threatening light. The corrupt rule of the Qing Dynasty had long plagued China with the title of the “sick man of Asia,” threatening the death of the Chinese empire. If the Asiatics could somehow master themselves and take full advantage of the plentiful natural resources that the non-industrializing Qing had failed to tap, then Russia would only be the first of many to fall to the Yellow Peril. In November 2017, Trump praised China for mastery of the trade game and clear dedication to Chinese national interests. “Who can blame a country for being able to take advantage of another country for the benefit of its citizens?” he asked, going on to criticize previous administrations for their comparatively lax pursuit of American profit. It would seem that China, then, has finally mastered itself without the help of Japan, and has furthermore bested the United States as the greatest economist in the world, fulfilling the prophecy of an “Asian Century” that has been anticipated in fear for over a hundred years. How, then, is it possible that journalists – the very same Fourth Estate that feverishly reproduced the diverging Yellow Peril narratives of the Russo-Japanese War – cannot reconcile his comments with the narratives that their predecessors played in perfect tension, directly correspondent as they are? And how has the global imagination responded to this supposedly impending collapse of Western civilization? The purpose of this thesis is firstly to argue that the particular strains of apocalypticism that emerged around the Russo-Japanese War crystallized the two faces of the Yellow Peril that has once again reared its Janusian head in American journalism. I identify one as that of the classic “coolie,” and the other as the “master,” primarily to distinguish between the roles of dominator and dominated. Over the course of the argument, I will replace “master” with “creditor” to denote the transformation of the economic arena of concern from the factors of production to that of financial capitalism over the course of the 20th century. Through an investigation of war correspondences, memoirs, educational books, short fiction, and essays, I will trace the development and circulation of the “coolie” and “master” images of Yellow Peril in the United States from 1904 through 1923 and argue for the necessity of the Russo-Japanese War to understanding portrayals of American economic precarity as well as the resulting effects on Asian Americans. The secondary purpose of this thesis is to explore how America has dealt with the apocalypticism inherent to Yellow Peril. Although journalists of the early 20th century were relatively trigger-happy with warnings of impending civilizational collapse at the hands of the Chinese, modern journalism stops rather conservatively at predictions of trade war and national decline as a world power. However, the apocalyptic has not by any means been vanished. Rather, it has been relegated (or perhaps sublimated) to the realm of fiction, and most spectacularly that of the disaster film, where entire countries might be obliterated with no real consequence, to the delight of the public. This is particularly true of German director Roland Emmerich’s Hollywood oeuvre, which includes such American epics as Independence Day, The Day After Tomorrow, and Godzilla. When Emmerich deals with impending disaster on a global scale, one might reasonably expect to witness the spectacular collapse of significant nations around the world, especially those with a familiar visual lexis ripe for gleeful iconoclasm. The entry of China onto the world stage as one of these significant nations, because of this dual narrative, has had complex implications for its depiction in disaster films both on a diegetic and a production level. Emmerich’s 2012 (2009) is uncommon in this genre because of its treatment of China as a source of salvation for all Western civilization, and because of its popular reception amongst Chinese moviegoers. Ultimately, this thesis will seek to answer the questions I have posed about the underappreciated cultural significance of the Russo-Japanese War, its centrality to the discourse of Yellow Peril, the development of dichotomous narratives during that era, and how the prophetic aspects of journalism, as well as its apocalyptic figurations, have been developed in cultural production. It will also explore the function of apocalyptic films as an ideological apparatus that foments support for exclusionist Yellow Peril policy and populist racial hysteria, providing the public with visions of America as it might persist even after a physical obliteration through a state eschatology in direct opposition to civilizational collapse. By theorizing an American approach to confronting the impermanence of empire, I hope to shed light on an often overlooked influence on U.S.-China relations and the domestic treatment of Asian Americans, and provide a basis for discussing how apocalypticism is used as a national project to plan for the collapse of the national apparatus it is intended to serve. My argument relies on several fundamental contentions. The first is that the Yellow Peril is a tool used by the West to understand its economic relationship with Asia, especially in terms of coolie labor and the presentation of a call to action to limit Asian immigration. The second is that the Yellow Peril is a type of eschatology through which the American empire can cathect its anxieties about its place on the world stage. Finally, I contend that the publication of the documents previously mentioned, as well as the release of 2012 (2009), indicate the presence of a state-sanctioned eschatology, which focuses on naturalizing and preserving the superstructure of empire, dislodging it from its material formations and creating a pathway toward maintaining regenerative but imperially reproductive understanding of social, political, and economic relationships. It is a way of anticipating the total obliteration of the American state and envisioning a future in which it may one day rise again.

### Knowledge production DA

#### **The aff’s portrayal of China as a dystopian threat reflects paradigms of Techno-Orientalist Sinophobia, creating a totalizing view of China that undermines scholarship and knowledge production – only the alt can solve.**

Wu 21 (Valerie Wu, "Western Media’s Portrayal of a Futuristic, Dystopian China is Harmful", Glimpse from the Globe, https://www.glimpsefromtheglobe.com/topics/politics-and-governance/western-medias-portrayal-of-a-futuristic-dystopian-china-is-harmful/, 8-10-2021, Accessed 7-8-2022)//ILake🪐

SAN FRANCISCO — Imagine a futuristic city where robots prevail. Since the advent of imperialism, this futuristic and otherly view has often served as the popularized Western conception of Asia. This concept is known as Techno-Orientalism, a phenomenon that primarily dominates discourse surrounding media portrayals of East Asia. According to journalist George Yang in Wired Magazine, Techno-Orientalism, which creates an ideology of the Asian “Other,” rests on Western logic of the East as a technological threat to the world. With Beijing’s technological rise in an increasingly globalized world, Techno-Orientalist frameworks have now become fundamental to specifically describing China. Plan A Magazine’s Lily Luo writes that the term “Techno-Orientalism” was originally coined by Asian scholars like David Roh, Greta Niu and Betsy Huang. These scholars perceived Techno-Orientalism as the projection of historical Orientalism, or what Khan Academy’s Nancy Demerdash describes as the “conception of an ‘Orient’ that was rooted in incivility.” Under the futuristic gaze of Techno-Orientalism, East Asians are not only conceived of as a racialized source of fear, but also a source of technological fear. In other words, the technological advancements of East Asian countries were perceived as a threat to the global order. Today, Techno-Orientalism is most evident in the Western media’s coverage of China, which often reflects what Yang describes as “Western anxieties about the East.” “China’s dystopian tech could be contagious,” reads a 2018 headline from The Atlantic. The word “contagious” implicitly projects the notion that China’s technology is somehow diseased, evoking imagery of illness and a plague — racialized elements that Yang states were formerly attributed to Chinese immigrants building the United States’s Transcontinental Railroad back in the 19th century. The article goes on to describe China’s “social credit” system and its effects as a method of “social control” with “teeth.” The element of “teeth” provokes a more physical understanding of China’s technological capabilities. Instead of directly analyzing the mechanics of the system, the article employs metaphors that conjure up negative connotations of fear and violence. Another headline for a 2019 article in The American Conservative demonstrates a similar concept: “George Orwell’s Dystopian Nightmare in China.” The featured image displays a large cartoon of Chinese President Xi Jinping looming over ordinary citizens and handing them numbers intended to dictate their identities. The article cites the Orwellian vision of the world — particularly Social Psychologist Erich Fromm’s afternote about the dangers of men becoming machines — implying that this is what China has become. The issue is not endemic to a few articles or a handful of media organizations and publications. In a 2018 op-ed in Bloomberg, Cathy O’Neil argues that the United States must take an active stand against the surveillance state with the headline: “Want to See Your Dystopian Future? Look at China.” For The New York Post, a headline reads: “China’s ‘social credit’ system is a dystopian nightmare.” This angled coverage of China, unintentional or not, falls prey to a certain dehumanizing rhetoric in which the Chinese people are viewed as constant victims of a dystopian, futuristic state. In the process of shedding light on how China’s technological advancements may strip humanity away from Chinese citizens, an important topic that deserves coverage and criticism, Western media coverage paradoxically falls victim to the same trope: implying that Chinese people are mindless robots at the mercy of a technological villain. It is necessary, though, to acknowledge that criticism of Techno-Orientalist sentiments pervasive in Western media is not based on the assumption that such articles are not credible. In fact, it is because these articles are so well-written and well-researched on a topic that merits global attention that it becomes even more essential to understand how racialized ideals manifest in complex ways within contemporary media discourse — even in the small ways, like headlines, images and adjectives. This problem becomes cyclical, especially because so many articles cite the ideas mentioned by others. This may explain how the media tends to exacerbate Sinophobia. Often, Western media’s hegemonic mindset regarding Beijing prizes competition over collaboration. This undermines a positive diplomatic relationship between the United States and China and, more critically, a nuanced American understanding of Chinese people, culture and values. When evaluating how Techno-Orientalism has shaped internalized conceptions of China, it is critical to be rhetorically careful and to distinguish between hard evidence and Western interpretations of that evidence. These interpretations appear to be motivated by hegemonic fears of Asian countries achieving unprecedented progress and subverting colonialist paradigms. Alternatively, these interpretations may be real fear rooted in the use of technology to oppress certain liberties — a genuine concern. However, journalists must be careful in examining their assumptions and biases. When writing about China, they should consider how certain language may benefit discourse on the country or proliferate harmful stereotypes. It may even be worth thinking about how the media can provide a counternarrative to Techno-Orientalist ideologies. Instead of characterizing China’s technological rise as dangerous and fear-mongering, journalists and media experts could explain the original reasoning behind such technological policy measures. The Qiao Collective, for example, is an organization that is a staunch defender of China against “Western aggression.” While not without its controversies and criticism, the volunteer-run media site features articles intended to provide a more nuanced, humanizing perspective on China. Articles on the website strategically deconstruct stereotypes and misconceptions about China from raising awareness of China’s internationalist solidarity during the coronavirus pandemic to more personal reflections on the connections between China’s political thought and anti-racist thinking. Ultimately, addressing biases in media coverage can enhance not only the quality of reporting, but also address the ways in which reporting contributes to political misconceptions of entire nationalities, cultures and values.

### Knowledge Differentiation DA

#### **Debate and research as models of resistance disrupts the will to dominate the Orient and brings a cleansing force to the modes of thought that sustain modern coloniality.**

Leonardo 18 (Zeus Leonardo, "Dis-orienting Western Knowledge", The Cambridge Journal of Anthropology, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26945997, Autumn 2018, Accessed 7-19-2022)//ILake🪐

Said’s debt to the Foucault (1977) of Discipline and Punish is clear when the former affirms the latter’s archaeological method, whereby rules of discursive engagement produce subjects based on their inclusion, as opposed to exclusion, into statements that do not determine but define their participation. In other words, it is through their appearance (in statements, in documents, in narratives) that natives as such are transformed into natives. Said (1979: xix) writes that this ‘will to understand’ the Orient turned into a certain ‘will to dominate’ it. France’s ability to ‘know’ the Egyptians brings the Orient and its subjects into view or existence, as objects of consumption for the Occident. They are brought into vision by a civilizing force capable of supervision. Like Foucault’s description of technologies of surveillance, the colonial panopticon sees the Orient without being seen, writes it without being read, surveys it without being marked. This happens through writing and other forms of capturing the natives for nativist purposes, that is, of asserting European superiority over the naturalized inferiority of the Orient. But Said disagrees with Foucault by asserting the author’s imprint rather than disappearance from discourse (see Foucault 1991). This is consistent with Said’s ‘worldly’ analysis of literature and other linguistic practices as not reducible to text but instantiations of concrete relations with their context. They function as representations of the material world, not in the reductive sense that compromises orthodox Marxism’s effectivity but in a Vician (1984) recursive sense of play between cultural traffic, knowledge production and human participation. Sometimes credited with Said, postcolonial analysis does not signal a break from anti-colonial analysis as much as it is a shift in explaining its processes. Said is concerned with the same colonialism that provided Fanon ([1952] 2008) and Césaire’s ([1955] 2000) problematic but Said’s is a colonial predicament turned into a literary phenomenon. Its brutality is not only its capacity to turn targets of colonialism into non-beings but equally their disfigurement through metaphor and other linguistic practices. The worldliness of language, for example, means that annunciation cannot be divorced from the earthliness that interpellates it. Disfiguration happens when knowers are perversely consumed as objects in the orientalist knowledge industry and ignorance ironically asserts itself as the only legitimate form of knowledge (see Mills 2007). Said shares Anibal Quijano’s (2000) turn away from studies of official, administrative colonialism and towards the ‘coloniality of power’. Following the grooves of Quijano, Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2007: 243) describes coloniality thusly: Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and everyday. Nxot to be underestimated, the fall of traditional colonialism marked a transition in the modern world system of race from colonialism to coloniality, from subordination to subjectivation, from the transparency of power to its opaqueness, and finally, from what Said (1994a: 23) characterizes as the reliance on the ‘business of empire’ and ‘empire of business’. Just as Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren (1986) describe curriculum as simply the introduction to a particular way of life, so we can characterize, with William Appleman Williams, ‘empire as a way of life’ (cited in Said 1994a: 55). Immigrants, refugees and other categories of people enter colonialism as a structure already lying in wait, whether or not a colonial power administers a colonial state (see Grosfoguel 2007). In short, the world witnesses the coloniality of power turn into the power of coloniality to direct life outcomes even after the end of the official colonial era. Just as the end of US enslavement ended one peculiar form of racism and not racism itself, thus inaugurating another form (i.e. Jim Crow segregation) to replace it (Bonilla-Silva 2001), ending colonial occupation does not sound the death knell of coloniality. Knowledge and the epistemic problem To say that decolonization is a curricular problem is to suggest that curriculum reform is part of the decolonial project. Knowledge production has always been part of the colonial project for it was not only a material imposition of a foreign or external power but a concerted effort internally to supplant an existing way of life with another. This means that decolonizing the curriculum is no less than decolonizing the dominant theory of knowledge, if not knowledge itself. By theory, Said favours a secular version not reducible to its abstract, even religious, overtones but theory as part of human activity in Vico’s (1984) The New Science, which is that humans can only understand (and therefore undo) what they themselves have made. It shares a family resemblance with Lukács’ (1971) affirmation of theory’s place in forging critical consciousness as part of creating the world we can get behind rather than only describing the one we reject in front of us (see Said 1983: 234). But neither is theory the same as critical consciousness, the second providing spatio-temporal context for the first as well as accounting for the untidy nature of historical experience that resists standardization through theory. In this sense, knowledge is less a thing of human nature than a thing humans do. As part of undoing what colonial knowledge has made of us to which we no longer consent, the gift of colonialism must be returned with interest within a decolonial project that dis-orients the curriculum. In recent decades, multicultural reform has put a dent in Eurocentrism’s hold on the US curriculum. That welt has been noticed as its sentinels were awakened in order to defend their territory. Once thought to be something about re-indigenization of land, decolonization moves on to new territory, this time the realm of knowledge and cognition. It is one thing to remove the colonizer from the first and quite another to purge them from the second. For the colonizer’s stench remains long after the denouement of decolonization. Insofar as the colonizer was able to insert themselves into every nook and cranny of the colony, inner city or township, including the colonial subject’s self-concept, a decolonizing violence of the same magnitude, what Fanon ([1961] 2005) calls a ‘cleansing force’ (51; italics in original), must take place. Colonialism redefined the category of ‘human’ as part of the radical departure within humanism to reduce it to essential traits like abstract reason. Since at least the Cartesian cogito, which pronounced the mind-body split in favour of a decontextualized, rational spirit, the coloniality of being meant that cognition was a cog in the juggernaut of European, capitalist, colonial expansion. Western epistemology has oriented humans, as part of defining their essence, towards knowledge as a conquering impulse. This ‘ego conquiro’ and its accompanying ‘imperial attitude’ became a constitutive part of knowledge, practically and conceptually (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 245; italics in original). In practical terms, it means a fundamentally suspicious and misanthropic attitude towards the other as a threat to European being, who must be stamped out or violently assimilated in what has become a perpetual state of war. Conceptually, europocentrism has a virtual monopoly on what it means to be human, for as Charles Mills (1997) reminds us, within the racial contract European humanism is just as it sounds: only Europeans are humans. To make matters worse, the ‘educational racial contract’ (Leonardo 2015) is flanked by the ‘colonial contract’ (Leonardo and Vafai 2016). Even accursed Whites in the form of white women and the white working class, for example, retain the mark and possibility of being human; they are beings, after all. The radical cut within the denominator of the human made by colonialism within an imperialist ontology makes curriculum reform a matter of life and death as colonial subjects fight off forms of social death in everyday life.

#### **Orientalism is a self-contradicting disaster with no internal consistency and aspects of essentialization, binarism, and more.**

Güven 19 (Fikret Güven, "Criticism to Edward W. Said’s Orientalism", RumeliDE Journal of Language and Literature Studies, https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/740353, 7-15-2019, Accessed 7-17-2022)//ILake🪐

The role of intellectuals and academics is central throughout Said’s critique of Orientalism. Said builds his entire deconstruction on the Western tradition of writing, and on theories, which are also generally characterized as Western. For this, he bases his work on ideas from Nietzsche (representation and the thing-in-itself), Foucault (discourse, power/knowledge, episteme and truth regimes), Gramsci (cultural hegemony), and Derrida (deconstruction). In rejecting the conflation between representation and truth, the tradition, which Said follows, is Nietzschean. Giving the example of a painting, which is normally conceived as a fixed image representing a fixed object, Nietzsche concludes “the human intellect allowed appearance to appear, and projected its mistaken conceptions onto the things” (Nietzsche, 2000: 38). This is based on the belief that the thing-in-itself always exists in the state in which it is depicted. Nietzsche considered such a conception to be erroneous, because “the appearance has come to being gradually, and will continue to be evolving, and can therefore not be a representation of an essence that created it. It is our minds, our intellect, that gradually create the appearance” (38). Hence, all representations are already misrepresentations by the sheer idea that they represent a thing. Orientalism claims to be representing the Orient, but in doing so, it is only representing its own conception of what must be outside the construction of the ideal West. The Orient, which Orientalists claim to represent, and travel literature claims to depict, is therefore empty of essence: “Perhaps we will recognize then that the thing -in- itself deserves a Homeric laugh, in that it seemed to be so much, indeed everything, and is actually empty, that is, empty of meaning” (38). Said owes to Antonio Gramsci the idea of cultural hegemony, which is “exercised in society by the ruling class”(41). For Gramsci, the intellectuals of society function as: the ‘officers’ of the ruling class for the exercise of the subordinate function of social hegemony and political government of the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the direction imprinted on social life by the fundamental ruling class, a consent which comes into existence ‘historically’ from the ‘prestige’ (and hence from the trust) accruing to the ruling class from its position and its function in the world of production (Gramsci, 2000: 40). Gramsci is here treating the knowledge of intellectuals as, literally, a “production” (Gramsci, 2000, 39), albeit indirectly. The role of the intellectual in shaping public opinion is due to their mediation in the process, between the social fabric and the “super- structures of which the intellectuals are in fact the ‘officials’” (39). For Said, the persistence of the spontaneous acceptance of the binary world view of the opposition West versus East builds in the scholarly world on protecting the hierarchies which maintain, for the public, the imaginary sense of binarism. These concepts of prestige, trust, and the relation between the ruling class and the intellectual are also discussed by Foucault as he elaborates on the close relation between power and knowledge, and the power regime in his works such as the Archaeology of Knowledge (1969), Civilization and Madness (1964), and interviews published in Power/Knowledge (1980). A. L. Macfie summarizes Nietzsche and Gramsci’ s views as follows: According to Foucault, until the period of the Renaissance people had assumed that language reflected reality (objects, things). But in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries language came to be seen, not as a reflection of reality, but as a transparent ‘film’, dissociated from it. As a result it became possible to identify words and statements not as signs, representing objects and things, but as events, floating in a space, field or episteme. In this strange world, knowledge became not so much a matter of fact as the outcome of a struggle for power, in which events and discourses, vehicles of ‘economies of power’, created new ‘networks’ and ‘regimes’ of knowledge – regimes which would themselves survive only until such time as new ones arose, capable of taking their place. Truth, therefore ... was not outside power or lacking in it (Macfie, 2000: 41). Said builds on Foucault’s concept of discourse and truth regimes as described by Foucault, which means that power allows particular things to pass as unquestionable truths, to argue that there is nothing inherent or fixed about the Orient or the Occident or West, and that the idea of the unitary West or Western subject is built upon a contrast to its imaginary Other, the Oriental, which is depicted as inherently inferior and less capable. This is something, he says, has been accepted throughout Europe’s history, and has both allowed, and been allowed to survive by power regimes. Aijaz Ahmad in “Between Orientalism and Historicism” (1991) critiques Said’s focus on text “facilitates a reading of history not from the basis of material production, but from its systems of representations” (Macfie, 2000: 285). According to Ahmad, Said’s view of Orientalism is ahistorical for two reasons: the first is counting on a non-material, non-linear understanding of history. The second, upon adopting Said’s view for argument’s sake, is that by foregrounding literature Said defines his object of study in ways, which are incompatible with one another. The contradiction which Ahmad refers to is between Said’s general and specific definitions of Orientalism quoted at the beginning, since by doing that, Said defines two different starting points for the tradition which he studies: one of them is roughly aroundthe end of the eighteenth century (Ahmad, 2000: 288), the other is European antiquity with Homer’s Iliad and Aeschylus’ The Persians (287). By stating an earlier beginning of Orientalism, Said, according to Ahmad, accepts a humanist approach to history while his indebtedness to Foucault betrays the antihumanist, Foucauldian, approach to history. Ahmad says that the problem with Said here is that he “tries to occupy theoretical positions which are mutually contradictory” (Macfie, 2000: 285). Nevertheless, in both cases Ahmad persists in his insistence on a particular mode of knowledge and history - reading, which for him is characteristic of Western academia. Ahmad therefore believes that Said has foregrounded the concept of discourse in order for him to use it as a defense against the misrepresenter of Oriental history (Ahmad, 2000: 293). Ahmad also refers to one of the theoretical difficulties in Said’s work which is “he has never been able to work out his relationship with the two slightly older intellectuals of his generation, Foucault and Derrida, whose work has influenced him the most” (290). This, along with the span and fluidity of Said’s definition for his object of knowledge leads Ahmad to the confusion of having to see Said either as a political writer or a theoretical writer (294). In one way or another, to be understood, Said must fit within a category, and ultimately Ahmad sees Said to be “riven between his anti - Westernist passion and his Foucauldian allegiance” (291). Ahmad gives precedence to the “Western archive of knowledge” (291) - that is, West-written history - as the true narrative which must therefore precede the discourse which Said is trying to deal with for “his anti-Westernist passion” (291). In both sides of Ahmad’s argument (historicism and disciplinarity), one can see his attempt to preserve a mode of knowledge that depends on categorization and field division, and preserving the catalogue of Western text, which has produced that knowledge. Nevertheless, requiring Said to conform to one particular mode or another, i.e. wholesale - Foucauldian (anti-humanist) or the opposite, or a mode of writing or scholarly field (political, historical, etc.), is what we are here considering as a particular mode of knowledge, with breaks in the borderlines of the epistemic field being seen as an act of violence to one’s own conception of self, as an academic in this case. Bernard Lewis in Islam and the West (1993) argues that Orientalism, the academic profession of enquiry into the lives of the Orientals, cannot as a whole be criticized, especially not by someone who is not an Orientalist himself. “The most rigorous and penetrating critique of Orientalist, as of any other, scholarship has always been and will remain that of their fellow scholars, especially, though not exclusively, those working in the same field” (Lewis,1993: 268). Lewis automatically dismisses critiques made by non-Orientalists simply for this reason. It is why he does not consider Said to be a scholar at all, and for the same reason, he dismisses non - Orientalist Marxist critiques as coming from unqualified individuals, unlike their Orientalist counterparts whose criticism is much more welcome. “Most of these critics are not themselves Orientalists ... it means that they do not possess the Orientalist skills, which are exercised with little difference by both Marxist and non-Marxist Orientalists” (257). This establishes the Orientalist as a category of qualified people who can or possess the skills and tools, which give them the right to speak about and for the Orient. Lewis refuses to accept Said as a scholar, which contrasts with his respect for other people’ s academic titles, such as Dr. Abdel-Malek (256) and Professor Zakaria (267), whom he accepts as scholarly simply because of their restriction to “known scholarly language” (256). The major part of Lewis’s attack on Said took the form of showing how Said got historical facts wrong, such as predating the rise of Arabic studies in France and ignoring German scholarship (258). Fred Halliday in “Orientalism and Its Crisis” (1993) argues he is wedded to a classical view of history (Halliday, 1993: 145), where there are truths, there are actual Orientals and that what Orientalist does is find these truths and represent them. Halliday claims that the choice of the name ‘Orientalism’ itself is a form of hegemonic claim, overgeneralized, and made by Said simply due to most of the knowledge and text produced by early Orientalists having been produced within an imperialist context. Halliday says there is no reason to reject any kind of knowledge simply because of the context in which it has been produced, and he gives the example of robbing a bank, where in order to achieve that aim, one would need an actual map and plan based on real knowledge which would enable them to perform the task at hand (148). This and similar claims, however, completely mix between the geographic and statistic knowledge produced about the land, its strategic map, the distribution of natural resources in it and the description of the peoples and their traditions on the one hand as scientific observable data, and the poetics in which this kind of knowledge is reproduced, where identities of Self and Other are presumed even before any of that writing takes place, or the way in which the scholar or researcher is thought of as having full capacity for accessing and producing that kind of knowledge. This all falls under the same category of generalizations. Said never condemns the objective or linguistic knowledge of the researcher or the philologist, but the idea that he is now believed to have full access, and full capacity to make the kind of generalized judgments that are then used to justify the continuity of colonization as a civilizing mission. It is a power regime that transforms the words of the scholar, thanks merely to his or her title, into truth.

### AT: Chinese threat real

#### **Western, U.S. interpretations of an inhumanly technological, revisionist China is Sino(techno)phobia and Digital Orientalism with little basis in fact.**

Mahoney 22 (Josef Gregory Mahoney, "China’s Rise as an Advanced Technological Society and the Rise of Digital Orientalism", Journal of Chinese Political Science, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11366-022-09817-z.pdf, 6-14-2022, Accessed 7-8-2022)//ILake🪐

The role of theory here is to provide the connective tissue of ideas and concepts to help us perceive the bigger picture and the various intersections within, changing and moving through time, but anchored with examples in a material reality that is familiar to us. The role of theory however is not explain everything perfectly. Nevertheless, my purpose has been to illustrate the role that advancing China as a technological society has played during its modern development, how this has in turned been received by others. What we find is that each period has been deeply entwined with competitive nationalisms and often, various forms of cultural, political and even racial discrimination. I have not discussed whether Sino(techno)phobia is in some way justified. This is the defining concern among those who assert that Chinese technology is dangerous, even without the taint of Digital Orientalism. To be sure, Chinese technology can now compete, and perhaps “win” in a decade or so; but it did not start the world down the path of competitive nationalism, imperialism or hegemony, nor did it innovate the first technological society. China can still argue that its advances have been to secure sovereignty and national wellbeing and not hegemony, arguments that are less credible elsewhere. This is why in part I find arguments advanced by some against Huawei, for example, to be disingenuous. Given what we know of actual American practices—including unregulated tech giants with self-serving agendas (including selling access to malign and anti-American interests), as well as US governmental spying through US-tech based networks, even on allies, and the fact that after 9/11 that the US government could access private and academic networks held by American firms and universities with little to no judicial oversight—the blacklisting of Chinese firms because they “might” engage in similar tactics at some point, and to characterize this as defending liberal values against communism, is complete nonsense. Indeed, as others have pointed out, there are constructive ways for Huawei to comply with the cybersecurity laws wherever they do business [26], and unlike many American frims, there’s no evidence that they haven’t done so. This is why Mayer and I described the continuing US-led campaign against Huawei as exemplifying Sino(techno)phobia and Digital Orientalism [45]. I have not discussed whether there is Chinese fear of Western technology, and how this relates to Sino(techno)phobia. To be sure, the Chinese are wary of any technology that compromises sovereignty and security. While the West and particularly the US have increasingly flirted with the fantasy of technological autarky, of decoupling from Chinese technology, the same can be said about China seeking autonomy and independence. But it should be noted that in the US, it’s common to cry loudly of potential threats, while in China, it’s generally taboo to do so unless those threats can be countered effectively. That said, we should acknowledge the increasing trend of technology securitization and strong fusions between civilian and military technology in both countries and the mutual fear this creates. Much is made about China’s intention of demonstrating the superiority of its system relative to Western forms of liberalism, with such rhetoric peaking again with what some in the West view as Chinese triumphalism associated with its successful eforts to contain the outbreak (e.g., [80]). But this overstates the role of ideology in policymaking and pits Marxism spuriously as the central antagonist in this confrontation [44]. Marxism did normalize technological development and the emergence of China’s technological society as a material means for reestablishing sovereignty and security. But perhaps today’s competition is really located in the extent to which China as a technological society acknowledges itself for what it is and then seeks a position of human advancement that transcends or evolves to a higher stage of existence and well-being—as China claims per it ambitions to establish itself as a ‘fully modern socialist nation.’ Conversely, the West, and more specifically the US, seem stuck in time or even regressing, unable to accept or manage changes constructively, unable to normalize the growing intersections and counterbalances that must exist within and between governance, technology, social progress and individual actualization. Too often, instead of looking inward and finding the true source of its problems, and further, how these problems are not dissimilar from others elsewhere, the US has externalized them with Sino(techno)phobia and Digital Orientalism. Perhaps the difference between the two countries is the extent to which they acknowledge and react to their own totalitarian-oriented surveillance states. In general terms, Shoshana Zubof gets to this question in part in her book, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism [88], where she asks whether we will be ‘the masters of information and machines or its slaves.’ We should be cautious when applying this thinking to China. Too often Westerners equate the CPC as the inhuman monster wielding inhuman technology. What if the opposite is true: what if the CPC is the human face that aims to be the master of machines and information, and to do so as much as possible for the greater good within a social and political system they believe they were compelled to create in the first place in order to survive the onslaught of technologically advanced imperial nations? What if this human face (or Facebook) does not exist at all in the West, or only limitedly, incapable of actually confronting or regulating various technological masters that have become systemically entrenched and the pharmakon of contemporary life—both the poison and the cure for so many Western ills? However, it’s possible that China’s general tendency towards techno-positivism risks revisiting dystopian social experimentation and misadventures, as the lockdowns suggest to some. Here I concede sympathies to a diferent viewpoint in Marxism, attributed to especially to Antonio Gramsci and Walter Benjamin, opposing positivism and determinism; but I also realize that it’s the nature of the Chinese political system to respond to crises by asserting control as opposed to surrendering the same. In fact, in the broader context of public health, which has always been based on police power, asserting control is considered universally preferable. Further, it’s not uncommon for a state to privilege saving lives if it has the capacity to do so despite signifcant economic, social and political costs. It’s generally better to be blamed for losses incurred despite strong eforts to minimize them, than to do less and likewise sufer. The concern that China aims to take over the world, and so on, seems little more than a hyperbolic speaking point belabored endlessly as the new Red Scare rhetoric, girding decoupling. In fact, despite mounting empirical evidence that China is a major contributor to global justice [23], a more dangerous concern at present is that China might choose to decouple itself. It’s not farfetched to suggest that we may have reached an infection point, one in which China increasingly views the world outside its borders as ungovernable. This would not be the frst time this has happened. And to a certain extent this has already happened with the pandemic— neither the frst nor last of global pandemics—with some experts predicting more to come due to climate change. Nevertheless, China is determined to proceed towards a new threshold of development as a technological society, with or without everyone else. Many derailments might occur along the way, from new crises like the pandemic or global warming, which many experts fear will wreak global havoc by 2050. Other than these, are there any convincing eforts currently underway that might forestall China’s advance in lieu of encouraging it? We might be witnessing less a clash of civilizations than one outcompeting the other despite that other setting the initial terms of the game.

#### Perceived threats of Chinese technological dominance inaccurate and nonsense – rather, they are sinotechnophobic projections of Western technological insecurity and an inability to move towards the future.

Mahoney ‘22 [Josef Gregory Mahoney; Josef Gregory Mahoney is professor of politics at East China Normal University in Shanghai, where he also directs the International Centre for Advanced Political Studies and the international graduate programme in politics;6-14-22; “China’s Rise as an Advanced Technological Society and the Rise of Digital Orientalism”; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-022-09817-z#Sec5; accessed 7-17-2022; AH]

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What if this human face (or Facebook) does not exist at all in the West, or only limitedly, incapable of actually confronting or regulating various technological masters that have become systemically entrenched and the pharmakon of contemporary life—both the poison and the cure for so many Western ills?

#### Reject the aff’s Westernized studies – they reflect a securitized narrative of the China that does more to demonstrate Western Sino-panic than actual information about China.

Bergsten ‘20 [Lisa Bergsten; Sweedish Defense university + Master’s Programme in Politics and War ;Fall 2020; “Evil Monsters and Machines”; https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1525320/FULLTEXT01.pdf; accessed 7-16-2022; AH]

There has been a lot of research done on China within the academic field of security studies. Researchers have studied the **Western view of China** from both critical and non-critical perspectives. Some research is a **Western attempt to understand** and predict the tactics and strategies used by China. Ratner (2011) argues that it is important to look at the Chinese government through different perspectives, and not only strategic ones, and tries to perceive the emergent security threats which China will have to handle in the future. Zhang (2019) investigates how the PRC use coercion, both military and non-violent coercion as a tactic against other states in the South China Sea. Saunders (2020) explores China’s strategies and calculations when it comes to their national security. He looks at aspects such as their **modernisation of their military** as well as their international and regional cooperation and diplomacy in both military and other security fields to analyse how China is trying to secure its strong position in the world order. The focus is on how China is protecting its national interests overseas by looking at their military strategies, and their peacekeeping operations to better understand China’s behaviour (Saunders 2020). Overall, these **studies do not tell us that much about China, as they are still from a Western perspective**. Other studies about China focuses on how the West views China. Möller (2007) gives an account of how the West has researched China from the 80s until the early 2000s. He looks at how the debates have gone from discussing multipolarity to China’s rise, and conclude that the research has been dominated by different strands of thought at different times: The evolution of the European debate over two decades points to an early dominance of Sinological exceptionalists, followed by a challenge by “internationalists” that pulled the Sinologists back in conceptional terms, followed in turn by the emergence of constructivism that provided the Sinologists with an excuse to once again turn exceptionalist (Möller 2007, 183). Hook, through a descriptive study, gives an account of how the British threat perception of China has changed and developed from 1945-2000, with a focus on Hong Kong and how the handover of Hong Kong to China affected it (Hook 2004). Roy (1996, 758) conducted a literature review over the different arguments on the pro-China vs anti-China stances politically. Focusing on the China threat, the arguments he presents concern regional instability and how China could transform into a superpower which would increase both their power and threat level to the West. More recently, Song (2015) did a securitisation analysis with a poststructuralist approach and analyses how the **West securitises China from three different perspectives**. One of the more interesting pieces of research is by Pan Chengxin (2012), who discusses how, in the current Western research on the rise of China, China is usually approached either as a security threat or as a country full of economic opportunities. Building onto arguments by Said, Clifford, and Geertz about the autobiographical nature of knowledge, Pan argues that **most studies about China’s rise** to power say more about how the West views itself rather than **producing actual useful knowledge about China**. Two paradigms (or narratives), opportunity and threat, perpetuate the **East as something Other to the West** (Pan 2012, 43). Focusing on this othering, Pan argues that it “is not so much about treating others as threats per se as it is about the employment of such discursive tactics as imposition, reduction, and denial when it comes to understanding other’s subjectivities” (Pan 2012, 56). Furthermore, using the threat paradigm when looking at China tells us about how the West is afraid to be treated like they have treated others in history; the **West is afraid to be colonized, conquered by China**. This paradigm is built onto ideas about Western superiority due to knowledge – i.e. modernity and technology – which allows/have allowed them to justify not only the current world order but also colonisation (Pan 2012, 43ff). Hence, it includes ideas of **Orientalism**, ‘the white man’s burden’ etc. Through representing China as a monolithic whole, dismissing its subjectivities, and/or imposing onto it a singular, fixed subjectivity of power politics, the **“China threat**” paradigm acts as a discursive construction of an **objectified Other**, cast as an Other and threatening object, China by definition lacks the kind of rationality and subjectivity that are characteristic of the Western knowing subject (Pan 2012, 55).

## Links

### Biotech

#### Invocations of securitied rhetoric in biowarfare is part of a larger techno-Orientalist anxiety fueled by US competitiveness with China in the global tech race---Yellow Peril becomes reconfigured through this imaginary and manifests in domestic anti-Asian sentiments in the name of technological and national security

Siu and Chun 20 (Lok Siu and Claire Chun | “Yellow Peril and Techno-orientalism in the Time of Covid-19: Racialized Contagion, Scientific Espionage, and Techno-Economic Warfare” | DOI: 10.1353/jaas.2020.0033 | SAoki)

Make no mistake, as long as President Trump continues to take a confrontational stance, using the rhetoric of blame against China with the intention to punish it with new sanctions, tariffs, and even the cancellation of U.S. debt obligations,5 the racial aggressions against Asian Americans will continue to rise, if not intensify. By now, it is widely accepted that the novel coronavirus emerged first in Wuhan, and scientists believe that the zoonotic disease might have jumped from animals to humans at Wuhan’s Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, a wet market where vegetables, seafood, meat, and a small number of exotic wildlife were sold. Despite this, on April 30, President Trump casually offered a new theory, which Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted: that COVID had originated in the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which houses a biosafety level-4 lab, and that the virus might have “leaked” from that lab. The implicit suggestion is that China had either intentionally bioengineered the novel coronavirus to cause massive destruction, thereby attributing malice, or carelessly leaked the virus due to scientific negligence, thereby attributing incompetence. In either case, these kinds of unsubstantiated speculations work to further stoke anger and disdain against the Chinese state. More disturbingly, they traffic in the idea of China as a biotechnology threat, resonating The immediate and unqualified responses from the scientific community reveal the danger of these potentially incendiary speculations. Responding swiftly, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a press release the morning of April 30 stating that “The Intelligence Community . . . concurs with the wide scientific consensus that the COVID-19 virus was not manmade or genetically modified . . . ” (my emphasis).6 Within days, the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease, Dr. Anthony Fauci, attested that the virus “could not have been artificially or deliberately manipulated.”7 These assertions sought to extinguish any attribution of malice to the Chinese state. Even with firm contestation, however, the very invocation of the idea of biotechnology warfare has tapped into and perhaps even fueled our existing techno-Orientalist anxieties. As the COVID pandemic story transpires in real time, engulfing the entire global community, taking unexpected twists and turns, making divergences and transgressions, we have become increasingly aware that the layers of entanglements cannot be easily parsed out, nor will we know anytime soon how and when the story will end. We offer a query into how we might assess and make sense of the intensifying Sinophobia and xenophobia in this current context. To do so, we must resist the temptation to confine our analysis to the narrow parameters of the pandemic. Rather, we insist on examining the rise of anti-Asian aggression within the concomitant vectors of the pandemic, the escalation of the U.S.-China trade war, and the growing concerns about cyber- and techno-security. Here we assert that the ideology of yellow peril set within a techno-Orientalist imaginary is powerfully animating the racial form and racial affect mediating the multiple terrains of public health, technology, global trade, and national security. While it is tempting to treat this historical conjuncture as extraordinary, it is crucial that we situate the current unfolding within the long history of Asian racialization, one that indexes the abiding tension between the political impetus to define national belonging and the shifting economic imperatives of the nation-state.8 In this essay, we examine the techniques and effects of race-making in this current moment, while linking them to historical antecedents, in order to illustrate the persistence of the yellow peril ideology as it is being configured through a techno-Orientalist imaginary where China is posited as the chief enemy-threat. What follows is an analysis of how Chinese alterity as national security threat is being simultaneously constructed and disciplined in the different but related arenas of the pandemic, science, and technology.

#### Discussion of new emerging tech in STS shows that race is NOT just biological, but has recentered toward a posthuman conversation of socio-genetic discussion---specifically in biotech, this racial configuration brings new forms of biological orientalism to fruition that aggregates Asian Americans into racialized stereotypes of dehumanization

Min 16 (Susette Min | “Biopower, Space, and Race in Asian American Studies” | DOI: 10.1215/00029831-3711150 | SAoki)

---STS = science and technology studies

Like Zhou’s and Anderson’s monographs, which group Asian American texts and cultural productions around a particular theme, Lee’s book can be approached as an analysis of Asian American literature and performance art within the framework of biopolitics and the idea of the fragmented Asian American body. But Lee’s book is much more ambitious, an epistemological reassessment of Asian American studies that attempts to graft recent scholarship in gender theory, queer theory, and science and technology studies (STS) onto Asian American critical thought to break the static thinking of the field’s pursuit of social justice and understanding of agency. In a framework where race is understood as a historically variable construct with material effects, the term Asian American has been foregrounded as a necessary “fictional (discursive) construct,” one that constantly threatens to be interpreted as essentialist and biological (8). Pointing to the field’s renewed anxiety about essentialism, Lee reviews the different ways scholars such as Kandice Chuh and Colleen Lye have called for “more rigorously historicist, formalist, [and] aesthetic” interrogations (10). While not taking issue with these endeavors, Lee questions the implications of avoiding a discussion of the ways scientific discourse on race has moved to the genetic and cellular level, and has cleaved from the biological. This disconnect, she argues, forecloses a number of opportunities to advance social justice agendas: the ability to see the persistence of particular forms of biological racism, the emergence of new racial forms, and the apparent equivalence of living matter “in an abstract system of underlying exchangeability” (233). In a manner analogous to Asian American studies’ deployment of qualified personification, STS deploys discursive strategies that conjure narratives about fictional persons in order to return the part (of the body) to the whole—for example, conflating cell lines with persons and turning them into proxies for personhood. Lee highlights how recent scholarship in STS traces the historicity of biology and exposes the ways biotechnology has reconfigured biology as a factory in correspondence with an intensified commodification of organs and tissues from surplus populations, separating human biological persons from partial persons. She pushes Asian American scholarship to consider these new forms of racial profiling and rearticulated divisions between nature and culture, human and posthuman. In other words, the meaning of race has changed within the discourse of biology, but Lee contends that these shifts have neither displaced nor supplanted a chromatic schema of race. Instead, biotechnology’s separation of human biological persons from partial persons and its anthropomorphizing of cells performatively intensify the aggregation and disaggregation of Asian Americans into revised racial classification systems. This emerges, for instance, in the case of Greg Bear’s biothriller Blood Music (1985), whose plot includes racializing and reinforcing Orientalist stereotypes of Asian Americans as superhuman, indifferent to feeling and suffering, and biologically impossible

### Borders

#### The nation state border is constructed on a eschatological imaginary that pulmugates in racialized ways of understanding U.S.-Asian relations as an ideological contagion

Man 18 (Jessica Man | Master of Arts degree in Asian American Studies | *“The Perfect Type of Industry”: 2012 and Apocalyptic Visions of the Asian Century* pg 26 | DOA: 7/8/2022 | SAoki)

Adam McKeown reminds us that the ways in which the Chinese Exclusion Act was enforced at the American border “did more than just classify Chinese immigrants. It asserted a vision of properly ordered global social relationships, a vision that was inseparable from the failures and contradictions inherent in its enforcement” (379-280). There is a wealth of scholarship that addresses the imperial preoccupation with legislating the border, linking it to both nationalist-statist anxieties about maintaining the ethno-national hierarchies of empire as well as anxieties about controlling subjugated bodies and legitimating colonial relationships to land. Chinese exclusion, which provided the basis for all subsequent iterations of racialized border control, points to the conceptualization of migrant labor as ideological contagion. All migrants are “carriers;” “illegal” migrants as early as the Exclusion Act had not been subjected to the proper ritualized screening that McKeown writes about. The inconsistencies inherent to border policing despite several attempts at reform indicate that Exclusion was not only about the physical prevention of Chinese entry, which it failed to do in the comprehensive manner pushed by labor unions, but about the public ideological decontamination of the United States. The concept of Yellow Peril not only threatened the stability of these “properly ordered global social relationships,” i.e. the economic and political ordering of immigrants and citizens based on American ideas of trade, race, and disability, but with actual total cultural and national annihilation. Yellow Peril is not only epistemological or metaphysical – it is an eschatological way of understanding U.S.-China (and more broadly U.S.-Asian) relations. With this framework, we can begin to understand the Page and Exclusion Acts and the associated immigration bans levied in the early 20th century as a state-sanctioned method of staving off apocalypse and eschaton, a legitimate way of recognizing the periodic and transitory nature of Empire. VII. Dream Interpretation – Apocalypse, Eschaton, and Empire In order to understand the relationship between state and apocalypse, we must first define the terms “apocalypse,” “eschaton,” and “eschatology.” “Apocalypse” is commonly understood as a temporal mode that is focused on the imminence of an ending – to Empire, to global life, to cosmology. I am making a distinction here between the popular and the theological, scholastic definitions. The former conflates apocalypse and eschaton into a commentary on imperial and colonial anxiety, while the latter approaches apocalypse as a critical, fundamental, and radical shift in epistemology where what is hidden is revealed, and eschaton as the moment or period of obliteration where knowledge itself collapses. “Apocalypse” is a term derived from the Greek apokalypsis, roughly translating to “uncovering,” but most famously taken to mean “revelation,” as in the biblical Revelation of John, sometimes called the Apocalypse of John. The word cannot be separated from its theological origins; Christianity is one of the fundamental traditions of thought through which Western nations understand history, social order, and futurity, and apocalypticism comes directly out of that tradition. The secularized notion of apocalypse turns prophesy into prediction, masking imperial Christian logics behind those of capitalism, modernity, and the state. “Apocalypse,” especially in its theological sense, should not be used as a semantically-neutral stand-in for just any religious conceptualization of the end of the world for this exact reason. John’s apocalypse, received on the island of Patmos, is an extremely dense text, crowded with fantastic and terrifying images, moving in and out of different modes of signification without giving the reader a comprehensive cipher. Throughout the text, John describes a vision of the destruction of the world, wars in spiritual and physical realms, the subjugation and liberation of humanity, and the dramatic culmination of Christian notions of spiritual warfare. Most importantly, the text anticipates the thing which is to be revealed: the total renewal and redemption of the spiritual and physical realms, and the nature of the perfected body. John’s vision is not only of the end of the world but of how the cosmos will be reorganized into a new as a temporal mode that is focused on the imminence of an ending – to Empire, to global life, to cosmology. I am making a distinction here between the popular and the theological, scholastic definitions. The former conflates apocalypse and eschaton into a commentary on imperial and colonial anxiety, while the latter approaches apocalypse as a critical, fundamental, and radical shift in epistemology where what is hidden is revealed, and eschaton as the moment or period of obliteration where knowledge itself collapses. “Apocalypse” is a term derived from the Greek apokalypsis, roughly translating to “uncovering,” but most famously taken to mean “revelation,” as in the biblical Revelation of John, sometimes called the Apocalypse of John. 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If American triumphalism is a belief in the inevitable dominance of U.S. government, culture, and ways of life over those of other nations, it must be maintained and driven by an eschatological imaginary that exposes weaknesses in the imperial strategy and thinks about the ways through which the empire could be destroyed. London’s “Unparalleled Invasion” provides an apocalypse that exposes the eschatological nature of the Exclusion Act and how it anticipated the fundamental threat Chinese laborers posed to the American nationstate. The Exclusion Act and all other anti-Asian immigration laws function on, and are justified through, an imagined future predicated on the destructive power of Yellow Peril, validating a specific vision of eschaton and apocalyptically reframing the nature of Asian immigration. Apocalypse necessarily deals with periodicity. Christian theology recognizes several “marks” in its historical record: pre- and post-lapsarian time, ante- and post-diluvian time, preand post-messianic time, pre- and post-apocalyptic time, and so forth. It also recognizes the nebulous and intractable nature of time – Giorgio Agamben notes in Infancy and History that Christianity “resolutely separates time from the natural movement of the stars to make it an essentially human, interior phenomenon” (95). The Second Epistle of Peter corroborates this observation, famously stating that “with the Lord one day is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day” (3:8, ESV). Eschatology therefore must be understood to extrapolate from a specific system of periodizing or marking history, but purposefully leave the actual span of the period it envelops unclear in order to avoid foreclosing itself at a certain date. In a statesanctioned eschatology, the effect is to suspend, extend, and frame the period of imperial life so that the end state of totalized destruction hangs ominously over the present moment, continually presenting a justification for exclusion and border maintenance as nationalist projects of conservation.

#### [Links]

### China

#### Yellow Peril is not a racialized construction, but rather the racial affect from the projection of Western anxieties in the techno-Orientalist struggle for hegemony---this anxiety has externalized material and discursive violence in anti-Asian sentiments of Asian ‘sub-humanity’ and Otherization

Siu and Chun 20 (Lok Siu and Claire Chun | “Yellow Peril and Techno-orientalism in the Time of Covid-19: Racialized Contagion, Scientific Espionage, and Techno-Economic Warfare” pg. 425-427 | DOI: 10.1353/jaas.2020.0033 | DOA: 7/8/2022 | SAoki)

The term yellow peril emerged in the late nineteenth century in response to Japan’s arrival to the geopolitical stage as a formidable military and industrial contender to the Western powers of Europe and the United States.9 The concept was further elaborated and given a tangible racial form through Sax Rohmer’s series of novels and films that provided the early content for the social imaginary of “yellow peril” along with its personification in the character of Dr. Fu Manchu, the iconic supervillain archetype of the Asian “evil criminal genius,” and his cast of minions.10 Strikingly, Dr. Fu Manchu’s characterization as evil, criminal, and genius continues to inform the racial trope of the Asian scientist spy; and more recently, we may add to the list the bioengineer, the CFO, the international graduate student, to name just a few. Moreover, the notion of the non-differentiable “yellow” masses continues to function as a homogenizing and dehumanizing device of Asian racialization, which makes possible the transference of Sinophobia to Asian xenophobia. In its inherent attempt to construct a racial other, “yellow peril” is more a projection of Western fear than a representation of an Asian object/subject, and in this sense, it may be better understood as a repository of racial affect that can animate a myriad of representational figures, images, and discourses, depending on context. Indeed, the images and discourses of yellow peril have surfaced multiple times throughout the twentieth century, capturing a multitude of ever-shifting perceived threats that range from the danger of military intrusion (i.e., Japanese Americans during WWII), economic competition (i.e., Chinese laborers in the late nineteenth century, Japan in the 1980s), Asian moral and cultural depravity (i.e., non-Christian heathens, Chinese prostitutes, opium smokers), to biological inferiority (i.e., effeminacy, disease carriers). As Colleen Lye observes, “the incipient ‘yellow peril’ refers to a particular combinatory kind of anticolonial [and anti-West] nationalism, in which the union of Japanese technological advance and Chinese numerical mass confronts Western civilization with a potentially unbeatable force.”11 Arguably, the yellow peril of today represents heightened Western anxieties around China’s combined forces of population size, global economic growth, and rapid technological-scientific innovation—all of which emerge from a political system that is considered ideologically oppositional to ours. The current context, we suggest, is best understood through the lens of techno-Orientalism. When the idea of techno-Orientalism first appeared in David Morley and Kevin Robins’s analysis of why Japan occupied such a threatening position in Western imagination in the late 1980s, techno-Orientalism offered a framework to make sense of the technologically imbued racist stereotypes of Japan/the Japanese that were emerging within the context of Western fears and anxieties around Japan’s ascendancy as a technological global power. They proposed that if technological advancement has been crucial to Western civilizational progress, then Japan’s technological superiority over the West also signals a critical challenge to Western hegemony, including its cultural authority to control representations of the West and its “others.” They claimed that the shifting balance in global power—the West’s loss of technological preeminence—has induced an identity crisis in the West. In response, techno-Orientalism, in which “[idioms of technology] become structured into the discourse of Orientalism,” is produced in large part to discipline Japan and its rise to techno-economic power.12 The United States, for instance, externalized its anxiety into xenophobic projections of Japan as a “culture that is cold, impersonal, and machine-like” in which its people are “sub-human” and “unfeeling aliens.”13 Techno-Orientalism, born from the “Japan Panic,” was effectively consolidated through and around political-economic concerns that frame Japanese and, by extension, Asian techno-capitalist progress as dangerous and dystopian. Extending Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism,14 techno-Orientalism marks a geo-historical shift where the West no longer has control over the terms that define the East—the “Orient”—as weak, inferior, and subordinate to the West. It marks a shift not only in political-economic power but also in cultural authority. Techno-Orientalism, then, is the expressive vehicle (cultural productions and visual representations) by which Western and Eastern nations articulate their fears, desires, and anxieties that are produced in their competitive struggle to gain technological hegemony through economic trade and scientific innovation.15 Analogous to Japan’s position in the late 1980s, China currently figures into the techno-Orientalist imaginary as a powerful competitor in mass production, a global financial giant, and an aggressive investor in technological, infrastructural, and scientific developments. At the same time, the increasing purchasing power of China provokes American fear of a future global market that is economically driven by Chinese consumptive desires and practices. It is this duality—the domination of both production and consumption across different sectors of the techno-capitalist global economy—that undergirds American anxieties of a sinicized future.16 Further amplifying these anxieties around Chinese techno-economic domination is our imagination of China/the Chinese as the ultimate yellow peril, whose state ideology is oppositional to that of the United States and whose unmatched population size combined with its economic expansion and technological advancements may actually pose a real challenge to U.S. global hegemony. We turn now to examine how the ideology of yellow peril is manifesting in the current context of techno-Orientalism, beginning first with an analysis of the racial trope of “Chinese as contagion” and its connection to anti-Asian aggression.

#### The 1AC’s need to combat the existential threat of Chinese technology is a manifestation of digital orientalism that mirrors COVID-19 conspiracy theories and Trump’s sinophobic rhetoric.

Mahoney ‘22 [Josef Gregory Mahoney; Josef Gregory Mahoney is professor of politics at East China Normal University in Shanghai, where he also directs the International Centre for Advanced Political Studies and the international graduate programme in politics;6-14-22; “China’s Rise as an Advanced Technological Society and the Rise of Digital Orientalism”; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-022-09817-z#Sec5; accessed 7-17-2022; AH]

Nevertheless, at the precise moment that China was at her most vulnerable, in the late-to-early nineteenth century, this is when we see rise of the “yellow peril” discourse, broadly aimed at the East but attaching to China in particular, without outcomes like the Chinese Exclusion Acts in the United States and the growing popularity of “super villains” like Fu Manchu [19, 47, 72], that would evolve into the Red Scares during the Cold War, exemplified in popular media like The Manchurian Candidate (1962) and many others. This is to say that at various points in time there have been profound Western apprehensions about Chinese intelligence and capacity, and these have correlated with efforts to dominate China as a perceived cultural, ideological and often racial inferior. This pattern seems to be repeating itself today. As China has emerged as a technological society, the general Western fear of technology or technophobia has developed as a distinct Sino(techno)phobia, along with fears the CPC is using Chinese technology in a bid for global domination. We have even some popular conspiracies from leading American officials promoting the idea that COVID-19 was engineered in a laboratory as part of a larger plot to help China ascend over its competitors, the US most especially. As noted above, there are three themes that broadly correspond with three periodizations of Orientalism that can be used to described how the West in various ways has perceived China. But to be clear, as Vukovich reminds (per private communication), these three themes are all based on the same underlying logic and motivations. Similarly, I am reminded of an apt comment made by Fredric Jameson of ‘heads in the clouds of capitalism of the 21st century, but our feet grounded in the same logic and basic practices of capitalist of the 19th century’ ([30] 72). The first theme, what we can call the classical Orientalism described by Said, dominated until the end of the Mao era and the Beginning of Reform and Opening Up ([75] 23). This theme and period saw China as being culturally, socially and politically backward, justifying colonialism and other forms of aggression. The second period, which I describe using Vukovich’s work, is Sinological Orientalism, where China is seen as increasingly adhering whether it likes it or not to universal values and standards established by the West a la “the end of history” (Ibid. 1, passim). In this context we see Western scholars and policymakers contesting Chinese exceptionalism, still asserting a type of Western paternalism and superiority, and concluding that China’s party-state system will eventually collapse (i.e., the “collapse thesis”) or reform itself into a liberal democracy within a liberal capitalist world order. Sinological Orientalism was dominant more or less until mounting American disappointments crossed paths with China’s exceptional rise. This can be dated with contrasts over a twenty year period, with extraordinary examples occurring in three periods: 2001: China joins the World Trade Organization; the US suffers 9/11 an initiates the Global War on Terror). 2008: China has a triumphant propaganda achievement hosting the Beijing Olympics; American economic governance failures spark the Global Financial Crisis. 2021: China claims victory over extreme poverty and establishes a xiaokang/“moderately prosperous society,” and effectively contains COVID-19; the US suffers high morbidity and mortality, experiences high inflation and a host of social ills, including intense polarization and what some describe as a coup attempt instigated by then-President Donald Trump against Congress with the Capitol Attack on January 6, and along the way, executes a disastrous retreat from Afghanistan). While Trump had repeatedly invoked China in negative ways during his campaign for the presidency in 2016, to the point of using dog whistle tactics, a number of factors pushed him to a more extreme position after he took office. First, CIA-associated intelligence failures and the increasingly discredited collapse thesis was replaced by the Pentagon-supported “threat thesis,” which in turn was likely reinforced by the high number of generals Trump appointed to key positions in his Administration. By 2017, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign had restored a measure of public trust and disciplined the Party and state, and likewise produced a number of reforms that could be characterized as significant improvements to governance. This was capped with the 19th Party Congress, when term limits on Xi’s leadership position were suspended, completing his consolidation of power. China had also launched a number of national “made in China” development campaigns, while Chinese firms like Huawei were gaining global market share in areas previously dominated by Western firms, or at least those considered the US considered less dangerous to its hegemony (e.g., Japanese, South Korean, Taiwanese, etc.). These developments intersected with growing American concerns with the role of technology generally, with mounting distrust of major firms like Facebook, Google, Apple and others, and even greater distrust for Chinese firms like Huawei, Tencent, TikTok and so on. Trump’s “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) campaign drew substantial inspiration from Ronald Reagan’s rhetoric against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and altogether, these developments saw the Trump Administration but American society more broadly agreeing that China was a threat, one that needed to be countered in various ways. A large part of this rhetoric asserted that China had gained her achievements at America’s expense, with allegations of state and corporate espionage explaining China’s technological capacity, but also helped along by American multinational firms that accommodated China for access to the Chinese market. All of this this helped normalize Trump’s trade war against China, to the extent that it has still not been reversed by his Democratic successor Joe Biden. In fact, it likewise intersected with rhetoric accusing China of genocide and slavery in Xinjiang, alleged by many, including the State Departments of both administrations. Various efforts to block Chinese technology at home and abroad, to create chokepoints in Chinese production, to encourage boycotts were pursued. As these developments peaked in 2020 under the duress of failed American efforts to contain COVID-19, the US saw spikes in anti-Chinese sentiments and racist attacks on people of Asian descent. With these points in mind, we can theorize that Sinological Orientalism was increasingly overwhelmed by Digital Orientalism, roughly dated from 2017, and continues to the present. Within this new theme/period there are three key features that present in somewhat contradictory but nevertheless explicable ways. First is the inversion the key ideas of Sinological Orientalism, insomuch as China is now viewed as not becoming like the US but as a growing threat, particularly as China’s technological capacity and that of the CPC are viewed as advancing hand-in-hand [62]. Some, like former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Vice President Mike Pence, publicly claimed that China was ideologically committed to seeking a global communist order and hinted at a new Cold War [5, 60, 61]. In short, many no longer saw China and the US on the path of political or economic convergence, but the complete opposite. This rhetoric did not change with the arrival of a new US presidential administration. Second, however, is that despite this apparent divergence, and despite efforts in Washington and Beijing to emphasize cultural and political differences, there were in fact profound convergences underway. China like the West was being radically transformed by digital culture and technology as a whole, with similar positive and negative experiences. As many have discussed elsewhere, China’s capacity to spy on competitors and compete militarily advanced, (though still shy of American abilities and practices by most estimates). Perhaps more pervasive and significant despite American alarmism about China’s improved intelligence and military capabilities: as market reforms and culture became increasingly advanced and dominant from the 1990s onward, incredible generation gaps emerged in which young Chinese arguably had more in common with their Western peers than their own parents. These developments worried Beijing to no end, with deep suspicions directed against what it saw as the malign influences of foreign soft power. In fact, while the government salutes young people as the most fortunate in Chinese history, ample data from Chinese government sources suggest that Chinese youths have been in a state of increasing crises, with significant increases in youth-associated drug and alcohol abuse, crime, suicides, sexual abuse, mental illness, social discontent, spiraling divorce rates, screen-brain interfacing and so on, again, quite similar to their peers in the West [42]. Third is that many of these ills have meet new policy responses in China that arguably demonstrate not only an increased capacity for governance as an advanced technological society, they also appear to contrast with accelerating declines of the same in the West, especially the United States. This is apparent in the last couple of years, where China’s dynamic zero-covid policies demonstrate a new plateau in its development as a technological society, while breakdowns and even regression seem more apparent in America. In the US, for example, there have been profound economic and social disruptions associated with COVID-19 morbidity and mortality, with deaths exceeding a million. In contrast, China was the first and by some accounts the only country to contain the virus, with deaths c. 5000 over the same time period. China was also the first to reverse contractions and return to positive economic growth in 2020, becoming the top global destination for inbound foreign direct investment that same year (Xinhua [69]). Furthermore, once again it proved its position as the world’s leading industrial system [57], providing critical supplies to meet surging global demand (e.g., personal protection equipment, vaccine production, computer products needed as students around the world shifted to online courses, etc.) as other countries struggled to meet basic needs [4]. In the US, in addition the high morbidity and mortality rates, many if not most children lost at least year of effective schooling, with declining standardized exam results and graduation rates in states painting a bleak picture [22, 54], especially among low-income and minority students who were more vulnerable from the start (who didn’t have access to computers or internet services for taking classes online, or who dropped or sold these resources to buy food, and who often lacked guardians capable of supervising their studies (see, for example, [1, 16, 49]). These reverses have to be placed in a broader context, namely, the national policy initiatives that started with national legislation known as “No Child Left Behind” (2001) and continued with subsequent reforms that aimed to dramatically improve STEM education to better compete with students from China and India—reforms that had thus far failed to achieve desired results and that are now encountering systemic reversals associated with the pandemic. To make matters worse, the US during the pandemic saw marked increases in sexual abuse, drug and alcohol abuse, depression, suicide, crime and hunger among children. It also saw major upticks in screen times as children were forced online, dependent on technologies sans effective data privacy protections, and susceptible to various forms of online exploitation. Meanwhile, US technology firms reaped record profits and pushed back against nascent attempts to regulate them (meanwhile, China disciplined major Chinese tech platforms, online gaming targeting children, and after school programs that were widely recognized as having pushed children to breaking points). Meanwhile, the US saw the rise of a growing anti-science and anti-vaccine culture among Americans, further undercutting both outbreak responses and rational thinking. In some states, new laws required teaching the Biblical account of creation alongside the Big Bang Theory in public school science classes. Fake news became the norm, eroding trust in government and well-established news sources. The Federal Reserve increased the money supply by 20% to help cover the crisis, fueling major increases in inflation, and both the Trump and Biden administrations provided massive outlays of public assistance with trillions in subsidies and cash payments. The American economy faltered and the fate of the US dollar as the supranational currency diminished. As American society floundered, it turned inward against itself through polarization and increasing crime and violence, and likewise turned against countries it considered competitors who were faring better, China above all. While the US failed to contain the outbreak, China managed to do so through effective lockdowns and subsequent controls that minimized social and economic disruption. To be sure, some areas faced significant disruptions, e.g., Shanghai, but the argument that this minimized disruptions elsewhere likely has merit. But to be clear, there has not yet been an honest appraisal of China’s dynamic zero-covid policies. China likely had little choice otherwise: had it not taken this approach, we might be looking at six million or more dead in China. Given the density in Chinese cities, we likely would have seen collapsed health care systems and disrupted economic production, schools closed, children suffering, and so on. This would have created tremendous amounts of social instability among a people and system with little tolerance for chaos. At the same time, keeping COVID-19 under control limited the possibility of new mutations. It ensured the Chinese economy could provide vital supplies for global markets. China sped the development of new technologies and organizational capacities to limit the disease and preserve social well-being and progress. These included: mobilizing, expanding, reinforcing and better linking national and local health and public health systems, down to local police bureaus and neighborhood committees (juweihui); establishing clear operational values and objectives; speeding development and dissemination of vaccines (86% with two doses nationally as of January 2022, according to the National Health Commission, see: [25]); requiring masking, social distancing and when necessary, lockdowns (in some cases individual buildings, city districts and whole cities); building emergency overflow hospitals in outbreak areas (fangcang yiyuan); requiring individual temperature scans for entering public transportation and large public venues, including shopping malls; establishing free testing on demand with same day results; enabling individual tracking of movement for past 14 days by mobile phone number (xingcheng ma); and linking all of these efforts, including public guidance about outbreaks and control efforts, vaccine and test records, to smart device apps based in various digital platforms that facilitate contact tracing, and that produce codes that allow or restrict individuals from traveling or entering public buildings (jiankang ma), and when necessary, signaling and helping enforce self-isolation or stronger forms of quarantine (in fact, this is simply a fast moving outgrowth of the public and popular embrace of e-government in China, see [38]). Meanwhile, many Western countries wagged their fingers, arguing their principles of individual freedom were more sacred than effective containment through social controls. These calls only intensified with lockdowns in Jilin and Shanghai in 2022, and understandably so. That said, the general perception among many Sinologists and international disease specialists was that the lockdowns were technically impossible to execute, especially in Shanghai, that the people would rise up and stop them, that it was impossible to contain and control the Omicron variant anyway, and even, that it was unnecessary to do so, despite the fact that Omicron killed more in the US than Delta, and killed scores in Hong Kong. In fact, while the initial lockdown of Shanghai was fractious, while there was inconsistency ensuring essential supplies were met reliably and fairly, while there were excesses that required adjustment and sporadic cases of local officials guilty of abuse or negligence, a city of 25 million was locked down (historically unprecedented), many of the initial missteps of the lockdown resolved, and the outbreak contained with associated deaths minimized. As much of the rest of the world is moving to a model of endemicity, despite the US predicting up to a 100 million new infections in America alone in late 2022, China is building what some describe as a 48-hour or 72-hour testing regime and building on local and national health codes that connect individual test results with locations and movements [31]. For some critics this evokes a dystopian nightmare, and others might fairly criticize it as emphasizing the sort of techno-positivism not uncommon to Marxist-Leninist systems, the sort that have variously produced both great leaps forward and backward. Time will tell whether China’s pandemic control policies served the nation well, but however they are assessed, we shouldn’t be distracted from the key point: China did this because it believed it must, because a critical mass of its people expected the government to control and fight the disease, and most importantly that same mass helped make it happen. In short, dynamic zero-covid, including the lockdowns, happened in China because they could, because China as a technological society could, whereas most Western countries lacked the ability or the will to do so at all. Thus, when we look others hoping for silver bullets from what many perceive as an insufficiently regulated and untrusted pharmaceutical industry, when we see a breakdown in trust in government and even public health agencies like the US Centers for Disease Control that were once considered the gold standard the world over, what we also see are untrusted techniques trying to compensate for the pronounced inadequacy of the US to function effectively or competitively as a technological society. And while the US by some accounts still holds an edge over China in terms of intellectual property and technology stocks, it seems increasingly apparent that China has surpassed the US as a technological society, and likewise, shortened the time when it will exceed the US on other fronts as well. It should be noted that among a raft of proposed solutions, US policymakers have advanced the idea of national industrial policy that resorts not to free market principles but aims to compete with China using tactics more familiar to a planned economy. These efforts have not yet matured and there is good reason to suspect they never will, even if supporting legislation is signed into law. Additionally, we should note that in 2008 and again with the pandemic, the US has resorted to extraordinary market interventions with both monetary and fiscal policies, far outstripping the more narrow and disciplined scope of China’s regime of macro-controls, which the US excoriates despite their relative efficacy. It’s difficult to categorize these points as either convergences or divergences, as they contain elements of both. But it shouldn’t surprise us if Digital Orientalism evolves as the US learning from and copying China as it seeks solutions to its multitude of deeply entrenched problems, but rationalizing this politically as an existential need to compete with China.

#### **Fearmongering surrounding China’s technological advancement marks a shift from Sinological Orientalism to Technological Orientalism, marking a *re-*articulation and *re-*emergence of the “yellow peril,” where China is shifted ideologically from the “inferior” to a radically dangerous threat.**

Mahoney 22 (Josef Gregory Mahoney, "China’s Rise as an Advanced Technological Society and the Rise of Digital Orientalism", Journal of Chinese Political Science, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11366-022-09817-z.pdf, 6-14-2022, Accessed 7-8-2022)//ILake🪐

There has long been a complicated coexistence between Western fears of China and Western senses of cultural and technological superiority. As D.E. Mungello notes, when Europeans traveled to China to visit the Ming court in the sixteenth century, the technical and cultural advances observed by these visitors were so unsettling that it led some to classify the Chinese as being racially “white.” It was only later, when the Qing Dynasty was in decline and Europe was on the rise that Orientalism ‘colored’ Chinese both yellow and scientifically inferior [52, 53]. Others also have argued that initial Western tech development in the early modern period were in part inspired by Chinese accomplishments and fears of the same [24]. Nevertheless, at the precise moment that China was at her most vulnerable, in the late-to-early nineteenth century, this is when we see rise of the “yellow peril” discourse, broadly aimed at the East but attaching to China in particular, without outcomes like the Chinese Exclusion Acts in the United States and the growing popularity of “super villains” like Fu Manchu [19, 47, 72], that would evolve into the Red Scares during the Cold War, exemplified in popular media like The Manchurian Candidate (1962) and many others. This is to say that at various points in time there have been profound Western apprehensions about Chinese intelligence and capacity, and these have correlated with efforts to dominate China as a perceived cultural, ideological and often racial inferior. This pattern seems to be repeating itself today. As China has emerged as a technological society, the general Western fear of technology or technophobia has developed as a distinct Sino(techno)phobia, along with fears the CPC is using Chinese technology in a bid for global domination. We have even some popular conspiracies from leading American officials promoting the idea that COVID-19 was engineered in a laboratory as part of a larger plot to help China ascend over its competitors, the US most especially. As noted above, there are three themes that broadly correspond with three periodizations of Orientalism that can be used to described how the West in various ways has perceived China. But to be clear, as Vukovich reminds (per private communication), these three themes are all based on the same underlying logic and motivations. Similarly, I am reminded of an apt comment made by Fredric Jameson of ‘heads in the clouds of capitalism of the 21st century, but our feet grounded in the same logic and basic practices of capitalist of the 19th century’ ([30] 72). The first theme, what we can call the classical Orientalism described by Said, dominated until the end of the Mao era and the Beginning of Reform and Opening Up ([75] 23). This theme and period saw China as being culturally, socially and politically backward, justifying colonialism and other forms of aggression. The second period, which I describe using Vukovich’s work, is Sinological Orientalism, where China is seen as increasingly adhering whether it likes it or not to universal values and standards established by the West a la “the end of history” (Ibid. 1, passim). In this context we see Western scholars and policymakers contesting Chinese exceptionalism, still asserting a type of Western paternalism and superiority, and concluding that China’s party-state system will eventually collapse (i.e., the “collapse thesis”) or reform itself into a liberal democracy within a liberal capitalist world order. Sinological Orientalism was dominant more or less until mounting American disappointments crossed paths with China’s exceptional rise. This can be dated with contrasts over a twenty year period, with extraordinary examples occurring in three periods: 2001: China joins the World Trade Organization; the US suffers 9/11 an initiates the Global War on Terror). 2008: China has a triumphant propaganda achievement hosting the Beijing Olympics; American economic governance failures spark the Global Financial Crisis. 2021: China claims victory over extreme poverty and establishes a xiaokang/“moderately prosperous society,” and effectively contains COVID-19; the US suffers high morbidity and mortality, experiences high inflation and a host of social ills, including intense polarization and what some describe as a coup attempt instigated by then-President Donald Trump against Congress with the Capitol Attack on January 6, and along the way, executes a disastrous retreat from Afghanistan). While Trump had repeatedly invoked China in negative ways during his campaign for the presidency in 2016, to the point of using dog whistle tactics, a number of factors pushed him to a more extreme position after he took office. First, CIA-associated intelligence failures and the increasingly discredited collapse thesis was replaced by the Pentagon-supported “threat thesis,” which in turn was likely reinforced by the high number of generals Trump appointed to key positions in his Administration. By 2017, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign had restored a measure of public trust and disciplined the Party and state, and likewise produced a number of reforms that could be characterized as significant improvements to governance. This was capped with the 19th Party Congress, when term limits on Xi’s leadership position were suspended, completing his consolidation of power. China had also launched a number of national “made in China” development campaigns, while Chinese frms like Huawei were gaining global market share in areas previously dominated by Western frms, or at least those considered the US considered less dangerous to its hegemony (e.g., Japanese, South Korean, Taiwanese, etc.). These developments intersected with growing American concerns with the role of technology generally, with mounting distrust of major frms like Facebook, Google, Apple and others, and even greater distrust for Chinese frms like Huawei, Tencent, TikTok and so on. Trump’s “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) campaign drew substantial inspiration from Ronald Reagan’s rhetoric against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and altogether, these developments saw the Trump Administration but American society more broadly agreeing that China was a threat, one that needed to be countered in various ways. A large part of this rhetoric asserted that China had gained her achievements at America’s expense, with allegations of state and corporate espionage explaining China’s technological capacity, but also helped along by American multinational firms that accommodated China for access to the Chinese market. All of this helped normalize Trump’s trade war against China, to the extent that it has still not been reversed by his Democratic successor Joe Biden. In fact, it likewise intersected with rhetoric accusing China of genocide and slavery in Xinjiang, alleged by many, including the State Departments of both administrations. Various eforts to block Chinese technology at home and abroad, to create chokepoints in Chinese production, to encourage boycotts were pursued. As these developments peaked in 2020 under the duress of failed American eforts to contain COVID-19, the US saw spikes in anti-Chinese sentiments and racist attacks on people of Asian descent. With these points in mind, we can theorize that Sinological Orientalism was increasingly overwhelmed by Digital Orientalism, roughly dated from 2017, and continues to the present. Within this new theme/period there are three key features that present in somewhat contradictory but nevertheless explicable ways. First is the inversion the key ideas of Sinological Orientalism, insomuch as China is now viewed as not becoming like the US but as a growing threat, particularly as China’s technological capacity and that of the CPC are viewed as advancing hand-in-hand [62]. Some, like former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Vice President Mike Pence, publicly claimed that China was ideologically committed to seeking a global communist order and hinted at a new Cold War [5, 60, 61]. In short, many no longer saw China and the US on the path of political or economic convergence, but the complete opposite. This rhetoric did not change with the arrival of a new US presidential administration.

#### The depiction of a rising China and fear of a technologically advanced east is techno-orientalism and still perpetuates the belief of the east as the other.

Hu 22[Jane Hu, PhD candidate in English and Film & Media Studies at UC-Berkeley, "Where the Future Is Asian, and the Asians Are Robots",3-4-2022, New Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/where-the-future-is-asian-and-the-asians-are-robots, 1LEE]

“After Yang” follows a long tradition of science-fiction narratives that fall under the category of “techno-Orientalism,” in which the future is often figured as Asian, and Asians are often figured as robots. The genre is historically understood as emerging from American anxieties about Japan’s postwar economic boom, starting in the nineteen-seventies. Techno-Orientalist texts typically forecast an impending future, as in nineteen-eighties cyberpunk media such as William Gibson’s “Neuromancer” and Ridley Scott’s “Blade Runner.” These earlier, Japan-inflected techno-Orientalist worlds, however, have since become a template for speculations about the future—any future. There are techno-Orientalist sensibilities in “Ghost in the Shell” (adapted from the Japanese anime franchise and featuring Scarlett Johansson as a vaguely Asian robot), the Asian-inspired action sequences of “The Matrix,” the Asian-infused aesthetics of Spike Jonze’s “Her,” the futuristic Asian section of the Wachowskis’ “Cloud Atlas,” the dancing Asian robot in Alex Garland’s “Ex Machina”—you get the idea. In these films, an ambient dread about Asian influence gets expressed through an aesthetic sensibility rather than by representing or centering actual Asian characters.

As with Edward Said’s foundational theory of Orientalism, in which the Eastern Other is framed as peripheral to the rich humanism of the Western subject, techno-Orientalism figures Asians as distant, unrelatable, and inscrutable. Whereas Saidian Orientalism understood the Eastern Other as fundamentally backward and uncivilized, however, techno-Orientalism presents an upgraded vision of the Asian as threateningly futuristic and advanced. In both iterations, the Other is a robot—or at least robotic—because Western speculations about an Asianized future still rely on stereotypes of Asians as passive, unfeeling, and good at math.

Earlier instances of techno-Orientalism largely fixated on Japan’s technological advancements, but the twenty-first century has progressively shifted toward “rising China.” (Techno-Orientalism might be traced as far back as the British author Sax Rohmer’s infamous evil scientist, Dr. Fu Manchu, who plots to build up Chinese power by kidnapping European engineers.) As scholars David S. Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta A. Niu write, in “Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media,” “Japan creates technology, but China is the technology.” In other words, if Japan was once the innovator, then China is now the relentless manufacturer.

#### Digital Orientalism explains the acceleration of fears of China’s rise and if it continues to dominate our epistemological thought then it could have apocalyptic consequences-surveillance states and justification of suppression

Maximillian Mayer and Josef Gregory Mahoney 20[Josef Gregory Mahoney, professor of politics at East China Normal University in Shanghai, Maximillian Mayer, assistant professor in international studies at the University of Nottingham Ningbo, "Why Trump’s campaign against Huawei is digital orientalism",01-18-2020, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3046357/trumps-campaign-against-huawei-symptom-digital-orientalism-ignoring, 1LEE]

We introduce the concept of “digital orientalism” to help explain what is really at stake in controversies over China’s rapid digitalisation.

In a special issue of the Journal of Chinese Political Science, we write: “The increasingly apparent and uncomfortable development that many instinctively deny is that one of the key elements of Sinological orientalism, the notion that China would become more like the West, has become increasingly true, with the caveat that the West, likewise through the same types of technology, has become increasingly like China.”

Anxieties have resurfaced in two key areas. First, worries about the “technological society” and its threat to values and practices considered culturally intrinsic are key concerns in both China and the West.

These fears have accelerated in the West with the unprecedented rise of platform companies – technology-enabled businesses that create value by facilitating exchanges between two or more interdependent groups – and state surveillance.

But with the emergence of a Chinese tech state and mushrooming Chinese platform companies, and with China drawing even with and perhaps overtaking the West in some technology fields, these fears have been reinforced.

Huawei and the double standards of the West

Second, China’s technological leapfrogging has produced “Sinotechnophobia”. The fear of Chinese technology has diminished Western fears of Western tech in a manner that recalls the cold war’s arms race (“we’re bad, but they’re worse”).

But Sinotechnophobia could have apocalyptic consequences, either through self-destruction or mutual destruction, on par with those described by Jairus Victor Grove in Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World: imagine unrestricted surveillance states justifying self-suppression in the name of bolstering security against each other, with competing artificial intelligence running algorithms that accelerate poor decision-making.

What digital orientalism masks is the extent to which China experiences many of the same problems and practices found in democratic societies. Surveillance capitalism works similarly everywhere and some misuse of AI and big data by US agencies is on par with China and sometimes worse.

This convergence also causes discomfort in Beijing, which often trumpets China’s differences while struggling to discipline the ’90s and 2000s generations, which, having grown up in a market society with extremely high levels of personal technology usage, have more in common with American millennials than with their own parents.

How AI and quantum computing add to danger of US-China conflict

Whatever threats Huawei poses for democratic politics, it distracts us from those posed already by Western tech giants and algorithmic governance through an almost complete erosion of privacy, omnipresent surveillance and valid worries that elections can be hacked by foreign powers or purchased via social marketing using targeted fake news.

In the Journal of Democracy, Larry Diamond describes this as the “road to digital unfreedom” and “postmodern totalitarianism”. We add that a self-defeating “us versus them” logic is merely picking your poison.

Instead of focusing on the drawbacks of an individual company or technology, we should acknowledge the broader reality: intensifying global homogenisation, cyberwar, the dominance of platform companies, inescapable surveillance capitalism, the impossibility of data privacy, the normalisation of stealth mass-manipulation and nudging campaigns, the experience of post-truth rationalities and the reduction of individuals to constantly accessible screen-brain interfacing.

Liberal societies don’t need Chinese tech to destroy not just democratic processes but the very conditions of democratic life and politics. Yet, by creating a “dangerous other” and foregrounding misleading binaries, digital orientalism keeps us from deliberating socio-technical futures and the good society that we should envision.

Only by recognising the convergence of authoritarian digitalisation in China, Europe and the US can we unchain our imaginative powers as digital citizens and find a better way forward.

#### Digital Orientalism the is independent cause towards the fear that drives the US and its Allies to harsh policies towards China

Gregory Moore 22[Gregory Moore, Professor of Global Studies and Politics at Colorado Christian University, "Huawei, Cyber-Sovereignty and Liberal Norms: China’s Challenge to the West/Democracies",6-3-2022, SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-022-09814-2, 1LEE]

We define digital orientalism as re/inscribing a pseudo-otherness, typically resorting to tropes first employed during classical [Said], Cold War, and Sinological forms of orientalism [Vukovich], but now used when social, cultural, economic and even political differences have increasingly narrowed through the increasing tilt towards a global technological society in ways that are undermining older national and cultural narratives and associated hegemonies [17, p. 1].

Said’s orientalism construct [26] is an important contribution to the study of colonialism, post-colonial thought, international relations and sociology. There is no reason to challenge it here. It’s application to the digital realm is an interesting and important one. The premise of the editors of this special issue is that the West expected China to evolve into a liberal democracy, but that this has not happened, and moreover this (from the West’s perspective “fundamentally illegitimate”) power has been able to increasingly compete head to head with the US and the West in military, political, economic and technological terms, and this has created deep fear among Western/democratic leaders. Fear is a key part of this orientalist narrative. The argument is that it is fear of this digital, political and cultural other that drives a tough US, Australian, British (for example) policy toward China, and drives a harsh stand toward Huawei. To set this up in a cause and effect framework, then digital orientalism is the independent variable that causes fear in the US and others towards China, that brings about the dependent variable, harsh policies toward China and Huawei specifically. What this would mean is that other factors would not explain the dependent variable, the harsh US/Western policy toward Huawei. The question we will pose here is, is this correct?

#### **The 1ac’s positing of China as an emerging threat through technological development follows orientalist discourses that constantly racialize and dehumanize Asian peoples**

Mahoney 6/14[(Josef Gregory Mahoney, 6-14-2022, "China’s Rise as an Advanced Technological Society and the Rise of Digital Orientalism," SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-022-09817-z )**//BRownRice**](file:///C:\Users\jreub\Downloads\(Josef%20Gregory%20Mahoney,%206-14-2022,%20%22China’s%20Rise%20as%20an%20Advanced%20Technological%20Society%20and%20the%20Rise%20of%20Digital%20Orientalism,%22%20SpringerLink,%20https:\link.springer.com\article\10.1007\s11366-022-09817-z%20)\BRownRice)

There has long been a complicated coexistence between Western fears of China and Western senses of cultural and technological superiority. As D.E. Mungello notes, when Europeans traveled to China to visit the Ming court in the sixteenth century, the technical and cultural advances observed by these visitors were so unsettling that it led some to classify the Chinese as being racially “white.” It was only later, when the Qing Dynasty was in decline and Europe was on the rise that Orientalism ‘colored’ Chinese both yellow and scientifically inferior [52, 53]. Others also have argued that initial Western tech development in the early modern period were in part inspired by Chinese accomplishments and fears of the same [24]. Nevertheless, at the precise moment that China was at her most vulnerable, in the late-to-early nineteenth century, this is when we see rise of the “yellow peril” discourse, broadly aimed at the East but attaching to China in particular, without outcomes like the Chinese Exclusion Acts in the United States and the growing popularity of “super villains” like Fu Manchu [19, 47, 72], that would evolve into the Red Scares during the Cold War, exemplified in popular media like The Manchurian Candidate (1962) and many others. This is to say that at various points in time there have been profound Western apprehensions about Chinese intelligence and capacity, and these have correlated with efforts to dominate China as a perceived cultural, ideological and often racial inferior. This pattern seems to be repeating itself today. As China has emerged as a technological society, the general Western fear of technology or technophobia has developed as a distinct Sino(techno)phobia, along with fears the CPC is using Chinese technology in a bid for global domination. We have even some popular conspiracies from leading American officials promoting the idea that COVID-19 was engineered in a laboratory as part of a larger plot to help China ascend over its competitors, the US most especially. As noted above, there are three themes that broadly correspond with three periodizations of Orientalism that can be used to described how the West in various ways has perceived China. But to be clear, as Vukovich reminds (per private communication), these three themes are all based on the same underlying logic and motivations. 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### Cyber

#### Cybersecurity is a strategic framing of racialization rooted in techno-Orientalist anxieties that weaponize racialized fears of the dangers to liberalism and democracy to legitimize a hegemonic state that paints Asians in the specter of a techno-viral threat

Siu and Chun 20 (Lok Siu and Claire Chun | “Yellow Peril and Techno-orientalism in the Time of Covid-19: Racialized Contagion, Scientific Espionage, and Techno-Economic Warfare” pg. 425-427 | DOI: 10.1353/jaas.2020.0033 | DOA: 7/8/2022 | SAoki)

The American media coverage of Wuhan’s shutdown and the Chinese state’s deployment of surveillance technology to contain the virus through contact tracing and quarantine enforcement measures offered the American public a preview of the PRC government at work. Enfolded in these stories are both the underlying admiration and fear around the Chinese state’s efficiency and efficacy in using technology for population control. Similarly, the same kind of admiration and fear are evident in American perceptions of China’s explosive economic development and global reach since the 1990s. And arguably, these same sentiments re-emerge when we read about the seemingly rapid success of Huawei Technologies, which has become the world’s largest telecommunications technology company, overtaking Western companies that were once household names, like Eriksson, Nokia, and Motorola. The exemplary case of Huawei brings our discussion of yellow peril into the explicit terrain of techno-Orientalism where the idea of the Chinese techno-virus—emerging at the nexus of technology, international trade, and cyber-security—is articulated through the racialized fear of Chinese technological domination achieved purportedly by stealing trade secrets, engaging unfair trade practices, and enabling Chinese state surveillance. What the case of Huawei illustrates is the extension of the “Chinese virus” trope that already exists in the domains of public health (as biological pathogen) and research institutions (scientist-spy) into the realm of everyday consumer technologies. Our point in discussing Huawei is not to defend it or to judge its activities. Rather, we want to call attention to the increasing significance of media/communications technologies as sites of interstate techno-economic-security struggles (in addition to already existing corporate surveillance). Toward that end, the Huawei example clearly shows the entwined issues and discourses of technology, international trade, and cybersecurity, all of which are filtered through and constitutive of the racializing techniques of the “Chinese virus.” Between January 2019 and February 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice filed three indictments against Huawei and its subsidiaries. That Huawei is the first foreign company of recent memory that is singled out by the United States for charges related to sanctions violations, conspiracy to steal trade secrets from American companies (including source code and wireless technology manuals), and federal racketeering (including fraud, obstruction of justice, money laundering) is noteworthy in itself. This last charge of racketeering is used historically to address organized crime (i.e. mafias) and points to the U.S. government’s intended juridical delegitimization of Huawei as an irrational institution mired in secrecy and an unlawful global corporation that cannot be trusted. In response to these allegations, Huawei accused the Department of Justice of exercising a form of political persecution and asserted that “[the charges] are based largely on resolved civil disputes from the last twenty years that have been previously settled, litigated, and in some cases, rejected by federal judges and juries.”31 The case will likely take years to resolve, but its function will become apparent by the ensuing interstate trade and diplomatic negotiations between China and the United States. Meanwhile, the White House and various U.S. state departments have begun to exert pressure on both domestic institutions and allied nation-states to end contracts and research collaborations with Huawei. For instance, the U.S. Department of Commerce in 2019 blacklisted the firm on charges of intellectual property theft and barred U.S. companies from selling products to Huawei without federal authorization.32 Also, as discussed in the above section, the FBI has placed pressure on universities to increase oversight of Chinese American researchers and to divest from research collaborations funded by Huawei and other Chinese firms. Multiple universities, including MIT, Stanford University, and the University of Illinois, have terminated research partnerships with Huawei.33 In addition to these domestic pressures, U.S. officials have asked allied nation-states to cancel any existing contracts with Huawei, especially ones that involve using the firm’s equipment for developing 5G wireless networks. Cybersecurity serves as the stated rationale, conjuring the potential of the Chinese Communist Party through its ties to the firm to engage in cyber surveillance/espionage by intercepting individual, corporate, and government data flowing through the 5G wireless networks. According to this logic, the “Chinese/Asian contagion” manifest as “Chinese/Asian espionage” can now be hardwired into the infrastructural fabric of our telecommunications systems through which data will travel from our phones, computers, online accounts, and other kinds of technologies to Chinese companies and, potentially, the Chinese state. The assertion is that the use of Huawei’s equipment will create massive security vulnerabilities not just to U.S. intelligence but also to American individuals whose personal information can be captured and used for endless possibilities of commoditization. It is also argued that Chinese technology integration into any Western cyber infrastructure project “would give China the upper hand in any potential cyber war.”34 Recently, this racialized fear of Chinese technology has materialized with intensified urgency in the privacy debates surrounding the immensely popular video-sharing platform, TikTok, and its Chinese parent company, ByteDance. With over 100 million users in the United States alone, TikTok has ascended to social media ubiquity, exacerbating American anxieties around China’s technological dominance.35 Rehearsing much of the same rhetoric used to condemn Huawei, U.S. lawmakers have argued that TikTok poses a threat to the “national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States,” citing concerns over TikTok’s handling of user data and the company’s alleged allegiance to the Chinese government.36 Indeed, in early August 2020, the Trump administration released an executive order that would effectively ban the social media app from the United States if ByteDance failed to address concerns regarding the app’s surveillance mechanisms, including the Chinese Communist Party’s “access to Americans’ personal and proprietary information . . . ”37 Worth noting is the fact that TikTok was the platform of choice used by K-pop fans to flood the Trump campaign with fake ticket reservations to the Tulsa, Oklahoma, rally. The spectacular embarrassment of a half-empty arena no doubt left an impression on the White House. However, even as the U.S. government is accusing Chinese corporations like ByteDance and Huawei of colluding with the state, it too is expanding collaborations with U.S. technology companies. For instance, in 2019, Microsoft was awarded a $10 billion contract from the Department of Defense to update and transform the U.S. military’s cloud computing infrastructure. The project, known as the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI), is the Pentagon’s largest technology contract to date38 and represents the growing relationship between the high-tech industry and the military. Ironically, these are the very same nationalistic ties that the U.S. government has accused TikTok of advancing. The strategic framing of potential foreign violation of individual privacy is part and parcel of the racialized construction of the “Chinese/ Asian techno-virus” as a danger to both American liberal personhood and national capitalist democracy. Indeed, the potentiality for China to gain the upper hand in any possible cyber and technological war with the United States compounds the economic threat that conglomerates like Huawei and ByteDance pose to U.S. global capitalism. The perceived dual dangers of compromised national security and economic competition—as embodied by Chinese transnational tech firms—positions Chinese technology, its commoditization, and its capture of the global market as evidence of China’s advance in “techno-economic warfare.” In this way, the specter of the Chinese/Asian threat is central, if not necessary, to legitimizing the insistence of American hegemony.

### COVID

#### Fears of COVID further perpetuate the racialization of the virus – spurs anti-asian violence and the dehumanization of Asians through a techno-orientalist lens

Siu and Chun 20 (Lok Siu, Claire Chun, October 2020,Yellow Peril and Techno-orientalism in the Time of Covid-19: Racialized Contagion, Scientific Espionage, and Techno-Economic Warfare, page 427-428)**//BRownRice**

In the early weeks of the COVID-19 outbreak in the United States, President Trump put out many mixed messages, but he remained consistent with one—that China was to blame for the spread of the virus. Repeatedly, he insisted on calling the novel coronavirus “the Chinese virus,” despite mounting public criticism against the racialization of the deadly pathogen. Many noted the inflammatory nature of this anti-Asian rhetoric. During this same period, reports ranging from verbal abuse to intimidation to physical assault against people of Asian descent documented the sudden rise of anti-Asian hate crimes in the United States and globally. According to Human Rights Watch, an Asian woman in Brooklyn, New York, suffered a racially motivated acid attack, and in Texas, a Burmese American man and his two children were stabbed by a man who claimed he thought the family was “Chinese and infecting people with the coronavirus.”1 The Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council in the United States reported over one thousand cases of anti-Asian incidents in a two-week period in March 2020.2 Outside the United States, a Singaporean student in the United Kingdom was violently kicked and punched by an angry group of men after they uttered, “we don’t want your coronavirus in our country” (my emphasis).3 In Australia, a survey taken by the community group Asian Australian Alliance recorded a total of 178 reports of anti-Asian incidents in two weeks, ranging from racial slurs to physical assault.4 Though President Trump has dropped the “Chinese virus” for “kung flu” and tweeted on March 23 that “It is very important that we totally protect our Asian American community . . . the spreading of the virus is NOT their fault,” it seems that Sinophobia and racial violence against Asian Americans have been unleashed. Make no mistake, as long as President Trump continues to take a confrontational stance, using the rhetoric of blame against China with the intention to punish it with new sanctions, tariffs, and even the cancellation of U.S. debt obligations,5 the racial aggressions against Asian Americans will continue to rise, if not intensify. By now, it is widely accepted that the novel coronavirus emerged first in Wuhan, and scientists believe that the zoonotic disease might have jumped from animals to humans at Wuhan’s Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, a wet market where vegetables, seafood, meat, and a small number of exotic wildlife were sold. Despite this, on April 30, President Trump casually offered a new theory, which Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted: that COVID had originated in the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which houses a biosafety level-4 lab, and that the virus might have “leaked” from that lab. The implicit suggestion is that China had either intentionally bioengineered the novel coronavirus to cause massive destruction, thereby attributing malice, or carelessly leaked the virus due to scientific negligence, thereby attributing incompetence. In either case, these kinds of unsubstantiated speculations work to further stoke anger and disdain against the Chinese state. More disturbingly, they traffic in the idea of China as a biotechnology threat, resonating with pre-existing filmic representations of futuristic dystopian worlds. The immediate and unqualified responses from the scientific community reveal the danger of these potentially incendiary speculations. Responding swiftly, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a press release the morning of April 30 stating that “The Intelligence Community . . . concurs with the wide scientific consensus that the COVID-19 virus was not manmade or genetically modified . . . ” (my emphasis).6 Within days, the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease, Dr. Anthony Fauci, attested that the virus “could not have been artificially or deliberately manipulated.”7 These assertions sought to extinguish any attribution of malice to the Chinese state. Even with firm contestation, however, the very invocation of the idea of biotechnology warfare has tapped into and perhaps even fueled our existing techno-Orientalist anxieties. As the COVID pandemic story transpires in real time, engulfing the entire global community, taking unexpected twists and turns, making divergences and transgressions, we have become increasingly aware that the layers of entanglements cannot be easily parsed out, nor will we know anytime soon how and when the story will end. We offer a query into how we might assess and make sense of the intensifying Sinophobia and xenophobia in this current context. To do so, we must resist the temptation to confine our analysis to the narrow parameters of the pandemic. Rather, we insist on examining the rise of anti-Asian aggression within the concomitant vectors of the pandemic, the escalation of the U.S.-China trade war, and the growing concerns about cyber- and techno-security. Here we assert that the ideology of yellow peril set within a techno-Orientalist imaginary is powerfully animating the racial form and racial affect mediating the multiple terrains of public health, technology, global trade, and national security. While it is tempting to treat this historical conjuncture as extraordinary, it is crucial that we situate the current unfolding within the long history of Asian racialization, one that indexes the abiding tension between the political impetus to define national belonging and the shifting economic imperatives of the nation-state.8 In this essay, we examine the techniques and effects of race-making in this current moment, while linking them to historical antecedents, in order to illustrate the persistence of the yellow peril ideology as it is being configured through a techno-Orientalist imaginary where China is posited as the chief enemy-threat. What follows is an analysis of how Chinese alterity as national security threat is being simultaneously constructed and disciplined in the different but related arenas of the pandemic, science, and technology.

#### Discourses of disease as security threats follow the trend of the racialization of disease, putting a target on Asian and Black people’s backs

Siu and Chun 20 (Lok Siu, Claire Chun, October 2020, Yellow Peril and Techno-orientalism in the Time of Covid-19: Racialized Contagion, Scientific Espionage, and Techno-Economic Warfare, page 427-428)**//BRownRice**

The Racialized Contagion The recent exponential rise of anti-Asian violence in the United States and globally during the pandemic illustrates the persistent danger of racializing diseases. Historians and social critics have documented and traced the ways in which diseases have been continually racialized by their association with particular peoples in geographical regions. Examples in recent memory include SARS marked as Asian, MERS as Middle Eastern, Ebola as African, and so on. In regards to this current pandemic, it might be useful to recall the popularization of the “Chinese as contagion” trope in U.S. history, as its multiple afterlives continue to inform the public’s facile acceptance of the notion of Chinese as diseased bodies and pathogenic carriers. The late nineteenth century racialization of the smallpox outbreak in San Francisco serves as the antecedent to the current moment and illustrates its relationship to the broader context of the anti-Chinese movement. When the smallpox epidemic broke out in San Francisco intermittently from 1868 through the 1880s, its origin was presumptively traced to Chinatown. At the time, it was widely accepted that epidemics were caused by environmental factors like polluted air, contaminated water, and general bad hygiene and sanitation. Through prevailing racist ideas of this period, Chinatown’s crowded streets, tight living quarters, and irregular layout were taken as evidence in creating a “laboratory of infection.”17 According to Nayan Shah, public health officials of the time helped construct Chinatown as a place filled with “horrors of percolating waste, teeming bodies, and a polluted atmosphere” and attributed these unsavory conditions to “depraved” innate Chinese cultural behaviors and practices, ignoring the economic factors that compel sharing of living quarters and the racist state in not extending sanitation services to Chinatown.18 By linking the environmental conditions of Chinatown with Chinese “primordial” culture, government officials came to target the Chinese person (the culturalbiological body) as the site of disease origin, contamination, and threat to public health writ large. Another study of public health in Los Angeles offers an analogous scenario.19 The emergence of these public health discourses in the 1870s must be situated in the context of the anti-Chinese movement. As Chinese workers poured into cities like San Francisco and Los Angeles after the completion of the railroad, they quickly became targets of intensified prejudice and racial violence. To the white working class, these Chinese laborers were perceived not only as economic threats to their livelihood; but, as racialized discourses of Chinese as disease carriers intensified, they were also feared and despised as a biomedical threat. Together, these yellow peril discourses molded perceptions of ethnic Chinese as both economic and biological threats, fueling the anti-Chinese movement that eventually led to the successful legislation of the Chinese Exclusion Act. This historical example shows how the racialization of disease worked in tandem with racial capitalist logic to animate anti-Chinese sentiment, violence, and legislation. The current rise in anti-Asian violence is clearly spurred by President Trump’s persistent attacks against China along with his explicit racialization of the virus. Indeed, since the onset of the pandemic, his administration has sought to blame China, whether it is for hiding the seriousness of the outbreak in Wuhan, delaying communication of the outbreak, or underreporting the number of deaths. The deployment of the politics of blame seeks to displace the pandemic-induced anger, anxiety, and rage onto China and, by extension, onto the bodies of Chinese and Asian Americans. Moreover, the racialized terms, the “Chinese virus” and the “kung flu,” naturalizes the virus as being endemic to Chinese bodies, thereby conjuring the phantasm of the Chinese/Asian contagion. While the ideational power of the Chinese/Asian contagion lies in its construction of the Asian body as the vehicle and embodiment of the virus, the deployment of blame against China/the Chinese for the spread of the virus serves as the catalyst that directs anger and rage against Chinese/Asian bodies. However, to view current attacks against Chinese/Asian Americans in the isolated context of the pandemic risks the danger of interpreting this aggression “as exception.” Instead, drawing on the lessons of the late nineteenth century example, we want to situate the rise of anti-Asian violence within the broader context of the anti-China campaign.

### NATO

#### The post-COVID world has inoculated a Sinophobic culture of fear within the Western world to consolidate members of disaster capitalism in a united front to securitize the Other---calls for a ‘US-led order’ and ‘NATO cooperation’ thrives on Orientalist, traumatic shocks that scapegoat marginalized populations to normalize neoliberal authoritarianism domestically in mass surveillance and incarceration and abroad in the military industrial complex

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THE CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) may have led to the most significant public health emergency of the 21st century, with enormous implications for the global economy and politics. Some recent forecasts suggest that the COVID pandemic is likely to plunge the world economy into a deep-seated crisis whose consequences will be even worse than the Great Depression of the 1930s (Caşın, 2020). These forecasts were recently validated by Gita Gopinath, the chief economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), who portrayed the current situation as “the worst recession since the Great Depression, and far worse than the Global Financial Crisis” (Gopinath, 2020). What is more, Western leaders’ recent statements may well be interpreted as early signs of a rapidly accelerating geopolitical turbulence. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has described the COVID-19 pandemic as the greatest threat since World War II. The European Union (EU), already suffering from heavy blows dealt by the 2009 European debt crisis and Brexit (Britain Exit), has been accused by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez of abandoning his country. For similar reasons, Italian mayors have ripped down EU flags and politicians participated in popular protests targeting the EU’s indifferent attitude. Meanwhile, Italy and Spain welcomed generous medical aid delivered by China and Russia. Italy, as one of the top troop contributors to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), went so far as to host Russian military personnel operating near a US military base (Braw, 2020; Clark, 2020; Smith, 2020). These cracks within the Atlantic Alliance seem to be accompanied by a rising Sinophobia. French President Emmanuel Macron openly targeted China with his statement, “There are clearly things that have happened that we don't know about” (Financial Times, 2020). In his turn, US President Donald Trump publicly supported claims that the pandemic originated in a lab in Wuhan and went on to proclaim that he had decided to defund the World Health Organization (WHO) for its “insidious relations with China” (Chomsky, 2020). He insisted on branding COVID-19 as the “Chinese disease” (The Conversation, 2020). Similarly, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo directed open threats at China: “There will be a time when the people responsible will be held accountable … There will be a time for assigning blame” (Bild, 2020). Pompeo went so far as to name China “as the most dangerous adversary for the United States and for all Western governments”. He added: “We’re going to do the right things by building up our military” (Finnegan & Margolin, 2020). British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab joined the chorus by declaring, “We’ll have to ask the hard questions about how it came about and how it couldn't have been stopped earlier … We can’t have business as usual after this crisis” (France 24, 2020). Against this backdrop, the present article aims to bridge the gap between the “disaster capitalism” approach and the study of “cultures of fear”, to provide a systematic explanation of how the capitalist world order undergoes profound transformations. The “capitalist world order” refers in this context to a system of global governance that institutionalizes a status quo of capitalist-imperialist cooperation and expansion under the leadership of an imperialist power or group of powers. The main argument in this article is that the cultivation and diffusion of a culture of fear erected on world-historical disastrous events serve as an important medium for the transformation of the world order. In this context, we will draw on the ways in which neoliberalism was globally instituted as the organizing principle of the US-led world order in a political-economic and cultural context constructed around disasters. The focus will be on emblematic cases that illustrate the symbiotic relationship between neoliberalism and the culture of fear as a constitutive element of the US-centered world order: the Pinochet coup in Chile and Argentina’s military dictatorship era, “shock therapy” economics in Russia, and the US war on terror following 9/11. Our inferences from these cases will then be used to perform an anticipatory analysis of how the COVID-19 pandemic may give way to a world-historical transformation based on a rapidly spreading culture of fear. We will rely on the method of process tracing, which uses logical reasoning by reference to major events of historical importance, as well as the preferences, goals, values, and perceptions of global actors involved in these events (Vennesson, 2008; Bennett, 2010; Collier, 2011). Our article is structured as follows. The first section will conceptually explain the symbiotic relationship between disaster capitalism, neoliberalism, and the culture of fear. The second section will be devoted to case studies that show case the said relationship. In the final section, we will recontextualize our research within the framework of the COVID-19 pandemic. Disaster Capitalism and the Culture of Fear The term “disaster capitalism” was coined by Naomi Klein (2007), who based her conceptual framework on the critique of neoliberalism. In her lexicon, neoliberalism refers to a policy paradigm defined by three landmark demands: privatization, government deregulation and deep cuts to social spending. Her polemic against neoliberalism focuses especially on Milton Friedman, one of its most prominent neoliberal thinkers. Reflecting on Hurricane Katrina – one of the most devastating natural disasters in US history – Milton Friedman recommended the US government to dismantle its public education system by extending the network of charter schools and distributing vouchers to households for food access. Ultimately, Klein shows that the Katrina disaster provided an opportunity for the Bush administration to implement Friedman’s neoliberal recommendations with action (Klein, 2007). Based on similar cases, Klein advances the argument that global capitalism instrumentalizes man-made or natural disasters (e.g. military coups, terrorist incidents, economic crises, wars, earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes) for the sake of advancing its own agenda of renewal and reconstruction. According to her, such disorienting disasters help to suspend public debate and suppress democratic practices. This allows capitalists to exploit the window of opportunity opened by traumatic shocks (Klein, 2007). Undoubtedly, capitalism cannot succeed in rejuvenating itself merely through topdown policy impositions. It needs to secure popular consent from the ground up. In this regard, we believe that the study of “cultures of fear” would be helpful for a deeper understanding of the inner mechanism of disaster capitalism. A culture of fear is a system of beliefs, values, and behavioral patterns rooted in negative emotions such as fear and terror, which can be used as “affective tools of government that come into being as a modus of population management deployed by military, political, and administrative actors” (Linke & Smith, 2009: 5). It feeds off a strong sense of existential insecurity that inflates the meaning of harm and fosters a mood of mistrust. This is facilitated by simplistic blaming of the media and the propagation of alarmist reactions meshed with catastrophic rhetoric (Furedi, 2018). In certain cases, the end result is the formation and consolidation of an imagined community united against the threat of the Other, whoever or whatever that might be. In this way, global capitalism can easily deploy a securocratic language around disastrous events to emotionally mobilize popular support and execute its own programmatic agenda conducive to large-scale transformations in the world order (Linke & Smith, 2009). Ultimately, fear becomes “a central figure of global social life” (Linke & Smith, 2009: 4). Neoliberalism and Disaster Capitalism in Action Chile is widely regarded as the first laboratory of neoliberalism: the later structural adjustment programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were modeled on the Chilean experiment. In fact, the case of Chile perfectly reveals how the roots of neoliberalism formed in world-historical disasters are constitutive of the US-centered world order. Chile’s socialist president Salvador Allende was overthrown in 1973 by a military coup led by Augusto Pinochet and actively supported by the United States. In 1975, Chile transitioned to neoliberal capitalism under the guidance of the Chicago Boys: neoliberal economic advisors, most of whom were trained at prominent American institutions such as at the University of Chicago, Harvard University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Klein, 2007). Chile’s neoliberal restructuring owed its power to wide-scale social pacification: the military junta cracked down on opposition forces and inculcated a culture of fear, ensuring compliance with neoliberal shock therapy measures. Estimates suggest that in the Pinochet era, more than 3,000 people disappeared and tens of thousands were jailed, tortured, and/or exiled. This repressive environment strengthened Pinochet’s hand in reducing import tariffs and social expenditure, abolishing price controls, carrying out mass privatization, and debilitating unions. Ultimately, Pinochet’s shock therapy exposed Chile to deep recessions in 1975 and 1982, and contributed to extreme levels of inequality. Chile’s Gini coefficient rose from around 0.45 in the mid-1970s to over 0.6 by the end of the 1980s (Taylor, 2006). Moreover, the replication of the Chilean model in the rest of the region resulted in disaster. The number of people in poverty in Latin America grew from 118 million in 1980 to 196 million in 1990. The region’s total foreign debt increased from US$31.3 billion in 1972 to US$430 billion in the late 1980s, and US$750 billion by the 2000s. In the period 1981–2000, average annual economic growth was only 1.6% in Argentina, 2.1% in Brazil, and 2.7% in Mexico (Arestis & Saad Filho 2007; Saad Filho, 2007). The mobilization of fear through military coups was also instrumental in the case of Argentina’s transition to neoliberalism under US influence. Argentina stepped into a long era of military dictatorship when Isabel Perón's government was overthrown by General Jorge Rafael Videl as part of Operation Condor, a US-backed campaign of state and paramilitary terror in support of right-wing dictatorships in Latin America. This period – also called the Dirty War era (1976–1983) – led to the disappearance of 30,000 people, along with other human rights violations including child kidnappings (Hellinger, 2014) This environment of public fear was used by the military junta to impose neoliberal restructuring on the Argentine economy (Klein, 2007). In 1976, thanks to US support for the military dictatorship, Argentina was granted “the largest loan ever to a Latin American country” (Cooney, 2007). In line with the newly adopted neoliberal agenda, the country initiated a radical deindustrialization policy that accentuated agroindustry in favor of the landed oligarchy. This process went hand in hand with financial deregulation and the suppression of unions. Argentina witnessed a record increase in foreign debt, from US$9.7 billion in 1976 to over US$45 billion in 1983 (Cooney, 2007). A world-historical disaster of an even greater magnitude took place in Boris Yeltsin’s Russia in 1991–1999, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin took advantage of the environment of fear and confusion created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union to launch a shock therapy campaign with the aim of liberalizing the Russian economy. The campaign started in 1992, with the IMF’s active support: Yeltsin made a hasty move to liberalize prices and trade, which was followed by mass privatizations. An important side effect of these privatizations was the emergence of a new stratum of Russian oligarchs feeding off rising corruption in the Yeltsin era (Bedirhanoğlu, 2004). The shock therapy resulted in average real pay falling by almost 50% in the period 1990–1995. Organized crime grew to such an extent that up to 80% of private banks and businesses in major cities were involved with “mafia” organizations (Kotz & Weir, 2007). In the long run, excessive liberalization and indebtedness exposed Russia to the negative effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. This eventually marked the end of the Yeltsin era and paved the way for Vladimir Putin’s rise to power (Baiman, Boushey, & Dawn, 2000: 210-217). The post-9/11 conjuncture is an important example of how the world order is shaped by the symbiotic relationship between disaster capitalism and the neoliberal culture of fear (Mendieta, 2011). The collective trauma created by these attacks served as a historic opportunity for the United States to launch the “war on terror”: a strategic campaign for restructuring the world order in pursuit of its imperialist agenda On September 11, 2001, four passenger planes were hijacked by terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda. Two of the planes crashed into the World Trade Center complex and the third into the Pentagon, while the fourth plane crashed in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The attacks claimed nearly 3,000 lives and resulted in more than 25,000 injuries. The collective trauma created by these attacks served as a historic opportunity for the United States to launch the “war on terror”: a strategic campaign for restructuring the world order in pursuit of its imperialist agenda. As such, “the Bush administration outsourced, with no public debate, many of the most sensitive and core functions of government – from providing health care to soldiers, to interrogating prisoners, to gathering and ‘data mining’ information on all of us” (Klein, 2007: 12). The enacting of the USA Patriot Act enabled the government to suppress civil liberties and enhance the influence of the US military and prison-industrial complexes. Mass surveillance and incarceration thus became the norm (Klein, 2007; Mendieta, 2011). The driving agenda was not limited to reasserting the waning importance of US interventionism in the absence of the Soviet Union and reordering the Greater Middle East with the aim of inhibiting the rise of potential US rivals in Eurasia. The United States was also interested in refuelling its stagnating neoliberal economy based on a military stimulus. This was particularly seen in the US occupation of Afghanistan since 2001, the War on Iraq, and other interventions, for example in Libya and Syria as part of the so-called Arab “Spring”. In summary, these cases demonstrate how disastrous events such as terrorist attacks, state failures, and military coups lead to largescale transformations that open up new possibilities for neoliberal restructuring on a global scale. Disaster-led crises sweep away the conditions for healthy public deliberation; this process is facilitated by an authoritarian environment of fear and confusion. Such an environment is easily exploited by capitalist interests in favor of an agenda of renewal and reconstruction. In particular, the post-9/11 conjuncture strongly exemplifies the ways in which disaster capitalism reproduces itself by deploying an Islamophobic culture of fear, where highly inflated and alarmist reactions help to reorganize the world order in line with the catastrophic rhetoric of the war on terror COVID-19 and the Collective Mobilization of Fear The above cases can give us valuable insights into the possible ways in which the COVID-19 pandemic may pave the way for a paradigm shift in the world order. Worthy of mention in this regard is Giorgio Agamben’s thesis of a “state of exception”. In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, Italian philosopher Agamben asserted that the danger of the disease was highly exaggerated. According to him, the pandemic is a socially constructed phenomenon, which helps governments to create a state of exception in deploying extraordinary measures that might have been difficult to implement under normal circumstances. In other words, Agamben claimed that governments purposefully exaggerated the risks of the pandemic in order to implement new social control devices and methods (Agamben, 2020). Though he may have underestimated the lethal potential of the pandemic, there seems to be some value in taking his “state of exception” thesis seriously. The pandemic of COVID-19 has great potential to be used by capitalist forces to reinvent the capitalist system or postpone the collapse of global capitalism by exploiting widespread anxiety and panic. By creating a culture of fear that feeds off the COVID-19 disaster, global capitalism can potentially incapacitate anti-systemic forces through increased use of new surveillance technologies and enhanced social-distancing strategies. It is known that infectious diseases can trigger negative psychological effects such as hypochondriasis and anxiety (Duncan et al., 2009). The COVID-19 pandemic is no exception to this psychological peril. A case in point is a survey by Wang and his team, which reveals the psychological damage that the pandemic caused in China during its early phases. In this study, 16.5% of respondents showed moderate to severe depression symptoms while 28.8% of them experienced anxiety problems and 8.1% had high stress levels (Wang et al., 2020). Similarly, in a survey conducted during the lockdown period in Italy, 17.3% of respondents said they had depression while 20.8% admitted having anxiety problems (Rossi et al., 2020). In a similar vein, the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the people of Italy to intense stress, closely associated with high levels of uncertainty as to how long it will take for Italy to return to normal and whether the pandemic will affect loved ones (Montemurro, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic may really have engendered a collective trauma and mass anxiety that can be easily taken advantage of by global capitalism. Another important observer who anticipates the potentially dangerous outcomes of the COVID-19 pandemic is Slavoj Žižek. He claims that there is no turning back to normal and that this pandemic will irreversibly change our lives. Žižek implies that the pandemic will have paradigm-shifting effects for the world. In his opinion, the pandemic can only have two possible outcomes: either a new normal will be constructed “on the ruins of our old lives” or a new form of barbarism will emerge (Žižek, 2020: 3). Žižek goes on to suggest that the pandemic has the potential to engender the worst socioeconomic catastrophe since the Great Depression. In this new period, markets will not be able to prevent the forthcoming waves of poverty and chaos. Moreover, Žižek does not believe that developing medical treatments or a vaccine will suffice to reverse the crisis of global capitalism (Žižek, 2020). Indeed, even when the pandemic is brought under control, the markets may not function as they used to, because the risk of a new wave of COVID-19 could discourage investments and lead to monopolistic prices at the expense of lower income groups. Žižek maintains that the pandemic can only be controlled by using a different paradigm to neoliberalism; that is, through large-scale measures including government-imposed quarantines. Furthermore, he points to the fact that the spontaneous functioning of markets would eventually deepen the inequalities and hamper access to basic necessities and services. As such, the risk of economic disaster can only be averted through globally coordinated efforts; not only in the battle against the disease, but also in production and distribution. In the meantime, Žižek expresses optimism that this crisis presents a universal threat and therefore may give birth to global solidarity inasmuch as it invites us to reconsider “the very basic features of the society”. In this sense, the WHO’s global coordination efforts at leading this process based on precise and scientific recommendations without causing panic can be seen as a key catalyst for an emergent solidarity on a global scale (Žižek, 2020: 41). This is in contrast to US efforts to delegitimize the WHO by reference to its alleged “China-centric” approach (Deutsche Welle, 2020). In contrast to the WHO’s responsible approach, certain world leaders are not interested in following scientific guidance, preventing mass panic, or promoting global solidarity. Agamben (2020) underlines the fact that public authorities – and the mass media – contribute to the diffusion of panic at first hand. For instance, Donald Trump has not restrained himself from amplifying popular anxiety with his statements highlighting the number of potential fatalities from COVID-19; at the very beginning of the pandemic, these were estimated at somewhere between 100,000 and 240,000 (Mangan, 2020). Similarly, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson has not hesitated to stir mass panic by warning his people to be prepared “to lose loved ones to coronavirus” (Hughes & Payne, 2020). Yet political restraint could have played a key role in reducing pandemic-related social risks. One possible explanation for this situation is that leading politicians in Western societies are seeking to capitalize on a historical opportunity to reorganize global capitalism by justifying extraordinary measures through manufactured mass panic and Sinophobia. Therefore, they are mobilizing a culture of fear predicated on the COVID-19 disaster. As such, China’s geopolitical isolation can be used to re-industrialize capitalism in core countries, reverse the increasing Chinese influence on global governance, and postpone the multipolatization of the world order. Yuval Noah Harari’s warnings buttress this possibility of exploiting the disaster for a fear-driven political agenda. A state of horror triggered by economic and social turbulence can encourage society as a whole to search for a strong leader who will restore public order. This is similar to how the incessant economic disasters in post–World War I Germany resulted in the rise of the Nazis to power. Harari thus underlines how a crisis can be a turning point for a society, or a decisive moment to determine the direction of history. The COVID-19 pandemic is exemplary of such a milestone. It marks one of the deepest crises in recent history, which will surely have serious ramifications, not only for public health but also for the global economy, world politics, and culture (Harari, 2020). According to Harari, the human species will certainly survive the pandemic, but the world will be subjected to a deep-seated structural crisis. He goes on to argue that today’s political choices will greatly affect how the post-coronavirus world takes shape. Similar to how Agamben cautions about a disease-induced “state of exception”, Harari refers to the “nature of emergencies”, underlining how these are “fast-forward historical processes”, and there are some “short-term emergency measures” that can be implemented to overcome the crisis (Harari, 2020). We are already seeing the rapid proliferation of immature technologies such as distance-education platforms and teleworking environments. The diffusion of such technologies in the post-coronavirus era may result in the permanentizing of precarious labor practices (e.g. temporary employment, lower wages, de-unionization, job insecurity) and the intensification of labor exploitation (e.g. unpaid overtime and further disturbance of work-life balance). Meanwhile, governments across the world have already declared states of emergency and started to take extraordinary measures to counter the pandemic. One of these measures is the implementation of new surveillance technologies on the pretext of controlling the contagion. For instance, the UK government has adapted its facial recognition systems to identify COVID-19 victims (Tovey, 2020). Another case in point is how Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has authorized the use of surveillance technology, normally designed for anti-terrorist activities (Harari, 2020). Coupled with the proliferation of mass anxiety, “social” isolation and new surveillance technologies, the perpetuation of authoritarian government practices may seriously undermine the mobilizing potential of popular movements against neoliberal capitalism and imperialism. These possibilities parallel Harari’s observations: he suggests that the implementation of biological and emotional surveillance is another possible outcome. What is more, once these measures are normalized, they may become permanent, in the same way as the extraordinary antiterrorist measures adopted in the post-9/11 era (Harari, 2020). According to Harari, our political choices are the important things. Like Žižek, he believes that we need a global plan that avoids isolationism and encourages the free flow of information and equipment all over the globe, since the pandemic cannot be regionally contained. Moreover, global cooperation requires stronger trust in science and close care for personal hygiene, regular handwashing, and physical distancing. Just as Žižek advocates a stronger state to deal with the crisis, Harari maintains that the state’s role is crucial in this period and surveillance is necessary to overcome the pandemic. However, he also cautions that data collected for this purpose should not be exploited to invent “an all-powerful government” (Harari, 2020). According to Harari, more dangerous than the disease itself is “our own hatred, greed and ignorance”, which may even set the stage for a new dictatorship under mass panic (Deutsche Welle, 2020, April 22). In this sense, mass surveillance on social media platforms such as YouTube, WhatsApp, Twitter, and Facebook – as well as banning and removing content associated with “false” news and “conspiracy” – risk generating new forms of censorship to sustain the relations of domination and oppression. While Harari shares Žižek’s optimism about the prospects for global cooperation, he also cautions that these prospects are threatened by a growing tendency towards scapegoating or targeting minorities and rival nations. Such tendencies – which are perhaps most strongly reflected in a Sinophobic culture of fear in Western nations – evoke the pre-World War II period during which protectionism increasingly gained currency and minorities such as Jews and Roma were persecuted. At this point, Žižek calls for caution about a possible return to the premodern state of reason after COVID-19 (Žižek, 2020: 14). Even though developed countries benefit from higher educational standards, their citizens can be prone to anthropomorphizing the COVID-19 pandemic. The origins of this regression of reason may be found in mass anxiety and panic, which are further provoked by political authorities and corporate media (Žižek, 2020). According to Žižek, rational thinking dictates the necessity for collective struggle against the pandemic and stronger social policies geared towards protecting society as a whole. On any account, Žižek reasons that our health and welfare are inextricably linked to those of others, which brings forth the principle of altruism at the expense of absolute individualism. However, in the case of COVID-19, Žižek’s reasoning does not seem to fit the facts. Individualism may well be taking on increasing importance to the extent that people have started to see others, not only as potential rivals in the marketplace, but as “biological threats”. Enhanced individualism also has the potential to atomize society by fostering anxiety, especially when individuals withdraw themselves into their own private domains and see the public domain as inherently threatening. Such perceptions can be easily manipulated by political authorities such as Trump and Johnson, who are interested in taking advantage of disastrous situations. Put differently, a panic environment facilitated by public authorities may result in increased mass anxiety as a coping mechanism in the face of disastrous or threatening situations. On the one hand, the COVID-19 pandemic may further exacerbate the global economic crisis, with the total disappearance of growth, a ubiquitous rise in unemployment and debts, and a cascade of bankruptcies across the world. On the other, it may have already started to create material conditions for the reproduction of neoliberal individualism. Perhaps most importantly, the meaning of self-quarantine against COVID-19 may be extended from mere home isolation to the normalization of self-interested behavior. When society allows itself to be taken over by fear, individuals become more prone to pursuing nothing else but their own well-being and daily survival. In this environment, those in power positions could easily seize the moment to reshape the public domain in line with their agenda. This means that the COVID-19 pandemic may not be the absolute end of neoliberalism per se, even though it has exposed the deepening of the crisis of global capitalism. Under the influence of self-interested politicians, mass anxiety – as a popular self-defence mechanism against dangerous situations – risks the retreating of individuals, not only into their apartments but also into their narrow individual interests

#### NATO enlargement engrains Orientalist justifications to monopolize global, symbolic power that legitimizes essentialist reductions toward the formation of security alliances while simultaneously emboldening Western social power to incapacitate political discourse on nation state identity

Hellmann et al. 13 (3 May 2013 | Gunther Hellmann | Benjamin Herborth | Gabi Schlag | Christian Weber | Gunther Hellmann: Goethe University Frankfurt, Campus Westend - PEG-Gebaude, Hauspostfach 24, Gruneburgplatz 1, D-60323, Frankfurt am Main, Germany | Benjamin Herborth: University of Groningen, Faculty of Arts, Oude Kijk in ’t Jatstraat 26, 9712 EK Groningen, The Netherlands. | Gabi Schlag: Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Human Sciences, Zschokkestr. 32 (G-40), 39104 Magdeburg, Germany | Christian Weber: Goethe-University Frankfurt, Faculty of Social Sciences, Gru¨neburgplatz 1, 60323 Frankfurt a.M., Germany. | ‘The West: a securitising community?’ | <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/jird.2013.9.pdf> | DOA: 7/8/2022 | SAoki)

Curiously, ‘the West’ has received comparatively little conceptual attention in the field of International Relations (IR). While references to Western institutions, Western values, or a Western way of life as the broader target of terrorist threats are pervasive, we talk about ‘the West’ as if it were an unproblematic and taken-for-granted entity. To the extent that there have been attempts to unpack the meaning, the identity and the borders of ‘the West’, they have largely been built on an ontological understanding of ‘Western civilisation’ as a given entity with certain essential characteristics (Collins 2001: 422; Bonnett 2004: 332). Samuel Huntington’s narrative of a ‘clash of civilisations’ provides the most obvious example of such an essentialist conceptualisation where ‘the West’ is construed as a coalition of states united by a common cultural heritage (Huntington 1993, 1996). Essentialist conceptualisations of this kind have been an obvious target for critics pointing to the socially and historically contingent construction of cultural representations, especially when they come in the seductive form of geographic terms imbued with geopolitical meaning (Said 1978/2003, 1994; Hall 1992; Jackson 2006a). An ‘imaginative geography’ of this kind, Said (1978/2003: 71) notes, ‘legitimates a vocabulary, a universe of representative discourse peculiar to the discussion and understanding of [in the case of Said’s work] Islam and of the Orient’. Said’s analysis of orientalism remains instructive to students of ‘the West’, however, not only through the analytical vocabulary of imaginative geographies, but also on account of the engrained hierarchies and asymmetries he carefully observes. ‘To speak of scholarly specialisation as a geographical “field” is, in the case of Orientalism, fairly revealing since no one is likely to imagine a field symmetrical to it called Occidentalism’ (ibid.: 50). Indeed, while the term occidentalism has been introduced (Buruma and Margalit 2004), it does not refer to a distinct scholarly enterprise, but is rather used to trace how contemporary criticism of the West is rooted in earlier criticism of modernity such as 19th-century German romanticism. The study of the West is characteristically not organised into a field of enquiry, for ‘the West’ refers precisely to what is rarely questioned and routinely taken for granted. It remains diffusely associated with such different notions as modernity, capitalism and liberal democracy, civilisation (in the singular, yet equipped with an imaginary of geographical delimitation) as well as imperialism, racism, and ‘Western’ domination (Bonnett 2004; Browning and Lehti 2010). In this regard, imaginary geographies share ‘with magic and with mythology the self-containing, self-reinforcing character of a closed system, in which objects are what they are, for once, for all time, for ontological reasons that no empirical material can either dislodge or alter’.1 Against such a background of ‘epistemological obstacles’ (Bachelard 1938/ 2002) to the study of the West, our primary objective in this article is to reconstruct and theorise transformations of Western order in a manner that does not presuppose a fixed understanding of ‘the West’ as a pre-constituted political space, ready-made and waiting for social scientific inquiry. ‘The West’, we contend, is one of the elusive phenomena in international politics, which do not have phone numbers — to recall one of Henry Kissinger’s complaints about an ineffectual European partner at the side of the United States (US). Yet, references to ‘the West’ are ubiquitous in both political and scholarly discourse, each of them conveying some notion of what the West stands for. Motivated by a reconstructive interest, we propose focusing on the performative effects of these references. We are specifically interested in the institutional consequences of a security semantics in which ‘the West’ figures as the threatened, yet notoriously vague referent object that has to be defended against alleged challenges. A political formation or order called ‘the West’ can then be understood as a contingent arrangement of such institutional consequences, an arrangement that is continuously constituted, reproduced and transformed, for instance, by speech acts of securitisation. Hence, to the extent that securitisation has become a more important mechanism in reproducing the West in recent years, one might say that ‘the West’ is indeed secured by securitising its very existence. Given that the standard image of a Western community of values is linked prominently with the notion of security communities, the article will begin with a critical review of this literature. In the section ‘A Western security community?’, we argue that the Copenhagen School’s understanding of securitisation dynamics provides an adequate methodological framework for reconstructing the reproductive and transformative dynamics at hand. In the section ‘A securitising community – theorising ‘the West’’, we reconstruct such securitisation dynamics in three different fields: the implications of representing China and Russia as main challengers of Western order, the effects of the transformation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) towards a global security actor, and the consequences of extraordinary renditions and practices of torture for the normative infrastructure of ‘the West’. In the conclusion, we briefly outline why Western securitisation dynamics in our view should be understood as a discursive shift away from a legally enshrined culture of restraint towards more assertive forms of self-authorisation. A Western security community? Geographical representations such as West, East, South, and North encompass a distinct meaning in politics, especially in international relations.2 By establishing territorial, cultural, religious, and social boundaries, they convey a sense of order in our understanding of political space — and thus serve as localisations of identity (Albert et al. 2001). In everyday political language ‘the West’ usually refers to a political space encompassing a grouping of states in Europe and North America (including Australia, New Zealand, and possibly Japan as ‘Western’ outliers in the Pacific), which share a particular set of characteristics and are therefore tightly connected with each other. The commonalities are usually summed up in attributions such as ‘advanced liberal democracies’, ‘market-oriented’ or ‘capitalist’ economies, and a secularist culture developing out of a Judeo-Christian heritage.3 How political relations among European and North American states have developed and how they have contributed to shaping global politics more broadly has been at the centre of IR debates for several decades. Taking issue with both realist and institutionalist scholarship on the origins and mechanisms of inter-state alliances, the literature on security communities (Adler and Barnett 1998) has highlighted the constructivist bedrock argument that political order can be conceived of only as the result of ongoing processes of social interaction. Hence, at least two reasons as to why the security community literature provides an instructive starting point come to mind. First, the security community approach originated as a perspective attempting to transcend the state-centric perspective of IR and, in particular, security studies. It thereby allows us, second, to conceive of ‘the West’ as a political space characterised by transnational processes of political association and integration. Political entities such as security communities are not perceived as just being ‘out there’, but are seen as the result of transformative processes such as the formation of collective identities through social learning. Hence, as we share these premises, choosing the security community literature as a foil to develop our own argument means to engage relatively close kin. We can thus not only deliberately refrain from restaging the arguments vis-a`-vis realist, liberal, and institutionalist accounts, we can also focus more specifically on the dynamics by means of which ‘the West’ is invoked, reproduced, and eventually transformed, for this is precisely where we beg to differ with the storyline conventionally presented by proponents of a security community approach. In a nutshell, we argue that the literature on security communities simply does not go far enough in stepping outside of the imaginative geographies characterised above. The initial work on security communities that was conducted in the 1950s by Deutsch et al. (1957/1968) was driven by an interest in identifying the complex processes and mechanisms which enabled the permanent elimination of war between states, in particular in the ‘North Atlantic area’. They focused on ‘integration’ as a complex process by which security communities might come about. Most importantly they were interested in examining how a ‘sense of community’, central to their account of ‘integration’, could take shape in diverse and unique historical circumstances. In discussing the issue of how one ought to distinguish between ‘integration’ and ‘non-integration’ Deutsch and his collaborators argued that the achievement of a security community would have to involve ‘something like the crossing of a threshold’. The problem was that [s]omewhat contrary to our expectation [y] some of our cases taught us that integration may involve a fairly broad zone of transition rather than a narrow threshold; that states may cross and recross this threshold or zone of transition several times in their relations with each other; and that they might spend decades or generations wavering uncertainly within it. (ibid.: 32–33) Thus, not only did integration turn out to be a rather complex process involving at least a dozen ‘essential conditions’ (ibid.: 58), it was also evolving along unique historical trajectories in uneven ways. As a result, Deutsch and his colleagues concluded that a ‘sense of community’ should not be applied ‘as a matter of static agreement’ and that ‘more could be learned by viewing it as a matter of dynamic process’ (ibid.: 37). This keen sense of the processual complexity and non-linearity of political integration got by and large lost in subsequent research on security communities in general and in research on the transatlantic security community in particular. Rather than taking Deutsch’s warning about the ‘uncertain wavering’ between integration and non-integration seriously, the research agenda on security communities was increasingly shaped by a premise ‘that community exists at the international level’ (Adler and Barnett 1998: 3, italics added). Moreover, rather than dwelling on the Deutschian twilight zone between integration and non-integration, Adler and Barnett suggested looking for various groups of states that seemed to have abandoned the use of force in their relations in order to determine whether they fit the definition of a pluralistic security community. In particular, researchers were advised to ‘look for communities where actors have shared identities, values, and meanings, many-sided relations, and long-term reciprocity’ (ibid.: 33). If these criteria were met, and the citizens of these states held ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’, then we would have reason to speak of a security community. Not only does such a perspective neglect Deutsch’s interest in open-ended transformative processes, it also embraces a strong methodological preference for detecting something, which is both theoretically proclaimed and normatively embraced. Researchers, then, may lose a thorough and systematic reconstruction of social dynamics and contingencies out of sight. Pointing to the 19th-century heritage of the term, Charles Tilly (1998: 397) offers a particularly clear-cut elaboration of the problem: A haze of Paradigm Lost still surrounds the word ‘community’ in popular parlance, the social sciences, philosophy, and history. Calling up idealized images of solidarity and coherent identity in compact settlements before the advent of today’s complexity, the term almost inevitably evokes a mixture of description, sentiment, and moral principle. Users of the term with respect to international relations are usually hoping to create or restore solidarity among nations. This volume [Adler and Barnett 1998], with its quest not merely to identify but also to promote security communities, manifests just such a hope. Much like Tilly, we share the hope but remain troubled when it seems to impinge on the actual research process. In his work on the endurance of the transatlantic security community after 1990, Thomas Risse, for instance, similarly focused on postulating the existence of such a community as the key variable in explaining transatlantic cohesion. Instead of taking NATO as an institutional solution to deal with a multifaceted set of threats and risks (as realists would do), he argues that the alliance was the expression of an underlying community of shared values built on ‘mutual sympathy, trust, and consideration’ (Risse-Kappen 1996: 368). In this reading a ‘Western’ perception of a ‘Soviet threat’ certainly helped to foster a sense of common purpose within NATO, but according to Risse ‘it did not create the community in the first place’. Rather, ‘the collective identity led to the threat perception, not the other way around’ (Risse-Kappen 1995: 32). In this view the creation and persistence of the North Atlantic Alliance could be explained as the institutional expression of ‘the values and norms embedded in the political culture of liberal democracies’, which together constituted the ‘collective identity of a security community among democracies’ (Risse-Kappen 1996: 370; Schimmelfennig 1998: 213–4). As long as these values and norms are not seriously challenged by its members, ‘the West’ appears as an impressively stable security community in which conflicts are still resolved peacefully (Pouliot 2006; critically Cox 2005). In contrast to Deutsch’s initial work, this type of research is not particularly interested in the complex processes that lead to the creation of security communities in the first place. Instead, it takes the existence of a transatlantic security community already for granted and appears to accept, at least implicitly, an essentialist conception of community. Once again, a ‘we-concept’ is taken to be based on a set of values and norms, which are always already there. To be sure, most scholarship on security communities acknowledges that security communities are constructed in social interaction. However, rather than focusing on such interactions and reconstructing the ensuing complex processes empirically, Deutsch’s successors often propose models with preestablished definitions of ‘conducive factors’ and ‘necessary conditions’ that supposedly foster the development or persistence of security communities. Adler and Barnett (1998: 37), for instance, concede that they do this in a ‘highly stylized manner’. Yet, they feel obliged to do so in order to overcome two drawbacks associated with Deutsch’s operationalization of security communities: (1) the concept was resistant to precise operationalization because it was fuzzy and ill-defined; and, (2) while Deutsch’s behavioral methodology was able to capture increased transboundary movements that suggested interdependence, it could not detect a greater sense of cohesion and community based on mutual responsiveness, value orientation, and identity. The current challenge is to devise indicators that overcome these shortcomings. (ibid.: 48–49, italics added) In other words, where Deutsch’s processualism cautioned against a constricted fixation on abstract ‘indicators’, the approach adopted by Adler and Barnett narrowly circumscribes the problem of how inter-state communities emerge by formal definitions from the very beginning. The actual efforts are then directed at identifying already existing security communities and then to determine whether they qualify as ‘loosely coupled’ or ‘tightly coupled’. Hence, the second generation of security community researchers not only assumes that communities and shared values already exist, but also focuses methodologically on identifying indicators instead of analysing processes. However, while many of the substantive claims of the second generation sound quite plausible, it remains methodologically unclear how to decide, for example, whether groups of states do indeed have ‘shared identities’ or whether their relations are characterised by ‘long-term reciprocity’. Some critics have therefore objected that Adler and Barnett’s framework was ‘not backed by a compelling method of empirical investigation’ (Bially Mattern 2000: 303). Their discussion of questions of research design suggests that scholars could easily identify features of security communities that self-evidently exist, just waiting to be discovered. This understanding seems to rest on the belief that security communities were ‘out there’, independent of the concepts social scientists apply (Jackson 2008: 134–43). Yet, to treat democratic values or human rights, for instance, as attributes that specific societies possess or acquire is to conceal the intersubjective construction of these concepts and to ignore their productive, even hegemonic power. This is the reason why Iver Neumann and Michael Williams have proposed that constructivist analyses of NATO’s enlargement should consider the alliance’s self-description as a ‘democratic security community’ not as an unproblematic fact but as a way of exercising symbolic power. Claiming a democratic identity can then be interpreted as a political practice that assigns legitimacy to NATO’s actions and at the same time structures the realm of possibilities for acceptable Russian self-conceptions. Hence, the ‘capacity to claim such identities, and to grant and deny them to others, is a source of social power’ (Williams and Neumann 2000: 364). An approach that treats references to common Western values as evidence for an alleged reality — the existence of a transatlantic security community — risks committing an essentialist fallacy by taking the invocation of these depictions at face value. One problematic consequence of such an account is that it becomes methodologically impossible to distinguish between a political assertion of ‘shared values’ and its performative effects. Assuming an already existing transatlantic security community with certain ‘shared values’ and a ‘collective identity’ tends to reify prevalent notions of political discourse instead of interpreting them as an element in processes of social construction. In our view, claims to a democratic identity of NATO or public commitments to human rights constitute a valuable body of empirical material that social scientists ought to be interested in. However, instead of treating them as evidence for an alleged ‘Western’ identity, we suggest treating them as a distinct and powerful move in a political struggle (Jackson 2006b). Invocation of ‘Western values’ or a ‘democratic identity’ can then be interpreted with regard to their performative effects and institutional consequences. Thus, instead of presupposing the existence of an Atlantic security community, we are interested in reconstructing processes of community formation, that is, processes that lead to the evolution, reproduction and transformation of an inter-state political space commonly described as ‘the West’ (e.g., Jackson 2003; Bially Mattern 2005). Just like Deutsch and his colleagues, we assume that political orders are integrated via the construction and reproduction of a sense of community in complex and non-linear dynamic processes. However, in contrast to the initial work on security communities, which focused on measuring the quantity and density of transactions, we propose that the emergence and the reproduction of a sense of community should be studied by focusing on the productive power of representations in contingent processes of signification. As these processes of community formation are open ended and nonlinear, they can be reconstructed from within by interpreting how contentious references to ‘the West’ operate in political discourse.

## Links – k affs

### Afropess – the alt is in here

#### Wilderson’s theorization of antiblackness is too totalizing and forces Asians into violent spheres of whiteness cementing them as junior partners to whiteness which precludes alternative strategies of navigating racialized power structures

Gotby 16 (Alva Gotby, “Body, Geography, Exteriority : Race and spatiality in the writings of Denise Ferreira da Silva” 2016) mahintha

This problem also indicates a broader issue, which is that Wilderson’s account absolutises the exclusion of black people - an ”ontological” exclusion that is detached from actual historical processes yet in some sense seems to depend on those processes. But what is political ontology? Here, I think it can most usefully be described as the naturalisation of certain relations of power, through various institutions and processes. However, Wilderson suggests that groups can be banished from those ”ontological” relations altogether (while simultaneously arguing that blackness is determined by gratuitous violence, thus ignoring the fact that this violence is a form of relation), and that ontology, once it is instituted, operates on a level that is detached from material and historical processes. This political ontology thus becomes next to impossible to change, because once instituted by a historical process, it becomes almost dehistorical. While I agree that it is difficult to overstate the importance of race for the constitution of the modern world, I think this absolutising of antiblackness might serve to renaturalise it as an totalised and unchanging condition, thus ignoring the multitude of strategies through which racial power operates. Indeed, Wilderson explicitly states that he is not interested in how raciality came to be, but rather wants to describe it as an ontological paradigm of power.82 For Ferreira da Silva on the other hand, the ”how” of race cannot be neatly separated out from the ”what” of race.83 Thus, we must look at the processes of knowing that instituted the racial - rather than an absolute ontology of race as exclusion, Ferreira da Silva proposes an ontoepistemology of racial difference. As I have shown, she criticises the use of exclusion as a model for understanding race. Much of that criticism does not apply to Wilderson’s theory - for example, he does not presuppose a prepolitical subject beyond the mechanism of exclusion. Rather, he suggests that blackness is a form of desubjectivation.84 He also does not naturalise racial bodily traits as the explanation for exclusion, as he uses Hortense Spillers’ concept of flesh to describe racial embodiment. Flesh, in Spillers’ terminology, is a politically produced being, not a natural minimal level of life.85 However, I find Wilderson’s account limiting because it tends towards doing one thing that Ferreira da Silva puts under the label ”the logics of exclusion,” namely to create an almost entirely negative statement of the being of (certain) racialised people. In his insistence on black people as the only group which is completely excluded from humanity, he lumps Asian and Arab people together with white people in the category of masters, providing very little justification for doing so.86 Thus, one racialised group is placed in total negativity, while other non-white groups are fully included in the sphere of the human. He does place Native Americans in a liminal position, half- way between the human and the antihuman, life and death. This move strikes me as rather U.S.- centric, and Wilderson tends to waver on the spatial extension of this racial ontology - does it apply to North America or the whole world? Moreover, to place Asians and Arabs solidly within the sphere of humanity, while blacks are completely excluded, obscures how the racial produces degrees of differentiation. With Sylvia Wynter, we might consider raciality as gradual deviation from the purported norm of Man, rather than as the total nonrelationality of one racial group from others.87 With Ferreira da Silva, we might say that racial bodies are ordered on a scale of transparency/affectability, where blackness occupies the position unsublatable affectability, the body so close to dying that it can never be represented as subjectivity unmediated by death. Wilderson’s account does not give a very clear account as to why white capacity is dependent on black incapacity. Instead he merely states that it is so, thus not explaining how whiteness is constituted. While Ferreira da Silva and Wilderson share a commitment to what I would call the radical exteriority of the racialised subject, in the sense that it is a subject that cannot be included into humanity and universality, Ferreira da Silva’s account provides us with a key to how this mechanism of exteriority work. Because her account does not rely on the pure negativity of the racialised other, she can state that what has been positioned as exterior is the affectable subject. Again, exteriority is different from exclusion because it does not necessarily connote negativity, or being deprived of something.

#### Vote neg for transnational Asian-Black solidarity---only through rejecting totalizing forms of theorization and US-centric epistemologies can we enable intersectional critique that allows for collective survival

Liu 20 (Wen Liu | “Internationalism Beyond the “Yellow Peril”: On the Possibility of Transnational Asian American Solidarity” | DOI: 10.5070/T8112050102 | DOA: 7/17/2022 | SAoki)

However, the point of Asian–Black solidarity is neither recentering Asian American experiences in the struggle toward police abolition nor placing racism against Black and Asian American communities in the same comparative framework. These approaches would minimize Black people’s repression by the carceral state and fall into the unproductive logic of an “Oppression Olympics.” The 1960s slogan that some Asian Americans have repopularized—“Yellow Peril Supports Black Power”—in order to support the current movement2 has stirred up debates relating to Asian Americans’ relationship to the ongoing Black struggles. While it highlights the historically bounded fate and formation of the Asian American and Black Power movements,3 it should also remind us that the 1960s Asian–Black solidarity was made possible by the antiimperialist positions of anti-Vietnam war and the decolonial movements in the global South. The Orientalist depiction of Asian nationals as “foreign enemies” during World War II constituted the “perpetual foreigner” status of Asian American subjects, thus demanding an Asian American critique of racial exclusion and the US empire. In other words, the demand for racial inclusion and equality as the basis of Asian–Black solidarity without problematizing the transnational reach of US imperialism is not only anachronistic but also counterproductive. As Minju Bae and Mark Tseng-Putterman articulate, the interconnected events of Orientalist racialization of the Asian body as virally contagious and BLM’s uprisings against policing “require an analysis that sutures the discourses of antiblackness and Orientalism, not as equivalent but constitutive components of global racial capitalism,”4 rather than flattening the differences of white supremacist operations under the US nation-state. In the midst of a global pandemic and social upheavals, how will transnational Asian–Black solidarity take shape? Currently living in Taipei, Taiwan, I am involved in an emergent circle of diasporic Asian radicals who write and organize around the vibrant left-leaning movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong and seek to build international solidarity based on a critique of both US and Chinese imperialism. This new activist milieu that has been described as “transnationally Asian”5 not only rejects Asian American assimilationist politics and the narrow focus of liberal international politics around democracy and human rights, but also actively seeks cross-national and cross-racial points of racial encounters and challenges the orthodox Western leftist takes on social movements that often defer to a reductionist binarism of “capitalism versus communism.” For example, a Hong Kong activist was excluded from participating in a BLM solidarity event hosted by the Sunrise Movement, an American youth–led climate organization, due to some US leftists’ Twitter commentaries that misrepresented Hong Kong’s protests against Beijing’s increasingly harsh conditions of authoritarian control as being funded by the US military. Writers from Lausan, a leftist Hong Kong press, have condemned such mischaracterization of Hong Kong’s ongoing mass movement as merely manipulated by US imperialism and, instead, insisted on the importance of building alliances between Hong Kong’s struggle against authoritarianism and BLM’s vision of police abolition.6 From this single case, one can understand that building transnational solidarity is complex and arduous work, both conceptually and practically. It requires us to maneuver from one ideological trap to another across geopolitical contexts and locally specific historical conditions. While transnational iteration is emancipatory and necessary to achieve a genuine form of Asian–Black solidarity, it must be built on a bidirectional and bifocal analysis instead of merely relying on the US-centric epistemology of what constitutes leftist politics. By seeking transnationalism from the West toward the non-West and not vice versa, it’s easy to fall into the logic of Western “China apologists” or neo-Cold War logic, dismissing the interasian conflicts that also have global ramifications. To put it in another way, as China criminalizes Hong Kong’s fight for fundamental democratic rights and implements mass arrests of young activists under the National Security Laws,7 a progressive Asian American politics must not only be focused on racial relations domestically but challenge multiple forms of Empire beyond the borders of the US. Only through this multidimensional transnational praxis can we begin to see the underlying mechanisms that allow BLM activists from Minneapolis to Seattle to adopt Hong Kong protesters’ strategies against the police. 8 These possibilities for alliance among “transnationally Asian” activists include protesters in Hong Kong and the US using umbrellas and tennis rackets to protect themselves from tear gas, the joint coalition between Taiwanese indigenous organizations and Black Lives Matter Taiwan calling out racism,9 and Singaporeans debating whether to topple their colonial monuments.10 Our current shared struggles against the rapid right-wing turn of global hegemonies do not draw lines between the simple binaries of “East vs. West,” “white vs. Black,” or “authoritarianism vs. democracy,” but underscore the interconnected fights against the militarized police state, neoliberal capitalist order, Han supremacy, and the continued impacts of Euro-American coloniality. The “yellow peril” may have been a useful metaphor describing the shared racialization of the Asian body against white supremacy and US imperialism; the politics of internationalism in the present conditions requires a much more nuanced analysis of interregional geopolitics across the transpacific. The possibility of transnational Asian American solidarity must be situated beyond the framework of “one united race against one empire.” Indeed, the fastgrowing infection and mortality rates of Covid-19 show that the virus cannot be simply contained by national borders, and our racial critique must also be extended transnationally. When a disease is racialized, it not only exposes the racial inequalities built in the global public health infrastructures but also how mechanisms of national security require the domination of subjects who are deemed to be “outsiders.” Rather than falling into a nationalistic blame game based on the Cold War logic—choosing sides between one empire (the US) and another (China)—the pandemic requires us to engage in the racial justice and antinativist struggles in our different localities as well as hold one another’s movements accountable to an internationalist vision of collective survival.

## Impact

### Yellow Peril O/W

#### Understand Yellow Peril as an apocalyptic threat in your impact calculus---foreclosing our mode of critique cedes epistemological framework to staticism which temporally delimits our understanding of the state and undermines decolonial projects

Man 18 (Jessica Man | Master of Arts degree in Asian American Studies | *“The Perfect Type of Industry”: 2012 and Apocalyptic Visions of the Asian Century* pg 44-45 | DOA: 7/8/2022 | SAoki)

Without understanding that the Yellow Peril is an apocalyptic mode, and without a persistent critique of how the state leverages eschatology as a reproductive apparatus, the only frameworks that we can use to understand it are statist; our understanding becomes temporally delimited by the end-time of the state. Apocalypse is a way of understanding how the state envisions its persistence beyond that end, and Yellow Peril is itself a racial fiction used to serve that purpose, generating other fictions that struggle to reconcile an understanding of history as periodic with an understanding of the future as progressive, triumphant, and utopic. It is apocalyptic and eschatological, and proposes a method of preserving ethno-national power. Eugenic self-defense is implicated and inherent to the forecasting of precarious conditions. The entanglement of history with fiction, as well as the understanding of history as a fiction, and of speculation as fictive work, should compel us to look at cultural production as the production of politicized time. This thesis contends that the Orientalist racism of the Yellow Peril resides in an economic understanding of time, space, and progression that generates anxiety about borders, both geopolitical and financial, and that this understanding, as we know it today, comes out of an historical moment that eyes all over the world looked to as a premonition of the things to come – as an apocalyptic play that was meant to prefigure the conditions of the 20th century. Its development into the Asian Century requires fundamental changes to the nature of speculative fictions and methods of subjugation, which we can understand both through legislation and the speculative contexts that generate it. Future discussions of Orientalist apocalypticism, especially those strains that entail Yellow Peril and economy, must first look back to the entry of Japan into modernity at the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War in order to understand what sort of future Americans have predicted for themselves, and still predict in different shapes today. If this is to be a decolonial project, we must also look at how an empire understands post-imperial time in order to create a vision of the future that interrupts Empire and forecloses the state. We must look critically at what within us is structurally valued, how that value is reproduced within our imagination, and reconsider what we plan to carry on our backs through our journey into the eschaton of the Asian Century

### Asian Violence

#### **Techno-orientalism is one manifestation of orientalism that involves viewing Asians as technologically superior. The aff’s propagation of information capitalism asserts its usage of U.S. dominance as means to reaffirm harmful stereotypes and perpetuate superiority over developing nations.**

Roh et al. 15 [David S. Roh, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara., 2015, "Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media," pp. 1-20: “Technologizing Orientalism”, Rutgers University Press, [https://muse.jhu.edu/book/40896]//AA](https://muse.jhu.edu/book/40896%5d//AA)

A century has passed since British author Sax Rohmer introduced the character Dr. Fu Manchu, whose particular brand of Eastern mysticism wedded with Western science both terrorized and titillated readers and audiences alike. Appearing in 1912, the character is perhaps one of the earliest and most potent instances of techno-Orientalist expression. A figure of unnatural, unknowable peril who must be kept from acquiring knowledge lest it be used against the Western subject, Dr. Fu Manchu is at once brilliant and technologically challenged. In one part of the serial, Dr. Fu Manchu plots to strengthen China by kidnapping European engineers, suggesting the Orient’s lack of technological prowess and desire for Western technology. Yet, in another, he is described as possessing “all the cruel cunning of the entire Eastern race, accumulated in one giant intellect, with all the resources of science, past and present.”1 Both of the past and the future, his monstrous form captured Western ambivalences toward what it regarded as the mysterious power of the East, manifesting in strange contradictions. Throughout the twentieth century, variations of that premodern-hypermodern dynamic in speculative visions of Asia and Asians have been recycled numerous times.2 Exemplars include the villainous Khan Noonien Singh in Gene Roddenberry’s Star Trek universe, the leader of a group of superhumans who attempt to take control of the Starship Enterprise; the Chinese scientist Dr. X in Neal Stephenson’s novel, The Diamond Age (1995), a counterfeiter using “a gallimaufry of contraband technology” (73) to steal Western innovations; and most recently The Mandarin in Iron Man 3 (2013), a clear revival of Dr. Fu Manchu played cleverly by Ben Kingsley in a tongue-in-cheek fashion.3 But Western speculations of an Asianized future are not always consolidated in a singular fictional figure as in Fu Manchu, Dr. X, or The Mandarin. The yellow peril anxiety of an earlier, industrial-age era embodied by Fu Manchu found new forms across cultures and hemispheres as Asian economies become more visible competitors in the age of globalization and rapid technological innovations. One needs to witness only the speculative fictional worlds of Maureen McHugh’s novel China Mountain Zhang (1992), Joss Whedon’s television series Firefly (2002), and Gary Shteyngart’s novel Super Sad True Love Story (2010) to trace persisting anxieties over the past three decades of a Chinadominated future. All of these worlds feature Western protagonists struggling to navigate a sociopolitical landscape in which China is the dominant global empire with a superior technological edge. Beyond the focus on China, paradigmatic works such as William Gibson’s Japan-based oeuvre (including Neuromancer), Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner, and the Wachowskis’ The Matrix films have also burnished in the Western consciousness Asian-influenced visions of the future underpinned by a familiar yet estranged mixture of Orientalist sensibilities. These examples perfectly illustrate our definition of techno-Orientalism: the phenomenon of imagining Asia and Asians in hypo- or hypertechnological terms in cultural productions and political discourse.4 Techno-Orientalist imaginations are infused with the languages and codes of the technological and the futuristic. These developed alongside industrial advances in the West and have become part of the West’s project of securing dominance as architects of the future, a project that requires configurations of the East as the very technology with which to shape it. Techno-Orientalist speculations of an Asianized future have become ever more prevalent in the wake of neoliberal trade policies that enabled greater flow of information and capital between the East and the West. Substantial criticism of techno-Orientalism emerged in the mid-1990s when cultural theorists began to trace its manifestations and theorize its causes and implications. Kevin Morley and David Robins, Toshiya Ueno, and Kumiko Sato, principal trailblazers of the field, laid much of the valuable groundwork. Morley and Robins’s Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes, and Cultural Boundaries (Routledge, 1995), in which a definition of “techno-Orientalism” first saw print, remains the most cited in critical assessments of technological and Orientalist discourses; however, Ueno has probably written most extensively about techno-Orientalism as a discursive cultural phenomenon in the era of what he identifies as the “post-Fordist social environment of globalization” (223). “The basis of Orientalism and xenophobia is the subordination of Others through a sort of ‘mirror of cultural conceit,’” Ueno explains. “The Orient exists in so far as the West needs it, because it brings the project of the West into focus” (223). Whereas Orientalism, as a strategy of representational containment, arrests Asia in traditional, and often premodern imagery, techno-Orientalism presents a broader, dynamic, and often contradictory spectrum of images, constructed by the East and West alike, of an “Orient” undergoing rapid economic and cultural transformations. Techno-Orientalism, like Orientalism, places great emphasis on the project of modernity—cultures privilege modernity and fear losing their perceived “edge” over others. Stretching beyond Orientalism’s premise of a hegemonic West’s representational authority over the East, techno-Orientalism’s scope is much more expansive and bidirectional, its discourses mutually constituted by the flow of trade and capital across the hemispheres. As Ueno observes, techno-Orientalism is first and foremost an effect of globalism. “If the Orient was invented by the West,” he writes, “then the Techno-Orient was also invented by the world of information capitalism” (228). Technological developments, driven by the imperial aspirations and the appetites of consumerist societies on both sides of the Pacific, propel the engines of invention and production. In its wake, Western nations vying for cultural and economic dominance with Asian nations find in technoOrientalism an expressive vehicle for their aspirations and fears. Our volume, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, documents past and current constructions of the role of Asia in a technologized future and critically examines this proliferating phenomenon. Dr. Fu Manchu illustrates just one way in which techno-Orientalist imagery pervades Western cultural productions in the early twentieth century. The principal locales of techno-Orientalist projects as they developed in the late twentieth century have primarily been Japan and China. Ueno, whose influential analyses of “Japanimation” in the mid-1990s seeded the field of technoOrientalist studies, observes, “In Techno-Orientalism, Japan is not only located geographically, but is also projected chronologically. Jean Baudrillard once called Japan a satellite in orbit. Now Japan has been located in the future of technology” (228). Morley and Robins put a finer point on the temporal dimension of the spatial construction: “If the future is technological, and if technology has become ‘Japanised,’ then the syllogism would suggest that the future is now Japanese, too. The postmodern era will be the Pacific era. Japan is the future, and it is a future that seems to be transcending and displacing Western modernity” (168). Whereas Japan’s dubious honor as the original techno-Orient was bestowed in the eighties with the help of the cyberpunk movement, the techno-Orientalizing of China occurred roughly a decade later.5 China was not yet a competitor in the global economy in the 1980s, when the West focused its wary gaze on what it saw as an invasion of Japanese capital investments and imports into Western economies. When China was recognized as a newly industrialized country (NIC) in the 1990s and its influence in the global economy increased, it, too, became once again a target of techno-Orientalist fashioning. The discourse on China’s “rise” in the U.S. context, consistent with techno-Orientalist contradictions, has focused on constructing its people as a vast, subaltern-like labor force and as a giant consumer market whose appetite for Western cultural products, if nurtured, could secure U.S. global cultural and economic dominance. This dual image of China as both developing-world producers and firstworld consumers presents a representational challenge for the West: Is China a human factory? Or is it a consumerist society, like the United States, whose enormous purchasing power dictates the future of technological innovations and economies? Japan and China are thus signified differently in the techno-Orientalist vocabulary. Both are constructed as competitors and therefore threats to the U.S. economy; but while Japan competes with the United States for dominance in technological innovation, China competes with the United States in labor and production. To put it in starker terms, Japan creates technology, but China is the technology. In the eyes of the West, both are crucial engines of the future: Japan innovates and China manufactures. And as Asia, writ large, becomes a greater consumerist force than the West,6 its threat/value dualism commensurately increases. These differences in the technological signification of Japan and China manifest themselves in the fictive forecasts of the Asiantinged future. If Japan is a screen on which the West has projected its technological fantasies, then China is a screen on which the West projects its fears of being colonized, mechanized, and instrumentalized in its own pursuit of technological dominance. India, another NIC, has also found itself under the techno-Orientalist gaze as a consequence of U.S. outsourcing practices. As a much maligned business strategy, outsourcing has provoked extremely negative public sentiments in the United States. These opinions find expression in a particular strand of techno-Orientalist discourse that consolidates China and India as the chief threats to the U.S. service and labor sectors. These Asian nations serve as the scapegoats for corporate decisions to move service and manufacturing jobs abroad and bear the brunt of the resulting xenophobic antipathies. Chinese and Indian workers, for instance, are routinely portrayed in techno-Orientalist and technophobic vocabularies; call center employees in India adopt Western Christian names and mimic the linguistic and idiomatic style of Americans, a practice so ubiquitous as to be parodied cinematically in romantic comedies such as Outsourced (2006), conjuring images of Dickian androids (or Blade Runner’s “replicants”) who simulate human behavior and threaten the distinction between “real” and “fake” Americans. Glossy spreads of endless rows of Chinese workers in corporate factories and towns in mainstream magazines such as Time and Wired seal the visual vocabulary of Asians as the cogs of hyperproduction. In the NIC contexts, techno-Orientalist discourse constructs Asians as mere simulacra and maintains a prevailing sense of the inhumanity of Asian labor—the very antithesis of Western liberal humanism. Discursive Conspicuity, Critical Invisibility As this collection demonstrates, techno-Orientalism occurs across genres and disciplines—history, art, literature, film, television, video games—but the majority of the criticism coalesces around literature and film, particularly in the genre of speculative fiction (SF). This is unsurprising; techno-Orientalism finds some of its most pervasive expressions in SF because of the genre’s futurist esprit of contemporary existential, racial, and technological anxieties. Nevertheless, we identify a disciplinary narrowness to SF in the extant scholarship that our project attempts to broaden. Even as techno-Orientalism in SF has been documented by several incisive studies in recent decades, critical studies of Orientalism in the long history of FIG. 0.1. Factory workers in China. Source: Photo by Steve Jurvetson. Licensed under Creative Commons 2.0. SF are scarce. A survey of the essays published in the genre’s flagship journal, Science Fiction Studies, founded in 1973, confirms the critical neglect. A search with the term “Orientalism” in the journal’s archives yielded only nine substantive essays that address Orientalism, four of which are book reviews. A search with the term “techno-Orientalism” yielded, even more negligibly, two review essays. Similar searches in Extrapolations, another major academic venue for SF criticism, yielded equally scant results. And when PMLA, the lingua franca of academic scholarship in literature and languages, published a special issue on science fiction in May 2004, no mention of Orientalism could be found— this despite the fact that SF’s propensity for projecting and amplifying contemporary racial and imperialist attitudes is well documented.7 Indeed, the conceptualization of techno-Orientalism as a recognizable discursive effect of the postindustrial age may have been the clarion call for addressing this gap in the genre. Orientalism in SF during the pre-cyberpunk era may have suffered critical neglect because of the perception that the “yellow peril” has been kept in check by the mechanisms of immigration and exclusion acts that were in place for much of the midcentury. It took the repeal of the immigration acts in 1965, coupled with the entrance of Japanese capital and imports into the U.S. economy in the late seventies, to precipitate a renewed wariness toward all things Asian, onto which the West once again projected agendas of cultural hegemony and technological dominance. Cyberpunk, with its fetishizing gaze upon Japan as a seductive and contradictory space of futuristic innovation and ancient mystique, sharply focused the SF critical and creative lenses upon Asia. Substantial criticism of techno-Orientalism thus emerged in the mid1990s with the contributions of Morley and Robins, Ueno, and Sato. Critical momentum continued with Takayuki Tatsumi’s 2000 historiography of Japanese SF in Science Fiction Studies (SFS), and a 2002 special issue of SFS on Japanese speculative fiction, guest edited by Takayuki Tatsumi, Christopher Bolton, and Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., introduced Japanese SF and cyberpunk visions to the Western audience. Sato’s important and incisive 2004 intersectional analysis of what she describes as “the four different categorical spheres, namely, Western cyborg philosophy, American cyberpunk, Japanese cyberpunk, and Japanese theory of uniqueness known as nihonjinron” (335–336) and Christine Cornea’s chapter “Techno-Orientalism and the Postmodern Subject” in Jacqueline Furby and Karen Randell’s Screen Methods: Comparative Readings in Film Studies (Wallflower Press, 2006) sustained the necessary critical interest in the field. These studies, however, constitute the bulk of the critical history of technoOrientalism. Other studies in recent years, such as Mimi Thi Nguyen and Thuy Linh Nguyen Tu’s Alien Encounters: Popular Culture in Asian America (Duke, 2007), Wendy Hui Kyong Chun and Lynn Joyrich’s 2009 special issue of Camera Obscura, “Race and/as Technology,” Chun’s New Media, Old Technologizing Orientalism • 7 Media: A History and Theory Reader (Routledge, 2005), and Lisa Nakamura’s Cybertypes (Routledge, 2002), made significant contributions to critiques of Orientalism in popular culture and mainstream media. Yet, despite technoOrientalism’s growing prevalence in the Western cultural consciousness, and in SF more specifically, it has been generally ignored in academic and popular cultural spheres. A special issue of the literary journal MELUS, titled “Alien/Asians” (2008) and edited by Stephen Hong Sohn, expanded the critical scope of the phenomenon and drew it closer for theoretical scrutiny. Sohn’s introduction persuasively conveys the urgent need for vigilant documentation and analysis of the ever-growing techno-Orientalist vocabulary. The eight essays in the issue examine a range of techno-Orientalist instantiations in SF within U.S., Japanese, Chinese, and Indian contexts, from “a cyberpunk-inflected Asian future” to “the cyborg technologies intertwined with Asian American bodies” (Sohn 15). The essays, Sohn writes, “investigate how alternative imaginaries provide fertile terrains to consider the prospects of racial subjectivity and identity” (15). The essayists take a hard look at the work of SF luminaries such as Philip K. Dick, Ursula K. Le Guin, William Gibson, Neal Stephenson, and William S. Burroughs, whose work consciously or unconsciously traded in technoOrientalist tropes, as well as the work of Asian American and Asian Canadian writers such as Karen Tei Yamashita, Amitav Ghosh, and Larissa Lai, who mount metafictional critiques of techno-Orientalist tropes in SF. Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, therefore, has two objectives. The first is to continue the work begun by the aforementioned predecessors, to “consider the prospective thesis that cultural production is still invested in parsing out how the yellow peril continues to be a mode to draw from, write against, challenge, negotiate, and problematize” (Sohn 6–7). The volume argues that while Orientalism defines a modern West by producing an oppositional and premodern East, techno-Orientalism symmetrically and yet contradictorily completes this project by creating a collusive, futurized Asia to further affirm the West’s centrality. The second objective is constructive. While we critique the dehumanizing effects of the technoOrientalist gaze, we also see an opportunity for critical reappropriations in texts that self-referentially engage with Asian images; indeed, as an example, Asian SF writers have already taken to the trope to create the SF cottage industry in which the subject and setting are Eastern. There is of course the danger that Asian and Asian American creators might internalize techno-Orientalist patterns and uncritically replicate the same dehumanizing model. However, thanks to its global and mass appeal, the speculative imagination in television, graphic novels, or science fiction is by no means the purview of single national traditions. Even as techno-Orientalism has become more pervasive, it has also engendered counterdialogue in those same cultural and political spaces. Global Consumption While Orientalism as a critical lens describes how Western discourse discursively catalogues or frames the East, it has always been trained on domestic— that is, Western or U.S.—configurations against the Orientalized Other. Edward Said notes his “real argument is that Orientalism is—and does not simply represent—a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with ‘our’ world” (12). Techno-Orientalism, with a vision of the future that is global in scope and reach, adds a wrinkle to the critical commonplace that Orientalism actively produces and reproduces an oppositional East to cement Western hegemony. Particularly within the realm of SF, techno-Orientalist tropes have been absorbed, reenvisioned, and replicated by other sites of cultural production, with interesting geopolitical implications.8

## Alt

### Rejection

#### Vote neg for rejection---political decisions are a monolithic view of only *half of the globe*---rejection entails a shift to a dynamic view of which necessitates an iterative process of rejecting the homogenizing claims of the 1AC and giving a voice for the organic intellectual---every American, White, etc. author they cite should take a back seat to enable the self-representation of ‘the Oriental’

Nagar 13 (Neha Nagar | Research Scholar. Department of English & MEL. University of Lucknow | ‘Reading Orientalism: A Postcolonial Perspective’ | <https://www.galaxyimrj.com/V2/n5/Neha.pdf> | DOA: 7/16/2022 | SAoki)

Manifest Orientalism are the visible, overt features of Asian culture, such as clothing, architectural styles, calligraphy, and artistic creations. Manifest Orientalism is what is spoken and acted upon. It includes information and changes in knowledge about the Orient as well as policy decisions founded in Orientalist thinking. It is the expression in words and actions of Latent Orientalism. The first 'Orientalists' were 19th century scholars who translated the writings of 'the Orient' into English, based on the assumption that a truly effective colonial conquest required knowledge of the conquered peoples. This idea of knowledge as power is present throughout Said's critique. By knowing the Orient, the West came to own it. The Orient became the studied, the seen, the observed, the object; Orientalist scholars were the students, the seers, the observers, the subject. The Orient was passive; the West was active. One of the most significant constructions of Orientalist scholars is that of the Orient itself. What is considered the Orient is a vast region, one that spreads across a myriad of cultures and countries. It includes most of Asia as well as the Middle East. The depiction of this single 'Orient' which can be studied as a cohesive whole is one of the most powerful accomplishments of Orientalist scholars. It essentializes an image of a prototypical Oriental--a biological inferior that is culturally backward, peculiar, and unchanging--to be depicted in dominating and sexual terms. The discourse and visual imagery of Orientalism is laced with notions of power and superiority, formulated initially to facilitate a colonizing mission on the part of the West and perpetuated through a wide variety of discourses and policies. The language is critical to the construction. The feminine and weak Orient awaits the dominance of the West; it is a defenseless and unintelligent whole that exists for, and in terms of, its Western counterpart. The importance of such a construction is that it creates a single subject matter where none existed, a compilation of previously unspoken notions of the Other. Since the notion of the Orient is created by the Orientalist, it exists solely for [them] ~~him or her~~. Its identity is defined by the scholar who gives it life. Said argues that Orientalism can be found in current Western depictions of "Arab" cultures. The depictions of "the Arab" as irrational, menacing, untrustworthy, anti-Western, dishonest, and--perhaps most importantly--prototypical, are ideas into which Orientalist scholarship has evolved. These notions are trusted as foundations for both ideologies and policies developed by the Occident. Said writes: "The hold these instruments have on the mind is increased by the institutions built around them. For every Orientalist, quite literally, there is a support system of staggering power, considering the ephemerality of the myths that Orientalism propagates. The system now culminates into the very institutions of the state. To write about the Arab Oriental world, therefore, is to write with the authority of a nation, and not with the affirmation of a strident ideology but with the unquestioning certainty of absolute truth backed by absolute force." He continues, "One would find this kind of procedure less objectionable as political propaganda--which is what it is, of course--were it not accompanied by sermons on the objectivity, the fairness, the impartiality of a real historian, the implication always being that Muslims and Arabs cannot be objective but that Orientalists. . .writing about Muslims are, by definition, by training, by the mere fact of their Westernness. This is the culmination of Orientalism as a dogma that not only degrades its subject matter but also blinds its practitioners.". So Said calls into question the underlying assumptions that form the foundation of Orientalist thinking. A rejection of Orientalism entails a rejection of biological generalizations, cultural constructions, and racial and religious prejudices. It is a rejection of greed as a primary motivating factor in intellectual pursuit. It is an erasure of the line between 'the West' and 'the Other.' Said argues for the use of "narrative" rather than "vision" in interpreting the geographical landscape known as the Orient, meaning that a historian and a scholar would turn not to a panoramic view of half of the globe, but rather to a focused and complex type of history that allows space for the dynamic variety of human experience. Rejection of Orientalist thinking does not entail a denial of the differences between 'the West' and 'the Orient,' but rather an evaluation of such differences in a more critical and objective fashion. 'The Orient' cannot be studied in a non-Orientalist manner; rather, the scholar is obliged to study more focused and smaller culturally consistent regions. The person who has until now been known as 'the Oriental' must be given a voice. Scholarship from afar and second-hand representation must take a back seat to narrative and self-representation on the part of the 'Oriental.'

### Asian Poetics

#### Vote neg to endorse the poetry of Asian America

Park 08 (Josephine Nook-Hee Park | *Apparitions of Asia Modernist Form and Asian American Poetics* pg 157-159 | DOA: 7/19/2022 | SAoki)

Frank Chin’s groundbreaking play The Chickencoop Chinaman, first produced in 1972, opens with his main character, Tam Lum, explaining his birth: “My dear in the beginning there was the Word! Then there was me! And the Word was CHINAMAN. And there was me” (6). Tam elaborates in thunderous tones: Born? No! Crashed! Not born. Stamped! Not born! Created! Not born. No more born than the heaven and earth. No more born than nylon or acrylic. For I am a Chinaman! A miracle synthetic! Drip dry and machine washable. (8) Tam’s immaculate conception is miraculous because he comes “out of junk-imports, lies, railroad scrap iron, dirty jokes” (6). The list goes on, but this first handful of detritus sketches an American past of cheap Asian imports and labor. Tam cannot simply jettison this mess; instead, it comes together to create him. In fact, Tam orphans himself in the play in order to claim a lineage of exclusion and Orientalism. A synthetic creation made from the dregs of racism, Tam is an emblem of Asian America: the miracle of Asian America lies in this transformation, a new cultural formation come to life against a history of anti-Asian sentiment and policy. Tam explains that “The Word is my heritage,” but this grim past has been especially difficult to embrace for Asian America. Asian America has dramatically expanded since its 1968 creation. Perhaps we may read the literary shaping of Asian America in the last forty years as a dialectic of exclusion and inclusion, in which periodic delineations inspire new entries. The originary “Word” as Chin construed it, however, continues to be theorized as a hard limit: Asian America has a heritage, but it is emphatically not Orientalism. The breach between Orientalism and anti-Orientalism has widened since The Chickencoop Chinaman as a growing field of scholarship has significantly uncovered an anti-Orientalist literary past. As a result of these crucial excavations, Asian America created a canon untainted by American Orientalism. Yet the Asian American movement itself provided an extraordinary demonstration of the artistic riches that could result from grappling with an Orientalist heritage, and Asian American artists have returned again and again to Orientalism as a complex source for new experiments. Jessica Hagedorn’s important 1993 anthology of Asian American literature proclaimed that “Charlie Chan Is Dead,” but the truth, as the anthology demonstrates, is that reviving him is a means of bringing together a wide range of texts. The original spark of resistance was the miracle of Asian American literature, and later generations of Asian American artists continue to return to this potent stance, in ever-changing and often surprising ways. Indeed, resistance hasn’t gone away in Asian American literature because Orientalism has never gone away—and the call to Asian American political resistance seems as crucial in the twenty-first century as it was when it was first sounded in the late 1960s. It has been the aim of this study to examine this heritage by reopening a past of literary Orientalism which has long been walled off from Asian American literature. The Orient examined in the first half of this study was ultimately a legitimizing force: Pound and Snyder secured their authority in the Far East, and the poetry that resulted from their transpacific journeys presented Eastern aesthetics as the mode of an American literary revolution. Each was locked into his own distance from the United States, and each found a way of grasping an essence of nativity by sailing due east. To garner authority in a distant land in order to trumpet it back home is a well-known colonial enterprise, but these American adventurers presented a subtle twist on the old formula by operating through alliance over difference. At the base of such alliances lay commerce: these literary accords were offshoots of political and commercial ties across the Pacific which periodically hailed a friendly Orient. The sympathetic Orient these poets discovered and, in particular, their aesthetic admiration for the Far East presented a singular bind for Asian American poets. Asians in the United States tend to be branded with alternating praise and blame, each of which calls for varying tactical responses: “junk-imports, lies, railroad scrap iron, dirty jokes” provide fodder for combat, but altogether different maneuvers are required to negotiate a legacy of haiku and scroll painting. How to respond artistically to this Orientalism, one premised on appreciation—in all senses of the word—and not denigration, has been the central conundrum of this study. In making the leap from Orientalism to Asian America, I have attempted to convey the formidable task of creating a new culture out of an ill-fitting heritage—and routing this question through poetry brings to bear a distinctly formal pressure. The modernist and counterculture poetic revolutions were shot through with Orientalism, and it is my claim that this heritage conditioned the formal innovations of Asian American poetry. Lawson Fusao Inada’s poetry presents a significant experiment away from this past: he turned to different cultural amalgams, applying African American and Latino rhythms to his verse, but he also critically revised Orientalist forms for Asian America. My study closes with further formal experiments in Asian American poetry, in which an Orientalist heritage is invoked in order to break it open and reveal the fissures within. Theresa Hak Kyung Cha and Myung Mi Kim reopen a literary past, and their difficult poems provide a kind of anatomy lesson for American poetry as they dissect its forms. Apparitions of Asia has traced Pound’s modernist apparition of “Petals on a wet, black bough” to Myung Mi Kim’s “azaleas in full bloom/Composed of many lengths of bone.” Against the momentary flash of Poundian Imagism, Kim’s appari tion refers to a bitter transpacific history. At the end of the twentieth century, Asian American poets newly invoke the United States– East Asian alliances that drove the literary revolutions of the past. American poetry is itself a supremely synthetic creation. For the poets of the first half of my study, the component parts of their verse were aligned with an American ambition: they dreamed of bardic status, a role which had long been declared defunct. These poets quite literally circumvented the problem of their full belonging to America—the first and most important requirement to be a bard—by reforming their native land through a discipline learned in the Orient. In reading the poetic forms of American Orientalism, I have sought to examine the precise configurations that result from transpacific alliances in order to understand their significance within modernist and Beat poetics—and, further, in order to comprehend the formal burden they present for Asian American poets. The miracle synthetic of Asian American poetry emerged in the wake of these extraordinary claims to nativity. In querying their own belonging to the United States, these poets conducted experiments in verse which took apart and newly assembled the forms that constrained them in literary acts that ultimately renewed American poetry

### Afro-Orientalism Poetics

#### “...I am the Silent One,

#### Saying nothing,

#### Knowing no words to write,

#### Feeling only the bullets

#### And the hunger

#### And the stench of gas

#### Dying.

#### And nobody knows my name

#### But someday,

#### I shall raise my hand

#### And break the heads of you

#### Who starve me.

#### I shall raise my hand

#### And smash the spines of you

#### Who shoot me.

#### I shall take your guns

#### And turn them on you.

#### Starting with the bankers and the bosses

#### Traders and missionaries

#### Who pay the militarists

#### Who pay the soldiers

#### Who back the police

#### Who kill me—

#### And break my strikes

#### And break my rising—

#### I, silently,

#### And without a single learned word

#### Shall begin the slaughter

#### That will end my hunger

#### And your bullets

#### And the gas of capitalism

#### And make the world

#### My own.

#### When that is done,

#### I shall find words to speak

#### Wait!...”[[1]](#footnote-1)

Huh 17 (Jang Wook Huh | ‘Beyond Afro-Orientalism: Langston Hughes, Koreans, and the Poetics of Overlapping Dispossessions’ | <https://doi.org/10.1215/00104124-3865403> | DOA: 7/16/2022| SAoki)

Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University By exploring Hughes’s attention to racism among people of color, I use his cross-cultural poetics to challenge the current discourse of “Afro-Orientalism,” a term coined by Bill Mullen to describe the literary subgenre in which African Americans idealize Asians as their allies, a “cultural fetishization” that renders Asia into a “utopian attraction” for anti-imperialist and antiracist discourses (xii, xx). As useful as Afro-Orientalism is when discussing black disseminations of pro-Japanese sentiments, this discourse also threatens to eclipse both Asian colonialism and local realities. It also marginalizes the nuanced understandings that emerged from African Americans’ varied experiences with Asians (see Taketani, “Cartography” 82). In this context, I view Hughes’s disaggregation of Asian nations from Japanese Pan-Asianism as a counter-narrative to the Orientalist discourse that normally depicts Asia as an undifferentiated and unified entity. In doing so, Hughes showcases an “overlapping tale” involving racialized African Americans and colonized Koreans “without ever yielding to the temptation to identify a sublimated History” (Glissant 85). Afro-Korean convergences contest the unidirectional simplifications of an Afro-Orientalism that through its emphasis on black reifications of Asia trivializes Asian receptions and reproductions of black culture and so “overlooks the explicitly generative role that non-Western and especially Asian languages and cultural traditions” play in producing literary texts in conversation with Western literature (Yao 9; see also Huang; Palumbo-Liu; Park, Apparitions; and Wilson). I contend that the Afro-Korean poetic intersection embodies a reciprocal form of cultural exchange that translates the racial and cultural differences between African Americans and Koreans into a shared vision of global liberation. Considering Asian agency in response to black radicalism, I situate Hughes’s Afro-Korean connection within contemporaneous Korean literature. Koreans living in the United States and Korea in the 1930s complicated Hughes’s cross-cultural poetics through translation, transforming U.S. antiracism into a point of entry into anticolonialism in Korea, as they subtly overlap Korean colonial loss with black disenfranchisement. In addressing the absence of Korea in studies of black radical literature, I also examine the poetics of what I call “overlapping dispossessions,” by which I mean literary conduits of transpacific interactions, inspired by leftist minoritarianism, that represent the entanglements of imperialism and racism in Asia in conjunction with U.S. racism. Hughes and his Korean translators, I argue, employ the poetics of overlapping dispossessions to provide an epistemological model for imagining a shared juncture of subjugations—racial and colonial—and the affinity between the racialized governance of the U.S. and Japanese sovereignties over subjects. In what follows, I explore Hughes’s analogy of dispossessions as a poetic mode of activating a cross-racial political unconscious that critiques mechanisms of racism within peoples of color and recuperates Koreans little recognized for their activities in relation to black internationalism. I then examine two Korean translations of a Hughes poem that insert anticolonial references to Korea into the legacy of the Harlem Renaissance.

### Electric Dress – Asian futurity

#### Vote NEG for to endorse the Electric Dress---a centering of the Asian American narrative around the intersectional solidarity of imagined futures, situated through orienting oneself at the margins of history and discourse

Hsu 20 (Allison Hsu | Allison Hsu is a performance curator, writer, and arts administrator from Connecticut, currently based in Brooklyn, NY. Her research interests include bridging Asian American studies and feminist and queer theory. She is currently an assistant to performing artist Eiko Otake, and she works with a number of arts organizations in New York, including the Museum of Chinese in America, Movement Research, and the Asian American International Film Festival. Allison received her MA in Performance Studies from NYU and BA from Wesleyan University in Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies | “Imagining Asian Futurity: History, Multiplicity, and Racial Solidarity” | <https://www.colorbloq.org/article/imagining-asian-futurity-history-multiplicity-and-racial-solidarity> | DOA: 7/19/2022 | SAoki)

In 1956, Atsuko Tanaka donned a kimono-style garment made entirely out of colored incandescent light bulbs of different sizes and electrical cords tangled together. When displayed in galleries and exhibitions, the dress hung on its own, decorative and immobile like a sort of postmodern Christmas tree. When worn in performances, Electric Dress came to life and covered Tanaka’s body from head to toe, leaving only her face and hands exposed. The effect was the fusing of technology and flesh, transforming her into a glowing symbol of post-war Japan. Tanaka was part of the radical artistic Gutai movement in Japan that rejected traditional art styles in favor of large-scale multi-media works that integrated technology in ways that had never been previously attempted. By breaking away from the past, Tanaka chose to re-envision Japan as the center of modernization, rapidly changing and growing as if undisturbed by war and the horrors of recent history. Electric Dress signifies a rebirth of industry and consumerism in a country that had previously suffered. During Tanaka’s performances, the complex network of pulsating lights flickered on and off; tangled wires mimicked the body’s own circuitry of nerves and veins; and her hybrid body, composed of luminous techno-skin, became emblematic of the lights of a modern Asian city.

In Electric Dress, Tanaka looks straight ahead towards an imagined Asian future.

A picture containing text

Description automatically generated

Techno-Orientalism, Past & Present I look to this image to theorize how this performance of Asian futurity breaks away from the techno-Orientalist stereotypes present in contemporary art and performance, as well as in science fiction literature and film. Techno-Orientalism imagines Asia as a futuristic dystopia. It dehumanizes Asian people by presenting them as robot-like technological objects in order to ease Western anxieties about being surpassed by the rise of Asia. This paranoid imagination places a Western protagonist, often as the figure of the space cowboy, at the center of the narrative and relegates Asian subjects to the background. As machines, they are suspended between life and death, marked as both super-human and sub-human, unable to materialize as fully-formed. The Western protagonist must exhibit his superiority over technology (and over race) through exploitation and control. These techno-Orientalist stereotypes make their way into popular narratives, from Blade Runner to Cloud Atlas. More recently, these tropes appear in the third season of Westworld, where scenes set in a futuristic version of Los Angeles were filmed in different locations across Singapore. This suggests that the future will be Asian, but the heroes will never be. Asian futurism, on the other hand, recasts these technology-driven visions of the future to create speculative worlds in which Asian thinkers and artists are not exoticized as Oriental others. Instead they are at the center of narratives rather than dotting the margins. Asian futurism asks not how future imaginings of Asia and Asian identity are built from the West looking East, but instead, how they emerge from the East looking forward. In this preoccupation with imagining a hypothetical future, we have to re-orient ourselves to see how we are situated in the present and ask the question “Where do we go from here?” While contemporary artists attempt to rework tropes of techno-Orientalism and reposition Asia in the future, we question our own position in the present and begin to feel even more disconnected from the past. There is a gap between this abstract futuristic conception of Asia, the actual experiences of Asians today, and those of our predecessors. Where, and When, Do We Go From Here? I return again to the image of Tanaka in Electric Dress to develop my own theory on Asian futurity as that which is inseparable from history. The presence of Tanaka’s human body in her 1956 performance of Electric Dress evoked a feeling of horror rooted in historical memory that resonates with both the audience and the performer in a way that the lone object cannot. Audience members worried about the amount of heat that emanated from the incandescent bulbs and feared that the dress would electrocute her. In a postwar context, the excessive light covering her body becomes reminiscent of the light of the atomic bombs and their devastating technological power. Tanaka even confessed to having a fleeting thought of death by electrocution when she flipped the switch on the console and turned the power on: “Is this how a death-row inmate would feel?” The fear and anxiety that came along with this sense of hope, of looking forward, suggest how intertwined the past, the present, and the future are. While we speak about Asia in the future tense, the past still tightly grips our social reality in the present. We live in a moment where minimalism, or rather a kind of affective minimalism, is a virtue, deeply informing our lives and the ways that we build our archives looking forward; we are told by tidying expert Marie Kondo to only keep items that we have sentimental relationships with and discard items that no longer “spark joy.” In looking to the past, we might find more moments of sadness and confusion than of joy — memories that we would rather suppress and forget but that deeply inform our present moment nonetheless. The Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong noted the following upon visiting the United States in 1944: “American children hear no stories about ghosts. They spend a dime at the drugstore to buy a Superman comic book…Superman represents actual capabilities or future potential, while ghosts symbolize belief in and reverence for the accumulated past." Despite being born and raised in the United States, I never cared much for superheroes, but I very much believe in ghosts. As I continuously ask myself “What now?” and “What next?” I find myself being drawn into the past and realizing that the “actual capabilities or future potential” that Fei saw in Superman might be found instead within and through ghosts, through history. Performances of Asian futurism are still primarily responding to place, imagining alternate realities through constructing or subverting images of landscapes like the hyper-technological Asian metropolis that Tanaka embodies in Electric Dress. When futurity is linked to place and not the lives of the people who inhabit those places, I fail to envision myself in it. Dawn Chan writes, “…the Asian American experience continues to grapple with the unease that comes with sitelessness and the ongoing threat of encountering the phrase go home.” The Asian American experience, in this sense, is lost in time as well as in space. I have never lived or spent much time in Asia, and my status as an American citizen is one that is constantly being contested. I have never been able to locate myself anywhere within Asia nor within the United States, so I identify with the term Asian American because it encompasses everywhere and nowhere simultaneously. While my identification with the term in the present is one of ambivalence, I look through the lens of history and recognize how the term emerged not from one particular place but from a collective movement — the Black Power Movement. It is therefore necessary to parse through our vastly different experiences as racial minorities in order to recognize rather than to equate oppressions in Asian racialization’s relationship to white supremacy and anti-blackness. Attention to intersectionality in approaching multiply-marginalized identities is not divisive but conducive to kinship. This multiplicity is irreducible and cannot be situated within one specific place or one particular time. The divisions between then/now, and here/there, highlighted by Asian futurism become blurred by movement. An alternative approach to performing Asian futurity, I believe, relies on an acknowledgement of history and of multiplicity to build interracial solidarity with attention to the specificity of racialization. Asian futurism, after all, draws inspiration from Afrofuturism, yet there has been very little discourse amongst and between the two futuristic imaginings. David Xu Borgonjon suggests that if there’s a place for art that reflects the concrete experiences of Asians today, “it must be collective in process, focused on action, and oriented to the margins.” This art asks not only how we can develop a theoretical futurism but emphasizes how we can utilize that theory to act in envisioning a real future for real people. An orientation towards the margins allows us to decenter whiteness and consider multiply-marginalized identities in relation to each other rather than to whiteness alone. A collaborative living archive that documents and experiences the complications and interconnectedness of Afro-Asian solidarity, like that of BUFU (By Us For Us), might be such a project that looks to history and addresses the present through collective action by constructing paths of possibility. BUFU — which was founded by a collective of queer femme Black and Asian artists/organizers — was born in 2015 out of racial solidarity and Black Lives Matter organizing and evolved into a decentralized multimedia project that aims to build solidarity between Black and Asian diasporas. Their video documentary weaves together interviews in different languages and footage from around the world to facilitate global conversations that reveal how deeply interconnected our personal histories are. Through collecting stories about Black and Asian cultural and political relationships around the globe and sharing this living archive through public programming, BUFU engages with multiply-marginalized communities to confront history and build collective and collaborative solidarity. In Electric Dress, the future is the body and technology fusing together and becoming one. This project, on the other hand, uses the technology of documentary to center human experience and form a collective body. The future is solidarity, a shared language, a deepening of the archive. In every second of footage, there is movement. In order to look to a future where we can really see ourselves, we need to look backwards. A theory of Asian futurity can only work towards more generative ends through an acknowledgment of history and of multiplicity, looking not at where we are situated but how we move together.

### Kill America

#### Vote neg to have the dragon of Yellow Peril emerge from its lair of the American psyche and bring about the death of America

Lyman 2000 (Stanford M. Lyman | “The "Yellow Peril" Mystique: Origins and Vicissitudes of a Racist Discourse” | <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20020056> | DOI: 10.1023/A:1022931309651 | DOA: 7/17/2022 | SAoki)

CHINESE AMERICA AND THE YELLOW PERIL: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

In the last year of the nineteenth century, Theodore Roosevelt wrote to Spring Rice, a British diplomat, boasting, "Together . . . the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race . . . can whip the world."302 A few years later, he was not that sure. And neither were the U.S. presidents who came after him. For the next one hundred years first China, then Japan, then China again would rise up in America's public consciousness as a threat to the West in general and the United States in particular. In each era of this yellow peril mystique Americans of Asian heritage, whether immigrant aliens or native-born citizens, would suffer outrages directed against their character, culture, opportunities, and, often enough, their very lives. Whether cast as members of a "race," a "civilization," or a "culture," Asian Americans are treated as bearers of virtually ineradicable traits that, are at least implicitly assumed to be "inherited." Thus, Professor Huntington asserts that civilizational "differences are the products of centuries"303 and that cultural differences are "far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes."304 For Huntington, as Robert G. Lee has pointed out in his thoroughgoing critique of the "clash of civilizations" thesis,305 Asian Americans, together with all those representatives of other non-western civilizations residing in America, are imagined to threaten the U.S. with "de-Westernization." This is a fate so terrible, Huntington-sounding very much like Homer Lea - warns, that "if Americans cease to adhere to their liberal democratic and European-rooted political ideology, the United States as we have known it will cease to exist and will follow the other ideologically defined superpower [the Soviet Union] on the ash heap of history."306 However, it is the Asian American victims of individuals and groups that have been moved to murderous action who have become the real martyrs to such apprehensions. Robert G. Lee has summarized some of the most lethal of the attacks that have occurred since the re-emergence of the yellow peril in the American mind-life and the imposition of what he calls the "mere gook rule," i.e., the rule that any Asian American is a "gook" worthy of extermination: Most notorious have been the murders of Vincent Chin in Detroit; Navorze Mody, an Indian American, in New Jersey;. . . Vandy Phorng, a Cambodian American, in Massachusetts in 1987; Jim Loo a Chinese American, in North Carolina, and five Cambodian and Laotian American children in a Stockton, Calif., schoolyard, in 1989; Hung Trong, a Vietnamese American, in Los Angeles in 1996 . . ., [and] the killings of scores of Asian American shopkeepers and cabdrivers ... [as well as] twenty-five Korean American shopkeepers . . . killed by non-Korean assailants [in the two years before the Los Angeles riot of 1992].307 And, what is to be done? Rose Hum Lee, writing in 1960, after the Korean conflict had ended but before the Vietnam War, the temporary competitive advantage of Japan, or the national security fears about China and America's Chinese had revived a new yellow peril, thought that "Now is the most auspicious time [for Chinese residing in the United States] to strive for total and unreserved integration into the American society" and put the burden of accomplishing this on the Chinese themselves: "Regardless of where the peoples of the United States of America originated, they must strive to fit in to the new social climate which emerged in American society and the world after World War II."308 Forty years later we can see that such a program, even if it is desirable - and some of the new multiculturalists have registered their dissent from it - has not been effected. Even after being designated as one element of the Asian American "model minority,"309 a veritable role model for other ethnoracial groups experiencing race prejudice, discrimination, and poverty, Chinese Americans discover that in times of crisis they are thrust back into the special category reserved for internal enemies.310 The idea of America, or the entire Occident for that matter, being in peril from the "yellow" people has something of a "geological" character. It is deeply embedded in the Occidental consciousness of itself, a consciousness that, until recently, took "whiteness" to be a fact of nature needing neither an "archaeology" nor a sociological deconstruction,311 and "Orientalism" to be its utter and absolute antithesis.312 It is an all-too-neglected element in the "American dilemma" that, despite numerous efforts over the past half-century, has not been re solved.313 Robert Park once pointed out that "A more thorough investigation of the facts would probably show that minorities, racial, cultural, and national, have always sought the freedom and protection of the more inclusive imperium."314 No doubt this is true, but two questions arise with respect to that claim: How is that freedom and protection to be gained? What forms of social and cultural organization are most conducive to both liberty and security? None of the proposed processual and institutional answers to these questions-assimilation, acculturation, amal gamation, on the one hand; congregation, pluralism, ethnic power, and multiculturalism on the other-has as yet proved either effective or become likely to be fully realized.315 The lair of the yellow peril's fire breathing dragon is to be found in the winding labyrinth of the American psyche. It is one of the "idols" of the American mind in a society that, as Harold Isaacs pointed out so presciently in 1975, is "fragmenting and retribalizing ... at a much more rapid rate, certainly, than [it is] moving toward any more humane kind of humanhood in the arrangement of [its] social and political affairs."316 Asian Americans, not only Wen Ho Lee, are thus waiting for an outcome still unclear and more than likely to be unsatisfying.

# Aff answers

## T/L

### Orientalism is false

#### Attempts to label Orientalism as an effect of all powers takes away from the true origin – modern Europe, which used anthropocentrism, knowledge and liberalism to dominate nature to throw the world into modernity.

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WH: To answer your question, I want to begin with the blurb’s statement that Restating Orientalism is concerned with “re-evaluating,” “deepening,” and “extending” the critique of Orientalism. Let me begin with the last of the trio, “extending,” but let me insert a caveat first. At one level, I could not even begin to extend Said’s critique when he, like almost every scholar engaged in such matters, applies the term indiscriminately, almost to any idea or person writing about anything Islamic, Asian or African. Said erroneously thought that Orientalists are to be found everywhere, from ancient Greece to thirteenth century Latin scholars, to von Grunebaum, Bernard Lewis and their likes in the twentieth century. So it is not true that I extend the critique in any of these directions. If anything, in fact, I limit its diachronic scope, I reign it in, and refuse to accept its sweeping historical coverage. There was no Orientalism before modernity, not even in the high cultures of antiquity who, according to Said, were also “racist.” […] I may even counter by deploying an equally categorical statement: “No matter how ethnocentric and how dominating pre-modern empires all were, none could wed knowledge to power and redefine ethics as our modern empires did and continue to do.”

But how do I extend the critique, which I in fact do? First, in order to show why it is a modern phenomenon, I deepen the exploration into the genealogy of modern knowledge in order to excavate a structure of thought that is – as a hegemonic structure -- unprecedented in human history. Second, because this structure is a foregrounding structure, it obviously did not just sit under the field of Orientalism alone. If the structure foregrounds modern thinking and ways of living in the world, then it radiates onto all disciplines, especially the ones formed by this structure as paradigms. This is the accurate meaning of “expanding the critique” in the blurb. I see engineering, economics, business schools, journalism, law schools, mainstream philosophy, science, medicine, and a host of others as being epistemologically structured in the same manner in which Orientalism was fashioned. The major difference, from this perspective, is the substantive content of each discipline. Orientalism is the most obvious field for the study of the other, even more so than anthropology, and it is here, in Orientalism, where racism, manipulation, control, domination, and sovereignty show themselves most obviously.

My argument, furthermore, is also that showing and practicing sovereignty over a Hindu or a Muslim in Asia is not very different from showing and exercising sovereignty over a tree or a river in the forests of Peru or Ecuador. I call each instance an epistemological “genetic slice” where the totality of such instances amounts to a unique but structured modern attitude toward the world. Said navigated at the political level of racism, pejorative language, and exoticizing the Orient, but could not see that what is involved in the production of Orientalism was nothing short of a deeper, underlying structure of thought from which he could not extricate his own thought.

To critique Orientalism is to critique secular humanism, liberalism, anthropocentrism, materialism, capitalism -- all of which, and more, Said took for granted.

FF: What is the relationship between ‘the west’, modernity, knowledge and power? Could you elaborate on the relationship between orientalism and colonialism?

WH: I think it is important to understand that modernity is not a continuous trajectory with what preceded it. Modernization theory continues unabated in almost every academic field. This theory, foundational to writing and making history, operates on the assumption of what I have labelled a “theology of progress.” The theology is founded on the assumption that time has a homogeneous teleological structure, that this structure is inevitable, and that the earliest phases of history were preparatory for the later ones, which were in turn simply the means to reach the intended summit of real human progress: Western modernity. Integral to this understanding is that no culture or “civilization” outside of and prior to modern Europe possessed the same validity, competence, and moral and intellectual development. Whatever these civilizations had possessed of value, culturally or otherwise, was consumed in the process of preparing for a higher goal, outside and beyond themselves. The goal was Western modernity, which was imposed on the world by colonialism, coercion, and hegemony.

Even if we were to concede—however objectionable and repugnant this may be— that modernity’s violent tools were adopted by necessity with a view to improving the human condition, we find ourselves facing the bitter reality of a world in which we have destroyed almost everything around us, from communal and social structures to ecology and environment.

What many do not seem to understand is that all this is integral to modernity as a particular project, as a particular epistemology which has dictated a particular set of practices, all of which are the work of a particular subject, a particular subjectivity. My argument is that modernity’s structure of thought created a novel relationship between man and nature, one that produced a pathological sense of domination over nature, including our own.

Colonialism did not start in the colonies, but in Europe itself, and this is because early modern Europe embarked on a quest in which knowledge was systematically harnessed to subjugate nature, including our own selves. Orientalism is nothing more than a strand of discourse by which this bleak result was achieved, but every branch of knowledge – philosophy, science, law, etc.– is equally involved in the same project. That modernity now is everywhere in the world should not hide the fact of its European origins. The reader is advised to read the book for a detailed account of how all this happened.

#### **Orientalism is only regarded as dangerous by those who don’t know enough about it, Said’s book is riddled with vengeful bias, and the theory provides incentives for not considering Asian scholarship.**

Owen 12 [Owen, Roger, Roger Owen is the A.J. Meyer Professor of Middle East History at Harvard University and was previously the Director of the university’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies., 4-20-2012, "Edward Said and the Two Critiques of Orientalism," Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/edward-said-and-two-critiques-orientalism]//AA

And so it has been ever since. Orientalism often continues to be regarded as dangerous, perhaps in particular by those who have never read it. Hence, the intense, ludicrous, alarming and, I would hope, unique way in which the field of modern Middle Eastern studies has become polarized between the followers of Edward Said and those of Bernard Lewis and, now between those belonging to the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) and its newly-created rival, the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA). Given the fact that this “dangerous person” Edward Said appeared well-versed, if not in the social sciences then in post-structuralism and in what was soon to become post-colonial studies, meant that the motley band of persons identified as Saidians could all be tarred — regardless of what they actually said, regardless of what they actually taught — with the same brush as being purveyors of politically motivated, trendy, and ideologically dangerous gibberish. Such is the meretricious message which, without much elaboration, and without any obvious mental effort, remains as potent with some audiences as it did 30 years ago. It also is worth noting that the personal tone of the book helped to make things even worse. The author himself, his reasons for writing the book, his genuine offense at the way Arabs and Muslim are objectified in such a reductionist way, is powerfully present in the text. He names names — Bernard Lewis’ in particular. And certain passages are more easily read as political and polemical rather than as scholarly and academic, even if this was almost certainly not Edward’s original intention. All this has had unfortunate consequences. Critics use the personal and the political to muddy the waters, not only of Edward’s critique itself but also of anyone who can reasonably, or unreasonably, be associated with it. Hence it provides a reason for not taking the work of a huge number of scholars of the Middle East with the academic respect it deserves, even when, as in the case of most social scientists at least, their work has little or nothing to do with Orientalism, either in praise or blame. By the same token, it allows those who still practice some version of an Orientalist approach to insulate themselves, and their students, from a powerful, alternative, point of view. More seriously, the ad hominem attacks on Said and his band of alleged Pied Pipers also make it more difficult to sustain an attack on the role of Orientalists in authorizing certain aspects not only of American military and security policy but those of Israel as well. For all the books that castigate the malign influence of the State Department Arabists, none to my knowledge point to the policy impact of Israeli Orientalists as well as to the fact that, even in Israeli terms, their close association with the country’s defense establishment has been counter-productive to what might be described as the country’s national interests. Think of expert authorities like Gabriel Baer, who assured me, in the mid-1970s, that Egypt would never make peace with Israel. Think of those who created and managed the Palestinian “village leagues.” Think of those who supported policies to encourage Hamas during the first Intifada. Think of those who argued that the Shi‘a population could be lured into playing an anti-PLO, anti-Syrian role in South Lebanon. Bad Orientalism encourages the notion that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Bad Orientalism, paradoxically, though based on the concept of a certain Middle Eastern timelessness, authorizes ambitious schemes of political and social engineering based on short-term considerations while lacking any way of anticipating unexpected long-term consequences.

#### Rejecting modernity is wrong – we must develop an external critique that emphasizes ethics to displace the central domains that make up modern civilization

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WH: My short answer is a resounding Yes. I think that the position which argues that one cannot critique modernity from within modernity—necessarily the only place in which we find ourselves— is a nihilistic one. It is both historically and epistemologically untenable. Historically, because every piece of evidence points to the undeniable fact that systems and cultures and “civilizations” are not only in constant change, but they come and go. Modernity came at the heel of European Christendom, just as Islam came at the heel of Persian and Byzantine empires, and Greece before it displaced Pharaonic Egypt and Phoenicia. Each one of these “civilizational constellations” was epistemologically and culturally unique, each with a particular way of seeing the world. To say that modernity is the end of history is sheer foolishness. Epistemologically, because our forms of knowledge have done us a great deal of disservice. To say the least, we have destroyed the very Earth we live on, our home, and this is because we no longer know who we are.

So the question is how do we go about exiting this situation? In Restating Orientalism and [my] new book to appear next year, Reforming Modernity , I argue that our only hope is to develop what I call an external critique, which does not mean that we can speak from outside modernity. To speak from within modernity is inescapable. In my earlier The Impossible State, I developed the concept of central and peripheral domains, both of which must exist in all cultures and “civilizations.” For example, in modernity, the state, capitalism, bureaucracy, and a particular form of reason have become central domains that govern all other domains. These central domains have formed our subjectivities, and made us who we are. My argument is that we can capitalize on the peripheral domains, through an act of heuristic retrieval, in order to displace the central domains. And ethics is one peripheral domain from which we can begin to rethink who we are. In the time and space we have here, I cannot of course tell you what the details and modalities of this project are, but the three works I have referred to above begin this continuing project.

#### **Orientalism is a flawed and contradictory theory**

Landlow 7[(George P Landlow, Oct 23 2007, "Edward W. Said's Orientalism," Professor of English and Art History, Brown University, http://www.postcolonialweb.org/poldiscourse/said/orient14.html)**//BRownRice**](file:///C:\Users\rishishetty\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Word\(George%20P%20Landlow,%20Oct%2023%202007,%20%22Edward%20W.%20Said's%20Orientalism,%22%20Professor%20of%20English%20and%20Art%20History,%20Brown%20University,%20http:\www.postcolonialweb.org\poldiscourse\said\orient14.html)\BRownRice)

Drawing upon the methods of feminist criticism of the 1970s, Said's Orientalism did much to create the field of postcolonial studies by teaching us to "read for the gap," placing texts in broad political contexts. Despite its obviously valid points about weaknesses of Euro-American thought, its appeal for Western intellectuals, and its liberating effect on intellectuals from former countries that were colonized, this seminal book has some major flaws: Though enormously effective as a polemic, Orientalism is very shoddy as scholarship, and yet it presents itself as a corrective to flawed scholarship. The book completely neglects China, Japan, and South East Asia, and it has very little to say about India. Although purporting to be a study of how the West treats all of the East, the book focuses almost entirely upon the Middle East. Its generalizations about "the Orient" therefore repeat the very Orientalism it attacks in other texts! It is bizarrely forgiving of French Orientalist writers like Nerval and Flaubert. Orientalism is an orientalist text several times over, and in two ways commits the major errors involved with the idea of the Other: First, it assumes that such projection and its harmful political consequences are something that only the West does to the East rather than something all societies do to one another. (I am surely not the only teacher who has had heard Asian-American students returning from their parent's country of origin exclaim, "Everything Said says the West does to the East, the East does to the West!") Because Orientalism is apparently based on very little knowledge of the history of European and Non-European imperialism, it treats Western colonialism as unique. This point, like the previous one, makes perfect sense if one takes Said's pioneering book largely as a political polemic, for in that case such omissions might be forgivable. One expects more from criticism and scholarship, particularly politically motivated criticism and scholarship. Although greatly influenced by feminist criticism and theory, Orientalism almost completely neglects gender matters. Although emphasizing the way the West sexualizes the East, it also tends to repeat the pattern, and, moreover, its generally favorable treatment of French orientalization suggests a great insensitivity to such issues, For many scholars, one of Orientalism's most offensive claims was its dramatic assertion that no European or American scholar could "know" the Orient and that, moreover, all scholarly attempts to do so (except Said's own) always constituted acts of oppression. In a single dramatic move, which had great appeal for many, Said committed the greatest single scholarly sin: he silenced others by preventing them from taking part in the debate. According to Said, if someone knew Persian or Tamil grammar, the history of Islam or Hinduism, or the societies of Saudi Arabia, Eygpt, or Bangladesh, he or she already belonged to the devil's party. They were corrupted by what Said defined as Orientalism. For Said, who studied literature at Princeton and Harvard, this proved a very convenient tactic, since he knew very little about these alien fields. Indeed, one of the bitterest charges directed at him was that in his own Orientalist ignorance of the actual Middle East, Said himself in effect suppressed important work by Egyptian and Arabic scholars! Whatever liberatory or other benefits Orientalism might have offered upon its appearance, it has harmed literary studies and literary students. By focusing exclusively on the political valences of literary texts, it has very little to offer those also interested their literary or aesthetic dimensions. Even those with little interest in such non-political themes have been harmed by the school of thought Orientalism has fostered: its political argument, which first enriched familiar texts, impoverishes when it leads to a neglect of literary and rhetorical technique. (Note: Said does not himself argue against acquiring such skills, but those who follow him often do.) Even if all these charges were true (and I believe they are), Said's Orientalism remains a major work. Why do you think this is the case? How is the book larger than the local conditions in which it was produced? Why do the book's strengths, rather than its weaknesses, appear far more important to a scholar working in, say, Morocco, Singapore, or India?

#### Orientalism is a myth that perpetuates the rhetoric that people of the east are barbarians that must me colonized and corrected for the good of the world-it legitimizes violence and gathers public support for it

Joanne Esch 10[Joanne Esch, Ph.D. candidate who specializes in organizational communication and communication practices of law and policy at the university of Boulder Colorado, "Legitimizing the "War on Terror": Political Myth in Official-Level Rhetoric on JSTOR", June 2010, Political Psychology Vol. 31, No. 3, International Society of Political Psychology, https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/20721298?sid=primo, 1LEE]

The myth of Civilization v. Barbarism (also known as the "new barbarism thesis"--see Richards, 1996) and its variations are an outgrowth of the third aspect of the myth of American Exceptionalism: America represents the forces of good against evil. This myth is a classic story of "Us versus Them" that favors cultural or civilizational explanations for conflict over political or economic ones. The myth's central dichotomy appeals to identity and makes it powerfully intuitive. Linguists and anthropologists have noted that language has a binary structure wherein almost every noun, adjective, and verb has a direct opposite. Generally, one term has positive connotations while the other does not, and using one term brings to mind its value-opposite. This underlying architecture of language is relevant to the study of this myth, because it means that either word--civilization or barbarism--alone can conjure the larger body of work on myth. If a speaker talks about the "triumph of civilization," it can be understood that (good) civilization is triumphing over (bad) barbarians (Jackson, 2005). Thus, words that have clear opposites--for example, justice, western, evil, freedom, and hate--are especially powerful lexical triggers of political myth. According to Cap (2005),

The present formula of social communication in the US demonstrates a striking proportion of language which portrays reality in terms of a necessary division into "two," which the latter usually means different and opposing. Such a stance is hence expected of politicians, and non compliance is scarcely tolerated--President Bill Clinton ... got under a massive wave of criticism for being "too conciliatory" in his 1997 State of the Union Address, (p. 14)

This sheds light on the groundwork and intuitive appeal of Civilization v. Barbar ism. Huntington's 1993 thesis, The Clash of Civilizations, and Barber's (1992) Jihad vs. McWorld are reified traces of work on this myth. Today, Civilization v. Barbarism acts as a classic story of "Us versus Them," in which a politically and culturally civilized western world is defined in opposition to a violent and barbaric eastern world. Edward Said (1978) drew attention to this construct in his famous book, Orientalism. The lasting influence of Rafael Patai's (1973) book The Arab Mind is an especially relevant example of (neo-)Orientalism. Patai claimed that psychological and cultural factors intrinsic to the "Arab mind" account for what he described as the violence, stagnation, and backwardness of Arab populations. Such (neo-)Orientalist explanations for violence have served as a sort of pseudo scientific alibi for the Civilization v. Barbarism myth, illustrating the sometimes porous boundary between myth and scientific theory.

Certainly, rhetoric of the time accessed this myth in order to legitimize and justify acts of genocide against Native Americans throughout the eighteenth century. In fact, William McKinley's secretary of state, John Hay, combined the third com ponent of American Exceptionalism with Civilization v. Barbarism when he described the Indian wars as "the righteous victory of light over darkness ... the fight of civilization against barbarism" (qtd. in Judis, 2005, p. 55). Cold War rhetoric also conveyed the myth of Civilization v. Barbarism, and Reagan's rheto ric in particular used the language of "good versus evil." As the discourse and practice of the Cold War reveals, the significance of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union went far beyond politics and economics; it was understood that a Godless "evil empire" was threatening our way of life. Implicit in the Nixon-Khrushchev Kitchen Debate was the idea that the encroachment of the Soviet Union would threaten the commodity-rich lifestyles of average Ameri cans. The discourse around the threat of Communism was largely an exercise in axiological proximization, whereby the evil ideology of the enemy was conveyed as encroaching on everything we know to be good and right. Because of the ideological nature of the Cold War, We and They could not be reliably defined by geopolitical borders; so the myth of Civilization v. Barbarism served as a discursive compensation for blurred boundaries.

George H.W. Bush's public opinion polls and focus groups showed that the public found rhetoric emphasizing axiological considerations such as the "evil" deeds of Saddam Hussein to be more compelling in justifying the Gulf War than rhetoric emphasizing economic reasons, such as jobs and oil (Rottinghaus, 2008). Thus, the legitimization effect of "good versus evil" rhetoric is widely acknowledged.

#### Orientalism isn’t that great of a book

Bijl 22 – Freelance writer/analyst interested in Sino-African and Afrasian relations (Matthijs, “The Remaking of Edward Saïd’s Orientalism”, 3/3/22, Medium, <https://medium.com/@matthijsbijl/the-remaking-of-edward-saids-orientalism-no-postcolonial-critique-c5ea78d232c8>, Accessed 7/16/22)//mackerel

Orientalism is and was known as a controversial work. I can’t comment on scholarly criticism with regard to Saïd’s inferences made from 18th/19th and 20th-century writers, which may or may not sometimes have been incorrectly interpreted or cited. Regardless, there was undeniably some sort of representation constructed and reproduced in literature and by policymakers that had clear racist undertones and was embedded in a strong sense of Western superiority. There are several issues with Orientalism, however, beginning with Saïd’s problematic understanding of representations. The Self vs. Other concept is pretty straightforward, namely that along the passage of time and increasing contacts with and knowledge of other peoples, human societies have felt the need to define themselves in opposition to a fictional Other. This has become a Manichean relationship in which the Self is dependent in its own construction on its representation of the Other. For example, ‘we are civilized because they are barbaric’ or ‘we are good because they are evil’. Saïd criticizes Orientalism as a discourse that has inadequately represented the Orient and thereby constructed and reaffirmed the high notions Western cultures had/have about themselves. In itself, this argument is well-grounded in a review of centuries of Western colonial literature, conquests, and political/economic domination. But Saïd isn’t necessarily concerned with the problems of colonialism. As stated by himself: The Arab world today is an intellectual, political, and cultural satellite of the United States. This is not in itself something to be lamented; the specific form of the satellite relationship, however, is. Saïd’s overriding concern is with an incorrect, and therefore unjust, representation of this Arab world. He decries the “degradation of knowledge” and implores his readers to accept that their conception of the Middle East/Orient is distorted by constructed representations. He urges them to expand their knowledge in order to decrease (and perhaps ultimately break out of) this distortion of knowledge. What he is, seemingly, not concerned with is: (1) how a changing cultural representation of the Orient Other would necessarily impact the representation of the Western Self; (2) how the Orient has represented itself vis-à-vis the West; Saïd claims there is a clear imbalance in the number of works produced in the West on the Orient versus the number of workers produced in the Orient on the West, and one cannot really speak of a self-representation or at the very least a counterweight in that regard; (3) the question whether some sort of representation is inevitable. In the theoretical case a representation of the Other would be entirely ‘native’ and just, would an Other still exist? And would You as a Self continue to exist? As Saïd himself touches upon, an arbitrary division has been made on a variety of artificial categories such as race, which has led to the removal of the universality of humanity. By returning to a state of universal humanity, the fabric of societies might be argued to unravel. People have cared beyond their own family about their community precisely because they have been able to identify with it and in opposition to others. While an understanding of other cultures is necessary and essential, some sort of representation to fit these cultures within one’s own framework appears necessary in order to continue human societies as we know them. Without a Self vs. Other cultural representation, humanity would in its universality return to a family clan-based organization. Or, in other words, it would continue a Self vs. Other representation but now simply based on bloodlines. Orientalism, moreover, boils down to the dictum power is knowledge. This is not unique to Western representations of the Orient, of course, and would extend to every historic relationship in which one culture has exercised political and economic hegemony over another and thereby repurposed representations of the other culture. Saïd merely touches upon this broad application of his critique on cultural representations, failing to see the broader implications and applications of his writing. After all, Orientalism addresses a small circle of academic readers who, for example, are assumed by Saïd to be already well-versed in etymological discussions of the Arabic word tahwra. Saïd’s main goal, in the end, appears to be the awakening of Orientalists who fail to see that their body of knowledge on the Orient is constructed rather than an accurate representation. He is writing for an Occidental audience who can read vast quotations in French and have intimate knowledge of obscure Orientalists. He is not interested in any Oriental readers. Saïd published his work in English and didn’t author its later Arabic translation. He also makes no reference to Oriental representations of itself and the Occident, and ways in which they might have been constituent for Orientalism itself. The adoption of Orientalism as a postcolonial critique is therefore clearly a remaking and incorrect representation of Saïd’s personal and academic intentions and his writing. Saïd is not out to tilt the balance of power in favor of the colonized, he merely intends to make the colonizer understand his colonized object better. He explains how through philology, in combination with other disciplines, representations of the Other/Orient were imbued by racism. Yet for all his detailed descriptions of the clear racism and exploitation of the Orient by the West, Orientalism is no scathing critique of racism, colonialism, or imperialism. Following the publication and subsequent popularity of his work, Saïd and his readers have remade his work to represent such a critique. Note for example the most popular quote of the book on Goodreads: “Every single empire in its official discourse has said that it is not like all the others, that its circumstances are special, that it has a mission to enlighten, civilize, bring order and democracy, and that it uses force only as a last resort. And, sadder still, there always is a chorus of willing intellectuals to say calming words about benign or altruistic empires, as if one shouldn’t trust the evidence of one’s eyes watching the destruction and the misery and death brought by the latest mission civilizatrice.” This quote isn’t from the original edition of Orientalism published in 1978 but is penned down by Saïd in his preface to the 25th-anniversary edition, in 2003. Its anti-imperial/colonial tone is something Saïd actively eschewed in his original work. One can only speculate to the reason (fear of reputation damage in an already close-knit community of academics? Failure to escape from his own Western education?), but it is clear that by 2003 Saïd had remade himself into an advocate of postcolonialism and critic of the West (although he rejects the notion still in 2003 that his book is anti-West). But besides Saïd himself, who now is even considered “a founder of postcolonialism”, Orientalism has been remade by its readers as well into a postcolonial critique. Through the fact it has been simplified and reduced to a mere few sentences in academic teaching, but also through its readers who were especially offended or inspired by its slimmer of revolt against and renunciation of the West and reframed the book in turn through the emotions evoked. If anything, this remaking of Orientalism itself is a vivid display of the way in which a search for scientific objectivity and an uncovering of “truths” is bound to be rendered into representations of this reality. Orientalism as such, as examined and argued by Saïd, is a reflection of this unavoidable reality of representations. One should always be conscious of knowledge being framed and interpreted through various lenses and contexts and attempt to limit this distortion as much as possible, yet also be aware of the boundaries of this exercise for ‘truth’.

#### Orientalism as a theory is full of flaws and contradictions

Elif notes 4/11(Elif Notes, 04-11-2022, "Edward Said’s Orientalism: Various Flaws and Weaknesses," ElifNotes, https://elifnotes.com/edward-saids-orientalism-flaws-and-weaknesses/)**//BRownRice**

Edward Said’s Orientalism is his signature contribution to literary criticism and academic life. The book questions a pattern of misrepresentation of the Orient (East) by the Occident (West). It argues that there had never been a neutral scholarship that studied the Orient. This is because those who were doing the study belonged to the West. This fact exercised colonial power over those being studied. This unequal power relation created the very object of study. It means ’we’ could study ‘them’ because ‘they’ were separated from ‘us’ and subject to ‘our’ rule. The evaluation and critique of Edward Said’s set of beliefs, known as ‘Orientalism’, forms a significant background for postcolonial studies. Besides, it has also given birth to a new sub-discipline—the cultural study of colonialism. However, Edward Said’s Orientalism has various flaws and weaknesses as well. Various literary theorists, anthropologists, historians, and political scientists have often cited as well as criticized it. However, it received strong criticism from academic Orientalists, including some of Eastern background. Edward Said’s Orientalism made a parenthetical statement that ‘the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident’. This statement presents a useful summary of the binary opposition he creates. Nevertheless, here Said acknowledges the obvious opposition of Orient and Occident. Whereas, at various stages in the text, he complicates the issue. He refers to Orient both in opposition to that which is ‘Western’ and also that which is ‘European’. At the same time, neglecting its already established natural antonym. Some Major Drawbacks of Said’s Binary Distinction Between the Orient and the Occident The dualistic definition of the Occidental half of the binary by Edward Said causes a great problem. It is obvious that he uses the two terms apparently interchangeably. Yet, despite the overlapping of definition to some extent, the lack of true synonymy between ‘European’ and ‘Western’ shows that it is no longer explicit what Said is suggesting the Orient (East) to be defined in opposition against. Since this binary construction is crucial to Said’s theory, if it is improperly explained or seems indistinct, the whole theory raises doubt. Said’s binary distinction between the Orient and the Occident further becomes doubtful by his discussion of the commonality of German Orientalism, American Orientalism, and Anglo-French Orientalism. By naming them separately, and in therefore acknowledging a difference as well as a commonality between the three, Said opens up the possibility of the existence of multiple Orientalisms rather than a single unified system of Western thought, which he elsewhere defines Orientalism as being. This concession to divisions within European thought, and further, between European and American thought, highlights the problems of trying to discuss and theories such large terms as Europe and Western. Moreover, Said discusses the problem he claims every writer on the Orient faces. These problems, in his views, are: “how to get hold of it, how to approach it, how not to be defeated or overwhelmed by its sublimity, its scope, its awful dimensions”. However, at the same time, he appears faced with similar problems of the sublimity, scope and dimensions of his terms as he discusses the Occident. EDWARD SAID’S ORIENTALISM: DEFINITION, SUMMARY & ANALYSIS Fractured Unity of Occidental Models in Edward Said’s ‘Orientalism’ As the unity of Edward Said’s Occidental models fractures, his binary system breaks down yet further. The central binary distinction between the Occident and the Orient becomes increasingly complex. For, it becomes more apparent that while we can define Europe and the West in relation to their differences with the Orient, so can we similarly define the West’s component parts in relation to their differences with each other. In this way, the binary opposition upon which Said’s premises his theory is problematic because he has defined it poorly. Moreover, Said theory also appears doubtful because of the reductive nature of the terms he uses. Such reductive tendencies are not only present in his discussion of Europe/the West/the Occident. They also appear to the same degree in his discussion of the Orient. In addition, while Said acknowledges the geographical span of the Orient, “which extended from China to Mediterranean”, and has already discussed the perils of sublimity in writing about the Orient, he nevertheless still seems to forget the cultural and societal span this sweeping labelling of ‘the East’ takes in, and continues to talk about the Orient as a single sublimed entity. Edward Said’s Orientalism Theory: Overshadowed by Improperly Defined Concepts Although Edward Said acknowledges Orientalism as ‘a Western style’. However, he seems to fall too easily into line with the western thought he critiques. He does so by delineating the Orient as a holistic unit because of its exoticism and its ‘otherness’ to the West, instead of any commonality of features within itself. By not seeking enough to define and question the concepts and labels he uses in his discussion, Said falls victim to their reification. This eventually makes Edward Said’s Orientalism theory overshadowed by concepts that he fails to define properly and gain control over. Also, this evidence seems to indicate the necessity of a number of different binaries to fully construct the complex system of interrelationships. These interrelationships are between the various acting nations and people in this discourse, rather than one simple distinction of the West and the East. READ BRIEF SUMMARY OF EDWARD SAID’S ORIENTALISM Major Flaw in Said’s Claim about the Orient’s Silence As we’ve discussed, Said’s often sweeping and reductive nature is explicit to an extent in his problematic use of the terms around which his argument revolves. Another example of such a generalizing tendency in Orientalism appears in his suggestion that: “Orientalism is premised upon exteriority, that is, on the fact that the Orientalist, poet or scholar, makes the Orient speak, describes the Orient, renders its mysteries plain for and to the West”. Another central aspect of Said’s theory is that the knowledge gained about the Orient from representations of it in literature, is crucial to the power the West held over it. In his own words: “Knowledge of the Orient, because generated out of strength, in a sense creates the Orient, the Oriental, and his world”. However, we can see such writers such as William Jones, Warren Hastings, Robert Southey, William Hodges as Said describes. That is, to speak for the Orient, and thus, to create it in the minds of their readers. While, theirs are not the only representations of the Orient that exist. Often cited as an Indian author’s first text in English, The Travels of Dean Mahomet (1794) is quite significant in this regard. An autobiographical book , it is an instance of the exception of Said’s generalized rule of exteriority. Its production and existence is enough to dispute Said’s claim about the Orient being spoken merely from the outside—the West. Mahomet’s work clearly defies Said’s convention. It is an explicit example of a description of the Orient, rendering its mysteries plain and clear for the West, not written by an external ‘Orientalist’, a European poet or scholar travelling in the East. However, its author is an Indian writer who has travelled in and emigrated to Europe. Edward Said’s Orientalism Theory: Based Upon A Generalized & False Assumption Therefore, Edward Said’s Orientalism theory seems based upon a generalized and a false assumption that ‘such an Orient was silent’. Although very much in the minority, the existence of Mahomet’s text rejects Said’s notion of such silence. The book further reveals that it is not the imperial eyes’ that solely created the Orient. However, the representations of the East by the Eastern people also played a role in its creation. Nevertheless, Mahomet is not simply an Indian writer who offers a simple refutation of Said’s claim of exteriority. Instead, since he migrated to Europe, Mahomet is a hybrid figure, as culturally English as he is ethnically Indian. Similarly, his text is a hybrid. Other European Orientalist texts seem to influence it in style and possibly in content. Yet, it is also different due to his different view of events. Although Mahomet’s text doesn’t base on exteriority to the Orient to the same degree as works by contemporaneous writers, neither can seem the work of a completely Oriental insider. It shows that there are certain complexities surrounding Mahomet’s location as a writer. Therefore, his work’s example cannot completely disprove Said’s claim of Oriental exteriority. However, it does highlight the fact that there are elements to Said’s Orientalism that he oversimplifies and doesn’t explore as fully as he might have done. For Said to claim that “Orientalism is premised upon exteriority” is as reductive in its own way as the earlier problems surrounding his definition of the binary opposition of the Orient and the Occident. This is because it is without examination of a character like Dean Mahomet or other recourse to evidence and examples. Conclusion As I’ve demonstrated in the above argument, Edward Said’s Orientalism theory has certain flaws and weaknesses. However, in spite of these flaws and weaknesses, there is a also testament to the importance of Said’s work. That is, it provoked such criticism and debate nearly two decades after its publication.

#### Orientalism is too totalizing of a theory and doesn’t allow us to learn about the Middle East

Jones 8(Johnathan Jones, 5-22-2008, "Orientalism is not racism," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/jonathanjonesblog/2008/may/22/orientalismisnotracism)**//BRownRice**

Romanticised but not out of contempt ... The Snake Charmer by Jean-Léon Gérôme A woman wraps a giant snake around her nude form as north African men in a picturesque variety of costumes look on in J-L Gérôme's 19th century painting The Snake Charmer. She stands on a Turkish carpet; the entire scene is permeated by sexy blue light reflected off a tiled wall. This is the "orient" as imagined by a 19th-century European. You can see why Penguin in the 1980s chose it as a cover image for the paperback of the critic Edward W Said's famous book Orientalism. The appositeness of Orientalism, first published in 1978 and one of the most influential books of the last 30 years, to the present moment is obvious. Writing at a much earlier stage in America's relationship with the Islamic world, Said analysed what he claimed to be certain enduring structures of western thought about the "orient". These structures were established by European intellectuals in the 19th century - he argued - and taken up in the 20th by American scholars. The Orient, he suggests, was a lurid fiction of otherness that afforded westerners a valuable territory of fantasy and desire - as Tate Britain's exhibition, The Lure of the East: British Orientalist Painting, which opens on June 4, will surely illustrate. And yet, this western fascination was in no sense humanising. Orientalism, he argues, produced not real understanding but knowledge that was power: the racist claim to omniscience summed up by one of his chapter headings, "Knowing the Oriental". Advertisement Let me be frank. I think Orientalism is more than just a bad book. It is a bad book that legitimates bad politics. It is a great wedge of dishonesty that has begat a great mountain of ignorance. It is a treason of the clerks, an intellectual fraud that justifies bigotry and hatred. Said's book licenses the claim that any and all statements by westerners about the Middle East can be dismissed as worthless and racist. Anything a European says about a range of subjects from the Pyramids of Giza to the stories of Sinbad the Sailor to the nature of Islamic art can be assumed from the start by readers of Orientalism to be orientalist - or latterly, Islamophobic. In fact, the very writers and scholars analysed by Said tell a different story. One of the first works of Orientalism that he discusses is the vast Description of Egypt, ordered by Napoleon and researched by a team of French scholars whose work was eventually published in a series of monumental volumes by 1828. From this staggering work, Said quotes no more than a paragraph of its preface. In this one paragraph, he finds evidence that Napoleon's scholars saw Egypt as a theatre of colonial power. In fact, the paragraph, itself fairly anodyne, looks irrelevant when you examine the Description as a whole with its meticulous drawings of stingrays and snail shells and careful records of engineering machinery used to pump water from the Nile, ploughing techniques, and costumes. Can all this be lumped together as one colossal discourse about a fictional Orient? Was Napoleon saying Egyptians were like fish? Advertisement The real story here, that Said reveals against his intentions, is the remarkable fact that Europeans and Americans in the 19th century knew more about the cultures of the Middle East than we do now. They read the Tales of the 1001 Nights and dreamt of the Alhambra. Was this just a complacent Imperialist celebration of power, based on the contrast between nostalgia for the great Oriental past and contempt for the Arab present? No, I think there was real curiosity and admiration. But where has it gone? Today the west is bleakly incurious about the history of Islam, its art, peoples and learning. There's a blank wall of terror. This wall has been strengthened by Said's book because it closes down a crucial way for cultures to encounter one another: it closes down romanticism. The first time I visited Granada and walked through the stucco-laden, tile-glistening rooms of the Alhambra, I had no doubt this triumph of medieval Moorish architecture was the most beautiful building I had ever seen. I also reached quite naturally for "orientalist" metaphors to describe it to myself - in short, I felt like I was riding on a magic carpet. I still think that's a reasonable way to evoke in words the feeling of lightness the Alhambra creates. To see - and love - Islamic art in this way is not a style of contempt. It is not patronising. It is not racist, and it is the very opposite of Islamophobic. In censoring such longings, Said's book has for 30 years helped to ensure that white Europeans and Americans become progressively more ignorant of the Islamic world. It is a modern classic - of fear and loathing.

### AT: Orientalism- Said’s“Ideal type”

#### Said’s narrative of Orientalism contains a damaging paradox in which he seeks to reject typification of “the orient” yet himself typifies European civilization as an “Ideal Type”, an agent of Orientalism creating an essentialist simplification

Sara R. Farris 10[Sara R. Farris, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Goldsmiths, University of London , "AN ‘IDEAL TYPE’ CALLED ORIENTALISM",7-19-2010, Taylor & Francis, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/1369801X.2010.489701, 1LEE]

The ‘whole impulse to classify nature and man into types’ (Said 2003: 119), for Said, was one of the elements that prepared the way for modern Orientalist structures. ‘In natural history, in anthropology, in cultural generalization, a type had a particular character which provided the observer with a designation and, as Foucault says, “a controlled derivation”’ (ibid.). Said goes on to list such designations: ‘the wild men’, ‘the Europeans’, ‘the Asiatics’ and so on. The practice of classification, as Said recognized, became crucial to sciences, both natural and social. However, in the field of the social sciences and humanities it resulted in the assembly of human/cultural types, thus producing stereotyped images of cultural collectivities. As we have seen, Said acknowledged that Max Weber's ideal types played a central role both in shaping the ways in which classification was employed by European – but also North American – social sciences and in assembling non-western cultures and individuals into Orientalized types.

Said was thus very insightful when he recognized a certain instrumental and summational function of the notion of the ideal type. Its main problem and dangerousness, for Said, lay in the nature of the ideal type itself, as a way of simplifying and naturalizing the Other (especially the Oriental Other) as an articulation of a geographical, historical and sociopolitical entity with immutable traits. He also recognized the pervasiveness of this notion in contemporary intellectual work. As he writes, ‘still, the notion of a type – Oriental, Islamic, Arab, or whatever – endures and is nourished by similar kinds of abstractions or paradigms or types as they emerge out of the modern social sciences’ (Said 2003: 61, my italics).

The characteristics of ideal types as the modalities and the outcomes of conceptualization and classification proper to social sciences are the result of Weber's epistemological presuppositions. Ideal types express Weber's neo-Kantian conception of the relationship between reality and knowledge in which the former is a meaningless infinity in constant change, to which human beings give their own meanings, and the latter is the rigorous, disciplined capacity of the scientist to put some order in this chaos. The ideal type

is a conceptual construct which is neither historical reality nor even the ‘true’ reality. It is even less fitted to serve as a schema under which a real situation or action is to be subsumed as one instance. It has the significance of a purely ideal limiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant components. (Weber 1949: 93)

The ideal type thus appears as a ‘telescope’ or a ‘yardstick’ (Mommsen 1974) used in order to comprehend reality.

Within Max Weber's comparative studies on world religions, the method of the ideal type functions as a tool for the ‘conceptualization’ and ‘classification’ of different social phenomena by means of focusing upon a specific point of view, or ‘perspective angle’. Thus Weber applied it in his historical comparative studies in order to classify religious prescriptions regarding economic activity into ‘types of economic ethics’, and came up with a typification of different societies as those geoculturally and geopolitically unified constellations that Said criticized as essentialist and stereotyped.

Each of Weber's studies on Weltreligionen thus leads to the formulation of types of ‘civilizations’ that in the end seem to be assumed as uniform and static. As a result, as many subsequent critics have emphasized, the variables ‘time’ and ‘history’ are cancelled from these unifying/essentializing ideal types (Fischoff 1944; Robertson 1933). Even Parsons had to admit that Weber ‘tended to treat typical motives … as rigidly unchangeable entities [and] used ideal types to atomize his material into rigid units which could only be combined and recombined in a mechanistic way or absorbed into higher-order patterns’ (Parsons 1963: lxiv).

Said, on the other hand, although he does not offer such an extensive methodological reflection as Weber, refers explicitly to Foucauldian concepts of discursive formations in methodological terms. Nonetheless, several criticisms of the same kind as those addressed to Weber's ideal types have also been made of Said's multifaceted definition of Orientalism (Clifford 1988; Porter 1994). The tendency towards a certain semantic shifting in his definition of Orientalism and the association between very different authors who belonged to very different countries and epochs are aspects of Said's work that have been criticized precisely because of a certain ultimate disregard for the variable ‘history’. As Porter has argued, ‘[Said] fails to historicize adequately the texts he cites and summarizes, finding always the same triumphant discourse where several are frequently in conflict’ (1994: 160).

We could go further by noting many more similarities between Said's discourse and Weber's ideal type. Orientalism shares with Weber's notion of the ideal type the one-sided viewpoint of departure and focus that implies the choice of what aspects or objects can enter into the definition (or class). Thus, Said chose to focus on British, French and American Orientalism, while leaving aside other writings. Like Weber's ideal type, Orientalism tries to view with the same ‘telescope’ centuries of history and the most disparate writings and authors, thus often risking annihilating history and dehistoricizing the object of investigation. Similarly, Weber and Said share an attitude of beginning the classification with the purpose of providing a historical account of the object under investigation (namely, the origin of the spirit of capitalism in Weber, and the origin of Orientalism in Said), thus attempting to find its starting point. In a further moment, however, this point is then lost in the beginning of human history. In Weber it was to be the sixteenth century of the Reformation, but then became the beginning of rationalization in its march from pre-Christian history right up until the disenchantment of the world in Protestant Europe. In Said, Orientalism at one stage is the discourse constructed ‘politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period’ (Said 2003: 3) and then progressively goes back to the Middle Ages with Dante Alighieri and then to that virtual place that Said calls ‘imaginative geography’, which makes us set arbitrary boundaries according to a ‘universal practice of designating in one's mind a familiar space which is “ours” and an unfamiliar space beyond “ours” which is “theirs”’ (53–9).

In the end, and at a more substantial level, the central similarity between Weber's ideal types of Oriental civilizations and Said's ideal type of Orientalism lies in their very content: in their geopolitical and geocultural ‘nature’ as immutable and determining traits. The mere fact of belonging to them affects ideas, cultural and intellectual practices and identities. We might recall that by ‘Orientalism’ Said means, among other things, ‘European culture’ and ‘Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient’ (Said 2003: 3). Thus the Orientalist discourse belongs to ‘Europe’ and the ‘West’ as autonomous entities, and it ends up being the ideal type of the attitude adopted by westerners towards the Orient, in a pure geocultural, crystallized fashion. Said's (and several postcolonials’) tendency to treat Orientalism as a geographical and ‘civilizational’ entity has been brilliantly highlighted by Fernando Coronil (1996) and Neil Lazarus (2002). The former notes how ‘typical markers of collective identities, such as “territory”, “culture”, “history” or “religion” appear as autonomous entities … [and] as with commodities, the material thing-like, tangible form of geographical entities becomes a privileged medium to represent the less tangible historical relations among peoples’ (Coronil 1996: 77). As a consequence, the Orientalist typifying or summational attitude, strongly criticized by Said for the generalizations and essentialization of the non-western territories and cultures it provided, is the expression of a territorial entity itself, a territorial entity which in turn has been unified and generalized by Said in a common type: European culture.

Said was certainly correct to identify in the European social sciences dealing with non-western societies and in particular Weber's ideal types the danger of essentialist simplification that, at its core, was informed by a Eurocentric attitude. Nonetheless, when he accused Eurocentrism of essentializing non-western societies, of neutralizing their internal differences and their history, of addressing artificial entities such as the ‘Orient’ or ‘Islam’ and the like, he himself ran the risk of an essentialist simplication. This is to say that he committed the error of adopting a similar conceptual structure in relation to Europe or the West, conceived as geographical, geopolitical, geocultural abstract categories.

Beyond Orientalism

As Said clearly recognized, the most important task of all would be that of undertaking ‘studies in contemporary alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or a non-repressive and non-manipulative, perspective’ (Said 2003: 24). This is certainly a difficult task, for which answers on the level of meta-reflection – epistemological and/or methodological – seem to be inadequate and misleading.21 Said was well aware of the importance of such a task; indeed, his critique of the manipulative and repressive depictions produced by European scholars during centuries of uneven relations between the West and the East was designed precisely in order to open the space for such non-repressive perspectives. Nonetheless, while conducting this critique, he employed a methodological and theoretical apparatus much closer to that which he criticized than he thought.

The concept of discursive formation, used by Said in order to describe Orientalism both as the discourse produced by colonial rulers and as the discourse that performatively produced them, recalls Weber's analysis of the active dimension of the relationship between religion and political power. This pattern of thought seems to affect also their reciprocal anti-Marx (and anti-Marxist) critique, as well as a certain epistemic ambiguity according to which representation is never, and can never be, ‘objective’ or ‘true’. At the same time, both affirm that the task of the intellectual is to speak ‘truth’ to power and politics. In this way, the realm of politics becomes the locus in which determining decisions that ‘truly’ act upon reality can be made.

Yet, in the last instance, the decisive affinity between Weber and Said lies in the way in which both conceptualized their object of enquiry: Said, not less than Weber, produced an ‘ideal type’ of the West as the geographical, geocultural and geopolitical agent of Orientalism. However, while the formulation of a ‘civilizational’ and ‘geocultural’ ideal type was precisely Weber's goal, in his search for the origin of Europe's accomplishments in comparison to the East, Said's goal was that of demolishing this ‘civilizational’ attitude that, according to him, helped to immortalize the Orient as the static, geocultural entity thus depicted by European writers. The conceptual coordinates that he employed for his analysis, however, arguably run the risk of unwittingly reinforcing such ‘civilizational’ attitudes.22

This internal paradox strongly weakens Said's critique, not only in intellectual terms, as a source of contradictions or incoherence, but especially on the level of what his critique aimed to be: that is, an instrument for the pursuit of studies not affected by a manipulative and repressive perspective. If the origin of this manipulative perspective is thought to lie in a sort of geographical entity, or immutable ‘cultural’ essence (regardless of whether it is the European or the Oriental), it obviously becomes much more difficult, if not impossible, to produce a counter-non-manipulative perspective from within.23 Said's critique has been important for the humanities and social theory as a stimulus for rethinking some foundational categories and in terms of disciplining a certain politico-theoretical ‘arrogance’. The time has perhaps come, however, to rethink the terms of this critique itself, if we are to find a way to move beyond the ‘ideal type’ – and reality – that lies at the heart of Orientalism.

## FW

### T/L

#### **A relational approach to digital sovereignty centering the national Self and its Other is key**

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What is to be gained from a relational approach to digital sovereignty? This article argued that centering the relationship between the national Self and its Others in the analysis of national digital sovereignty elucidates why and how it emerges and develops. This argument bridges two established claims from constructivist theories of culture and technology. One is that national identity as articulated and propagated by governing elites guides the state’s technological program. Another is that identity is an inherently relational category that is maintained through continuous boundary making between the Self and its Others. Taken together, these claims indicate that it is analytically productive and sometimes imperative to attend to relational dynamics between the national Self and its Others to grasp the logics of digital sovereignty. To illustrate this proposition, this article traced how Estonia’s cultural constructions of its Russian and Western Others shaped the contours of its digital sovereignty. It showed that Estonia’s digital initiatives, which are often couched in technofuturistic postnational discourse, are meant to reaffirm Estonia’s sovereign territorialized existence within the Euro-Atlantic community.

Whereas this article examined digital sovereignty as an elite political project manifested in highlevel official discourses and institutions, the relational lens’s theoretical and methodological versatility opens the door for diverse scholarly approaches to digital sovereignty. Ethnographies of infrastructure, for example, can investigate Self-Other dynamics in the everyday workings of digital sovereignty, what cultural anthropologist of technology Alix Johnson (2021) conceptualizes as the “mechanics of sovereignty.” This approach treats sovereignty as a process of material construction and explores its constitutive people and practices. Lorraine Kaljund (2018), for instance, draws on participant observation and interviews with the developers of a recent e-Estonia initiative, data embassy, to explore how this team embeds ethnocentric Estonian statehood into the project’s software, code, and policy.

Another dimension to consider is domestic power struggles over competing constructions of Otherness and technology. Analyses of debates and decision making surrounding digital sovereignty, particularly the use of Othering to legitimize one’s technological agenda, illuminate how and why some ideas but not others become state rhetoric and policy. The official e-Estonia narrative retroactively frames Estonia’s digital turn as a self-evident response to Soviet occupation and a reflection of ethnic Estonians’ natural predisposition toward technology. Yet, when Estonia’s ruling coalition first promoted the project of digital transformation in the early 1990s, as part of their Western-oriented ethnocentric platform, it was not uniformly supported across the political spectrum. How did e-Estonia become political dogma, the questioning of which is seen as tantamount to undermining Estonia’s Euro-Atlantic credentials and benefiting Russia? Detailing national technopolitical struggles would help show digital sovereignty as always a product of political contention, including over membership in the national imagined community.

Further, sociological approaches might explore how Self-Other dynamics manifest within the circles directly involved in the making of digital sovereignty. Historically, dominant ethnic and political elites excluded their Others from creating and enjoying technological innovation on par with the privileged group (Edgerton, 2006, pp. 131–136). Scholars of e-Estonia note that the country’s digital elite—entrepreneurs, developers, policy makers—remain almost exclusively ethnically Estonian (Kattel & Mergel, 2019, p. 147) and that national digitization does not benefit the social and professional standing of ethnic Estonians and Russians equally (Drechsler, 2018, p. 13). In Estonia and elsewhere, future research could employ the relational lens in examining the structural barriers to participation in the making of digital sovereignty and the consequences of such representational imbalances.

Specific manifestations of Self-Other dynamics on digital sovereignty will vary across national contexts. The analytical task of the relational approach is to discover and conceptualize Others and then empirically demonstrate their material significance for digital sovereignty. Beyond the nation-state, the relational approach potentially applies to other types of digital sovereignty conceptualized by scholars, such as municipal, personal, indigenous, corporate, and others.

### Essentialism DA

#### Essentialism DA: Said’s analysis of hegemonic discourses creates a binary of East and West which serves to uphold the very westernism he criticizes – takes out any links to hegemony too

Potter 19(Naomi Potter, Orientalism: in review, Jan 15, 2019, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lseupr/2019/01/15/orientalism-in-review/)**//BRownRice**

Said’s essentialising of the Western scholars does not constitute the start and end of his problems in Orientalism. Turning to Said’s (mis)use of Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony can help us to illustrate instances of essentialism in categories of East and West in Orientalism which goes beyond Western scholars. Said draws on the role of hegemony, the presence and construction of ‘certain cultural forms which dominate over others’ (2003: 6-7) in order to demonstrate how Orientalism managed to take a sustained position as the hegemonic discourse, being internalised by Western and Eastern cultures alike. However, Said does not explore the concept fully, in particular he fails to offer the necessary depth in Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as distinct from those such as Hegel and Marx. For Gramsci, hegemony, unlike mere domination, is not something held over another group but rather the result of complex interplay of societal forces and groups (Stein and Swedenburg, 2004: 9-10). Hence, Gramsci had a unique focus on the active nature of counter-hegemony in history: its role in the ‘war of positions’ which helps to determine the character of the hegemonic forces (Chalcraft and Noorani, 2007). A complete Gramscian analysis of hegemony would therefore offer great depth in studying counter-hegemonic forces as active, autonomous agents in terms of their role, position and culture (ibid.). There seems to be a distinct lack of reference to such agency of subaltern groups in Said’s work (Ahmad, 1992: 108). Given the time in which Said was writing and the proliferation of such forces this does not seem acceptable. For instance, James McDougal illustrates the influence that religio-cultural resistance of Islamic Algerians had on French colonial policy and the distinctive practice by which the French ruled; such as citizenship policies regarding the settlers vis-à-vis the colonized (Chalcraft and Noorani, 2007, 49-66). These Islamic liberation forces such as the Association of Algerian Muslims had been active for decades before Orientalism was published (ibid: 56). Said misses the importance of the agency of counter-hegemonic forces in terms of the nature and force of hegemony itself. This has the unfortunate impact in his work of reflecting a specific idea of the eastern world as passive and incapacitated, paradoxically leading to the assumption he wants to criticise: that of an eternally distinct and less powerful Eastern region. The essentialist implications of Said’s misuse of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony do not end here, however. Hegemony does not concern just polarized forces but also the way in which it persists in culture within society at large. Said often refers in his work to the role of literature and culture, however, in this exploration he neglects to consider the many different forms in which culture is constructed, beyond the dominating group itself. Melman, in observing the role of women in constructing parts of the Oriental narrative, highlights how ‘Europe’s attitude towards the Orient was neither unified nor monolithic’ (1992: 7). In particular, she turns to the role of women from the West in depicting Eastern regions. The perspectives of these women often included more richer self-criticism towards cultural superiority. Gramsci’s account of hegemony necessarily involves an extension of analysis to include this intersectional group who are a subset of the bloc of Europeans who explored, observed and studies the Middle East in the colonial period. In ignoring the role of women in the construction of Western hegemony Said makes uncritical assumptions about the core features of Western culture, locating them in the writings of academics throughout history and thus essentialising the notion of the ‘West’ as a perpetually dominating and uniform region of the world. Conclusion Said’s failure to fully utilise the theoretical richness of the theories and concepts which lay the foundations for his account led him to essentialise the categories of East and West in Orientalism. Firstly, in using historical methodology, Said obscures his attempts at a Foucauldian discourse analysis generating a historical account which does not do enough to interrogate the mechanisms by which Orientalism comes about, seemingly presupposing their existence in Western scholarly writing. Furthermore, this is only made worse by his neglect of important aspects of the building of hegemonic discourses which leads him to simplify both Western and Eastern cultural production, making uncritical assumptions about their core features of these categories and the extent of variation within them. Both these errors lead to a paradoxical account from Said as his intentions were not only to avoid such essentialist narratives but also to critique them. Despite these intentions however his treatment of East and West does suffer due to his theoretical shortcomings leading to essentialist construction of the categories.

### Binary DA

#### **Orientalism causes the problems it attempts to prevent by exacerbating divisions between the east and west**

Owen 12 [Owen, Roger, Roger Owen is the A.J. Meyer Professor of Middle East History at Harvard University and was previously the Director of the university’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies., 4-20-2012, "Edward Said and the Two Critiques of Orientalism," Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/edward-said-and-two-critiques-orientalism]//AA

Back to the Social Sciences When it comes to the immediate reception of Edward’s work, it was not only many Orientalists, or near-Orientalists, who were upset but also many well versed in what they regarded as a progressive science of society. This certainly applied to persons such as Harry Magdoff, the New York editor of the Monthly Review, who asked me to review Orientalism, a book about which he had very mixed feelings. It was also true of colleagues such as Fred Halliday, who argued that Orientalism could easily be read as creating an irreconcilable division between East and West, thereby undermining one of the basic features of our universalistic approach. No less telling was Fred’s second argument that, for many peoples of the Middle East in the 1970s, works by the scholars Edward defined as Orientalists were sometimes the only source of data for understanding large parts of their own national history. Al-Azm was to make the same point only a few years later. Several enormously important implications follow. The first is that we need the social sciences in Middle East studies not just for their own sake, but also to be able to continue to make use of works by persons we regard as Orientalists, though without falling prey to their assumptions and reductionism. This is the more significant as our own thinking contains either unexamined assumptions from the Orientalist period or, at the very least, questions which we cannot help students to answer properly because we do not know how to frame them or where to look for answers. A good example of this is what used to be called Islamic legal studies, studied only through certain canonic texts, and posited on the notion that the master story was one in which modern legal codes imported tout court from the West quickly supplanted so-called traditional Shari‘a law, confining it simply to the area of personal status.

### AT: Digital Orientalism

#### Digital orientalism is not the driver behind hardline US foreign policy against China – American trust in the technological leadership of other Asian countries such as South Korea prove that it isn’t orientalism but rather the existential security threat from Chinese hacking and intellectual theft that necessitates US action.

Moore ‘22 [Gregory J. Moore; Professor of Global Studies and Politics, Colorado Christian University; 6-3-22; “Huawei, Cyber-Sovereignty and Liberal Norms: China’s Challenge to the West/Democracies”; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-022-09814-2#Sec4; accessed 7-19-2022; AH]

Said’s orientalism construct [26] is an important contribution to the study of colonialism, post-colonial thought, international relations and sociology. There is no reason to challenge it here. It’s application to the digital realm is an interesting and important one. The premise of the editors of this special issue is that the West expected China to evolve into a liberal democracy, but that this has not happened, and moreover this (from the West’s perspective “fundamentally illegitimate”) power has been able to increasingly compete head to head with the US and the West in military, political, economic and technological terms, and this has created deep fear among Western/democratic leaders. Fear is a key part of this orientalist narrative. The argument is that it is fear of this digital, political and cultural other that drives a tough US, Australian, British (for example) policy toward China, and drives a harsh stand toward Huawei. To set this up in a cause and effect framework, then digital orientalism is the independent variable that causes fear in the US and others towards China, that brings about the dependent variable, harsh policies toward China and Huawei specifically. What this would mean is that other factors would not explain the dependent variable, the harsh US/Western policy toward Huawei. The question we will pose here is, is this correct? There are several potential problems with this argument. First, establishing that fear is an independent variable is not easy. Despite the quality of their work generally speaking, the editors have not done the thick description necessary to establish this. Simply showing tough rhetoric, hawkish views on the US/Western/democratic side (which are indeed there), does not really do the job effectively. Second, we haven’t considered counterfactuals or ruled out other methods that might test our hypothesis or do a better job explaining the outcome we observe (the harsh US/Western policy toward Huawei) than the proposed independent variable, digital orientalism. Following on from this point, I would propose a consideration of the hypothesized independent variable, “China and Huawei pose credible threats to national security of the US and other democracies” as a way to understand the approach the US, Australia, the UK and others have taken toward Huawei. Securitization provides a way of looking at this issue that is helpful in this case. As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde [3: 25] put it, Securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects…The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? There can be no doubt that in the United States, Australia, India and other countries, Huawei’s 5G offerings have been securitized, and this is evident by the “discourse and political constellations” in those and other countries, as I’ve illustrated above. Yet why hasn’t this been the case in all countries? As Buzan et al. note, referencing the work of Arnold Wolfers [3: 30], security threats may be objective/real, or subjective/perceived, and where the twain meet or diverge is not always easy to ascertain. It is possible that A. China’s Huawei is acting as a threat in some countries and not in others. It’s also possible that B. China’s Huawei and its 5G are a threat wherever they operate but some countries don’t yet understand that or don’t believe it. It’s also possible that C. Huawei and its 5G are not a threat and have simply been socially constructed as a threat, needlessly securitized. The notion that digital orientalism is the reason for the securitization of Huawei and its 5G would line up with the last tack, or C. The argument presented here, however, is that digital orientalism does not explain the US/Western/democratic response to China’s growing illiberal impact on global internet governance or its worrisome presence, via Huawei, in more and more national 5G internet infrastructure schemes. On the contrary, the hypothesis posed here is something like B. above, that real security concerns do, that the securitization of Huawei is not an irrational response to Huawei 5G because of 1. some of Huawei’s actions/track record, 2. the nature of its relations with the Chinese state, and 3. the track record or broader actions (now and in the past) of that Chinese state at home and abroad as it regards media freedoms, intellectual property theft, human rights problems, and more. Having said this, digital (or conventional) orientalism may be lurking in the background and exacerbating technological and political dynamics. I suspect it is. The editors are likely not incorrect in that sense, for certainly there is a sense that China represents a “digital other,” a “political other” and a “cultural other” for Westerners and Liberals in general, and the notion of digital orientalism may explain certain aspects of that. At the same time, the argument presented here is that a careful study of China’s practices in the cyber-realm, whether at home or abroad,Footnote9 make it clear that there are very clear security-centric reasons for concern about China’s and Huawei’s presence in 5G internet infrastructure construction, mobile phone handset production, and even Chinese apps like TikTok and WeChat, which India has banned, and both of which the Trump Administration tried but failed to ban in the US. US, Australian, British, Swedish and other countries’ increasingly robust pushback against Huawei and other Chinese players in the construction of global 5G infrastructure can be easily understood by studying A. China’s cyber practices at home and abroad, and B. the impact they have on the security (and perceptions of security) of nations they work with. Very simply, those pushing back see what China is doing, they don’t like it, and they don’t want Chinese companies to have any major role in constructing telecommunications infrastructure inside their countries. This is because they believe they know what that will lead to, and they don’t believe that is good from their perspectives. If China/Huawei was a player like Nokia, Ericsson or Samsung, the US and these others would not be raising alarms. In fact, the US, Australia and UK have not been raising alarms about Nokia, Ericsson or Samsung, the other major players in 5G. Why? Is it digital orientalism? In fact, given that Samsung is Korean, one might expect the US to push back against Samsung, for it too is “oriental,” non-Western, following the logic of Said. We don’t really see that, however. South Korea is a democratic polity and a US ally, so there is no angst on Washington’s part, no concerns about security. Moreover, the South Korean government does not have a history of stealing US IPR, of spying on the US as China has been, or doing anything that could be considered a national security threat toward the US, so there has been no pushback from Washington in the face of Samsung’s growing presence in the US or in US 5G operations. Some argue that the US simply refuses to yield the number one spot to anyone, whether in technology or in economic dominance. Yet if the US was pushing back against Huawei because the US wanted to be number one, because the US wanted to dominate, why wouldn’t the US fund AT&T, Apple, Google or someone else in the US to be number one? Why wouldn’t the US hinder the advances of Nokia, Ericsson and/or Samsung in the US and elsewhere? We don’t really see any of that, however. Digital orientalism doesn’t really explain this, in this case. I will argue here that it’s because first, American thinkers do not think in such hierarchical terms as their Chinese counterparts do (they aren’t unified in an obsession with being number 1 as is the case with the Chinese state and its companies; see [18]. Second, the US is not pushing back against Huawei primarily because of market imperatives/motivations, but rather because of concerns about security and lack of trust in the Chinese state and Chinese companies that are subject thereto. The US trusts the leadership of Nokia, Ericsson and Samsung, and they don’t see their home governments (Finland, Sweden and South Korea, respectively) as bent on spying, stealing IPR and undermining free expression at home and increasingly around the world. It’s about the Chinese state’s very bad track record of stealing intellectual property, of suppressing free expression, of cyber-surveillance and hacking, of suppressing truth and suppressing dissidents – increasingly not only inside China but abroad as well.Footnote10 Pushing back against Huawei and China’s cyber-sovereignty model has become an existential fight for those who see things in the way I have depicted here. In a telling statement by former Obama National Security Advisor Susan Rice to Canada’s CBC about the security threat Huawei posed to Canada and others, Rice said,

## Link

### No China Link

#### **The China threat is real – any notions that suggest otherwise are equally orientalizing – turns the K**

Dicicco et. Al 20(Jonathan M. Dicicco, Ja Ian Chong, Tadeusz Kugler, Jack S. Levy, J. Patrick Rhamey Jr., Yuan-Kang Wang, AyŞE Zarakol, Steve Chan, November 9 2020 "Roundtable 12-2 on Thucydides’s Trap? Historical Interpretation, Logic of Inquiry, and the Future of Sino-American Relations," H-Diplo | ISSF, https://issforum.org/roundtables/12-2-thucydides)**//BRownRice**

Indications exist that the Xi leadership may be less satisfied with the status quo than Chan claims given that current PRC actions push up against not only the United States and Taiwan. South Korea reported economic punishment from China as a result of the deployment of a missile defense system to guard against possible North Korean attacks and repeated dangerous behavior by Chinese fishing vessels.[8] Japan expressed concern over increased naval and aerial activity by PRC assets in and over contested areas.[9] Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam indicate growing PRC harassment of their fishing and other civilian vessels in the South China Sea, which is notable given that Indonesia and the PRC do not have overlapping territorial claims.[10] Then there are tensions along the Sino-Indian border that recently resulted in deadly clashes between Indian and Chinese troops.[11] Current PRC behavior is worrisome for regional actors in other ways as well. Australia reports economic pressure for not conforming to Beijing’s preferences on pushing for an open investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and complaining about PRC efforts to influence its internal politics.[12] Along with Canada, Australia saw citizens detained and charged for illegal activities under suspicious circumstances.[13] Singapore too faced Chinese state pressure over its insistence on adherence the rule of law over the arbitration over the South China Sea brought by the Philippines against the PRC.[14] That such issues do not receive more treatment by Chan is curious since they raise questions about PRC’s commitment to self-restraint and can potentially trigger the chain-ganging effects on U.S.-China ties that Chan warns readers about (21-22, 211-215). Such friction can potentially harden positions and raise the stakes over an issue such that prevailing becomes more tied to status and other concerns, driving more aggressive and even revisionist behavior.[15] Chan’s finding that misplaced worries about the PRC and its intentions stem in part from misunderstandings of perspectives on international politics that are informed by theories from “the West” rather than China deserves elaboration and debate. So-called “Western” international relations theories often have parallels in the Chinese tradition, broadly construed. Work analyzing Spring and Autumn, Warring States, Song, and Ming documents indicate that the strategic thought that is prominent in these periods closely resembles statecraft familiar to those in the contemporary “West.”[16] Texts as varied as the Han-era annals Records of the Grand Historian and the Ming-era fiction Romance of the Three Kingdoms will suggest the same.[17] Parallels between “Western” and “Chinese” approaches to politics are unsurprising. Several millennia of collective human experience, thought, and debate over statecraft, conflict, as well as governance are almost certainly bound to produce similarities in responses. Dividing the world into “Western” and “Chinese” views of the world ignores the fact the PRC has disagreements with ostensibly “non-Western” polities such as India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, each with their own distinct philosophical traditions.[18] Also, despite sharing cultural origins, people in the PRC and on Taiwan disagree fundamentally issues of political values and rights, not the relatively simple issues of who should rule China or what a Chinese state should entail geographically.[19] Moreover, the PRC’s ruling Chinese Communist Party draws at least some of its inspiration from European thinkers in the form of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. Successive dynasties from historical China also proved themselves very adept at conquest—that is how regimes and empires get built.[20] Attributing tensions between the United States and PRC to culture suggests an overly monolithic view of the rich and varied philosophical and political traditions both major powers draw from, giving them less credit than is due.[21] To claim that contemporary international scholarship and U.S. policy are unable to adequately understand China because they are “Western” may oversimplify the nature and seriousness of problems dogging U.S.-China relations and their consequences for the world. Relegating difference to culture is not only Orientalizing, it can encourage a misplaced expectation that understanding can bring some sort of happy, mutually acceptable outcome. Perhaps Beijing and Washington understand each other well. They simply disagree fundamentally over values and interests in ways that make finding mutually acceptable accommodation increasingly difficult. This does not have to imply that either side is morally superior or normatively “better” than the other, just that understanding provides little promise for improving relations and avoiding confrontation. Better accounting for such possibilities invites fuller consideration of the roles that agency and contingency play in major power relations, two features that Chan clearly identifies as critical in the volume. Thucydides’s Trap? deserves much credit for grappling with important, pressing, and difficult questions about the drivers behind the downturn in U.S.-China relations and possible ways to address this slide. Yet, Chan’s outlook is more similar to Graham Allison’s than he initially lets on. Allison’s call for creative statecraft is possible only if the United States and China are not locked in a structural situation which neither can escape or beset by contingent circumstances that prevents Washington and Beijing from effectively exercising the agency Chan believes is central. Chan offers some insight when he points to divergences in perspectives between Washington and Beijing but may be overly limiting the ways he conceives of effects of culture and socialization. Likewise, the volume can go further in conceptualizing the various ways third parties such as regional actors and international organizations can affect U.S.-China ties, given that world politics is not just major powers going at each other—a fact both Chan and Allison recognize. Major power interactions simply do not occur in a vacuum. Such dynamics may reinforce competition as much as ameliorate them, but their effects await further clarification and explanation.

#### The idea we need to protect the Chinese people from their own tech is dumb and founded in sinotechnophobia

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The key point here is not to debate the pros and cons of these changes but to note that since Liberation (1949) and especially 1978, China has rapidly developed as an advanced technological society. This development is vital for independence and security but also a key source of global technological culture. This transformation is not confirmed solely by China’s advances in technologies, for example, e.g., quantum computing, artificial intelligence, green energy and space exploration, or social media. Rather, in tandem with China’s advanced social and political organization, we can note the widespread presence of the modern cogito–consciousness, all of which reflect industrial ratiocination, industrial production, industrial education and so on, and all of which are consistent with technological society [41, 51].

Western theorists have long debated the utopian and dystopian aspects associated with becoming a technological society. In the East, in many instances, modernity emerged at speed when possible to counter Western tech-supported imperialism [81]; but in the West, the development of technological society was always resisted by and in negotiations with traditional values and practices. Even in modern Western philosophy, the critical tradition has regarded technological advances as being mostly negative. Ellul’s critique and Heidegger’s nightmare have already been mentioned, but these were inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche, and before him, Søren Kierkegaard, who saw in ‘modern man’ an abomination of being [3, 18, 79]. In the post-war period, these concerns were expressed by the Frankfurt School, but also in Michel Foucault’s works, which equated modernity with totalizing systems of control, with an unrestrained biopolitics and governmentality manifesting in modern schools, hospitals, prisons and so on, all of which were driven by the psychological and physical discipline imposed by the modern market economy [55]. Like Nietzsche, Foucault romanticized certain aspects of Platonic and Stoic philosophy, while Kierkegaard and Ellul did something similar with Christianity—with Ellul going so far as to describe mankind in modern technological society as the “new demons,” as “mature insects that have nothing left to do but reproduce themselves and die” ([13] vii). In short, these theorists have had a profound influence on Western society, and all the more so because their critiques reflected the deep existential fears associated with Western modernity: these have included an Orientalist pride in the West for creating modernity, and the unease that this creation inescapably has always been a double-movement of the becoming and unbecoming of the West itself.

In China, however, a different critical tradition was established as a solution to the even bigger existential crisis of foreign domination. On the one hand, the proliferation of Marxism and especially Marxism-Leninism substantially normalized technological development as a historically necessary step for human progress, one that viewed technology and consciousness as advancing and converging as and through the state itself. On the other hand, this was not deeply at odds with Chinese tradition, particularly the Confucian tradition, one in which technique in the form of ritual (li) was to be perfected by the individual, whether the emperor, the gentleman, the father, as exemplars of the ritual that constituted an advanced state of being (e.g., see [50]). Thus, while some Chinese traditions certainly resisted development, China’s rapid advancement as a technological society finds accordance with its traditional and modern philosophical perspectives on human progress, and not just the existential necessity of closing the technology gap to establish and sustain sovereignty.

It’s in this context that we can view broad popular support for Chinese development as a technological society in China itself in terms of high rates of new technology adoption [39], popular support for scientific solutions to problems, and mass positive engagement in public policies that aim for social advances consistent with both individual and national transformations that are forward-reaching, tech-based and tech-oriented [70]—exemplified most recently by broad popular support for China’s “dynamic zero-covid policies” (dongtai qingling).

While the West worries over the pervasiveness of technology and the relatively unrestrained power and influence of big technology firms, while it worries over the erosion of traditional values, privacy, and so on, while such resistances have been most recently on display with broad pushbacks over attempts to formulate effective responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, we see the opposite in China. Broad popular support has greeted, effectively demanded and made possible dynamic zero-covid policies, along with the rapid development and deployment of zero-covid technologies [29]. This does not mean that Chinese people have liked the costs associated with the policies [78], but they have preferred the benefits over the absence of effective controls [35]. And before this, surveys indicate approximately 80% of respondents have supported the development and implementation of China’s “social credit system” (shehui xinyong tixi), although the system is still incomplete and some doubt it will achieve its stated objectives, or do so with reasonable risks to personal privacy [33].

To be fair, not all innovations are popular. For example, although it’s still early days in the development and roll-out of China’s new digital yuan (shuzi renminbi), anecdotal reports suggest less than enthusiastic receptions among the general public. Nevertheless, tech-oriented innovations are popularly understood as essential for improved governance, including anti-corruption efforts, poverty alleviation, and market management, and they are reinforced with popular regulations designed to limit the power of tech firms and harmful social effects associated with technology, like unhealthy screen times among school age children. Furthermore, big tech advances, like 5G, are celebrated, and names like Huawei are embraced as a matter of national pride, with domestic sales soaring in response to international rejections of the same. The key point here is that China’s actualization as a technological society that advances with technology is broadly popular, that it’s even valorized by Chinese theorists as consistent with the rise of an “intelligent civilization” (zhineng wenming), one in which both governance and daily life are substantially supported by big data, artificial intelligence and other forms of digitalization [20, 84], and consistent with Marxist theories of social progress [76].

This isn’t to say that there are no pushbacks, no traditional values opposing, or again, that we don’t see periodic attempts to regulate and dismantle some technologies and tech firms. This has happened quite publicly with new laws policies directed at digital monopolies and anti-trust practices undercutting fair competition and governance, as well as other developments considered harmful to social and individual well-being. This was observed in enforcements against Alibaba in 2021, with implications for other firms (in 2022, new policies were announced to ease some big tech restrictions to help bolster an economy battered by lockdowns, but this does not signal a significant reversal of capacity or direction). Broadly, these regulations coincided with new laws related to digital finance and cryptocurrencies, but also video gaming, including limiting inappropriate content and imposing strict limits on children’s playing times (2021). Those policies were paired that same year with strict limits directed at buke—after-school study programs—which along with video games were assessed as having reached a tipping point of negative health effects and declining standardized test scores. In fact, these were new attempts at earlier policies with similar goals, e.g., efforts to limit teachers from assigning students unregulated, “off-the-books” homework through social media (initiated in 2018, and reinforced in 2021).

Overall, these policies were responses to pressures building over many years in different sectors. It bears noting that in the case of policies affecting children, there had long been efforts, often quixotic, to reign in China’s intensely industrial model of education [15, 86]; but these were more fully addressed at the height of China’s response to the pandemic. There is no evidence to suggest these policies were advanced because of the pandemic, i.e., when it was clear that online schooling in lockdown locations along with pandemic related social restrictions had made children even more vulnerable to digital exploitation and alienation, although such fears were acknowledged by some (see, for example, Wang et al. [77], Teng et al. [73], and Jiang, Tong, and Chen [31]). And they stand in stark contrast with excessive gaming and increased digital-associated alienation affecting American children in the same period and others around the world [17, 58], and for which there were little to no public policy responses.

But from a holistic perspective, these actions were not contrary to China’s emergence as a technological society but consistent with efforts to manage the well-being of that society as a whole, one in which governmentality is not understood as a conflict between the externality of a state and party vs. the internality of a more authentic or liberated individual existence, but as the convergence of both as the same, and broadly consistent with shared thinking, goals and objectives. Ideally, this is what a technological society would do, or else risk being less of a society and less capable technologically. So while we can point to Heidegger and Foucault and others as being horrified by such developments or less dramatically, the semi-luddite tendencies sometimes observed in European societies today, in fact, China’s emergence as a technological society is not horrific to most Chinese—quite the opposite. This development connected, however, to the emergence in the West of a new Sinophobia and Sino(techno)phobia.

#### Realism is the true root cause of Wests response to China, not orientalism-doesn’t explain other “oriental” companies like Samsung not being pushed away

Gregory Moore 22[Gregory Moore, Professor of Global Studies and Politics at Colorado Christian University, "Huawei, Cyber-Sovereignty and Liberal Norms: China’s Challenge to the West/Democracies",6-3-2022, SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-022-09814-2, 1LEE]

There are several potential problems with this argument. First, establishing that fear is an independent variable is not easy. Despite the quality of their work generally speaking, the editors have not done the thick description necessary to establish this. Simply showing tough rhetoric, hawkish views on the US/Western/democratic side (which are indeed there), does not really do the job effectively. Second, we haven’t considered counterfactuals or ruled out other methods that might test our hypothesis or do a better job explaining the outcome we observe (the harsh US/Western policy toward Huawei) than the proposed independent variable, digital orientalism. Following on from this point, I would propose a consideration of the hypothesized independent variable, “China and Huawei pose credible threats to national security of the US and other democracies” as a way to understand the approach the US, Australia, the UK and others have taken toward Huawei.

Securitization provides a way of looking at this issue that is helpful in this case. As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde [3: 25] put it,

Securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects…The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed?

There can be no doubt that in the United States, Australia, India and other countries, Huawei’s 5G offerings have been securitized, and this is evident by the “discourse and political constellations” in those and other countries, as I’ve illustrated above. Yet why hasn’t this been the case in all countries? As Buzan et al. note, referencing the work of Arnold Wolfers [3: 30], security threats may be objective/real, or subjective/perceived, and where the twain meet or diverge is not always easy to ascertain. It is possible that A. China’s Huawei is acting as a threat in some countries and not in others. It’s also possible that B. China’s Huawei and its 5G are a threat wherever they operate but some countries don’t yet understand that or don’t believe it. It’s also possible that C. Huawei and its 5G are not a threat and have simply been socially constructed as a threat, needlessly securitized. The notion that digital orientalism is the reason for the securitization of Huawei and its 5G would line up with the last tack, or C.

The argument presented here, however, is that digital orientalism does not explain the US/Western/democratic response to China’s growing illiberal impact on global internet governance or its worrisome presence, via Huawei, in more and more national 5G internet infrastructure schemes. On the contrary, the hypothesis posed here is something like B. above, that real security concerns do, that the securitization of Huawei is not an irrational response to Huawei 5G because of 1. some of Huawei’s actions/track record, 2. the nature of its relations with the Chinese state, and 3. the track record or broader actions (now and in the past) of that Chinese state at home and abroad as it regards media freedoms, intellectual property theft, human rights problems, and more. Having said this, digital (or conventional) orientalism may be lurking in the background and exacerbating technological and political dynamics. I suspect it is. The editors are likely not incorrect in that sense, for certainly there is a sense that China represents a “digital other,” a “political other” and a “cultural other” for Westerners and Liberals in general, and the notion of digital orientalism may explain certain aspects of that. At the same time, the argument presented here is that a careful study of China’s practices in the cyber-realm, whether at home or abroad,Footnote9 make it clear that there are very clear security-centric reasons for concern about China’s and Huawei’s presence in 5G internet infrastructure construction, mobile phone handset production, and even Chinese apps like TikTok and WeChat, which India has banned, and both of which the Trump Administration tried but failed to ban in the US.

US, Australian, British, Swedish and other countries’ increasingly robust pushback against Huawei and other Chinese players in the construction of global 5G infrastructure can be easily understood by studying A. China’s cyber practices at home and abroad, and B. the impact they have on the security (and perceptions of security) of nations they work with. Very simply, those pushing back see what China is doing, they don’t like it, and they don’t want Chinese companies to have any major role in constructing telecommunications infrastructure inside their countries. This is because they believe they know what that will lead to, and they don’t believe that is good from their perspectives. If China/Huawei was a player like Nokia, Ericsson or Samsung, the US and these others would not be raising alarms. In fact, the US, Australia and UK have not been raising alarms about Nokia, Ericsson or Samsung, the other major players in 5G. Why? Is it digital orientalism? In fact, given that Samsung is Korean, one might expect the US to push back against Samsung, for it too is “oriental,” non-Western, following the logic of Said. We don’t really see that, however. South Korea is a democratic polity and a US ally, so there is no angst on Washington’s part, no concerns about security. Moreover, the South Korean government does not have a history of stealing US IPR, of spying on the US as China has been, or doing anything that could be considered a national security threat toward the US, so there has been no pushback from Washington in the face of Samsung’s growing presence in the US or in US 5G operations.

Some argue that the US simply refuses to yield the number one spot to anyone, whether in technology or in economic dominance. Yet if the US was pushing back against Huawei because the US wanted to be number one, because the US wanted to dominate, why wouldn’t the US fund AT&T, Apple, Google or someone else in the US to be number one? Why wouldn’t the US hinder the advances of Nokia, Ericsson and/or Samsung in the US and elsewhere? We don’t really see any of that, however.

Digital orientalism doesn’t really explain this, in this case. I will argue here that it’s because first, American thinkers do not think in such hierarchical terms as their Chinese counterparts do (they aren’t unified in an obsession with being number 1 as is the case with the Chinese state and its companies; see [18]. Second, the US is not pushing back against Huawei primarily because of market imperatives/motivations, but rather because of concerns about security and lack of trust in the Chinese state and Chinese companies that are subject thereto. The US trusts the leadership of Nokia, Ericsson and Samsung, and they don’t see their home governments (Finland, Sweden and South Korea, respectively) as bent on spying, stealing IPR and undermining free expression at home and increasingly around the world. It’s about the Chinese state’s very bad track record of stealing intellectual property, of suppressing free expression, of cyber-surveillance and hacking, of suppressing truth and suppressing dissidents – increasingly not only inside China but abroad as well.Footnote10 Pushing back against Huawei and China’s cyber-sovereignty model has become an existential fight for those who see things in the way I have depicted here. In a telling statement by former Obama National Security Advisor Susan Rice to Canada’s CBC about the security threat Huawei posed to Canada and others, Rice said,

It’s hard for me to emphasize adequately without getting into classified terrain how serious it is…It gives the Chinese the ability, if they choose to use it, to access all kinds of information. Civilian intelligence, military, that could be very, very compromising. So as much as I disagree with the Trump administration on a number of things, on this I believe they are right [15].

Given how much Rice was opposed to Donald Trump and almost all he stood for, her agreement with him on this issue is striking. It seems clear that this was no election-year posturing on the Trump Administration’s part, though that is how the Chinese government tends to frame it.Footnote11 Huawei’s building and operation of 5G networks in other countries poses serious challenges to the security of potentially any host-country, and what is being argued here is that this is the reason for the increasing push-back, the securitization moves, China and Huawei are facing as Huawei tries to expand its 5G operations abroad.

Toward the ends of explaining how and why Huawei 5G gets securitized in some places and not others, I think it is possible to take Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s securitization a bit further. I don’t see regional security complexes (a key factor in their work) at play in a prominent way here, because the array of countries that have aligned in opposition to Huawei are more diverse than any regional framework could accommodate, with Sweden, Australia, India, the UK and the US all saying no to Huawei, whereas Germany, South Korea, and Canada are keeping the doors open. The US, for example, has close allies on both sides of this digital divide, and there are members of China’s region/neighborhood who are on both sides of this divide as well, all of which is to say that neither alliance patterns or regional patterns clearly explain the digital divide over Huawei.

I think another concept found in Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s work [3] better explains it, with the help of an expansion of another of their concepts. The first concept referenced here is that of security constellations (p. 201). Buzan et al. define them as “a much wider concept than security complexes, reflecting as it does the totality of possible security interrelationships at all levels” (p. 201). They add, “security constellations will almost certainly generate a much fuller set of nonregional subglobal patterns (such as those created by the sets of countries that export copper or those countries vulnerable to seal-level rises” (p. 201–2). Considering the range of Buzan et al.’s “sectors” (ie, military, environmental, economic, societal and political sectors), it is not clear where one would locate cyber, however. Given that the work being referenced was published in 1998, it seems logical that two new sectors should be added to Buzan et al.’s sectoral framework, and this is the conceptual expansion referenced above: that of cyber and space sectors. While space as sector is yet relatively underdeveloped, cyber is a sector that has grown apace in recent years and should now be considered a sector in its own right, as might be evidenced by the addition of “Cyber Commands” and like agencies to the arsenals of many nations today, whereas none existed only a few short years ago. With the addition of a cyber sector and the interrelation of this sector with extant sectors like military, economic and political sectors, for example, it is clearer to see how a security constellation encompassing all of these might interplay so as to bring about the digital divide we’ve seen over Huawei’s participation in 5G network construction. For example, whereas Sweden does not have to worry about a direct military threat from China as it does from neighbor Russia, it does operate in a security constellation wherein China’s economic interests (and actions) and the nature of its political sector/system are such that Sweden perceives a threat. In the same way, whereas South Korea has a more immediate potential threat from China militarily (after all, S. Korea’s mortal enemy North Korea is China’s ally, and S. Korea’s ally the US is China’s chief adversary), it does not apparently view China (or at least Huawei) with as much trepidation as the US does. It may be that it doesn’t see its own interests as being as divergent from China’s as the US does. It may also be that its cool relationship with Japan for reasons of unresolved history puts it in closer ideational orientation to China (with which it shares some anti-Japanese historical angst) than, again, would be the case with the US. Cyber is just one part of a constellation of security interests between these many players and so a simple digital orientalist, geopolitical, economic or alliance-driven explanation alone does not really do justice to the broader complexity of interests and issues that drive issues or sectors like cyber.

## Alt

### T/L

#### **The squo solves and any alt fails**

Owen 12 [Owen, Roger, Roger Owen is the A.J. Meyer Professor of Middle East History at Harvard University and was previously the Director of the university’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies., 4-20-2012, "Edward Said and the Two Critiques of Orientalism," Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/edward-said-and-two-critiques-orientalism]//AA

Second, we need to continue the good work of combining training in languages, history, and culture with training in the social sciences begun in most American and European centers of Middle Eastern studies. One without the other is no longer enough — and is no longer seen to be enough. Third, the social sciences provide a necessary additive to works of analysis which operate simply at the level of discourse and the various ways this has been used to answer questions with little or no attention to what I would still want to call material reality. Last, but not least, and in answer to those critics who accuse Said-influenced social scientists of managing to avoid most of the important political and ideological issues of the moment, we now have the tools to make important contributions to such vital contemporary Middle Eastern subjects as military occupations, religious politics, the explosive growth of the Gulf port cities, and Islamic banking, not to mention the enormous impact of globalization, where a knowledge of the history of the region has to be combined with an ability to pick out and to describe those underlying structures, dynamics, and trajectories which define them now and will continue to do so in the future. All this is good news, and would certainly be good news to Edward Said himself. Given that the field of modern Middle East Studies is only some 50 years old, that it had to extract itself from the hold of a first generation of scholars who still saw the Middle East in very reductionist, ahistorical terms, and that it takes time to build up a core of experts versed in language, history, local knowledge, and the social sciences, we finally have a set of praiseworthy scholars. Conclusion It is important to see Edward Said’s work, and the mixed reception it received, in the round. This means reading Orientalism as carefully as its author would wish and then being able to understand its role as the first part of a project which required the construction of alternative methodologies as its complement. Inevitably, this alternative project proved to be much more difficult for reasons Edward himself could not anticipate and for which his own critique shares a small part of the blame. Nevertheless, viewed from the perspective of modern Middle East studies, the present and the future look surprisingly good, with the ever expanding production of highly skilled graduate students around the world well-supplied with the tools not just to make use of whatever data the field contains but also to use their knowledge of the various social science disciplines to challenge the conventional wisdom and the old paradigms which continue to stand in the way of a proper understanding of how Middle Eastern societies, economies, and political systems really work.

#### Said’s goal of Orientalism was to critique an existing system, not establish any sort of alternative.

Owen 12 [Owen, Roger, Roger Owen is the A.J. Meyer Professor of Middle East History at Harvard University and was previously the Director of the university’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies., 4-20-2012, "Edward Said and the Two Critiques of Orientalism," Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/edward-said-and-two-critiques-orientalism]//AA

Given the temper of these times, it was also natural that those early social science critics of Orientalist scholarship should band together in workshops around joint projects designed to employ what we identified as the German-style 19th century “critique” — both to expose the lack of real explanatory value in traditional Orientalism and to begin to provide what we took to be a more useful way of studying the modern Middle East. This included, among many other issues, an attempt to come to terms with the way in which not just the traditional academic Orientalists but also several of the founders of Western social science, most notably Marx and Weber, held Orientalist-type views concerning a fundamental difference between East and West. Furthermore, also in anticipation of Edward Said, we had begun to discuss the ways in which our own social science disciplines, anthropology in particular, played a major role in what Talal Asad called the “Colonial Encounter.” Edward Said himself was well aware of what we were attempting — via our Review of Middle East Studies — having had his attention drawn to it by Fred Halliday, a very important figure in my story. Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, while Edward could commend us for working, as he put it, in “disciplines not fields,” I do not think he had any real understanding of what practicing these disciplines actually involved. This was partly the result of his inclinations, character, and training. He was a humanist through and through, seeing the world via the optic of literature, music, and the arts, not by the use of supposedly value-free economics, political science, or sociology. Just as important, as he explained to me, he had come to the end of his year at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Palo Alto tired out by writing Chapters 1 and 2 and in such a hurry to finish that he raced through Chapter 3, “Orientalism now,” without either thinking through his argument as far as the relationship between Orientalism and the modern centers of modern Middle Eastern studies was concerned, or paying much attention to the alternatives which he left, clearly and specifically, to others. As he puts it in the book’s rushed, last few pages: … in conclusion, what of some alternative to Orientalism? Is this book an argument only against something, and not for something positive? And then, having spent a sentence mentioning a number of what he called “new departures,” including the work of my own group — called the Hull group after the venue of our first few workshops — he notes that he does not attempt to do … more than mention them or allude to them quickly. My project has been to describe a particular system of ideas, not by any means to displace the system of ideas, not by any means to displace the system with a new one.

### AT: retooling rhetoric alt

#### The alt recreates the epistemological failures they try to critique

Eun 18(Yong-Soo Eunm Yong-Soo Eun, PhD, is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Hanyang University, South Korea, and the Editor-in-Chief of the Routledge series, IR Theory and Practice in Asia. Yong-Soo is broadly interested in IR theory, pluralism in social and international studies, emotion, and the international politics of the Asia-Pacific region. His work has been published in scholarly journals including Review of International Studies, PS: Political Science and Politics, Perspectives on Politics, and The Pacific Review., 10-17-2018, "Opening up the debate over ‘non-western’ international relations," SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0263395718805401)**//BRownRice**

Criticisms At the same time, a number of empirical, epistemological, and normative criticisms have been raised against attempts to develop a Chinese IR theory and (by extension) ‘non-Western’ IR. Empirically, Asian IR are not fundamentally different from those of Europe, in the sense that anarchy, survival, and the balance of power have been the key operating principles of state-to-state interactions since the pre-modern period. For example, based on a detailed archive analysis of China’s foreign relations under the Song and Ming dynasties, Yuan-kang Wang concludes that in the ‘anarchical’ international environment at that time ‘Confucian culture did not constrain … [Chinese] leaders’ decisions to use force; in making such decisions, leaders have been mainly motivated by their assessment of the balance of power between China and its adversary’ (Wang, 2011: 181). This finding leads Wang to defend the theoretical utility of structural realism based on the Westphalian system. Epistemologically, too, critics point out that it is ‘unscientific’ to emphasise and/or incorporate a particular culture or the worldview of a particular nation or region into IR theory, for a legitimately ‘scientific’ theory should seek ‘universality, generality’ (Choi, 2008; Song, 2001). Mainstream (positivist) IR theorists and methodologists argue that IR studies ought to seek observable general patterns of states’ external behaviour, develop empirically verifiable ‘covering law’ explanations, and test their hypotheses through cross-case comparisons. For example, Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba make it clear that generality is the single most important measure of progress in IR, stressing that ‘the question is less whether … a theory is false or not … than how much of the world the theory can help us explain’ (King et al., 1994: 101, emphasis in original). From this perspective, any attempt to develop an indigenous IR theory, be it non-Western or Western, is suspect because it delimits the general applicability of theory. In the case of a Chinese IR theory, criticism of this kind can increasingly be found in studies by younger Chinese IR scholars. According to Xinning Song (2001: 68), Chinese scholars, especially younger ones who have studied in the West, think that it is ‘unscientific or unnecessary to emphasize the so-called Chinese characteristics’. A similar criticism can be found among Korean IR scholars in regard to attempts to build a ‘Korean-style’ IR theory (Cho, 2015). Critics of the ‘Korean School’ of IR frequently ask how can we make a distinctively Korean IR theory while trying to be as generalisable as possible? In Jongkun Choi’s (2008: 215) words, ‘any theorising based on Korea’s unique historical experiences must be tested under the principle of generality’. Normative criticisms of attempts to build a ‘non-Western’ IR theory highlight the relationship between power and knowledge. Critics point out that although theory-building enterprises from the perspective of the ‘non-West’ commonly begin by problematising Western-dominated IR, the ongoing scholarly practices and discourses associated with ‘non-Western’ IR can also entail (or reproduce) the same hierarchic and exclusionary structure of knowledge production, which can fall prey to particular national or regional interests. For example, in his discussion of Chinese visions of world order, William Callahan doubts the applicability of ‘Tianxia’. He claims that what the notion of Tianxia does is ‘blur’ the conceptual and practical ‘boundaries between empire and globalism, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism’. Rather than help us move towards a ‘post-hegemonic’ world, Tianxia serves to be a philosophical foundation upon which ‘China’s hierarchical governance is updated for the twenty-first century’ (Callahan, 2008: 749). Supporting this view, Ching-Chang Chen (2011: 1) argues that: re-envisioning IR in Asia is not about discovering or producing as many “indigenous” national schools of IR as possible. Scholars … must also recognise and resist the pitfalls of equating the mere increase of non-Western voices with the genuine democratisation of the field, if they are to live up to their responsibility to jointly construct a non-hegemonic discipline. In a similar vein, Josuke Ikeda (2011: 12–13) argues that ‘there needs to be a “post-Western” turn rather [than a] “non-Western” [one] … in order to address another kind of “Westfailure” in IR theory’. In short, critics argue that although it is our ‘responsibility’ to make IR more pluralistic and democratic, ‘most intellectual endeavors to construct non-Western IRT in Asia run the risk of inviting nativism’ (Chen, 2011: 16). Most recently, Andrew Hurrell (2016: 149–150) has added that although developing culturally specific ways of understanding the world ‘undoubtedly encourages greater pluralism’, attempts to do so can also lead to a national and regional ‘inwardness’ that works to reproduce the very ‘ethnocentricities’ that are being challenged.

### Anti-eurocentrism fails

#### **Anti-eurocentrism is flawed and unneeded – western-centrism’s role in IR has decreased exponentially**

Kuru 15(Historicising Eurocentrism and antiEurocentrism in IR: A revisionist account of disciplinary self-reflexivity, DENIZ KURU\*, sep 21 2015, page 352-353)**//BRownRice**

‘All scholars are Eurocentrics’: The limits of anti-Eurocentrism What can be seen as a major problem with critics of Eurocentric IR is their tendency to overstate the impact of Eurocentrism as an ideology by confusing it with a more geo-historically situated form of Eurocentric world order. Stated differently, anti-Eurocentrics do not differentiate in general between Eurocentrism as an ideology (one that sees Europe, or a more global West as the only active subject of world politics) and Eurocentrism as a picture of the world that derives from the significance of European powers at a certain point in time, basically from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. This perception leads the critics to exaggerate the extent of Eurocentrism in IR. Virtually all forms of analysis that give a prominent role to the European (and Western) actors in the global political order come to be seen as Eurocentric. Whenever a scholar chooses to focus on the significance of the European powers (or the impact of the West), [they are] targeted as Eurocentric.3 The extent of this problem becomes more visible when considering the work of anti-Eurocentric scholarship, which demonstrates an unending circle of intra-IR disciplinary blaming and bashing. For instance, feminist IR scholarship points to the prevalence of Eurocentric biases among their more mainstream colleagues.4 In turn, they are accused by Hobson of Eurocentrism. He sees in feminist IRʼs focus on women in the Third World ʻthe risk of returning us back into the Eurocentric cul-de-sac of rendering Eastern women as but passive victims of Western power, thereby stripping them of agencyʼ. 5 Postcolonialists criticise in turn the approach most closely associated with Hobsonʼs approach, that is, historical sociology for carrying Eurocentric features.6 Finally, postcolonialists are attacked by advocates of decolonising approaches who find the presence of Eurocentric positions in the work of the former.7 This inherent race to the bottom in the form of accusing others as Eurocentrics demonstrates that a mere proliferation of anti-Eurocentric analyses will not suffice to de-Eurocentricise IR. Otherwise, disciplinary self-reflexivity will be reduced to blaming others for Eurocentrism without turning to a broader contextualisation of and variation between Eurocentrisms. It should be evident that this would help us neither in reducing the actual impact of ideologically motivated Eurocentric analyses in the discipline nor in gaining a better understanding of our own positions and scholarly motives. A major aspect in this context concerns the differences between the continuing impact of European/Western influences in todayʼs world and the way in which Western-dominated power-knowledge connections of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are to a certain extent overcome. Although many scholars criticise IRʼs Eurocentrism for the close relations they find between knowledge (production) practices and the supposed power impact of the West, they overlook the extent to which the gradual decline in the Westʼs power has also changed these interactions. This means that one has to approach Eurocentrism in a more nuanced fashion so that the residual impact of the Western powersʼ relatively decreasing global significance can be recognised as the instantiation of a gradual process of de-Eurocentricisation that goes in line with a less Western, more post-Western world. Immanuel Wallerstein speaks of ʻanti-Eurocentric Eurocentrismʼ. According to him, this form of Eurocentric scholarship asserts either that Europe just interrupted others from doing what they were doing and did it herself, or that Europe did something which was just ʻa continuation of what others had already been doing for a long time, with the Europeans temporarily coming to the foregroundʼ. To overcome such anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism, scholars must ʻcease trying to deprive Europe of its specificity on the deluded premise that we are thereby depriving it of an illegitimate creditʼ. Wallerstein suggests that ʻ[w]e must fully acknowledge the particularity of Europeʼs reconstruction of the world because only then will it be possible to transcend it.’ 8 Following this assumption, even Hobsonʼs anti-Eurocentrism emerges as an instance of Eurocentrism, for he tends to look for non-Western origins in virtually all historical developments of the modern era, overlooking thus the extent to which the Western dominance in the nineteenth century made its previous interactions with the non-Western actors less relevant when thinking of Eurocentrism in that era.9 I turn to a detailed examination of Hobsonʼs approach after providing a more differentiated typology between various forms of Eurocentrism. As another example in which Wallerstein would have seen anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism, one can refer to Kerem Nişancıoğluʼs recent study on the peripheral role given to the Ottoman Empire in studies of capitalist development. He argues that IR ʻhas been built on largely Eurocentric assumptionsʼ with the Ottomans being ʻabsent, passive, or merely a comparative foil against which the specificity and superiority of Europe has been definedʼ. 10 His counterpoint is that the Ottoman Empire ʻwas arguably the most powerful actor in the Early Modern periodʼ. Based on his employment of Trotskyʼs theory of uneven and combined development, the combined impact of Ottoman strength and Europeʼs privilege of backwardness would lead the latter (especially its northwestern parts, that is, England) to gain ʻthe geopolitical space required to conduct modern state-buildingʼ. Thus, Nişancıoğlu presents a revision of the historical sociology of international relations, which he accuses of being too concentrated on European history. The point of contention is about conditions affecting the birth of modern capitalism. However, it is possible to see this as another issue, one that is researchable in a historical framework without accusations of Eurocentrism. Nişancıoğlu himself is careful to add that his goal is not ʻto argue that capitalismʼs origins were entirely extra-Europeanʼ nor to ʻseek to substantially diminish the centrality or uniqueness of Europe in this processʼ. 11 These are big caveats that show that even self-declared non-Eurocentric accounts recognise Europeʼs specific role in the emergence of the modern world order. Hence, it becomes possible to reject Nişancıoğluʼs general critique of IRʼs Eurocentrism, for his own work illustrates that the broader assumptions of IR still hold with regard to Europeʼs dominant role in the emergence of modern capitalism and the international order associated with it.

### Asian Futurism fails

#### Asian futurity gets coopeted by the same neoliberal contradictions it tries to overcome

Bahng 15 (Aimee Bahng | “The Cruel Optimism of Asian Futurity and the Reparative Practices of Sonny Liew’s Malinky Robot” | *Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media* pg 163-165 | DOA: 7/17/2022 | SAoki)

The cover of Kishore Mahbubani’s 2008 publication The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East presents readers with what seems to be the global sign for financial growth: skyscrapers under construction. Cranes perch atop every tower, suggestive of the “all-at-once-ness” of growth in Asia. The illuminated construction site stretching into the night sky highlights the unrelenting pace of growth, which proceeds even as the rest of the world sleeps. The scene is a familiar one, prefigured by the race for the tallest building that ran across parts of Asia (Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan) in the early 2000s. 1 But the unpainted, all white structures feel eerily hollow and decontextualized. There’s no sign of the human laborers who welded and wired these structures. The lot is all but empty, with the exception of one nondescript car parked in the foreground. This scene of speculative building— construction predicted but not contracted to sell—feels like an already haunted future, in which “New Asia” has become an empty lot, evacuated of its denizens and prepared to signify the sheer potential of capital. Published amid the financial crisis of 2008, Mahbubani’s book, as well as his Financial Times declaration of a realizable Asian Century that serves as this essay’s epigraph, excite what Alan Greenspan once called “irrational exuberance.” Uttered in a speech Greenspan gave in 1996, in his capacity as chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, the phrase characterized the “unduly escalated asset values” of Japan’s economic bubble. The next day, Tokyo’s stock market fell sharply, closing 3 percent down, and Greenspan’s speech largely presaged the Asian financial crash a year later. The extent to which economic projections hang on the words of figureheads like Alan Greenspan demonstrates how such speculations work as performative speech acts that call the future into being. Similarly, the optimism Mahbubani announces in forward-looking, prophetic tones (“optimism will deliver the Asian Century”), affectively structures speculative investment in Asian futures. This vision of the new Asian hemisphere, colonized by empty high-rises reaching toward limitless horizons and built by deterritorialized workers, projects a future of automated speculative building, fueled by investment hungry banks. If Greenspan and Mahbubani both grasp how their respective declarations of pessimism and optimism will affect the global economy, they do so with two different Asias in mind: Japan of the late 1990sand Singapore at the dawn of a “new Asia” in 2008. 2 The so-called Asian Century, toward which Mahbubani’s optimism strains, functions as a largescale speculative fiction spawned from neoliberal fantasies that capitalize on a literary genre’s already problematic investments in techno-Orientalism. In their 1995examination of techno-Orientalism, David Morley and Kevin Robins call attention to U.S. and European fantasies of Japan and its shift in those imaginaries in the 1980s from an exotic playground to a land of emotionless automatons. Perhaps epitomized by Western dystopian cyberpunk such as Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982) and William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984), techno-Orientalism figures the Japanese as “unfeeling aliens; they are cyborgs and replicants. But there is also the sense that these mutants are now better adapted to survive in the future”(170). While Morley and Robins understand techno-Orientalism as primarily born out of Western anxieties about Japan’s challenge to U.S. economic hegemony, they also suggest more specifically how techno-Orientalism arises just as Japan emerges as “the largest creditor and the largest net investor in the world” (153). What Morley and Robins never fully develop, and what I want to explore in more depth here, is this coordinated turn toward Asian futures in both financial and cultural forms of speculation. Mathematical models of probability and investment strategies based on extrapolation are forms of speculative fiction that project finance capitalism’s visions of futurity onto the world. Interdisciplinary scholarship from the past two decades has pointed to the performative aspects of economic speculation (MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu), the sociological systems of financial markets (Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger), the impact on subjectivity of financial instruments such as derivatives and debt bundling (LiPuma and Lee), and the “financialization of daily life” (Martin). Because speculative economies rely ever more on rhetorical tools and narrative strategies to explain and market the practice of trading on futures and securities, financial speculation and speculative fiction both participate in the cultural production of futurity, and futurity becomes the arena in which new subject formations emerge. Does techno Orientalism register anxieties about finance capitalism, or does finance capitalism use techno-Orientalism as a basis for its extrapolations of futurity? I emphasize the co-constitutive relationship between the cultural production and financial worlding of Asian futurity. A peculiar question arises then, when Asian economic and political architects themselves participate in the projection of Asian futurity, all the while drawing on a techno-Orientalist toolkit. I argue that critical analysis of the discursive site of Asian futurity reveals points of contradiction in American neoliberalism as it travels that have to do with earlier forms of racial and colonial subjugation providing the scaffolding for the architecture of neoliberalism itself.3 As Asia develops its own neoliberal rhetoric, articulating its own futurity poses certain problems that necessitate a disavowal of the racism of techno-Orientalism. What stands in to “smooth” that difficulty is the heteronormativity techno-Orientalism always espoused that Asian futurity posits anew as part of its road map, capitalizing on aspirational teleologies, valuations of privatized worth, and nationalisms consolidated through processes of racialization. I focus my investigation on techno-Orientalism’s role in the production ofa global neoliberal subject in contemporary Singapore, where a tech economy adopts and adapts localized versions of seemingly universalized notions of “the good life.” Building on Lauren Berlant’s theorization of “cruel optimism,” this essay levies a critique of “the Asian Century” as imagined by economists around the world. It argues that a revisionist Asian futurity needs to intervene in the neoliberal orientations of “the good life” and, in the face of foreclosed futures, open possibilities of what Eve Sedgwick has called “reparative practices.”

#### Sinofuturism merely flips a Western binary of either a China stuck in the past or one stuck in the future – that denies China the agency to ever challenge the destruction of their coevalness and instead perpetuates a techno-orientalist fantasy about an exotic futuristic China.

de Seta ‘20 [Gabriele; Gabriele de Seta is a digital anthropologist and sociologist specialising in everyday digital culture in the Chinese speaking world, and known for his contributions to digital ethnographic methodology. He works at the University of Bergen.; Spring 2020; “Sinofuturism as inverse orientalism: China ’ s future and the denial of coevalness”; https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/64576870/de\_Seta\_\_Gabriele\_-\_Sinofuturism\_as\_inverse\_orientalism-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1658090638&Signature=dJJhqJ9brfAErvQgJ8Qmg91o6zqUFaj4iUOh0U8Y2g6hThQuk6I-yJzspcXLG6mOALlSPUspQOysbGtEbbwOUML0~8bODFitjRxjE2pnFT5hgwYQY1~-evsUcIDWHXj2BiKD11b6sCVc-PtrrXez59qu8dP5dNp0i7Mrx8dCOsvebHAMCJH8JTgNDJqDkQmelC-Z15GJbLp6q96mgZ1NI~sIpEHX8b8r3lj7ePLzWEb9Q62moKWHi6bHWaxZgf1vhsYgo5bubU1QCLsY2WJVsuY90K723413We7Guhs7rOw4KjKWeyEf3HjtaOlHyv5NA~gCcVDcAgrxMjb7bEBXUw\_\_&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA; accessed 7-17-2022; AH]

This genealogy of temporal othering evidences how both sinofuturism and technoorientalism are not merely culpable of propagating exoticizing fantasies about the future in China or other Asian contexts, but also responsible for perpetuating a more generalized denial of coevalness. In contrast with established orientalist tropes and with more recent liberal-democratic varieties of “sinological orientalism” (Vukovich), China is no longer deemed to be trapped in its atemporal pastness or condemned to eventually synchronize with modernity: instead, it already inhabits the future, arrives from it, or beckons a Chinese mode of futurity with global implications. In all these variants, sinofuturist imaginations deny China the possibility of challenging and negotiating representation in the coeval present staked out by Western knowledge production. The future is for sinofuturists what the past was for orientalists: a foil for steering representation by denying coevalness. The legitimacy of sinofuturism is premised on a parallelism with other emerging articulations of futurity: the comparative approach proposed by Armen Avanessian and Mahan Moalemi, for example, juxtaposes it with Afrofuturism, gulf futurism and other ‘ethnofuturisms’, highlighting the novel emergence of futureoriented imaginaries from non-Western contexts. While this approach cautions that futuristic articulations “outside of the west and across the Global South and other former peripheries can also evolve into neo-colonial tendencies” (Avanessian et al. 9), it also glosses over a more fundamental problem of serializing ethnic or national futurisms: their reference to the future might be the only contact point between otherwise radically different aesthetic and ethical programs—something that the history of Italian futurism glaringly evidences. Even Lawrence Lek’s artwork Sinofuturism (1839-2046 AD), which has become a defining reference for this term, repeatedly reaches for a common tactical repertoire among “minority movements which share an optimism about speed, velocity, and the future as a means to subvert the institutions of the present” (Lek). As proven by Afrofuturism, movements that upend hegemonic and colonial temporal frameworks are fundamental to reclaiming representational agency against the denial of coevalness. But in order to do so, they have to organically emerge from the periphery of Western time, rather than be conjured as part of technoorientalist fantasies. Instead, while the post-digital exotic pastiches of sinofuturism have circulated enough to consolidate into a recognizable aesthetic appropriated and subverted by local electronic musicians and new media artists, it is their less self-aware and more sensational variety that continues to find currency in popular representations of China. The introductory chapter of William A. Callahan’s China Dreams: 20 Visions of the future, aptly titled “China is the future,” offers a striking example of this banal brand of sinofuturism: It’s an exciting time to be Chinese. While in the West the first decade of the 21st century was defined by pessimism due to 9/11, the Iraq War, and the Great Recession, Chinese people are very optimistic that the 21st century will be the “Chinese century.” The fruits of China’s three decades of rapid economic growth are there for all to see: by 2010, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had the fastest computer in the world and the smartest students in the world, and it was enthusiastically entering the space age—just as the United States was retiring its fleet of Space Shuttles. (Callahan 1) This book’s first paragraph strings together many of the tropes highlighted above: national identity, the idea of a Chinese century, the PRC’s economic growth, and the post-reform developmental leapfrogging indexed by the trifecta of computational primacy, academic talent and space exploration, all measured against rusty yardsticks left over from the Cold War era. To sum up: sinofuturism responds to a lack of engagement with China’s future in both academic expertise and popular discussions of the country. It does so provocatively, by speculating on possible future configurations of wildly different aspects of Chinese history, culture and society, juxtaposing technological developments and traditional customs, global trends and local phenomena, political systems and material forces. At the same time, sinofuturism draws on— and at times directly reproduces—the tropes and narratives of techno-orientalism, reducing China to the last in a series of East Asian countries investing resources to accelerate industrialization and informatization and thus threatening the Western grip on technological innovation and transnational supply chains. The historical superimposition of techno-orientalism with popular culture genres like cyberpunk offers a convenient route for sinofuturism to find success as an aesthetic repertoire that is legible across contexts: outside China, it reacts with the mixture of fascination and anxiety for the illegibility and scale of China’s rise; inside China, it lends itself to the self-orientalizing celebration of national success. But this should not obfuscate its main operation. Sinofuturism, like techno-orientalism, operates as a denial of coevalness. In being largely articulated from the outside as an interpretive discourse, it posits some sort of equivalence between China and the future: China is the future, China comes from the future, the future will come from China, and so on. These proclaimations are as enticing as they are suspect, for they deploy the future as a way of deferring participation in contemporariness. The future functions exactly as the past does in orientalist arguments: as a temporality through which otherness can be safely managed and problematic interactions steered away from. If the locus of Said’s orientalism was the Hejaz region, “a locale about which one can make statements regarding the past in exactly the same form (and with the same content) that one makes them regarding the present” (Said 235), the loci of sinofuturism are the skylines of Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Chongqing, ready to be inscribed with claims about the future. Sinofuturism is a reverse orientalism—an orientalism operating its denial of coevalness through the attribution of futurity

1. Hughes, Langston. “Wait.” Chapter Outlines. Box 304, Folder 4998. Langston Hughes Papers. Beinecke [↑](#footnote-ref-1)